Japanese Worldviews, Ideologies, and Foreign Aid Policy by Shannon, Richard Warren
University of Denver 
Digital Commons @ DU 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
1-1-2008 
Japanese Worldviews, Ideologies, and Foreign Aid Policy 
Richard Warren Shannon 
University of Denver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shannon, Richard Warren, "Japanese Worldviews, Ideologies, and Foreign Aid Policy" (2008). Electronic 
Theses and Dissertations. 592. 
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/592 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
 
JAPANESE WORLDVIEWS, IDEOLOGIES, 













The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies 
 








In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 














Advisor: Joseph S. Szyliowicz 
© Copyright 2008 by Richard W. Shannon 
 





For my parents, Warren and Jean Shannon, whose love and continuing 
support enabled me to complete the project, and for Suzuki Miyoko, who first 
showed me the beauty, sensitivity and love of the Japanese people when I 
studied in Kyoto as a young student. 
 ii 
JAPANESE WORLDVIEWS, IDEOLOGIES, 













The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies 
 








In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 



















This project studies the ideational factors influencing Japanese foreign aid 
policy. It builds on previous research in political science on perception and 
foreign policy decision-making, Japanese political economy, economic and 
technological development, foreign aid, and in anthropology on perception, 
worldview, and international development.  
The main goal of the research is to answer the question of how Japan’s 
historical experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations (and 
key leaders’ views of those areas) from 1850 to 1945 have influenced current aid 
policies. Second, the project aims to answer whether the Japanese development 
concepts of “modernization,” internationalization and translative adaptation 
accurately reflect Japan’s own experience. Third, the project asks how spirituality 
and religion may be influencing current aid policies.  
In the research, I review key contexts of Japan’s historical experience 
from 1850 to 1945 in several important areas. I also study the beliefs and 
worldviews (cognitive frameworks) of seven key Japanese leaders for the same 
period: Fukuzawa Yukichi, Mori Arinori, Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Kato 
Hiroyuki, Yanagita Kunio, and Emperor Hirohito. I analyze these historical 
experiences and leaders’ views through analytical concepts and lenses from 
political science, anthropology, and economics, in three main areas: development, 
technology, and cognition.  
 iv 
Among my key findings are that there is much continuity between Japan’s 
prewar culture of politics and the postwar system, including examples and ideas, 
which shape the policy environment in which Japan’s aid operates. Many of these 
are negative in nature, and some are ideas based on Japan’s own development 
experience. Several key lessons emerge, including the importance of: 1) a strong 
civil society to prevent abusive politics for the achievement of Japan’s national 
interests, whether in its prewar politics or the current aid system; 2) a strong, 
effective state for encouraging successful development; 3) Japan’s development 
experience for other regions (if carefully applied); and 4) the concept of 
translative adaptation, the idea that each nation’s development must be 
customized for its own conditions and experiences. I conclude that Japan needs 
better consideration of ground level factors in its assessments of ODA policy and 
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Introduction: Research Problem 
 
 
 Over the last century, Japan amazed the world with its economic development 
and technology, and initiated the world's largest foreign aid budget in 1989.  Political 
science and economics have generated much knowledge about various aspects of 
Japanese technology, development and foreign aid, but until recently, there has been 
relatively little anthropological exploration of these phenomena. This project helps to fill 
that gap by surveying the broad contexts of Japan's experience with these areas from 
1850 to 1945, examining the historical and ideological antecedents of Japanese foreign 
aid during the pre-aid period, from the dawn of Japan’s modern age (the point of the 
restoration of Japan’s open relations with the whole world) to just before the start of 
Japan’s aid programs in the aftermath of the nation’s defeat in World War II.  
Understanding this background will help us better comprehend what Japan’s massive aid 
                                                
1 Note on Japanese names and pronunciation of the Japanese language: throughout the main body of this 
dissertation, when referring to Japanese names, I list them in the Japanese order, with family name listed 
first, and personal name second, i.e. Tanaka Hiroshi. When listing Japanese names in footnotes and the 
bibliography, however, the American order has been followed. Guide for pronouncing certain vowels in 
Japanese: the use of the following symbol over the letter o (ô), creates a double length vowel.  For example, 
instead of saying keimo, where the o is said for one beat, one says keimô, with the o pronounced for two 
beats, like “keimoh.”  This is also true for the following vowels as well: a (becomes â), i (becomes î), u (û), 
and e (ê). 
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program does, and why. My aim is to take a sounding of some of the most important 
historical trends and contexts surrounding Japan’s experience with technology, 
development and foreign relations, and the views of several important leaders about those 
trends from 1850 to 1945, to try to understand their evolution over time, and finally, their 
relationship with contemporary Japanese aid policy. An understanding of Japanese aid, 
within a historical view of foreign policy and ideas of development, will also greatly 
enrich our understanding of contemporary globalization processes.2 Cultural 
anthropology3 and political science are ideal, complementary approaches for this work. 
Using these disciplines, issues as diverse as technonational ideologies, development, 
policy, and cultural relations can be assessed over time.4  
 In the first section of this chapter I introduce key concepts that underlie the 
research, including development, technology, worldview and related cognitive concepts. I 
also discuss the value of studying (leaders’) worldviews for connecting history and 
policy, the centrality of religion and spirituality in worldview issues and their relation to 
Japanese aid, and the influence of contexts on worldviews and the key themes of the 
research. Next I consider how to link ideologies, history and policy outcomes, and how 
Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations influences its 
                                                
2 By this, I mean globalization in the form of foreign aid emanating from a non-Western source: Japan.  For 
more on the types of globalization flowing from Japan, see Harumi Befu and Sylvie Guichard-Anguis, 
Globalizing Japan: Ethnography of the Japanese Presence in Asia, Europe, and America (London: 
Routledge, 2001.  
3 Within broader anthropology, I am also using some concepts drawn from two subfields, applied and 
cognitive anthropology. Applied anthropology refers to anthropology put to use to solve human problems. 
Historically, applied anthropology is the branch of anthropology that has investigated the issue of 
international economic development the most extensively. Cognitive anthropology features several 
theoretical viewpoints that are helpful for this study. See the definition of cognitive anthropology in the 
Glossary.  
4 See the discussion of technonationalism as ideology later in this chapter. I thank Peter Van Arsdale, 
University of Denver, for several of these insights. 
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current aid policy. To answer this, I apply several important Japanese concepts of 
development and technology to Japan’s own experience. Throughout the first section, I 
gradually introduce the three main research questions and working hypothesis of the 
project, which relate to the subjects of how Japan’s experience with technology, 
development and foreign relations have affected today’s aid policies, if certain Japanese 
development concepts accurately reflect Japan’s experience with development and 
technology, and how spirituality has affected Japan’s aid. I argue that Japan’s experience 
with these areas has indeed affected its aid.  
 In the remaining sections of the chapter, I review relevant literatures, discuss 
my methodology and important contributions of the research. The key literatures relevant 
to the research, especially in anthropology and political science, include social science 
theory, work on linking ideology, history and policy, and research on Asian development, 
Japan’s economic and technological development, its foreign aid policy, and the 
intersection of religion, international affairs, and development. In the section on research 
methodology and analysis, I review my choice of the leaders studied, data collection, and 
data analysis. In the final section I review the contributions of this research to the fields 
of international studies, to consideration of historical, cultural, and religious factors in 
Japanese aid, and to the identification of human and ground level effects in international 
relations. The primary theoretical paradigm for this project will be postpositivism, which 
builds on the deterministic, naturalistic approach of positivism.5 
 At this point, we do not adequately understand the historical and cultural 
backgrounds of Japanese aid, subjects that have been studied relatively little. We also 
                                                
5 See Positivism and Postpositivism in the Glossary section. 
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need to strengthen the contribution of anthropological research to such issues.  The 
project’s topical framework focuses on Japanese foreign aid and development.  The 
“Japanese” (or “Asian”) model of development has had a massive impact on other Asian 
nations, and they have tried to emulate it.  Japan is the first case of a non-Western 
country to “successfully” industrialize.  Development has been a hot topic of 
investigation by anthropologists, since the 1980s and even earlier.  Perhaps 
anthropologists should be attracted to the Japanese case, but while many study 
development “failures”6 in other regions, few have considered the significance of this 
seminal case and model.7 In this project, I define development as, first, an increase in a 
society’s capacity for industrial production and the products of capitalism, and movement 
toward being a “modern” society.  Second, it means improving quality of life, the 
standard of living, and eliminating or relieving poverty.8  It also includes “attempts to 
[build] …local capacity, and [encourage] …local participation and decision-making.  
Development almost always involves multiple groups, and therefore, multiple cultural 
perspectives.”9 Another key concept under study here, technology, I define as tools, 
knowledge, learning and information that people use to live and survive. It may also be 
                                                
6 In this project, I use quotation marks in several cases: 1) to signify a direct quote; 2) to denote a somewhat 
questionable use of the term concerned, as in this example; 3) to indicate a judgment about the given issue 
that is controversial, unconventional, or not absolutely settled; or 4) to indicate a meaning of the term that 
is figurative. 
7 One of the few pioneers of anthropological research of Japanese foreign aid and development is Kikuchi 
Yasushi, professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University in Tokyo. For an 
example of his research, see his “Development Anthropology: Theoretical Perspectives,” in The Global 
Practice of Anthropology, eds. Marietta L. Baba and Carole E. Hill (Williamsburg, Va.: Dept. of 
Anthropology, College of William and Mary, 1997), 199-228. For a brief treatment of the role of 
anthropology in Japanese foreign aid policy, see Makio Matsuzono, “International Cooperation Activities 
and Anthropology: Problems in Japan’s Context,” Technology and Development 14 (2001), 5-11. 
8 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development", Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in 
Lesotho (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), 15, 55. 
9 Riall W. Nolan, Development Anthropology: Encounters in the Real World (Boulder, Colo: Westview 
Press, 2002), 309. 
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seen as an interconnected system of tools and knowledge used in a society or economy to 
accomplish purposes in daily life and work.10 
 One way I seek to understand Japan’s experiences with technology and 
development is through looking at key leaders’ worldviews.11 In a recent landmark study, 
theologian and philosopher David Naugle traces the roots of the worldview concept in 
philosophy, theology, and the sciences, concluding that worldview has had a crucial role 
in modern thought, is one of the most basic modern intellectual notions, and has extreme, 
if not the greatest, cultural importance.12 Studying a topic of international relations like 
foreign aid in a holistic fashion like this, through the concept of worldview, should 
generate new, significant insights. For example, how have the worldviews of key leaders 
affected Japan’s aid policies? Looking at leaders’ worldviews is key for this purpose. 
 Political scientist Carol Lancaster shares this view. She argues that among 
various factors in domestic politics that influence a donor’s aid policies,13 worldview is 
among the most important: 
There are several types of ideas,14 shared by significant portions of the public and 
political elites in aid-giving countries that can influence aid. Most fundamental are 
what some scholars have called “worldviews”—widely shared values (based on 
culture, religion, ideology) about what is right and wrong. These worldviews 
themselves are the product of a society’s history as well as major events and trends 
affecting its population. In terms of foreign aid, these might involve a view that all 
                                                
10 This definition is largely anthropological. See the several treatments of technology in the Glossary. 
11 The key keaders whose views I study are Fukuzawa Yukichi, Mori Arinori, Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata 
Aritomo, Kato Hiroyuki, Yanagita Kunio, and Emperor Hirohito. For more details on these leaders, see 
Chapters 3 and 7.  
12 David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans Pub, 
2002), 344-345.  
13 The chief domestic political factors that Lancaster examines in her 2007 comparative study of foreign aid 
in five countries (the United States, Japan, France, Germany and Denmark) are ideas, interests, political 
institutions, and aid organizations (how “…governments organize themselves to manage their aid”). See 
Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 18. 
14 See Lancaster’s definitions that immediately follow.  
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human beings have a right to liberty or a right to a minimum subsistence or that 
individuals (or families) should be self-reliant and responsible to the extent possible 
for their own well-being. Worldviews give rise to “principled beliefs” or norms—
“collective expectations about the proper behavior for a given identity.”15  
 
The three main types of ideas that Lancaster identifies here are: 1) worldviews, 2) causal 
beliefs, and 3) principled beliefs or norms.16 
 Lancaster further argues that these norms are often framed based upon 
fundamental values, which in turn can give rise to different types of policy outcomes. In 
Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (2007), she presents case 
studies from five different countries where “…aid-giving was framed and reframed in 
terms of different basic worldviews with very different outcomes vis-à-vis aid 
expenditures.” This, in turn, relates to another type of idea, what Lancaster calls “causal 
beliefs,” in this case, beliefs about what types of policies result in successful 
development.17 Lancaster finds that different worldviews and beliefs may bring different 
(aid) policy outcomes in different societies.18 For example, Lancaster concludes that 
Japan’s weak state-society tradition has limited its development of strong relief and 
development NGOs, contrary to the situation in most of Europe and North America.19  
 Regarding ideas, based mainly on her concepts of worldview and principled 
beliefs, in her study Lancaster asks two questions: 1) how basic values about the duties of 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 18-19. 
17 Ibid., 19. Causal beliefs seem to be related to what anthropologists call cultural logics, which means 
people’s unspoken assumptions that underlie their worldviews, especially about global phenomena such as 
economic development. See cultural logics in the Glossary section.  
18 Ibid. For example, Lancaster argues that beliefs that government aid is inappropriate and usually 
ineffective have resulted in criticisms by the political right of foreign aid programs in the United States. 
Strong norms of social solidarity and social democracy have led to strong public support for ODA 




the wealthy to aid the poor, and about the role of the state in those duties, influence 
foreign aid’s purposes in different nations, and 2) how widely held beliefs about the role 
of the state in society influence the presence of civil society organizations, which can also 
influence the purposes of ODA.20 These issues connect to cultural notions of charity, 
duty, and giving, and about the role of religion and of charitable, often religious, 
institutions, in those processes. Many of these views arise from religious and spiritual 
influences and worldviews. We will note several of these issues in Chapter 2. In this 
research, I am mainly dealing with worldviews and causal beliefs (cultural logics), not 
principled beliefs. I am particularly interested in the views and beliefs of important 
leaders in the Japanese case, the presuppositions under those beliefs, and how both have 
influenced Japanese aid policy outcomes. That is partly how I connect micro- and macro-
issues and levels of analysis. I am not really interested in the collective expectations in 
Japan about what proper behavior should be pursued (the concept of “principled 
beliefs”). 
 I define image as the basic ideas and pictures in our minds about reality; how 
we organize these ideas and pictures in our minds about reality and the world around us. 
In anthropology, Michael Kearney calls images fundamental, general perceptions and 
concepts of reality that together form a worldview, while political scientist Martha 
Cottam defines images as “perceptual filters” or “cognitive organizing devices” we use to 
conceptually organize our worldview or conception of the environment.21 Images are 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
21 Michael Kearney, World View (Novato, Calif: Chandler & Sharp, 1984), 47; Martha L. Cottam, Images 
and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 10; and 
Martha L. Cottam, “Recent Development in Political Psychology,” in Contending Dramas: A Cognitive 
Approach to International Organizations, eds. Martha Cottam and Zhiyu Shi (New York: Praeger, 1992), 
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sometimes considered in both political science and anthropology to be subcomponents of 
a worldview, and important in a worldview’s basic formation.22 In this research, I define 
worldview as a set of pictures and ideas about the world, or a certain part of or thing in 
the world, that mostly makes sense, but which may not be totally correct. Here, 
worldview is essentially a cognitive framework about a certain topic or subject.23 It 
includes complicated pictures about the world and how it works, based on deep, 
previously held beliefs. What people and political actors see and believe affects what they 
do.24 Cultural logics are the unspoken, unconscious, shared, frequently local assumptions 
                                                                                                                                            
3. The anthropological sense of image relates to the basic perceptions people hold, while the political 
science sense stresses how images function as perceptual filters.  In their study of images, political 
scientists and anthropologists have usually emphasized analysis of smaller variables, rather than larger 
theoretical or cognitive frameworks.  I also analyze smaller bits of information, but continually seek to 
identify the larger worldview(s) into which the images fit. What kind of images do leaders have of the basic 
variables under study?  Into what larger frameworks do they fit? How do they function as perceptual filters 
or organizing devices? I will examine images as both basic perception and perceptual filter, and seek to 
understand their larger frameworks. This can be done for any domestic or international issue. 
22 If one examines how anthropology and political science treat worldview, one sees that the former 
emphasizes a more holistic view, while the latter stresses a more specialized view of how a political actor’s 
perception of the world affects his/her understanding of events, uses of information, decisions, policies, and 
actions. Worldviews provide a mostly coherent framework for the numerous images people hold, and are 
relevant for any domestic or international issue. 
23 The concept of worldview that I use for this research is not the approach customary to anthropology. My 
concept is based on both political science and anthropological approaches. I treat worldview mainly as a 
cognitive framework for a person’s beliefs on a particular topic, not as the overarching, almost 
cosmological framework that most anthropologists do. As such, one might argue that the worldviews I 
construct seem arbitrary. They may seem so, since I have not constructed or discerned them on the basis of 
firsthand ethnographic interviews with living informants. Since the actors researched are dead, I cannot 
crosscheck my findings with follow-up interviews. However, these worldviews are not arbitrary. They are 
formed from historical data collected from and about the attitudes, beliefs, writings, and actions of 
significant historical actors from Japan, gathered from the most relevant sources available, and based on a 
series of systematic steps. My concept of worldview is based on careful reflection of relevant aspects of the 
topic from anthropology, political science, and historical study on the concept since its origination in 
Germany several centuries ago. It is not arbitrary. 
24 Here is a slightly longer version of my definition of worldview, drawn from anthropology and political 
science, used for this study: a cognitive framework or a “…a set of images and assumptions about the 
world…” (or a certain part of or thing in the world); “… mostly coherent, … though not always accurate” 
(Kearney quoted in Naugle, World View, 242; Michael Kearney, The Winds of Ixtepeji; World View and 
Society in a Zapotec Town [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972], 43).  It includes complex 
cognitions and preconceptions of the world and how it works, based on prior assumptions (Cottam, Images 
and Intervention, 10; Michael T. Hayes, The Limits of Policy Change: Incrementalism, Worldview, and the 
Rule of Law [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2001], 8).  Interaction between policymakers’ 
10 
 
and cultural patterns beneath a people’s worldviews about, and responses to, global 
phenomena like economic development.25 So in this research, images are the basic bits of 
perception that together form a cognitive framework called worldview. Lying underneath 
the worldview framework are deeply held assumptions and cultural patterns of belief that 
are called cultural logics. If people are interviewed, they can state their images about any 
subject. A researcher can also construct a tentative worldview framework for any 
informant if s/he has gathered enough data on the persons’ images of a certain topic.26 
There is no easy way that a researcher can easily uncover an informant’s cultural logics, 
since they are deep, normally unexpressed assumptions that underlie more surface 
beliefs. They must be philosophically inferred from data already gathered on images and 
worldviews. Nevertheless, investigating topics in a cognitive, holistic manner like this 
can yield rich results. 
                                                                                                                                            
worldviews and environments affects their policy judgments [and actions] (Martha L. Cottam, Foreign 
Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition [Boulder: Westview Press, 1986], 23, 26, 50).  The 
behavior of individuals is shaped by how their worldview defines the world’s order, its political [and other 
types of] organization, and the actions, views and roles of self and others.  As the cognitive structures of a 
worldview form a more meaningful “whole,” they influence the (political) actor’s perceptions, uses of 
information, and understandings of events and their causes (Chih-Yu Shih, “Seeking Common Causal 
Maps: A Cognitive Approach to International Organization,” in Contending Dramas: A Cognitive 
Approach to International Organizations, eds. Martha Cottam and Chih-yu Shih [New York: Praeger, 
1992], 40-42; Kearney quoted in Naugle, World View, 242; Kearney, Winds of Ixtepeji, 43). See also the 
longer treatments of Worldview (anthropology) and Worldview (political science) in the Glossary section, 
upon which my definition is based.  
25 See the more extended treatment of cultural logics in the Glossary. The concept of cultural logics is very 
relevant to this project, which focuses on Japan’s responses to global phenomena, and how those responses 
and beliefs shape its policies projected back out to the world as foreign aid.  On domestic issues, the 
concept of cultural logics can help us to reflect deeply on Japan’s domestic responses to outside forces. I 
will follow the following procedure, in this and later chapters, to construct the cognitive frameworks of 
these leaders’ worldviews and to consider how they have affected domestic aspects of Japanese society.  
First, I will identify leaders’ images about a particular topic. Second, I will use images to attempt to 
verbally “construct” the leaders’ worldviews about the topic. Third, I will consider if technological systems 
have affected the worldviews, and if so, what aspects.  Fourth, I will compare the worldviews, and fifth, try 
to conceptually identify the cultural logics and patterns underlying the worldviews, and compare them. 
26 It would be good if the researcher could also crosscheck his/her worldview findings with the original 
informants, where the informants are still living. 
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 What is the relationship between worldviews and cultural logics? Paul Hiebert 
recently argued that it is helpful to think of culture of consisting of several different 
levels. On the most surface level, the sensory level, we find patterns of behavior, cultural 
products, rituals and signs. On the second (middle) level, the explicit level, are belief 
systems. On the deepest or core level, there are worldview themes, under which lie 
(cultural) logics, and on the very bottom, epistemology.27 Although people commonly 
rely on different logics in different contexts, some are seen as more basic and are given 
more credibility. Other logics seem fuzzy and less reliable. Abstract, algorithmic logic 
supports most of the sciences. Other categories include analogical, topological, relational, 
and wisdom-based logics.28 
 In this project, the concepts of worldview and ideology are interrelated, similar, 
and yet distinct. I do not mean to conflate them.  Their essential meanings are different. 
The origin of both concepts, within both political science and anthropology, is related. 
Both derive from the German concept of Weltanshauung, or world-view, meaning one’s 
overall perception of the social world and how it works. In political science, an ideology 
is sometimes called a consistent set of beliefs, morals, and attitudes.29 Scholars of foreign 
policy argue that ideology can be viewed as a cognitive map, worldview, or guide to 
action. In my present research, I draw heavily on how Richard J. Samuels treats ideology, 
as “…the ways in which history and political structure conspire to constrain the strategic 
choices of nations.” Yet while ideologies and ideologies influence political outcomes, 
                                                
27 Paul G. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews: An Anthropological Understanding of How People Change 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2008), 32-33. 
28 Ibid., 39-45. 
29 David Robertson, A Dictionary of Modern Politics (London: Europa Publications, 1993), 232. 
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they do not determine them.30 Anthropologist Michael Kearney argues that in their 
nature, content and function, worldviews are influenced by ideological biases, and can 
also function as ideologies. In the recent past anthropologists debated whether ideas 
cause social conditions or the reverse (called the debate between cultural idealism and 
historical materialism).31 This debate is now outmoded. Some anthropologists have 
argued that ideology is a more current area of inquiry than worldview, while others 
disagree.32 In this project, I especially focus on certain ideologies related to technology 
and development, and how they relate to policies connected to historical outcomes and 
processes such as colonialism.33   
 Why is studying the worldviews of Japan’s leaders about Japan’s experience 
with technology, development, and foreign influences important, and what connection do 
these views have with later policies? Leaders’ beliefs and views of these subjects, in 
many cases, have had a significant influence on later policies that were eventually 
enacted, though not in all cases, and not always directly. Japan studies scholar Frederick 
R. Dickinson argues that it is helpful to study the earlier worldviews of key Japanese 
decision-makers, such as Yamagata Aritomo,34 to understand their later behavior and 
policy responses.35  As we study the worldviews of several important leaders, and the 
                                                
30 Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army:” National Security and the Technological 
Transformation of Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: 
Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 10.    
31 Naugle, Worldview, 240-242, 244. 
32 Thomas Barfield, “Worldview,” in The Dictionary of Anthropology, ed. Thomas Barfield (Oxford; 
Malden, MA:  Blackwell, 1997), 499.   
33 See my discussion of the work of Jean and John Comaroff later in this chapter. 
34 For a detailed treatment of the life of Yamagata, see Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of 
Modern Japan, 1838-1922 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 60. 
35 Frederick R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Harvard 
East Asian monographs, 177. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 40. In this case, 
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policies that eventually followed, this influence should become clearer, though it is 
challenging to prove direct linkages between historical trends and later policies.36 
Leaders’ decisions on particular policies tend to be made incrementally, influenced both 
by their belief systems and the historical stream of previous policies: “sharp breaks with 
the past seldom occur.”37 
 Many young Japanese who traveled abroad in the late Tokugawa period, like 
Mori Arinori, underwent a radical worldview transformation by encountering the West 
firsthand.  It was not “West-worshipping” (forsaking one’s own country), but rather 
psychological reorientation or conversion, soberly coming to terms with a significant 
outside enemy.  For these individuals, it was a “… complex process of response and 
                                                                                                                                            
Dickinson argues that the worldviews of certain leaders during World War I influenced their later policy 
responses in the 1930s. 
36 Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, and Development: Decision-Making in the Turkish Iron and 
Steel Industry (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). Szyliowicz argued this in several discussions I had 
with him at the University of Denver. In his “The Ottoman Educational Legacy: Myth or Reality” in, 
Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), Szyliowicz discusses how “tradition” in the Ottoman Empire confronted 
modernity in the nineteenth century, treating many similar themes to those in the present research, 
including worldview, education, religion, foreign cultural influences, Western knowledge, study abroad, 
science, and technology. While the Ottomans were conservative and resistant to new ideas (pp. 285-286), 
the Meiji leaders of Japan were also ideologically conservative but extremely open to new outside 
influences. Another example of the challenges of connecting history and later political realities (pp. 303-
304), through a broadly comparative approach, considers the imperial legacy of the Ottoman Empire on 
later behavior and perceptions in the Balkan region and the Middle East. Brown and others argue that 
possible connections between the past and present can be shaped by selective memory (Ibid., 9, 12), 
colonialism (Ibid., 11), the evolution of psychological perceptions of other cultures and peoples over time 
(Ibid., 14; Norman Itzkowitz, “The Problem of Perceptions,” in Imperial Legacy, ed. L. Carl Brown (New 
York:  Columbia University Press, 1996), 30; the historical legacy of great cultures on later civilizations 
(Halil Inalcik, “The Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case,” in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on 
the Balkans and the Middle East, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 17; and 
stereotypes/images (Brown, Imperial Legacy, 304), among other influences.  
37 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 223. The influence of belief systems and historical 
factors on policy decisions is seen in Szyliowicz’ treatment of the cognitive factors involved in 
international technology transfer cases. The viewpoints and beliefs of policy and decision-makers constrain 
and greatly affect the outcome of technology transfer cases and project outcomes, positively or negatively. 
Belief systems can blind decision-makers to reality, and failure to adjust their viewpoints and decisions to 
changing conditions can also greatly affect outcomes. Perceptions often “…diverge from the reality of the 
environment.” Because radical breaks in the historical chain of decision-making are usually rare, both 
history and decision-makers’ beliefs can affect their decisions for decades (Ibid., 8, 212, 223).  
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adaptation.”38  There were three primary possible responses—wholesale adoption of all 
things Western, selective adaptation of things that would prevent immediate invasion and 
strengthen the national polity, or redefinition of Japan’s national character according to 
the changing historical conditions of the nation, using the West as a model where helpful.  
Mori chose the third option.39 Here the “West” serves, historically, as both a point and 
counterpoint as I assess Japanese ideas of technology, development, and aid.40  
  Other leaders studied here, including Ito Hirobumi and Fukuzawa Yukichi, went 
through a similar process as they encountered and considered the West.  The particular 
response of each leader was based on his/her own particular education and upbringing, 
historical circumstances and context, individual beliefs, and the degree of involvement in 
policymaking.  So responses vary.41  Several of the leaders had significant influences on 
policies enacted in Meiji Japan and later—Mori on education, Ito on politics and law, and 
Yamagata on the military and politics.  Fukuzawa’s influence on Japanese policies was 
more indirect, since he was never a policymaker.  But he had a huge impact on Japanese 
attitudes concerning Western culture, foreign relations, and Western business practices, 
through his best-selling books, the major university and influential enterprises he 
founded.  
 Studying the past and present images that Japanese leaders have held about 
technology, development and foreign relations/aid will help us to understand their overall 
                                                
38 Alistair Swale, The Political Thought of Mori Arinori: A Study in Meiji Conservatism (Richmond, 
Surrey, UK: Japan Library/Curzon Press, 2000), 175-176. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver. 
41 To better understand the worldviews of each leader, before considering each leader’s beliefs about the 
major contexts of Japanese technology, development and international relations, where possible, I will 
examine his/her education and early upbringing, since these are important influences shaping each person’s 
later beliefs and actions. 
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worldviews about these subjects, and where possible, I will mention them.  At least since 
World War II, Western scholarship about Japan has been afflicted with a duality of 
contrasting images, such as liberalism/militarism, tradition/modernity, state/society, and 
Japan as World War II villain/victim.  The complexity of Japanese policymaking, and its 
general lack of transparency, sometimes contributes to the lack of depth in the study of 
Japanese politics (by Western scholars).42  Uncovering the underlying images and beliefs 
of Japanese policymakers can help us better understand the policy outcomes they have 
promoted. 
 Though religion43 and spirituality44 have historically been challenging and 
difficult to define, they are commonly seen as a deep, enduring part of a people’s identity 
or worldview, and considered to be increasingly important factors in contemporary 
international relations. Therefore it makes sense to investigate the possible connections of 
spirituality, worldviews, and an international affairs topic like Japanese foreign aid. 
Scholars of religion have important things to say about worldview. Anthropologist 
                                                
42 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 239-241, 243-244. 
43 An anthropological definition of religion sees it as the “…lived significance of … ideas, experiences and 
institutions…” about the supernatural, and about the role of such things in human existence. Religion is a 
part of culture, and is “…integral to the common understandings, activities, and circumstances that shape a 
people’s way of life” (“Anthropology of Religion,” in The HarperCollins Dictionary of Religion, eds. 
Jonathan Z. Smith et al. [San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1995], 891). See a more detailed treatment 
of Religion in the Glossary. 
44 Spirituality has been called “ …the concern of human beings with their appropriate relationships to the 
cosmos” (Mary N. MacDonald, “Spirituality” in Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Lindsay Jones [Detroit: 
Macmillan Reference USA, 2005], 8718), or the connections between “ ...the human and the sublime, … 
the concrete and the abstract, and between man and God” (Zehavit Gross, “Contemporary Approaches to 
Defining Spirituality,” in Encyclopedia of Religious and Spiritual Development, eds., Elizabeth M. 
Dowling and W. George Scarlett [Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2006], 425). Spirituality 
suggests feeling, thought, and practice connected with the inner, subjective world related to religion, and 
the meanings of the deepest parts of human life and existence. It is the main motivating force of religion, on 
corporate (organized or unorganized) or individual levels. Spirituality flourishes within living religious 
traditions. Forms of spirituality vary according to social and personal conditions and tradition (Wade Clark 
Roof, “Spirituality,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd ed., ed. William A. Darity 
[Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008], 59-60). 
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Charles Kraft argues that our worldviews and beliefs of many things (i.e. the 
supernatural) affect our experience of and reactions to/actions about them. Both Kraft and 
Paul Hiebert identify conflicts between “spirituality” and “reality/science” in the common 
worldviews of Westerners that are usually not found in the worldviews of non-
Westerners.45 Hiebert terms this common characteristic of Western worldviews the Flaw 
of the Excluded Middle. According to this concept, the worldviews of non-Westerners 
commonly allow for the existence of the spiritual realm, both beyond the present world, 
and in operation within it. Most Western worldviews, while possibly allowing for the 
existence of a spiritual realm after death, usually do not include the active presence of 
spiritual forces in everyday life.46 Possible conflicts between science and spirituality also 
occurred in the worldviews of Japan’s most influential political actor of the twentieth 
century, Emperor Hirohito.47 He was strongly affected by the government’s official views 
of Shinto, and his own great love of and belief in science.  He was also modern Japan’s 
supreme political leader before 1945. These two aspects of Hirohito’s basic worldview 
(Shinto and science) had great impacts on his political actions and decisions, affecting 
millions of people in Asia, the Pacific, and the United States through 1945, and nearly 
destroying Japan, at least outwardly. What were the implications of that conflict for 
Hirohito’s policy actions and impacts?  
 What are the implications of these issues for current Japanese aid policy? 
Spirituality is a highly important area of worldview issues, since it is one of the cultural 
                                                
45 Charles H. Kraft, Christianity with Power: Your Worldview and Your Experience of the Supernatural 
(Ann Arbor, Mich: Vine Books, 1989);  Paul G. Hiebert, “The Flaw of the Excluded Middle,” Missiology 
10, no. 1 (1982): 35-47; and Paul G. Hiebert, Anthropological Reflections on Missiological Issues (Grand 
Rapids, Mich: Baker Books, 1994). 
46 Hiebert, “Flaw of Excluded Middle” and Anthropological Reflections. 
47 We will examine this issue further in Chapter 7. 
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systems and contexts to which worldviews are connected, which they also influence and 
by which they are influenced.48 Paul Hiebert defines worldview as “…the foundational 
cognitive, affective, and evaluative assumptions and frameworks a group of people 
makes about the nature of reality which they use to order their lives.”49 I view worldview 
as a cognitive framework, so in this case, we can call spirituality a highly significant 
cognitive framework that interacts with and influences the other such cultural systems in 
people’s lives. As such, on some levels it also influences a society’s view of other 
societies, foreign countries, and how to relate to them. Since spirituality is a key area of 
worldview issues, one of my key research questions asks, how has Japanese spirituality 
perhaps affected Japan’s foreign aid policies? What evidence do we see in the historical 
data presented here? Are there possible conflicts between leaders’ worldviews of 
spirituality and science that have affected their policy actions, and/or later Japanese aid 
policies? My working hypothesis is that Japan’s experience with technology, 
development and foreign relations, as seen in the beliefs of some of its important leaders 
about them, has affected its current aid policies. I argue that the perceptions and policies 
of key Japanese leaders, from the late Tokugawa era forward, help us to better 
comprehend how technology has influenced Japan’s view of itself, its view of “the 
Other,”50 and its view of how foreign policy (especially for development) should occur.51 
 To better understand the ideologies of key Japanese thinkers and leaders about 
Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign affairs, it is also helpful to 
                                                
48 According to Paul Hiebert, the other systems to which worldviews are connected include cultural, 
biological, physical, personal and social systems (Hiebert, Transforming, 86-88). 
49 Ibid., 25-26. 
50 The “Other” means non-Japanese, mainly either Westerners or other Asians. 
51 I am thankful to Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver, for this last insight. 
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place their beliefs within several broader contexts. Accordingly, within the historical 
period covered in Chapter 3, I include a brief survey of major domestic contexts of 
Japanese technology and economic development from 1850 to 1895:  the roles of Japan’s 
technological development and domestic society. These two contexts are especially 
related to sociocultural issues. Technological development includes the state of the basic 
natural sciences in Japan, scientific knowledge imported from abroad, technologies and 
industrial applications (such as research and development), science and technology 
policies of different governments in Japan, and how social and cultural factors have 
influenced those processes. The section on domestic society contexts examines Japanese 
society and socio-cultural change, especially related to technology and development 
issues. In Chapter 4, my historical survey covers domestic political economy issues for 
the same period. The domestic state section covers Japan’s domestic politics and the 
nature of the state, and when data is available, how the state and political actors 
interacted with technological development. The section on the domestic market contexts 
looks at Japan’s domestic market, economic development and growth. I follow similar 
procedures in additional chapters. 
 What additional approaches from the social sciences can I use to link ideologies, 
history, and development policy outcomes?  There are several strong theoretical and 
methodological approaches.  Development policies are implemented through projects.  
Worldview is one contributing factor to project outcomes, but not a directly causal 
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factor.52 Project outcomes feedback to previous stages of the process in an iterative, 
circular fashion.53 Even if worldview is not a directly causal factor, it is an important one 
to examine. 
 All of this relates to the largest research question for the dissertation: how have 
Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations (and key 
leaders’ worldviews of those issues) from 1850 to 1945 affected its current foreign aid 
policies? In order to answer this question, I need to consider the meanings of Japanese 
development concepts like “modernization,”54 translative adaptation,55 and 
internationalization.56 I must do so since these concepts deeply embody Japanese notions 
and interpretations of what technology and development mean, and what they mean for 
the Japan case in particular. “Modernization” explores what happens to the internal 
cultural core of a developing, commonly non-Western country as it enters the global 
                                                
52 Political scientist and Japanologist Richard J. Samuels argues that ideologies interact with institutional 
factors over time to affect policy outcomes in powerful ways.  See my discussion below of Samuels’ work, 
especially under the definition of ideology in the Glossary. 
53 I learned these arguments about development policies implemented as projects and the circular pattern of 
feedback from project outcomes in an interview (March 2003) with a Denver area anthropologist who 
prefers to remain anonymous about this point. 
54 In this project I define “modernization” as is the process where a rich country in the core (center) of the 
world’s economy forces weaker, poorer countries in the periphery to trade with it, so it can become richer 
and more developed. As a poor, non-Western country is absorbed into the world economy, on the surface, 
its culture will start to look more Western (like the cultures of the rich “core”). But the core of its culture 
will not change much, but stay mostly non-Western. 
55 Translative adaptation is the process where a non-Western country adjusts to Western culture as it begins 
“modernization” and development.  As this happens, the non-Western country must carefully match and 
adjust its own culture and values to the imported cultural items. If it does this well, it will have Western and 
non-Western items in its new culture, and it will develop well. If not, it may not develop well, and its 
culture may be destroyed. See also longer definition in the Glossary section. 
56 Internationalization refers to the process where the “active” West absorbed the “passive” non-West, for 
the sake of its own development.  The non-West has included Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Americas, and 
much exploitation and subjugation. Internationalization focuses on external, international processes: what 
happens as the powerful “core” West absorbs other peoples from the periphery into the global market. It 
looks at both economic and cultural factors: what occurs as the periphery countries are absorbed into the 
“cultural universe” of the West? Internationalization does not examine internal implications. It especially 
considers what happened on the international level through historic processes of colonialism. It can also 
study contemporary issues; i.e. what happens on the international level as Western development ideologies 
affect non-Western countries? 
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economic system, arguing that though on the surface its cultural form may change, in its 
core, it will remain non-Western and indigenous.  
 According to translative adaptation, as a non-Western country develops, it must 
carefully adjust its own cultural features and values to imported cultural items. What 
happens to a society’s culture as it is drawn into the development process in the global 
economic system?  If it does so well, it will successfully develop, but if not, it may 
culturally implode. A closely related idea is that each nation must customize its recipe for 
development according to its own unique conditions. Japan is seen as a prime example of 
successful translative adaptation.57 Maegawa Keiji, a Japanese anthropologist, argues that 
if development is to truly succeed, the indigenous, core elements of a developing 
society’s identity must be respected, not destroyed.58 This raises profound questions 
about the viability of universalistic recipes for development and development ideologies 
that continue to be preached by major international development organizations such as 
the World Bank and the IMF, which in turn are largely dominated by Western nations in 
North America and Europe. Japan and other Asian nations sometimes bristle at these 
notions, which they often find are contrary to their own cultures, histories, and their 
significant, state-led experiences of authoritarian development, some of which are still 
unfolding.59 The concept of translative adaptation, drawn from development economics 
                                                
57 See the definition of translative adaptation earlier in the dissertation and in the Glossary. I also use the 
Japanese concept of “modernization” to assess development issues on the domestic level. Note that 
“modernization” is not the same as the outdated notion of modernization that was developed by leading 
Western social scientists such as W.W. Rostow in the early 1960s. 
58 For more, see Keiji Maegawa, “The Continuity of Cultures and Civilizations: An Introduction to the 
Concept of Translative Adaptation,” in Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the 
Market, eds. Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 166-177. 
59 See the definition of authoritarian developmentalism in the Glossary. According to this concept, 
development, as it has occurred in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China, is an example of 
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and anthropology, more from the latter, bridges those fields, plus development and 
technology, very well.60 
 Internationalization here refers to what happens on the international level, 
economically and culturally, as developing countries are absorbed into the global 
economy.61 According to this concept, they will be aggressively absorbed into the world 
system, in a damaging fashion. Key issues here include what happened to Japan as it 
developed, what happened to Japan’s colonies and neighboring states in Asia, and what 
happened and happens today through Japanese aid.  
 Historically, Japan has viewed technology as a key component in its economic 
development, improving imported technologies in many ways.  Today the nation strives 
to pioneer original technologies and discoveries.  In development, since ancient times, the 
Japanese state has usually had a primary role in directing the nation’s overall path, 
alternating between isolation from and interaction with foreign nations.  More recently, 
Japan’s “developmental state” shepherded the private sector toward maximum 
international competitiveness.  According to the “developmental state” concept, while 
market dynamism is the necessary engine of development, the state has important 
functions in managing the nation’s development and trade.  Only an effective state and its 
                                                                                                                                            
such a process. Similar development is underway in many nations, including China and Vietnam. The 
cultural assumptions behind authoritarian developmentalism, and related concepts such as developmental 
state and developmentalism, are also reflected in Asian-oriented development ideologies such as fukoku 
kyôhei, shokusan kôgyô, and others (see the definitions of all of these concepts in the Glossary). Many of 
the cultural assumptions behind these concepts are different from those in the development ideologies 
stressed by Western-dominated international development groups such as the World Bank and other major 
Western donors of aid. 
60 Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver. 
61 I mean the concept of internationalization as developed in Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno, Japanese 
Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market (London: Routledge, 1998), not the concept 
of internationalization (kokusaika) in common usage in Japan since the late 1970s. See Internationalization 
and Kokusaika in the Glossary.  
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supportive institutions can do so.  As Japan tailored its own approaches to technology and 
development in the 1800s, Japanese scholars argue that today’s developing countries 
must find “diverse paths to the market.”  But how has Japan’s own experience with 
technology and development affected the aid it offers other countries? It is therefore 
essential to explore another key research question of this project, whether the ideas of 
“modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation an accurate picture of 
Japan’s experience with technology and development.  If so, how much are they seen in 
Japan’s aid policies of today? In this research, I also try to identify useful lessons from 
Japan’s development experience as a developing country. It must be stressed, however, 
that Japan is not, nor has it ever been, an LDC as they are defined today. In times of 
historical memory, Japan has never been impoverished in the same way as today’s LDCs. 
At the beginning of the period under study, the late Tokugawa period, Japan also had a 
strong state, a national education system, and cultural unity that few of today’s LDCs 
have ever matched.62 Nevertheless, it is possible to draw forth several valuable lessons 
for LDCs in the present research, and when I can, I will.   
 An additional history-related concept in this research, technonationalism as 
ideology, has long been important in Japanese thought. More specifically, Samuels uses 
technonationalism to signify the belief that technology is a basic part of national security, 
and that it must be carefully developed in a country to make it wealthy and powerful.  He 
argues that the concept provides a helpful summation of Japanese beliefs about 
                                                




technology and security over several hundred years.63  One example of technonationalism 
as ideology is the slogan fukoku kyôhei.64 While Richard J. Samuels has traced this notion 
at length through political science,65 it is also helpful to consider it through the lenses of 
cognition and cognitive anthropology.66  
  To understand Japan’s contemporary foreign and aid policies, technology and 
development issues, a survey of relevant factors throughout Japanese history would be 
helpful.67  1850, the beginning of modern Japan’s interaction with the West, is a logical 
starting point.  This study’s consideration of historical influences and trends in the pre-aid 
era ends with the period encompassing the end of Japanese colonialism and World War II 
(in 1945). With the entry of American forces into Japan in 1945, significantly new 
influences enter the picture. It is thus logical to end this survey of pre-aid historical 
influences in 1945, to get the clearest picture of how Japanese forces in particular, in the 
pre-aid period, have shaped and contributed to today’s aid policies. Many scholars 
logically consider the history of Japan’s aid in the postwar period only, since that is when 
it began (1954), and 1945 was the beginning of significant American influence.68 Though 
American influence on Japan’s culture of aid has been profound, it has been relatively 
short-term (now about sixty years).  
                                                
63 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” ix-x. 
64 Fukoku kyôhei (“rich nation, strong army”) was one of the most important development ideologies in 
Japan during the period 1868 to 1945. See fukoku kyôhei in the Glossary. 
65 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army.” 
66 I thank Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver, for pointing out this last idea. 
67 Christopher Howe. The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy: Development and Technology in Asia 
from 1540 to the Pacific War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
68 For example, see the historical treatments in Sukehiro Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and 
Practice (New York: Praeger, 1975) and Dennis Yautomo, The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign 
Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). 
24 
 
But longer term, equally significant influences, particularly historical or cultural 
ones, were also present from the prewar period. To better comprehend the influence of 
those factors on Japan’s ODA, this project especially focuses on the pre-aid influences of 
Japan’s recent past on its aid system. A hint of Japan’s long-term influence on the region 
around it is seen in how many nations, including Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and 
even China, have copied elements of Japan’s economic model for their own development. 
Several, including South Korea and Thailand, are also adopting the Japanese aid “model” 
for their own emerging ODA donor systems. The one key element present in Japan’s own 
development and aid that has carried over to several other East Asian nations is Japan’s 
emphasis on economic infrastructure as the foundation of everything else. This, in turn, 
links to the attitudes of several key leaders examined here, especially Ito Hirobumi and 
Fukuzawa Yukichi, on the necessity of economic development as the foundation of 







 Into what broader theoretical debates can we situate this project?69 Chiefly, this 
research straddles the main approaches to development anthropology:  actor-oriented, 
                                                
69 Twenty years ago, the debate between cultural materialism and idealism would have been relevant 
(Robert Borofsky, Assessing Cultural Anthropology [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994], 27-28).  According 
to cultural materialism, the material and physical concerns of human survival drive other aspects of culture.  
In idealism, the symbolic aspects are seen as more determinative.  In the 1980s, this debate was seen as 
seminal in the analysis of worldviews (Kearney, World View, 9-40).  Today’s anthropologists feel that both 
material and ideational aspects of culture are interrelated, so now this debate seems outmoded 




postmodern and applied.70 Actor-oriented studies have studied how local peoples 
reconstitute the implementation of development plans and projects.71  Postmodern 
scholars have analyzed the effects of development discourse and actions,72 and question 
whether development has any value.73  The applied approach stresses the identification of 
ground-level effects in development.74  Few scholars have tried to bridge the gap between 
these schools.75  The actor-oriented and applied approaches seem most relevant for this 
project.76  
 This research also strengthens the contribution of anthropological approaches to 
international studies. In general, the integration of anthropology and political science 
work in international studies has been weak, though there have been some outstanding 
                                                
70 Scholars are not in universal agreement about how to divide the literature on anthropology and 
development.  Here I utilize the three-way division of the literature (actor-oriented, postmodern, and 
applied) used by Arce, Alberto, and Norman Long in Anthropology, Development, and Modernities: 
Exploring Discourses, Counter-Tendencies, and Violence (London: Routledge, 2000), 23-27. While various 
scholars sometimes divide the literature differently (i.e. two approaches), or use slightly different 
terminology, I find Arce and Long’s characterization the clearest and most helpful.  Other scholars, 
including Gardner and Lewis, refer to a similar division (Katy Gardner and David J. Lewis, Anthropology, 
Development, and the Post-Modern Challenge (London: Pluto Press, 1996).  It can be effectively argued 
that most of the literature historically has fallen within these three approaches.  There is some work that 
crosses these boundaries.  One example is recent work that seeks to combine postmodern and applied 
approaches. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine. 
73 Arturo Escobar, “Anthropology and the Development Encounter:  The Making and Marketing of 
Development Anthropology,” American Ethnologist 18 (1989), 658-82; and Encountering Development: 
The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
74 Emilio Moran, “An Agenda for Anthropology,” in Transforming Societies, Transforming Anthropology 
(Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1996), 1-24; Michael M. Horowitz, “Thoughts on Development 
Anthropology after Twenty Years,” in Transforming Societies, Transforming Anthropology, ed. E. Moran  
(Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1996), 325-51; Michael M. Cernea, Putting People First; Robert 
Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (London u.a: Longman, 1983); and Peter D. Little 
and Michael Painter, “Discourse Politics and the Development Process:  Reflections on Escobar’s 
‘Anthropology and the Development Encounter’.” American Ethnologist 22, no. 3 (1995), 602-09. 
75 Gardner and Lewis, Anthropology, Development, Post-Modern Challenge; Jeffrey H. Cohen and Norbert 
Dannhaeuser, “Introduction” in Economic Development: An Anthropological Approach, eds. Jeffrey H. 
Cohen and Norbert Dannhaeuser (Walnut Creek, CA:  AltaMira Press, 2002), xi-xxxi.   
76 See my discussion below of this topic. 
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exceptions.77  Historically, anthropology, with its widespread emphasis on assessing local 
societies, and international relations, with its postwar, “top-down” focus on the Cold 
War, found few opportunities for integration.78 Some recent explorations of politics and 
culture in cultural anthropology and comparative politics have seemed more promising.79 
This project integrates political science and anthropological research on perception, 
cognition, worldview and foreign policy for the first time.  It also applies anthropological 
theory to a new topic not previously studied by many anthropologists (Japanese foreign 
aid), although political scientists and economists have examined various aspects of the 
subject. 
Work on Perception, Worldview, Ideology, and Policy 
 
 A foundational scholar in this area was Karl Mannheim, who argued that people 
in different social groups often are blinded through their interests and cultural 
environments, from which they construct worldviews.80  Michael Kearney did much of 
                                                
77 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985); Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to 
Eastern Europe, 1989-1998 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).  
78 George B. Thomas, “Is an Anthropology of International Relations Possible?” Anthropology News 42, 
no. 9  (2001), 7.  
79 Some of this fascinating work has included Aaron B. Wildavsky, Richard Ellis, and M. Thompson, 
Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997); Pearl T. 
Robinson, “Democratization: Understanding the Relationship between Regime Change and the Culture of 
Politics,” African Studies Review 37(1) (April 1994), 39; Angelique Haugerud, The Culture of Politics in 
Modern Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 84; Wildavsky, Ellis and Thompson, 
Culture Matters; Marc Howard Ross, “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis,” in 
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, Structure, eds. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 42-80; and John Richard Bowen and Roger 
Dale Petersen, Critical Comparisons in Politics and Culture (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
80 Frank Bealey, “Ideology,” in The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science  (Oxford; Malden, MA:  
Blackwell. 1999), 158; Karl Mannheim, Louis Wirth, Edward Shils, Ideology and Utopia; An Introduction 
to the Sociology of Knowledge (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd, 1936).  
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the seminal work on worldview, and argued that it is a vibrant theoretical field.81  Others 
argued that it had been replaced by ideology.82 More recent works looked at the 
connections of identity, worldview, transnationalism, and global political economy.83  My 
project builds on previous anthropological work on worldview and perception by 
applying cross-disciplinary perspectives on perception and cognition (from political 
science and anthropology) to historical perspectives on a highly significant case of non-
Western globalization. In political science, Robert Jervis did much of the pioneering 
work on this area, including his studies of how states project desired images,84 and of 
how perception affects decision-making in international politics.85 Martha Cottam did 
important studies of how images in the worldviews of foreign policymakers affect their 
reactions to the foreign policies of other states,86 how images have influenced U.S. 
policymakers’ actions on Latin America,87 and how competing images and roles in 
decisions affect the behavior of actors in international organizations.88 
 One of the most seminal studies of ideology examined the impacts of western 
colonialism and Christianity in Southern Africa.89 Jean and John Comaroff’s 
anthropological study of colonialism in Southern Africa offers relevant insights on 
                                                
81 Kearney, Winds of Ixtepeji; Kearney, World View, Michael Kearney, “Worldview,” in Encyclopedia of 
Cultural Anthropology, eds. David Levinson and Melvin Ember (New York:  Henry Holt, 1996), 1380. 
82 Barfield, “Worldview,” 499. 
83 Edward F. Fischer, Cultural Logics and Global Economics Maya Identity in Thought and Practice 
(Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 2001); Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of 
Transnationality (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).  
84 Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1970). 
85 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1976). 
86 Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making. 
87 Cottam, Images and Intervention. 
88 Cottam and Shih, Contending Dramas. 
89 Jean and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in 
South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1.  
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worldview, history and ideology.  Beginning in the early nineteenth century, British 
colonizers sought to impose two different worldviews on the Southern Tswana—one 
religious, and the other distinctly secular.90 The Comaroffs argued that dominant classes 
cannot determine directly the mental conceptions of those they would dominate.  But the 
constellation of dominant ideas gradually sets limits, accumulates explanatory and 
symbolic power to organize the world, and becomes ingrained over time.91  Through a 
dialectical process of hegemony and ideology, consciousness and unconsciousness, a 
new, dominant worldview emerges.92 
 The Comaroffs’ study raises many issues relevant for the present study—how 
the “‘savages’ of colonialism” were drawn into conversation with the global cultures of 
capitalism, ideology, and religion.93 How much did Japanese colonialism reflect patterns 
                                                
90 Ibid., 11-12. How do the Comaroffs handle history?  Of Revelation and Revolution falls within the genre 
of historical anthropology, and seeks to delineate the “…making of a social and cultural world, both in time 
and at a particular time.”  Rather than constructing a chronological history of events, it explores these 
events as a multidimensional process of increasing complexity and scale, with distinct phases and levels 
(Ibid., 38-39). For general details about how the disciplines of history and anthropology interact, see 
Shepard Krech III, “History and Anthropology,” in The Dictionary of Anthropology, ed. Thomas Barfield, 
(Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997), 237-240. Methodological challenges here include the 
integration of political economy, culture, ideology, and the relationship of structure and agency (Comaroff 
and Comaroff, Revelation and Revolution, 8-10).  A fundamental question is how culture, power, ideology 
and consciousness affect historical processes (Ibid., 6).  In this case, European colonizers sought to create 
“history,” order and rationality for peoples who supposedly had none.  Ethnography, colonialism, social 
history and the social sciences are all the products of the nineteenth century Western “scientific worldview” 
of secular modernism (Ibid., 14-15). 
91 Ibid., 18-19. 
92 Here the Comaroffs build on work by Gramsci, Marx, Stuart Hall and others.  The Comaroffs’ definition 
of ideology is similar to that of Marx in The German Ideology. For the Comaroffs’ definitions of hegemony 
and ideology, see the Glossary section (Hegemony; Colonialism and ideology).  What is the relationship 
between hegemony and ideology?  They are two extremes along a continuum (Ibid., 28-29).  But in the 
uncertain spaces between them, people give voice to their evolving perceptions.  As the Tswana people 
were drawn under European domination, they resisted in uneven ways.  The Comaroffs assert that this is 
the common pattern in colonialism; the process is never one of simple domination and resistance (Ibid., 30-
32). 
93 Ibid., xi-xii. These issues include questions such the following:  what happened in Japanese colonialism 
and imperialism in East Asia and the Pacific in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?  How much did 
Japanese colonialism reflect patterns of hegemony and ideological resistance seen in Western colonialism?  
How did Japanese colonizers seek to impose their worldviews?  Did this include Japanese visions of 
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of hegemony and ideological resistance seen in Western colonialism? It is also interesting 
to compare how Japanese anthropologist Maegawa Keiji and the Comaroffs analyzed the 
cultural impact of Western worldviews and processes on the non-Western world.94 
Maegawa’s conception of “modernization” is very similar to the Comaroffs’ concept of 
colonialism and ideology, except in the latter case, the Comaroffs argued that the 
ideologies (worldviews) of the receiving culture, despite providing content, would be 
subsumed under the overall form of the hegemonic worldview of the colonizer.  
Maegawa seems to suggest that if “modernization” is successful, the culture or 
worldviews of the receiving (non-Western) society will maintain their “persistent form,” 
and not be engulfed or subsumed under the adoption or entrance of the Western 
culture/worldview. The Comaroffs assumed that the Western (or colonizer’s) worldview 
will dominate those of the receptor society, at least in overall form, that the receiving 
culture’s ideologies (their indigenous worldviews) will be subsumed under those of the 
colonizers. Perhaps Maegawa and the Comaroffs were describing the same basic process 
with different words. Colonizers are not necessarily Western, as in the case of Japanese 
colonialism in Northeast and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific from 1895-1945. 
 In anthropology, poststructural (postmodern) scholars of development offer 
insights on connecting ideologies, institutions, and policy/project outcomes.  To study the 
ideology of development organizations, James Ferguson analyzed the discourse 
embodied in agency reports, and then assesses ethnographically what happens on the 
                                                                                                                                            
technology, development, and foreign relations?  In the postwar world, has increasing Japanese economic 
presence or cultural globalization in East Asia led to a re-colonization of the region, economic or cultural if 
not political?  In particular, what has Japanese foreign aid contributed? 
94 See the definitions of “modernization” and colonialism and ideology in the Glossary section. 
30 
 
ground level.95 This study incorporates more historical background, and more analysis of 
how historical experience/ideologies influence the present.96 Other anthropologists 
contend that we can also gain important insights about development ideology by 
examining the interactions of development actors and institutions. Gardner and Lewis 
argue that within planning and project ethnography,  
…there is increasing recognition that the realities within which people act and make 
decisions are multiple and changing.  This is closely related to actor-oriented 
research, in which the worldviews of individual actors (rather than passive target 
groups or beneficiaries) and the interfaces between them and bureaucratic 
institutions are the focus of study….97 Recognition of the need to understand (and 
then change) the workings of bureaucracy… is also important.98 
  
Actor-oriented research, developed by mostly European scholars, emphasizes the 
assessment of the orientations of local actors, and of how development represents a series 
of conflicts between actors of the West and developing societies.99 Gardner and Lewis 
conclude that  
…anthropologists need to examine the ways in which people and the discourses 
they produce interact according to their different cultural, economic and historical 
                                                
95 Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine, argues that certain discourses support the work of particular 
development institutions.  Only supportive statements are included in agency reports.  So discourse affects 
actual development practice.  Development discourse and practice occur within development planning, but 
do not determine it; planning is only a small part of the whole development process (p. 68, cited in Gardner 
and Lewis, Anthropology, Development, Post-Modern Challenge, 73). 
96 Ferguson’s study incorporates little analysis of historical factors, and no analysis of how they influence 
the present.  Through the incorporation of historical ideologies and factors, I will add further depth to this 
fascinating work by poststructuralist scholars.   
97 Norman Long and Ann Long, Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in 
Social Research and Development (London: Routledge, 1992).  
98 Gardner and Lewis, Anthropology, Development, Post-Modern Challenge, 69-70. 
99 Arce and Long, Anthropology, Development, Modernities, 23-24, 26-27. Common themes in actor-
oriented works, relevant to this project, include the daily interactions and experiences of varied actors 
involved in the development process, how these social relations and development interventions/policies 
transform each other in uneven ways (Long and Long, Battlefields of Knowledge, ix-xi, 3-5, 8-9; Wedel, 
Collision and Collusion); gaps in perceptions and images projected by aid donors and recipients (Wedel 
ibid.); how local practices influence global ones and the reverse (Wedel ibid.); how people, in their (local) 
lives, reshape and contest modernity, development and its institutional arrangements, often imposed from 
the outside; and disconnections of state policy and people’s counter-tendencies (Arce and Long, 
Anthropology, Development, Modernities: 1-3, 9-11, 21-22). 
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contexts.100  Research must be actor-oriented, not only through those to be 
‘developed,’ but [also] in terms of how individual and group agencies cross-cut, 
reproduce, or resist the power relations of state and international development 
interventions.101  
 
These interventions are policy or project outcomes/implementation.  Actors, whether 
individual or organizational, can reproduce or subvert development policies/projects.  
Actor-oriented perspectives can help us to understand why, while ethnography can show 
us how. Actor-oriented approaches encourage us to tangibly examine how actors mediate 
and transform development. They are more relevant to this project than poststructural 
approaches.  Actor-oriented research shows more effectively the connections of 
worldview/ideology, institutions/organizations and policy.102   
 Another stream of literature, the applied approach, stresses practical responses 
to the problems of anthropology and development.103 Certain applied and ethnographic 
studies, especially of organizational culture, examine the connections of ideology, 
institutions/organizations and policy.104 Hoben’s ethnography of USAID uncovers 
important findings about the interactions of organizational culture, ideology, policy and 
                                                
100 I would also add that discourse is an outward, partial articulation of a worldview or ideology. 
101 Gardner and Lewis, Anthropology, Development, Post-Modern Challenge, 74-75. 
102 Comparing actor-oriented and postmodern approaches, Long and Long try to show how both can be 
integrated in studies of development (Long and Long, Battlefields of Knowledge, 6-8).  The two streams 
differ in how they treat the usage of knowledge (Arce and Long, Anthropology, Development, Modernities, 
24, 26).  Awareness of how local actors and sites mediate development is basic to understanding how 
development can be practically engaged, and problems solved. 
103Ibid., 25-26. This work looks at a wide variety of themes, including consumption, land and energy use, 
property rights, resettlement, agricultural development, and various national and international linkages 
(Suzanne Hanchett, “Anthropology and Development: The 1998 ICAES Discussion,” Practicing 
Anthropology 21, no. 1 [Winter 1999],  47). 
104 A fascinating essay by Carol MacLennan highlights the potential contributions of ethnographic research 
for helping us to better understand barriers to democratic participation in American political life.  One of 
the policy areas in which this participation is the weakest is technology policy.  See Carol MacLennan, 
“Democratic Participation: A View from Anthropology,” in Diagnosing America: Anthropology and Public 
Engagement, ed. Shepard Forman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 51-74. 
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institutional contexts in an aid organization.105 Additional studies highlight the value of 
ethnographic research methodologies for investigating bureaucratic organizations.106 The 
applied approach offers many significant lessons about institutional, organizational and 
bureaucratic cultures.107 Comparing applied and postmodern approaches, the former is 
more relevant to this project, since it is equally scientific, and more practical in the 
solutions it offers.108 
                                                
105 Allan Hoben, “Agricultural Decision Making in Foreign Assistance: An Anthropological Analysis,” in 
Agricultural Decision Making: Anthropological Contributions to Rural Development, ed. Peggy Bartlett 
(New York: Academic Press, 1980), 337-69. Key sections in Hoben examine ideological changes in the 
U.S. Agency for International Development in the 1970s, its organizational structure and culture, including 
impacts of the external environment, decision-making processes, and USAID’s response to new foreign aid 
legislation in the 1970s.  Hoben also studied why new policy mandates are often resisted.  USAID’s 
decisions are often made based on past policies.  Rather than careful analysis of all of the possible 
alternatives, decisions are limited by staffers’ self-reinforcing “cultural paradigms.” To increase their own 
impact, social scientists need to study decision-making processes in agencies. 
106 To really understand tensions in an aid agency’s organizational culture, policy and operating 
environments, we need to probe beneath the surface using ethnographic and similar methods (Judith 
Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975]). Ethnography helps us to 
better understand the inner workings of bureaucratic life by examining behavior in everyday contexts and 
events, uncovering hidden networks, insiders’ views, and details about the social frameworks of decision-
making (Gerald M. Britan, Bureaucracy and Innovation: An Ethnography of Policy Change [Beverly Hills, 
Calif: Sage Publications, 1981], 20-21).  As trained outsiders, anthropologists can uncover facts that policy 
makers or other organizational insiders are not trained/able to see themselves (Interview with Richard 
Clemmer-Smith, University of Denver, February 24, 2000).  While ethnography offers valuable approaches 
for understanding policies, programs, and the wider dynamics in large bureaucracies (Britan, Bureaucracy 
and Innovation, 7, 10-12, 24-26), there are limits to its contributions.  But they are fundamental and 
important.  Ethnography can show how bureaucracies work at the crucial level of daily implementation, 
and therefore how such policies and bureaucracies can be improved.  Ethnography also provides deep, 
multidimensional understandings of the social contexts within and surrounding bureaucracies.  This can 
help us to understand why bureaucracies actually do what they do, not just what they say (Ibid., 142-144). 
107 What are some of the lessons that the applied approach offers about organizational cultures?  To 
understand the actions and decisions of aid policy makers, we must study the institutional contexts, 
organizational structures and cultures of aid agencies, including impacts of the external environment 
(Hoben, “Agricultural Decision Making”; Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid).  Bureaucratic constraints on 
change are not simply due to organizational inertia, but often are more affected by the social, economic and 
political contexts and complexities in which organizations operate (Britan, Bureaucracy and Innovation, 
137).  The informal social organization of a bureaucracy can direct or hinder an agency’s attempt at rational 
policy improvement, especially in the context of everyday operations and decision-making (Ibid., 7, 10-12, 
24-26). Organizational rationality is contextual and limited, since it is based on the unique contexts of each 
organization (Ibid., 139-141). 
108 Emilio Moran argues that often, applied work is just as scientifically valid, ethnographically and 
theoretically rich as the work of postmodern academicians.  A weakness of present abstract (postmodern) 
theory is its emphases upon recent theory, rather than the history of theory, “texts” and beliefs, concrete, 
ground level realities and actual practice (Hanchett, “Anthropology and Development,” 47).  Postmodern 
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 Political scientist Richard J. Samuels’ Rich Nation, Strong Army is a key study 
on history, ideology, and Japanese technology development.109 How does he link the 
three?  Samuels studies the evolution of Japan’s ideologies of technological development 
and national security over time, and how institutions and ideologies interact.110 He does 
not argue that ideas alone drive political outcomes or policies, that they are unchanging, 
or that they lead directly to national policies.  But through interaction with institutions, 
ideology is a significant factor.  This interaction is finalized in the political economy.111  
As they interact with organizational, institutional and other factors over time, ideologies 
result in concrete influences and policy outcomes that should be visible in the actions and 
pronouncements of political actors. 
 Many policy studies handle the linkages between history and policy rather 
weakly, though there are exceptions.112 What are some other possible approaches to 
                                                                                                                                            
scholars rarely offer concrete solutions for development dilemmas (see Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine; 
and Escobar, “Anthropology and Development Encounter”). 
109 For details about how Samuels defines ideology and its interactions with history, see Ideology in the 
Glossary section. 
110 Concerning Japan’s experience with ideologies, Samuels argues that Japan’s national security has been 
driven by several related themes since Tokugawa Ieyasu united the nation in the 1600s.  The central theme 
is perhaps insecurity (fuan-anxiety) about Japan’s capacity, as a resource-vulnerable nation, to survive in a 
dangerous world.   National slogans from the Meiji era onward that captured Japan’s task include Oitsuki, 
Oikose (catch up and surpass the West) and Fukoku Kyôhei (“Rich Nation, Strong Army”).  Under the U.S. 
security treaty, Japan in the postwar era has pursued technology relentlessly, as seen in three predominant 
themes:  kokusanka (maintaining independence through the indigenization of technology), hakyu (the 
diffusion of this knowledge throughout the nation’s economy), and ikusei (the efforts on multiple levels to 
nurture enterprises to which such technical knowledge can be given).  Samuels argues that these three parts 
are the basis of Japan’s own “technonational ideology.”  Japan’s ideologies of technology and security have 
endured because they renew their value continuously.  They have evolved in the context of Japan’s late 
development in a turbulent world.  And they have survived in a challenging [domestic] environment of 
political and economic institutions intended to strengthen Japan’s national security.  In his book, Samuels 
explores how political protocols link ideologies and institutions of technonationalism (Samuels, "Rich 
Nation, Strong Army," x-xi). 
111 Ibid., x-xi. 
112 James P. Lester and Joseph Stewart, Public Policy: An Evolutionary Approach (Minneapolis/St. Paul: 
West Pub, 1996), xiii-xiv. Lester and Stewart argue that while many policy texts have handled the history 
of public policy poorly, an historical or evolutionary approach is more effective.  An in-depth historical 
study of solar energy and technology policy in the United States is Laird 2001. 
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connect history and later policy outcomes? To identify connections between historical 
ideologies/worldviews and current and future aid policies, in this research, I conceptually 
analyze the possible relations of historical ideologies, their evolution over time, from 
1850 to 1945, and later aid-related policies and ideas, especially in Chapters 9 and 10. It 
might be useful to use principles from systems analysis, a common analytical approach 
for technology, development and policy concerns.113  
 As an alternative, Rebecca Lynn Spyke offers the following figure to 
summarize how various influences and experiences of Japan have combined to form 
Japan’s contemporary aid policies:114 
 




Spyke summarizes her approach as follows:  
This study assumes that Japan’s historical experiences interacting internationally 
have combined with its domestic political and economic organization to form the 
Japanese view of the world. The experiences and conditions have also led to the 
motivations that have inspired particular foreign policy goals. In the contemporary 
context, aid has been used to attempt to attain these goals.115 
 
                                                
113 For example, one could consider both “vertical links” (historical ideologies and the contemporary scene) 
and “horizontal links” (between current ideologies and contemporary policies), and analyze them through 
the use of systems analysis and systems diagrams (conversation with J. Szyliowicz, March 2003). For 
examples of systems analysis and diagrams, see Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 12, 15, 23, 
31, 37, and the definition of systems analysis under systems theory/analysis in the Glossary section. But 
following such an approach is time consuming, and beyond the scope of the present project.  
114 Rebecca Lynn Spyke, “Japanese Foreign Aid Policy: Influences and Motivations.” Thesis (Ph.D.) 
(University of South Carolina, 1999), 3, 285. 
115 Ibid., 3. 
Influences Motivations Aid Policy 
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The basic steps Spyke follows to analyze this complex process, and the equally complex 
Japanese aid system, are fairly clear and impressive.116 However, there are several 
weaknesses in her approach. As I argue in Chapter 2, the process is more complex and 
nuanced than Spyke shows, involving a multiplicity of domestic and international 
contexts, historical and contemporary actors, their views and actions, and additional 
forces, at both the micro- and macro-levels, and their evolution over time. Spyke’s study 
only examines the macro- level, and lacks the more sophisticated, nuanced conceptions of 
worldview and additional, relevant concepts, many drawing on anthropology, that the 
present study includes.  
 In this study, I conceptually analyze how factors from Japan’s historical 
experience, relevant contextual factors on the domestic and international levels, and key 
leader’s ideologies/worldviews and actions interact and evolve over time, especially from 
1850 to 1945. In the final two chapters, I consider how the gradual development of these 
factors relates to policy concerns facing contemporary Japanese aid, and to important aid-
related ideas and themes in Japan’s recent ODA policy. I primarily connect these issues 
on the conceptual and ideational levels. 
Work on Asian Development 
 
 What works are especially relevant to the issues in this research? Few Western 
anthropologists and similar social scientists have studied the significance of Japanese 
development or foreign aid;117 my study is one of the first. In anthropology, this 
                                                
116 Ibid., 284-301. Spyke’s general findings and arguments about the outcomes of this process are 
interesting.  
117 John Clammer, “Beyond the Cognitive Paradigm: Majority Knowledges and Local Discourses in a Non-
Western Donor Society,” in Participating in Development:  Approaches to Indigenous Development, eds. 
Paul Sillicoe, Alan Bicker, Johan Pottier (London:  Routledge, ASA Monographs 39, 2002), 43-63. 
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dissertation project contributes to the study of foreign aid and development, on the Japan 
case in particular. And among Japanese anthropologists, the same has been generally 
true, especially concerning Japanese aid.  Maegawa argued that each nation must develop 
according to its own conditions,118 while Kikuchi argued for the application of kinship 
theory to Japanese development policy.119  Matsuzono briefly surveyed the history of 
applied and development anthropology in the United States and Europe, recent work of 
Japanese anthropologists studying development topics,120 and the general lack of 
anthropological input in Japanese aid efforts.121 There has also been significant, relevant 
work on other parts of East Asia, including Bray’s examination of the roles of 
development and technology in the rice economies of East and Southeast Asia, since 




                                                
118 Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures and Civilizations.” 
119 Kikuchi, “Development Anthropology.” 
120 Two examples of such work on development are: Eri Sugita, “Social Dimensions in the Organizational 
Culture of JICA and a Case Study of a Malaria Program in Tanzania” (M.A. Thesis, University of Florida, 
1998); and “Domestic Water Use, Hygiene Behavior and Children’s Diarrhea in Rural Uganda” (Ph.D. 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Florida, 2004). At: http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0004375/sugita_e.pdf. 
121 Matsuzono (Matsuzono, “International Cooperation Activities”) finds that while there have been various 
spurts of anthropological involvement in development and aid work, especially in the United States, 
through the late 1990s, involvement by Japanese anthropologists in applied aid efforts from Japan was rare. 
While Japanese anthropologists working overseas have often encountered Japanese aid workers in the field, 
and the former have found analysis of development topics to be empirically rich, Japanese government aid 
agencies such as JICA and JBIC have rarely drawn on the skills of anthropologists for their analyses of aid 
projects (see JICA and JBIC in the Glossary section). This is also true of several graduate schools of 
international development across Japan. Through the late 1990s, few of these programs employed many 
anthropologists among their full-time staff. An exception is Waseda University’s Graduate School of Asia 
and Pacific Studies in Tokyo, where Kikuchi Yasushi leads graduate programs in international cooperation 
and development anthropology.   
122 Francesca Bray, The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies (Oxford, OX 
UK: Blackwell, 1986).  
123 A.F. Robertson, People and the State: An Anthropology of Planned Development (Cambridge 
[Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
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Work on Japan’s Economic and Technological Development  
 
 Political scientists and economists have analyzed Japan’s economic and 
technological development and aid policy from several viewpoints.  Johnson traced the 
history of Japanese industrial and technology policies from 1925 to 1975, and develops 
the influential concept of the developmental state, that the state has a primary role in 
directing the nation’s industrial policy.  He concluded that limited elements of this 
concept should be institutionally transferable to other regions.124  Yet much Western and 
global development research and many financial institutions have supported the 
neoclassical, free market system.  Their recent policy tools encouraged structural 
adjustment, rapid borrowing, and viable governments in developing countries,125 while 
many Japanese scholars argued that each country’s development path must be unique.126  
Which are necessary, universal prescriptions or “diverse paths to the market?”  Pempel 
argued that the problems of Japan’s recent economic decline are best understood in a 
comparative historical framework.127   
 Concerning technology, Hayashi surveyed Japan’s experience in technology 
since the Meiji era, and offers specific lessons for other developing nations.128  Japan 
views technology as a key component in its development.  Morris-Suzuki argued that 
Japan’s technological successes were largely due to social information networks that 
                                                
124 A. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1982).  
125 John Rapley, Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World (Boulder, Colo: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).  
126 Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno, Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the 
Market (London: Routledge, 1998), 15.  
127 T. J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998). 
128 Takeshi Hayashi, The Japanese Experience in Technology: From Transfer to Self-Reliance (Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press, 1990).   
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rapidly spread innovation throughout the nation (Morris-Suzuki 1994).  Samuels 
concluded that various national ideologies of technology, and successful postwar 
development of both civilian and military applications of technology, contributed greatly 
to Japan’s economic growth.129  
Work on Japanese Foreign Aid Policy 
 
 Yasutomo assessed the strategic concerns of Japanese aid, and prominent 
Japanese aid trends in the 1990s, especially Japan’s role in multilateral development 
banks.130  Orr considered how Japan’s aid system reacts in response to pressure from the 
U.S., and its relationship with developing countries.131  Koppel and Orr assessed how 
Japanese aid is distributed to different world regions.132 Arase argued that an institutional 
approach is the most effective for assessing Japanese aid, and that the institutions that 
shape Japanese aid policy were influenced not merely by individuals, organizations, or 
rules, but also by international, domestic, crisis and ideological factors.133  Potter’s 
regional study examined in-depth the reaction of aid recipients Thailand and the 
Philippines) to Japanese aid.134 These are just a few examples of the broad literature in 
English and Japanese regarding Japan’s ODA policy. Works generally fall into these 
areas: strategic, institutional/bureaucratic politics, comparative, perceptual/cognitive, 
                                                
129 Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army." 
130 Dennis T. Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy (Lexington, 
Mass: Lexington Books, 1986) and The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1995). 
131 Robert M. Orr, The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990). 
132 Bruce Koppel and Robert M. Orr, Japan's Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era. (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1993). Koppel and Orr’s volume includes studies that focus on Japanese aid to several 
regions (Oceania, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East) and aid to different Asian nations (p. 15). 
133 David M. Arase, Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid (Boulder, Colo: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995). 




economic, cultural/historical, and human rights approaches. More examples of these 
areas of work are extensively surveyed in Chapter 2. My study adds a valuable historical 
and anthropological component to all of this important work.  
Work on Religion, International Affairs, and International Development 
Cooperation 
 
 Scholarship on religion and international affairs is a relatively new, emerging 
field. Two of the pioneering works in this field were Douglas Johnston’s 1994 study on 
the contributions of various religions, including Christianity, to conflict resolution 
processes in conflicts involving religion in regions around the world, and Wade C. Roof’s 
1991 study of the effects of global politics and economics on U.S. religion.135 There has 
recently been almost a torrent of books covering both general and specialized aspects of 
the subject. Texts introducing the field include works by Dark (2000),136 Hatzopoulos and 
Petito (2003),137 Carlson and Owens (2003),138 Fox and Sandler (2004),139 and Thomas 
(2005).140 More specialized studies examine religion and diplomacy (Johnston 2003),141 
religion and globalization (Beyer 1994),142 religion and global terror (Tétreault and 
                                                
135 Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994); and Wade Clark Roof, World Order and Religion (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1991). 
136 K. R. Dark, Religion and International Relations (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan; 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). 
137 Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
138 John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens, The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003). 
139 Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
140 Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International 
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Denemark 2004),143 U.S. diplomacy and religion (Albright and Woodward 2006),144 the 
effects of religion on the global order (Esposito and Watson 2000),145 religion and global 
governance (Falk 2001),146 religion and international law (Janis and Evans 2004),147 
religion and global security (Seiple and Hoover 2004),148 and religion and human rights 
(Lerner 2000, 2006).149 One Japanese study explores the meanings of religion, war, and 
globalization for Japan (Hashizume and Shimada 2002).150 Religion and international 
affairs has become a hot affair for investigation in graduate programs for international 
affairs in the United States, and several major graduate schools have recently received 
funding for this purpose.151 There are fewer works on religion and international 
development cooperation. Recent intriguing studies include explorations of the humane 
contributions of world religions to development (Harper 2000),152 cross-regional 
assessment of major religions as a development aid (Haynes 2007),153 critical study of the 
ethical aspects of the roles of social science and religion in global development 
                                                
143 Mary Ann Tétreault and Robert A. Denemark, Gods, Guns, and Globalization: Religious Radicalism 
and International Political Economy (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). 
144 Madeleine Korbel Albright and William Woodward, The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on 
America, God, and World Affairs (New York: HarperCollins, 2006). 
145 John L. Esposito and Michael Watson, Religion and Global Order (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 
2000). 
146 Richard Falk, Religion and Humane Global Governance (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
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148 Robert A. Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover, Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International 
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150 Daisaburo Hashizume and Hiromi Shimada, Nihonjin wa shûkyô to sensô o dô kangaeru ka (Tokyo: 
Asahi Shimbunsha, 2002).  
151 For example, there is the Luce Foundation’s Henry R. Luce Initiative on Religion and International 
Affairs, which issues such grants (Henry Luce Foundation, http://www.hluce.org/hrlucerelintaff.aspx, 
accessed November 8, 2008).  
152 Sharon Harper, The Lab, the Temple, and the Market: Reflections at the Intersection of Science, 
Religion, and Development (Ottawa: IDRC; West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 2000). 
153 Jeffrey Haynes, Religion and Development: Conflict or Cooperation? (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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(Salemink et al 2004),154 of the broad role of religion in international development and 
international affairs (Goldewijt 2007),155 and of the religious aspects of economic 
development and poverty (Marshall and Van Saanen 2007).156 
 
Research Methodology and Analysis 
 
 
Method of Choosing Leaders Studied  
 How and why did I choose the particular leaders, thinkers, and scholars I have?  
The criteria for my selection are practical, objective and subjective.  I began broadly by 
reading about Japan and Japanese culture. After identifying influential leaders and 
thinkers in many areas of Japanese politics, economics, culture, society and international 
relations, I read more about them.  Using a simple numerical scale, I ranked each 
potential leader/thinker according to his/her relevance to the themes of the project, his/her 
general importance and influence in Japanese society, and availability of sources 
by/about him or her. These leaders are important examples of how technology, 
development and culture were transmitted and perceived by the Japanese during their 
respective eras. Many are among the most important or interesting leaders of their 
respective periods.  
Data Collection  
 
 Briefly, the main stages of research have included data gathering and analysis of 
mostly secondary data and some primary data, theoretical analysis and reflection. My 
                                                
154 Ananta Kumar Giri, Anton van Harskamp, and Oscar Salemink, The Development of Religion, the 
Religion of Development (Delft: Eburon, 2004).  
155 Berma Klein Goldewijk, Religion, International Relations and Development Cooperation (Wageningen: 
Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2007). 
156 Katherine Marshall and Marisa Van Saanen, Development and Faith: Where Mind, Heart, and Soul 
Work Together (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007). 
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approach is qualitative, as are most studies of political cognition.157 The validity of 
qualitative research is strengthened through multiple methods (triangulation).158  
 To get a broad picture of the main contexts related to Japan and its history since 
1850, what happened inside and outside the country, I read broadly about Japan’s 
politics, economy, science, culture, and society.  From that, I identified eighty to one 
hundred important Japanese leaders and thinkers involved with Japan’s technology, 
development, culture and politics, 1850 to the present.  Third, I carefully assessed each of 
those persons, their lives, thought, the importance of their actions, relevance for this 
research, and the availability of sources written by or about them in English. Next, I rated 
all those factors on a series of simple numerical scales to measure and compare the 
importance and relevance of each leader for the project.  Then I narrowed the list to about 
forty possible top leaders to research.  Of those, seven are covered in this stage of the 
research, 1850-1945.  Next, I read key sources by or about each leader (where possible, 
more contemporary ones) to gather data on each leader’s beliefs about the major issues of 
the dissertation.   
Relation of Data and Research Questions 
 
 To answer my research questions, what types of research methods and evidence 
do I need?  For the first stage of historical analysis, I have reviewed relevant literature in 
the United States. This primarily involved scanning secondary sources, mainly in 
English.. My research and data collection approaches have seemed focused enough to 
                                                
157 One of the leading studies, by Martha Cottam, is qualitative (Appendix in Cottam, Images and 
Intervention, 187-191). 
158 Kathleen Musante DeWalt and Billie R. DeWalt, Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers 
(Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002), 101-102. 
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allow me to answer the central research questions well, partly through triangulation.159 
But the key issue of perceptions of technology, development, and aid has remained my 
emphasis here.   
Data Analysis 
 
 To analyze the data, I began writing on each leader’s beliefs about technology, 
development, and Japan’s foreign relations, comparing their beliefs, and analyzing them 
in terms of important concepts relevant for the project’s major questions. Then I explored 
how these beliefs and impacts have changed over time, 1850-1945. Finally, I considered 
the possible impacts of the leaders’ thoughts for the Japanese government’s aid policies, 
and for broader issues related to general policy issues, development policies, and relevant 
social sciences such as anthropology and international studies, both in Japan and abroad.   
 In order to answer the major research questions, I use concepts for data analysis 
that fall into three main areas: development, technology, and cognitive issues. My 
approach is holistic. I use concepts mostly drawn from political science and 
anthropology, and some from economics. For development, I take concepts of Japanese 
economists and anthropologists and apply them to Japan’s own experience. On the issue 
of how external engagement and internal adaptation to outside forces affected domestic 
society, Japanese scholars’ concepts of “modernization,” internationalization (in some 
cases) and translative adaptation are helpful.160 On technology, I use concepts from 
                                                
159 Margaret Diane LeCompte and Jean J. Schensul, Analyzing & Interpreting Ethnographic Data. The 
ethnographer's toolkit, 5 (Walnut Creek, Calif: AltaMira Press, 1999), 40-41; and Designing & Conducting 
Ethnographic Research. The ethnographer's toolkit, 1 (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 1999), 130-134. 
160 “Modernization” is helpful since it helps us to think both about Japan’s interaction with outside 
influences, and how they have affected its internal society. For domestic issues, “modernization” is more 
helpful than internationalization (see the definition of internationalization in the Glossary), and sometimes 
more useful than translative adaptation, since it integrates both internal and external components.  
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anthropology and political science to examine views of technology holistically: in daily 
life, and in economic and security policies. Thomas Glick’s articulation of technology is 
helpful for domestic society, since it can help us assess the effect of systemic issues on 
leaders’ views of society, politics, and their relation to technology, over time.161 I also use 
Richard J. Samuels’ concept of technonationalism as ideology, mentioned earlier.162 It is 
a key example of how technology and international relations have affected Japan’s 
domestic socio-political system. On cognition, I use concepts from political science and 
anthropology. Regarding how leaders’ perceptions affected domestic society, I use 
selected aspects of the concepts of image, worldview and cultural logics.163  
 Through this research, I gathered a lot of information about several important 
leaders, their thoughts and impacts on policies, and how these things changed and 
developed over time, to help me answer the research question and the working hypothesis 
that concern how Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign 
relations, and views of those, have affected its current foreign aid policies.  I considered a 
second research question (whether “modernization,” internationalization, and translative 
adaptation are an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology, development, 
and foreign relations) by reflecting on my data and the relevance of the three concerned 
                                                
161 On domestic society, if I can see how leaders’ views of society are affected by technology, as part of a 
socio-technical system, then Glick’s approach is relevant.  This is also true for other domestic aspects, if 
this approach helps me to think more systemically.  Viewing the domestic state, market and society as part 
of a technology-related system across time (the historical aspect of Glick’s definition) is useful.    
162 Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army." In this research and that of Samuels, technonationalism as 
ideology refers to technology as an important, basic part of protecting a country by making it rich and 
strong. The idea has been an important part of Japanese thought for several centuries. 
163 See my discussion of the meanings of these concepts earlier in the dissertation. 
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analytic concepts to the former.  The last part of that question164 concerns what Japanese 
aid policy is doing today: how much its aid reflects the ideas of “modernization,” 
internationalization, and translative adaptation. For the last key research question, about 
the effects of religion and spirituality on Japan’s current ODA policies, I draw on my rich 
findings about religion and spirituality in the data already gathered.165 Using the concept 
of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle and several others, I consider how spirituality has 
interacted with politics in Japan over time, and what it means for Japan’s aid policies of 
the present. I note, among other things, that the current constitution requires official 
separation of religion and state, and Japanese claim they are not “religious.” Yet in their 
daily practice, most Japanese, aid staff and policymakers included, are profoundly 
“spiritual.” As today’s Japanese become increasingly disenchanted with Japan’s 
workaholic ideologies of authoritarian development, significant new avenues for 
expanding political pluralism, civil society, and active “spirituality” are emerging.     
Several patterns of theoretical and data analysis here evolved as the research 
proceeded, and are dependent on the nature of the data I collected.166 In the course of 
qualitative research (and also participant observation), hunches frequently become 
hypotheses.  They must be checked and rechecked against both data and the researcher’s 
                                                
164 The last part of this research questions asks, if “modernization,” internationalization and translative 
adaptation are an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign 
relations, how much are they seen in Japan’s current aid policies? 
165 For example, this includes Yanagita Kunio’s prewar ethnographic research about rural Japanese 
spirituality, Hirohito’s possibly conflicting views of spirituality and science and their effects on Japan’s 
World War II policies, the rise of State Shinto as one of Japan’s prime motivating development ideologies 
from 1868 to 1945, and the effects of postmaterial values on current Japanese ODA.  
166 Peter W. Van Arsdale, “Ethnographic Field Investigations of Vietnamese Former Political Prisoners 
(FPPs).” (Unpublished paper, 1992), 6-7; and LeCompte and Schensul, Designing & Conducting, 147-159. 
This is normally how data analysis proceeds in much ethnographic (and qualitative) research, and how it 
went in an ethnographic study of computerization and policy in Sheffield, England (David Hakken and 
Barbara Andrews, Computing Myths, Class Realities: An Ethnography of Technology and Working People 
in Sheffield, England [Boulder: Westview Press, 1993]).  
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biases. That was also the case here. The final stage of my data analysis was conclusion 
drawing and verification. This refers to “…the development of ideas about how things are 
patterned, how they fit together, what they mean, …what causes them… and then 
returning to the data to verify that those ideas are valid, given the data available.”167 
  
Conclusion: Contributions of the Research 
 
 
 This dissertation research is important on several levels.  It improves our 
understanding of how ideational and historical factors affect policy, and Japanese foreign 
aid policy in particular. It strengthens the contribution of anthropological approaches to 
international studies issues, in areas where such application has not previously occurred:  
perception, cognition, and foreign policy.  The project also adds a significant, 
anthropologically based component to the extensive scholarship in political science and 
economics on Japanese technology, foreign aid, and economic development.  In sum, this 
project improves the study of the role of ideological, cultural and historical factors in 
foreign aid, and about the meaning of religion for international development cooperation 
policy, especially on the Japan case. It also helps to pioneer new ways to strengthen the 
contributions of anthropology to international studies. As we see from many 
contemporary examples in world affairs, from 9-11 to Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond, 
better comprehending the human, ground level components of international relations is 
one of the most pressing issues of our time.  
 In this research, I consider how various contexts and ideas have affected Japan’s 
aid policies of today by examining key leaders’ worldviews of social and cultural 
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issues,168 domestic and international political economy, and imperialism.169 This project 
is not intended to prove the influence of particular leaders and their beliefs (worldviews) 
on the project’s themes or later aid policies. Rather, I focus on the change over time of 
the worldviews themselves, their ideas and content, and how they may have influenced 
later policies relevant to Japanese aid. 
 After a survey of the Japanese foreign aid policy system in Chapter 2, this 
project continues with a historical survey of the chief contexts of Japanese technology, 
economic development, and foreign policy/aid from 1850 to 1895:  Japan’s technological 
development and domestic society in Chapter 3.170  Chapter 4 covers Japan’s domestic 
state and market, and Chapters 5 and 6, its relations with the outside world, all in the 
period 1850 to 1895. Chapter 7 examines domestic issues from 1895 to 1945, and 
Chapter 8, international issues for the same era. Final findings on the project’s key 
research questions and working hypothesis are in found in Chapter 9, and comments on 
possible policy implications will be offered in Chapter 10.  
                                                
168 This includes the related theme of technological development, in which I also consider how technology 
relates to culture. 
169 For domestic political economy, I will look at the contexts of the domestic state and the domestic 
market. For international political economy, I will consider the contexts of Japan’s foreign political and 
foreign economic relations.  
170 These contexts include looking at decision makers’ general views of Japanese society and social/cultural 
change.  Drawing upon both anthropology and political science, I define culture as all learned behavior and 








Overview of Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy System 
 
 
Introduction: Contexts, Concepts–Western, Japanese 
 
 
 Foreign aid (ODA, official development assistance) rose in the Western world 
after World War II, first in the United States, as a tool to rebuild damaged European 
nations, and to forestall the spread of communism.171 As Europe rebuilt, increasing 
amounts of aid went to other world regions, including Asia. In Asia, Japan and India in 
particular benefited from large amounts of aid, Japan through the 1960s. ODA has been 
used as a tool to cultivate allies, protect friends, discourage enemies, and to begin to 
attack other problems in international development, poverty, and security issues.172 
 After the American occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952, Japan began giving 
aid (as war reparations) to other nations in non-communist Asia. As Japan grew as an 
economic superpower in the postwar period, attention grew to the fact that it did not 
make many contributions to global security beyond hosting American bases, mostly due 
to the limitations from the peace constitution imposed on it after World War II. To 
answer charges that it was a “free rider,” Japan began increasing the amounts of its ODA 
                                                
171 Here I am not considering aid from the communist world, including aid from such nations as the Soviet 
Union, China, and Cuba to other regions, such as Africa. 
172 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 364. 
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to support the foreign policy goals of its American and other Western allies. Japan also 
wished to use aid to improve its relations with its Asian neighbors who remained angry 
and doubtful about Japan after the suffering they experienced during World War II. Japan 
felt it could also gain support as a regional leader in Asia through these efforts. Japan also 
hoped to use ODA to build positive relations with far away developing countries with 
which it had no historic relations, so that they might support Japan’s efforts to gain 
leadership positions in international organizations such as the United Nations. Aid 
assumed a prominent position in Japanese foreign policy since Japan has had few 
diplomatic tools available to it in the postwar period. This is partly due to Japan’s painful 
history of militarism, dictatorship, and the bombings of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
and other Japanese cities after World War II. There are also the limitations of the peace 
constitution, which limit, in principle, Japan’s capacity to build up a strong military 
beyond that needed for defense, and strict prohibitions, until recently, on dispatching 
Japanese troops to overseas conflicts. So Japan has had to use ODA to build its own 
international reputation and security, and to support its Western allies, among other 
issues.173 
 Stated simply, foreign aid is “…a transfer of resources and knowledge from 
industrialized to developing countries.”174 One important form of foreign aid is ODA 
(Official Development Assistance). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines ODA as: 
                                                
173 David M. Arase, Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions (London: Routledge, 2005), 
12-13. 
174 Tsukasa Takamine, Japan's Development Aid to China: The Long-Running Foreign Policy of 
Engagement (London: Routledge, 2006), 1.  
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1) given by official agencies, 2) provided with the enhancement of the welfare and 
economic development of developing countries as its primary goal, and 3) as recipient-
friendly (concessional) and refraining from imposing extreme burdens on aid recipients. 
To avoid doing so, it must include at least 25 percent provided as grant aid. ODA differs 
from two other kinds of financing for international development. OOF refers to “other 
official flows,” which means aid given by donor nations that includes less than 25 percent 
given as a grant. Export-import banks of developed countries commonly provide OOF. 
PF (“private flows”) include commercial loans given by private banks.175    
 According to Okita Saburo, through the late 1970s, there were two prominent 
lines of [Western] thought regarding foreign aid.  One, the efficiency principle of 
assistance, advocated aid to countries that could attain viable economic growth. The 
other, the basic needs approach, emphasized giving aid to meet the basic human needs of 
those in the poorest countries176.  By the late 1980s, aid was also defined as having 
altruistic or commercial components. Altruistic aid is often for humanitarian purposes, 
and carries no expectation of repayment to the donor country.177  
 Japanese ODA (Official Development Assistance) refers to foreign aid that is 
coordinated by the Japanese government.  Japan’s ODA program began in 1954, while 
Japan itself received aid from the World Bank to aid in the postwar reconstruction of its 
economy. From the late 1950s to the early 1980s, Japanese ODA policy mainly focused 
                                                
175 Ibid., 2. 
176 Saburo Okita, “Current Thinking About Development,” in his The Developing Economies and Japan 
(Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1980), 5-12. 
177 Terutomo Ozawa, Recycling Japan's Surpluses for Developing Countries (Paris, France: Development 
Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1989), 96-97. 
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on augmenting Japan’s domestic development, not the needs of LDCs.178 Japan’s aid 
increased almost every year since 1954,179 until 1998, when Japan’s economic recession 
forced the first aid cuts in decades. The general downward trend in Japan’s aid budget has 
continued since the late 1990s.180 According to Hanabusa, through the 1980s, Japan’s 
ODA was genuinely oriented toward promoting economic and social development in the 
third world, and not merely commercial gain. He argues that Japan’s concept of 
economic cooperation is broader then “official development assistance,” as commonly 
defined by the DAC countries.181 In the Japanese concept of aid, there is also 
commercially-motivated aid, which “ …entails the development of commercial relations 
between the donor and the recipient that are expected to bring economic gains to both 
parties, even though such gains may not be so evenly distributed.”  Successful economic 
development involving industry includes technologies, managerial skills, business 
experience and access to markets. These are key areas in which the private, commercial 
sector excels.182 
 Japan’s aid has gradually expanded to include recipients outside of Asia, and 
strategic, political goals, in addition to economic ones.  Japan’s ODA is divided into two 
                                                
178 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership (London: Routledge, 1993), 
19-21. 
179 Some of the information up to this point in this paragraph was taken from the following websites all 
accessed 17 September 2003:  JBIC, available from http://www.jbic.go.jp/ 
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forms, multilateral ODA and bilateral ODA.  Multilateral ODA consists of subscriptions 
and contributions to international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank.  
Bilateral ODA includes grants (grant aid and technical cooperation) and loans.  Grants 
are provided by JICA, while loans are released by JBIC.183 Japan’s new aid policy will 
also require increased oversight (and monitoring) of the aid process on the part of Japan, 
the donor nation. Usually aid has been provided on the basis of requests from potential 
recipients.  The majority of Japan’s ODA loans go to Asian countries.  ODA loans from 
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations (OECO) of the JBIC accounted for 40 
percent of Japan’s ODA in 2003, making them the “…cornerstone of Japanese ODA 
policy.”  Japan’s budget for total ODA for fiscal year 1999 was $15.385 billion.184 Critics 
of Japanese aid have argued that its true commercial purposes are masked by 
humanitarian rhetoric. In practice, humanitarianism is not an insignificant portion of 
international ODA, from Western, Japanese or other donors. But, given global 
competition and the flexible nature of ODA, it really serves a wide variety of diplomatic 
and other interests.185 
                                                
183 See JICA and JBIC in the Glossary section. In October 2008, the loan functions of JBIC were to be 
incorporated into a new aid agency, the “new” JICA. For more details, see later in this chapter. 
184 Information about Japanese ODA was taken from the following websites (all accessed 17 September 




185 Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 1, 3. This point is argued by several ODA scholars, including 
Ibid.; Peter J. Schraeder, Bruce Taylor, and Steven W. Hook, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A 
Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows." World Politics 50(2) (1998), 294-23; 
and Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 14.  
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 The forerunner of Japan’s system of official development assistance was post 
World War II reparations, and came to gradually include diplomatic, political, and 
humanitarian goals.186 Haider Khan has argued that 
…the structure of Japanese aid has gone through several stages leading to 
…[Japan’s] emergence as …[a] leading aid donor. …The motivation for giving aid 
has changed from purely economic to both economic and diplomatic reasons; … 
humanitarian concerns have also been given a voice. …The process of aid giving is 
a complex one. Both domestic bureaucratic and interest group politics are 
significant. International pressures play a major role as well.187 
 
It is possible to identify at least five major themes in the evolution of Japan’s foreign aid: 
diversification (disbursement of aid for foreign policy purposes beyond development 
alone, and beyond the Asian region), politicization (the use of aid for purposes beyond 
national economic gain, for broader political and strategic goals), multilateralization 
(increased aid coordination with other donors, and disbursement of aid through 
international organizations and other multilateral channels, beyond bilateral ones), and 
philosophizing (allowing Japan to contribute more broadly to aid and development: not 
just funding, but ideas too).188 A fifth stage is retraction and accountability (pressure to 
decrease aid disbursements, increase aid’s efficiency and public openness, streamline the 
aid bureaucracy and bring it more in line with international norms).189 
 Although narrow trade and economic interests drove earlier Japanese aid, by the 
1990s, security became one of the most important components of Japanese foreign 
policy. As Japan’s aid disbursements became increasingly globalized, they contributed to 
                                                
186 Mari Yamauchi, “Trends in Development Aid in Major Developed Countries,” In eds., Takamasa 
Akiyama and Masanori Kondo Global ODA Since the Monterrey Conference (Tokyo: FASID [Foundation 
for Advanced Studies on International Development]), 2003, 83. 
187 Haider A. Khan, “Japanese Foreign Aid,” (Unpublished paper, 1991), 17. 
188 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 3-4. 
189 This theme has emerged due to the prolonged economic recession in Japan since the early 1990s. 
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a broader range of issues, including environmental protection, humanitarian and refugee 
assistance, peacekeeping, aid for Eastern Europe, and the dismantling of nuclear weapons 
and other threats in the former Soviet Union and North Korea. Aid could be Japan’s 
means to help counter global criticisms stemming from its war guilt, “closed” markets, 
difficult trade imbalances, and “free-riding” through defense help from the United States. 
Yasutomo concludes that the rise of Japan’s aid programs happened through “…necessity 
and accident, pragmatism and idealism, fortuitous timing and opportunism,” and 
pressures both abroad and at home.190 
As noted in Chapter 1, I am applying largely cognitive, perceptual, and non-
materialist models to the study of Japanese foreign aid. Is such an approach inherently 
superior to a materialist, more economic approach? I do not believe it is. Earlier we noted 
the now rather antiquated debate among anthropologists about whether ideas cause social 
conditions or the reverse (called the debate between cultural idealism and historical 
materialism). Anthropologists now choose to view this relationship in a more holistic 
fashion, realizing that material and mentalist phenomena interact with and influence each 
other. The influence does not go mainly one way or the other. In the anthropological 
study of Western and non-Western worldviews, a divide between material and spiritual 
forces is also often noted. As discussed in Chapter 1, Paul Hiebert called this distinction, 
most common in the worldviews of Westerners, the Flaw of the Excluded Middle.191 In 
this project, I discuss both material and spiritual aspects of Japanese worldviews about 
technology, development, foreign relations, and other important themes germane to the 
                                                
190 Ibid. 




research. My ideational approach is not meant to demean material arguments or 
approaches, which also have great value. Rather, in this project I have chosen to focus on 
the ideational background of Japanese aid. For the most effective understanding of 
Japanese aid, and foreign aid in general, certainly both materialist and ideational 
approaches are needed. 
 
History and Philosophy of Japanese Aid192 
 
 
  Next I present major themes and developments in the history of Japanese ODA, 
over several decades, in a series of tables. This is followed by a discussion of the major 
debates over the philosophies behind Japanese aid.  
 
 
Table 2.1 History of Japanese Aid, 1950s 
Theme:        Time frame:  Details: 
War reparations Early 1950s to 
1965193 
Japanese government begins paying reparations (baisho) 
to other Asian nations for war damage in World War II, 
with goals to promote Japanese exports, access to their 
resources, and to recover Japan’s influence there. These 
efforts include public-private partnership, and 
cooperation of various ministries.194 Unique public-
private partnerships will become a permanent feature in 
Japanese aid.  
Types of aid 
interests 
1950s to 1960s Economic interests in aid: strong. Political, strategic 
interests: somewhat present (aid is offered to Asian 
nations in the Free World camp, due to the Cold War and 
                                                
192 For an excellent, succinct treatment of the history of Japanese aid from the 1950s through the early 
2000s, see Keiko Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and 
Development Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 164-176. 
193 William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr, Jr., “Japan’s Foreign Economic Assistance,” Asian Survey 25 
(March 1985), 323, 327.  
194 Beaudry, Micheline, and Chris M. Cook, Japan's System of Official Development Assistance. Profiles in 
partnership, no. 1 (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999), Chapter 1. At  
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9308-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html#begining. Internet; accessed 9 August 2008; and 
Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, v-viii. 
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Japan’s leadership aspirations there), but subdued in 




1950s Japan: aided by massive infusions of aid from the United 
States, much borrowing from the World Bank.196 
Key factors in 
Japan’s growth 
1950s to 1960s Japan’s abundant human resources, national unity, good 
education system, wise governmental economic policies, 
vibrant business sector, open international economy.197 
Types of aid 
offered to other 
countries  
1950s Japan’s first multilateral aid offered through its 
participation in the Colombo Plan. Japan’s first bilateral 
aid loan given (to India). Aid called “economic 
cooperation” (not ODA) to partly conceal the relatively 





Table 2.2 History of Japanese Aid, 1960s 
Theme:                     Time       Details: 
             frame: 
Aid goals, practices 1960s Along with export promotion,199 a main goal of Japanese 
ODA is kaihatsu yunyû (the “develop-and-import formula”), 
to encourage developing countries to produce primary 
products and raw materials, and to improve trade imbalances 
in Japan’s favor. In practice, Japanese technology and know-
how migrates to nations with greater resources and energy 
supplies.200 
Yen loans 1960s Japan begins extending yen loans to promote purchase of 
Japanese products by LDCs.201 
Coordination with 
international donors 
1964 Japan joins the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development). The OECD encourages 
economic cooperation among its members, and attempts to 
coordinate the bilateral aid programs of its members.202 
Regional distribution 




Asia receives almost 100 percent of Japanese aid.203 
 
                                                                                                                                            




199 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2 
200 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, v-viii. 
201 Micheline Beaudry-Somcynsky and Chris M. Cook, Japan's System of Official Development Assistance 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999), Chapter 1.  Available from 
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9308-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html#begining. Internet; accessed 9 August 2008.  
202 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 3. 
203 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8. 
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Table 2.3 History of Japanese Aid, 1970s  
Theme:              Time  Details: 




1970s ODA offered to various communist Asian nations, including 
Mongolia, Vietnam, and China. Offers of aid to Vietnam and 
Afghanistan later withdrawn in line with policies of the U.S. and 
ASEAN.204 Resource diplomacy: aid offers shifted from Israel to 
Arab and Palestinian interests after 1973-74 oil shock.205 The oil 
crises of the 1970s lead Japan to seek to use ODA as a means to 
gain access to needed natural resources.206 Late 1970s to late 
1980s: new emphasis in Japan’s aid on basic human needs, poorer 
countries, and on humanitarian needs of strategic countries. Late 
1970s: aid policy is more politicized to include strategic and 
economic objectives.207 Economic pressures on Japan increase, 
due to close economic relations with the U.S., the large U.S.-
Japan trade imbalance, and Japan’s worries about protectionism 
in the U.S. The U.S. and other Western nations put increasing 
pressure on Japan to participate in “burden sharing” and to 
contribute financially to global security and development. So 
Japanese policymakers evolve the new concept of 
“comprehensive security,”208 and political and strategic concerns 
continue to be manifested in Japan’s aid. The Ohira cabinet 
(1978-80) initiates aid to “countries bordering conflict,” “front-
line states” of value to the U.S., such as Thailand, Pakistan, 
Turkey, and China. Aid becomes a prime foreign policy tool of 
Japan for both third and first world nations (late 1970s).209 




Renewed emphasis on aid to Asia. Global influences on this 
trend: America’s defeat in Vietnam (1975), Sino-American 
thawing of relations (early 1970s), implications for Japan and 
Asia of the “Nixon Doctrine” (1969), and the shock of riots in 
Southeast Asia against Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit 
(1973).210 Then ODA terms to SE Asia are softened, amounts and 
recipients increased. Mid-1970s: Prime Minister Miki Takeo 
announces Japan’s new “Asian Marshall Plan,” to bring a 
doubling in rice production in Asia, partly through the Asian 
                                                
204 Ibid., 7, 12.  
205 Ibid., 6-8; and Hirata, Civil Society, 167-168. 
206 Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, Chapter 1. The oil shock, plus the “Nixon shock” 
(President Nixon’s 1972 surprise visit to China without consulting Japan in advance) showed Japan that the 
United States would do whatever was in its own interests first, and that Japan could not necessarily count 
on the latter to guarantee its access to vital resources. Japan saw the need to further globalize its 
international relations, especially with regions possessing abundant natural resources (Koppel and Orr, 
Japan’s Foreign Aid, 342-344). 
207 Dennis T. Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, 5. 
208 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2. 




Development Bank. Fukuda (Manila) Doctrine announced 
(1978): plan to offer $1 billion to various ASEAN projects.211 
Aid increases 1977 Prime Minister Fukuda’s cabinet pledges to double the amount of 






Middle East, Latin America, Africa each receive about 10 percent 





Table 2.4 History of Japanese Aid, 1980s 
Theme:            Time   Details: 








to late  
1980s 
Japan changes from the position of a debtor country to become the 
world’s largest creditor (1985). Its surpluses near $100 billion.214 
Japan’s aid budget rapidly increases after the appreciation of the yen 
(1985), resulting in extensive plans to recycle Japan’s economic 
surpluses as ODA.215 Late 1980s: Japan has an annual trade surplus of 
$80 billion, the largest of any nation in history. It continues to face the 
unusual economic problem of having to recycle its enormous surplus 
funds, and responds with massive programs of domestic and 
international investment, and more proposals for gigantic increases in 
aid.216 Japan creates new forms of “hybrid” aid (Minkatsu), which 
combine public and private sources to encourage “comprehensive 
development.”217 Late 1980s: despite growth, major criticisms of 
Japan’s ODA emerge: that it lacks transparency, is corrupt, has 




1980s The U.S. puts more pressure Japan to increase its ODA. Japanese 
policymakers increasingly view aid as a foreign policy tool, not just 
one for international trade.219 Economic emphasis of Japan’s ODA 
shifts from export promotion and gaining access to resources to 
promoting Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI), to encourage 
                                                                                                                                            
211 Ibid. The Fukuda Doctrine was important because it showed Japan’s new willingness to use aid to its aid 
in Southeast Asia for political, not just economic, purposes. Fukuda’s pledge to increase aid to ASEAN 
also signaled Japan’s first effort to greatly increase the quantity of its aid (Hirata, Civil Society, 169). 
212 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ozawa, Recycling Japan's Surpluses; and Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8-9. 
215 Dilip K. Das, The Yen Appreciation and the International Economy [New York: New York University 
Press]), 1993. Das explores economic aspects and issues related to the Plaza Accord decision by leading 
industrialized nations (in 1985) to double the value of the yen in the international economy, and how 
Japanese ODA was influenced by the appreciation of the yen. The recycling schemes are explored in more 
depth in Ozawa, Recycling Japan's Surpluses. 
216Ibid. 
217 Ibid., 7-12. 
218 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 123. 
219 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2-3. 
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Japanese firms to gradually shift production overseas. Mid-1980s: 4 
areas selected for special attention: rural and agricultural development, 
new and renewable energies, technical assistance, promotion of small 
and medium-sized businesses in LDCs.220 Late 1980s: Japan’s aid 
agenda begins to adopt more global concerns.221 Japanese aid becomes 
more multidimensional, global, political, generous, independent, and 




1980s Strategic and political objectives intensify in Japan’s aid, which the 
government tends to deny. 1981: Prime Minister Suzuki pledges that 
Japan will “…strengthen its aid to areas which are important to the 
maintenance of peace and stability of the world.”223 His cabinet (1980-
82) adopts “comprehensive national security” as official policy, but 
calls it “ODA” to “areas that are important for the maintenance of 
peace and stability in the world.” From 1982 to 1987, under Prime 
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, Japan approves a $4 billion aid program 
for South Korea, and limited aid to the Soviet Union and the 
Philippines, to voice opposition to the policies of the latter two.224 In 
response to the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Japan joins other 
Western nations in economic sanctions against China, but soon 










1980s Total Japanese aid flows, 1980: $3.3 billion, increasing to $50 billion 
in 1986.226 1986-1989: Era of “capital recycling” Japan approves three 
debt relief programs for third world nations to recycle its enormous 
economic surpluses, to be disbursed through bilateral and international 
financial institutional means.227 Late 1980s: Japan’s aid disbursements 
to Asia drop to around 60 percent of the total, yet the overall amount 
increases greatly, including to Asia.228 Japan surpasses the U.S. to 
become the world’s largest bilateral foreign aid donor,229 partly due to 
the size and growth of Japan’s economy, its position in the Western 
alliance as a leading industrialized nation, and its desire to contribute 
to world peace and security. Japan also needs stability in world affairs 
to assure a smooth supply of raw materials.230 Japan seeks to better 
coordinate its aid with other donors, and to diversify its aid recipients 
beyond Asia and through contributions to international and 
multilateral organizations.231 
 
                                                                                                                                            
220 Brooks and Orr, “Japan’s Foreign Economic Assistance,” 323, 327. 
221 Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, Chapter 1. 
222 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 6; and Orr, “Rising Sun,” 41. 
223 Yasutomo, Manner of Giving. 
224 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8-10. 
225 Ibid., 11-12. 
226 Ibid., 8. 
227 Ibid., 8-9; Hirata, Civil Society, 170-171. 
228 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8. 
229 This means the world’s largest donor of bilateral foreign aid in dollar terms (Arase, Japan’s Foreign 
Aid, 3); Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 9. 
230 Brooks and Orr, “Japan’s Foreign Economic Assistance,” 322-323; and Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, 2. 
231 Das, Yen Appreciation, 163, 170-171. 
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Table 2.5 History of Japanese aid, 1990s 
Theme:         Time         Details: 
    frame: 




Collapse of Japan’s huge bubble economy, the Gulf War, the after 
effects of the Tiananmen Square incident. Increasing emphasis on 
humanitarian (“soft”) aid and aid to LLDCs; continued emphasis on 
infrastructural, “hard” aid for capital projects.232 Collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the former Soviet 
Union; Japan’s offer of aid to many emerging states in those regions, 
for democratization and human rights. 1991-2001: Japan remains the 
world’s largest donor of bilateral foreign aid.233 Japan approves the 
1992 ODA Charter, concretely expressing goals for ODA.234 
Japanese aid flow increases to $70-$75 billion by 1993.235 1990s: 
Japan’s government devises creative new schemes to increase 
cooperation with NGOs, i.e. postal savings donations for NGOs.236 
By the mid-1990s, a new aid activism rises in Japan.237 1998: Japan 
is forced to make aid cuts for the first time in decades, due to its 
continuing economic retraction.238 Other problems: more public 
criticisms of aid corruption, aid to China, and political scandals 
related to ODA.239 Late 1990s: Japan’s aid expands to a more global 
agenda, including environmental issues, conflict resolution, post-
conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, humanitarian and refugee 
assistance, development projects, and efforts by international 







International factors, along with domestic ones, began to influence 
the development of Japan’s ODA system.242 Japan quietly avoids use 
of aid sanctions, contrary to American views, believing that aid is 
more effective as a positive political tool. Major aid is given for 
humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts in the Persian Gulf region 
and Africa. Japanese aid has a major role in contributing to peace 
and free elections in Cambodia. For this, ODA is combined with the 
                                                
232 Keiko Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development 
Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 165, 174-176. Hirata describes the challenges for Japan of 
offering soft (humanitarian) aid, as opposed to hard aid (for capital projects). Japan is much better equipped 
to offer the latter, not the former. 
233 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 3. 
234 For more details on the 1992 ODA Charter, see the discussion later in this chapter on Japan’s aid 
philosophy. 
235 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8, 10-11. 
236 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 122. 
237 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 3-4. 
238 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 3. 
239 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 129-130. 
240 Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, Chapter 1. 
241 Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2007, “Japan's International Cooperation,” 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ ODA2007/ html/honpen/index.htm, Internet; accessed 16 
August 2008. 
242 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 83. 
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first dispatch of the Japanese military (Self Defense Forces) to the 
Asian mainland since World War II.243 New Japanese ODA to 
former communist states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union further expands the global scope of Japan’s ODA.244 Despite 
Japan’s large aid budget, and globalization of aid, Western aid critics 
remain largely ignorant of the Japanese/East Asian development 
model’s possible usefulness for other regions.245 





More aid given via United Nations, multilateral development banks, 
and Group of Seven nations. Spending for multilateral bank aid 
especially increases. Multilateral aid in particular shows excellent 
evidence of new activism in Japanese foreign policy at this time.246 
Japanese 
ODA in Asia 
1990s Japan maintains its priority of giving aid to Asia, arguing that most 
of the world’s poor still live there. Several of former aid recipients 
like South Korea and Taiwan now become donors themselves. Japan 
expands its aid to new Asian recipients, such as the former Soviet 
Central Asian republics.247 With the Asian economic crisis of the late 
1990s, Japan receives many requests for aid from other Asian 
countries, briefly delays cuts in its own aid budget.248 1995, 1998: 
Japan suspends some aid to China, India and Pakistan because of 


















                                                                                                                                            
243 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 11. 
244 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 347-348. 
245 For example, although Japan funded the study and publication of efforts such as The East Asian Miracle 
by the World Bank in 1993 (World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy 
(New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1993), many Western aid experts largely failed to recognize 
lessons from Japan and East Asia for other regions. 
246 The last point is Yasutomo’s in The New Multilateralism, 15-16. 
247 Ibid., 12-13. 
248 Hirata, Civil Society, 165, 171, 175. 
249 Japan's White Paper, “Japan's International Cooperation.” 
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Table 2.6 History of Japanese Aid, 2000s 
Theme:            Time         Details: 








2000s Japan’s aid seeks to contribute to world peace and prosperity by aid 
for economic development and infrastructure. Japanese ODA 
continues to emphasize spirits of self-help, self-reliance with large 
emphases on ODA loans and request-based aid.250 2000: Japan 
Platform group founded to encourage cooperation among the 
government, business, and NGO sectors.251 Early 2000s: desire to 
base Japan’s ODA on the Japanese and Asian development model 
resurfaces.252 Decreases in Japan’s aid budget continue through 
2003.253 Early 2000s: mounting domestic and public pressures 
(naiatsu) for ODA reform lead the government to create new ODA 
advisory boards and councils.254 Increased global focus of Japanese 
ODA continues. 2002, 2004: Both JBIC and JICA announce new 
guidelines for considering environmental and social issues.255 The 
2003 ODA Charter stresses goals of aid efficiency and quality, 
Japan’s own security and prosperity, and global goals of poverty 
reduction and conflict management.256 2003: JICA to be turned into 
an “independent administrative institution.”257 2005: Prime Minister 
Koizumi Junichiro announces plan called “small government” to 
downsize Japan’s aid bureaucracy, increase efficiency and 
responsiveness to the Japanese public. Japan pledges to increase its 
ODA by $10 billion by 2010, and to double aid to Africa by 2008. 
Late 2008: JICA and JBIC’s ODA arm to merge into a new super aid 





2000s Early 2000s: Japan announces the goal to use aid as a “diplomatic 
weapon.” 2002: Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro announces goal 
to use aid to promote conflict prevention and peace.259 Goals for 
political development and democracy continue.260 The 2003 ODA 
                                                
250 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 117-119.  
251 Japan's White Paper, “Japan's International Cooperation.” For more on the Japan Platform, see Japan 
Platform, http://www.japanplatform.org/E/ work/index.html. Internet; accessed 12 August 2008. 
252 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 268-269. 
253 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 129. 
254 Ibid., 130-132. Critics like Lancaster charge that these attempts at reform will likely fail to change to 
fundamental nature of Japanese aid. 
255 Japan's White Paper, “Japan's International Cooperation.” 
256 Hirata, Civil Society, 175; and Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 131. 
257 Japan's White Paper, “Japan's International Cooperation.” 
258 Japan International Cooperation Agency, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/ about/oda.html, Internet; 
accessed 9 August 2008. 
259 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 103-104. 






Charter stresses goals of efficiency in Japan’s ODA and ensuring its 
contribution to pressing global issues.261 2003, 2008: Two more 
major aid conferences on aid to Africa convene in Tokyo as a result 
of varied motives.262 Japan makes various contributions to global aid 
efforts, including aid to China, Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, 
and global issues such as debt relief, NGOs, global health, the 
environment, conflict, grassroots development, gender and disaster 
relief.263 Many Western and international aid experts from groups 
like the World Bank continue to offer significant critiques of Japan’s 
aid and development efforts and to discount their usefulness for 
other regions.264   
 
 
 Does Japan have an aid philosophy? This has been a vigorous matter of debate 
for some time, involving scholars from both Japan and overseas.265 Official explanations 
of the main objectives in aid have greatly varied through the years, often according to the 
differing priorities of the various ministries that are involved.266 Dennis Yasutomo 
                                                                                                                                            
261 See further comments later in this chapter in the section on Japan’s aid philosophy in the decade of the 
2000s. 
262 For more information on these two conferences, see The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The 
Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) in Yokohama,” available 
from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/Africa/ticad/ticad4/ index.html. Internet; accessed 16 August 2008; and 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, available from 
http://www/mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/html/ zuhyo/zu020031.htm, Internet; accessed 15 
August 2008. Likely motives for these conferences include the desire to support the humanitarian goals of 
the global aid agenda, to increase Japan’s strategic natural resources, and to compete with China in its quest 
to gain resources from and influence in Africa. 
263Ibid. 
264 See the critiques presented by many Western scholars in Part I of Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. In 
another example, Western aid expert Carol Lancaster calls Japan “…more a niche player in development 
aid rather than a world leader” (Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 110).  
265 For example, Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid (1975) examines Japanese aid goals (including political 
and diplomatic ones), what its ODA does in practice (p. 144), its history and accomplishments from 1953 
to 1973, Japan’s aid policies, types and distribution of aid, the aid bureaucracy for multilateral and 
technical assistance through the early 1970s, and aid policy administration and formulation. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, Japanese international economics expert Okita Saburo argued that aid from the 
developed countries should be coupled with efforts of the developing countries to meet their own basic 
needs, and that Asian developing countries, with their limited land and huge populations, face problems 
different from nations elsewhere. With much surplus labor, the creation of productive employment is a key 
need in both rural and urban areas (Okita, Developing Economies and Japan, 6-10, 12). 
266 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 19-21. For example, aid goals for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) from the late 1950s through the early 1980s focused on international and foreign policy issues, 
such as the early 1970s oil crisis, and basic human needs, while the Ministry of International Trade and 




contended in the mid-1990s that there is a “mainstream” view that argues that Japan does 
not have an aid philosophy. There are five basic versions of this argument. In the first, 
Japan cannot develop an aid philosophy, for several reasons. It has historically lacked a 
charitable tradition, especially toward foreign nations, and its complex aid bureaucracy 
and policymaking processes make the development of a holistic philosophy 
impossible.267 A second argument that Japan does not have an aid philosophy is because 
one is not necessary. The purpose of its aid is simply to help the Japanese economy and 
Japanese firms. A third argument against a Japanese aid argument is that it should not 
have one. The request-based approach is best, and Japan’s traditional policy of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations should be maintained. A fourth 
argument is that Japan has no aid philosophy because it borrows aid philosophy from the 
United States or from other international sources. A fifth argument acknowledges that 
Japan lacks an aid philosophy, but that it should, to defend Japanese aid policy to both the 
Japanese public and to international critics.268 
 Others contend that Japan does have an aid philosophy. Das argues that 
Japanese aid policy lacked a significant philosophy (beyond “pragmatism” and 
“opportunism”) until about 1980.269 There are several arguments supporting this position. 
According to the first, Japan has had an aid philosophy from the start of its aid, stressing 
                                                
267 An additional argument that Japan does not need an aid philosophy is that a specific philosophy would 
violate the Japanese principles of request-based aid and self-help, since recipients best know their own 
needs. 
268 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism. 
269 Das, Yen Appreciation, 157-158. Similar to Das, Yamauchi contends that before 1990, Japanese aid was 
criticized as an aid system without a philosophy, since it was largely based on the requests of recipient 
countries. But as the volume and diplomatic issues surrounding aid greatly increased after 1980, domestic 
debate about a philosophy for aid ensued. In the light of these pressures, the government finally prepared 
Japan’s first ODA Charter in 1992 (Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 101).  
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commercialism and self-help, at first, for Japan.270 During the Cold War, Japan’s aid 
philosophy incorporated Free World, anti-communist principles. After the Cold War, 
these ideals have at least partially developed into goals to support leading development 
ideologies touted by international financial institutions and Western donor nations, 
including democratization, free markets, and civil rights. But Japan’s aid philosophy has 
not been political, but development-oriented. In this view, political goals such as anti-
communism, democracy, and diplomacy obstruct genuine economic development.271 So 
since the 1950s, Japan’s aid philosophy has stressed 
…a belief in self-reliance and self-help on the part of the recipient; a request-based 
aid philosophy; separation of politics from economics; emphasis on infrastructure; 
attention to the social infrastructure and the welfare of the masses. All of these 
constituted a Japanese development philosophy that has guided [Japan’s] ODA all 
along [through the mid-1990s]. It was practical and results-oriented rather than 
political and ideological, which as a rule are obstacles to genuine and effective 
development.272   
 
 A second pro-aid philosophy argument contends that Japan’s aid philosophy 
developed slowly. In one version, from the 1950s to the 1960s, Japan did not have an aid 
philosophy, but it has since the 1970s, when the concept of comprehensive national 
                                                
270 A variant on this argument is Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid. He contends that from 1953 to 1973, 
the Japanese government claimed that the goals of its aid were promoting world peace and economic 
growth (needed for Japan’s security), through improving living conditions in the LDCs (Hasegawa, 
Japanese Foreign Aid, 144). But Hasegawa argues in reality, that the major goals of Japanese aid were to 
strengthen Japan’s national interest (kokueki) and two national goals: national development and 
international ascendancy. During the first ten years, aid goals focused on Japan’s commercial purposes and 
its internal material well-being. In the second ten years, aid connected with attempts to improve Japan’s 
social welfare, its role as a potential leader in Asia, and its assumption of a proper role in the global 
community (Ibid., v). 
271 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 29. 
272 Ibid. Rix also discusses Japan’s “aid philosophy” from the 1950s through the early 1990s (Rix, Japan’s 
Foreign Aid Challenge, Chapter 1). Similar to my arguments in this dissertation, Rix argues that closely 
related to the idea of aid philosophy are the historical and cultural antecedents of aid, including contexts, 
motives and rationales behind aid (Ibid., 15-19). See my discussion of these issues later in this chapter.  
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security came into being.273 The aid philosophy evolved through various stages,274 until 
the early 1990s, when Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki (1989-1991) expressed it as: 
“democracy, freedom and a market economy must be the framework for any country 
offered assistance.”275 With the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan’s first fully formed and 
articulated ODA philosophy emerged.276 According to Rix, official explanations of 
Japanese aid in the early 1990s were fairly clear about the basic rationale behind Japan’s 
aid, but left many questions unanswered, including the underlying, fundamental 
objectives of Japan’s government.277 
 In a third argument, Japan’s aid philosophy finally emerged with the 1992 ODA 
Charter. It could not have been developed at earlier stages. Only the unique 
circumstances of the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War allowed such a philosophy to 
arise.278 According to the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan became committed to working with 
the least among the less developed countries (LLDCs) and other LDCs, to address 
                                                
273 Japanese politicians have evolved the concept of “comprehensive national security” since 1978. It 
stresses the use of foreign aid to maintain friendly international relations, to enhance national prestige, and 
to show Japan’s Western allies that Japan is loyal because it aids nations that are important to Western 
security interests (Yasutomo, Manner of Giving). 
274 Information up to this point is from Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 29-30. Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid 
Challenge, argues that Japan has had an aid philosophy since the 1950s, first clearly articulated in the 1992 
ODA Charter and similar statements, such as Kaifu’s. By the 1990s, aid assumed a high profile in Japanese 
society, given the large amount of taxpayer expenditures it entails. According to Rix, in the early 1990s, the 
key elements of the philosophy continued to include emphases on resources (and their connection with 
security), Japan’s national image, and trade—a focus more Japan’s economic security than on the needs of 
LDCs. Some aspects of aid were new: goals to use aid pragmatically, for humanitarian purposes, for global 
issues such as the environment, and to connect aid with political and economic reform objectives in 
recipients (ibid. Rix, 13, 31, 34-35, 41-43). Inject goals for recipient reforms into ODA signaled a “new 
wave,” a willingness to offer aid in a more politicized, interventionist manner, in Rix’s view (ibid. Rix, 33). 
Igarashi adds that by the early 1990s, Japanese aid included seven key objectives: “…reparations, trade 
promotion, comprehensive security, strategic aid, LDC economic welfare, economic power responsibility, 
[and viewing] …Japan as an aid power with international status” (Igarashi, “Keizai taikoku no kadai” in 
Igarashi 1990, cited in Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 32 and 200, n43). 
275 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 13-14. 
276 Ibid., 29-30. 
277 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 14. This suggests that deeper ethnographic research of these issues 
would be helpful. 
278 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 30. 
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“…basic human needs (BHN), poverty, environment, human-resource development, 
social and economic infrastructure, emergency humanitarian aid, support for the private 
sector, and structural adjustment,” and to strengthen international peace and stability, 
democratization, and market-based economies.279 Soon the Charter was augmented with 
the Medium-Term Policy on ODA (1999), which stressed goals of self-help efforts in 
recipients, partnership, balanced with aid for economic infrastructure, more coordination 
with NGOs, local governments and other civil society governments, support for South-
South cooperation, coordination of major ODA efforts through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA), and that Japan’s new ODA policies would be based on the DAC’s New 
Development Strategy (focused on social development and poverty alleviation).280 A 
significant question is how Japan’s 1992 ODA Charter, the related 1991 ODA guidelines 
and the 1999 Medium Term Policy Outline affected the evolution of Japan’s aid.281 The 
key question was: how much were these new guidelines used as key influences in aid 
decisions?282 By the early 2000s, there were doubts about how much the 1992 Charter 
                                                
279 In addition, the ODA Charter of 1992 stated that these factors would be considered in any offers of aid: 
military spending and arms trading, democratization, environmental conservation, basic human rights and 
freedoms, weapons of mass destruction, and market freedoms (Ibid., 13-14; and Kevin Morrison, “The 
World Bank, Japan, and Aid Effectiveness,” in David M.Arase, ed. Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities 
and New Directions [London and New York: Routledge, 2005], 23-40.). Some of the above information 
was also taken from these websites (all accessed 17 September 2003): 
http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/about/overseas/ A23/p15.php; 
http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/about/profile/index.php; http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-
bin/getcd.p15?ed20030917al.htm; http://www.jica.go.jp/ english/about/01.html. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 365, contended in 1993 that while there was little in the 1992 
Charter that was new, how it was implemented might be novel, given newly emerging public pressures for 
accountability and clarity. The 1992 Charter was related to four new ODA guidelines announced in 1991, 
which expressed several principles to be considered before granting aid: trends in LDCs’ military spending, 
production of weapons of mass destruction, import and export of weapons, and efforts for promoting 
democracy, free markets, human rights and freedoms (Ibid., 360-363, 365). 
282 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 36. 
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and the Medium Term Policy actually guided policy, since Japanese pronouncements 
have, under analysis, proven to not follow actual aid allocations by sector.283 
 
Table 2.7 Medium-term ODA Policy Outline 1999284 
Basic Approaches: 
Adherence to the DAC Development Partnership Strategy 
Promotion of good governance practices 
Priority given to individual recipient needs 
Role coordination among developing countries, donor countries, international organizations, 
private sector, and NGOs 
Human-centered development, LLDC needs, and human security 
More active domestic involvement in ODA 
Priority issues: 
Support for poverty alleviation and social development 
Support for economic and social infrastructure 
Human resources development and educational exchange 
Environment, health, population, food, energy, and narcotics issues 
Recovery and reform after the Asian financial crisis (1998) 
Conflict, disaster, and recovery assistance 
Debt relief 
 
 Another pro-aid philosophy argument contended in the mid-1990s that Japan 
did not yet have an aid philosophy, but would soon. During the 1990s, Japanese 
development economists and other policymakers focused on identifying common 
guidelines and principles based on the experiences of Japan and Asia, and arguing for 
them in multilateral banks and at other international venues. Japan’s aid philosophy, 
when it emerged, would be based on Japan’s development experience and the “Asian 
development model.” It would offer developing nations transferable lessons based on 
Japan’s and other Asian countries’ development, “…the common features of their 
                                                
283 Morrison, “World Bank,” 26-27.  
284 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 120. 
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‘economic miracles’.”285 By the late 1990s, several analysts argued that such an aid 
philosophy, based on Japan’s development model, not the West’s, had emerged.286 In this 
argument, Japan advocated development based on actual economic growth, self-help, 
efforts, and initiative from the LDCs: 
The Japanese government advocates the view that developing countries need to take 
responsibility for their own development, choose their own priorities, and mobilize 
their own efforts. Japanese economic cooperation changes the nature of the donor’s 
relations with developing countries from one based on humanitarian assistance to 
one based on a partnership for growth. Developing countries have been asking for 
years for trade, not aid. Japan has been successful in using public-sector financing 
under the OECD–DAC definition of ODA to leverage financing for, and investment 
in, developing countries from the Japanese private sector. Japan is very proud to 
point to its active involvement in bringing about the Southeast Asian miracle as a 
model for other donors to pursue with developing countries.287    
 
In the 1990s, there was also somewhat of a shift in aid policy to “results-oriented” and 
“client-centered” aid approaches, with an emphasis on “measurable” and “sustainable” 
                                                
285 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 30. One of the key fruits of these discussions is Ohno and Ohno, 
Japanese Views, a seminal volume that explores the reflections of major Japanese scholars on Japan’s 
development experiences. It has many valuable essays, such as Yonosuke Hara,  “A Blueprint for Asian 
Economics,” in Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno, eds. Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse 
Paths to the Market (London; New York: Routledge. 1998), 125-144; Shigeru Ishikawa, “Underdevelop-
ment of the Market Economy and the Limits of Economic Liberalization,” in Kenichi Ohno and Izumi 
Ohno, eds. Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market (London; New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 87-124; Yasusuke Murakami, “Theory of Developmentalism,” in Japanese Views on 
Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market, eds. Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno, 181-200 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1998); Kenichi Ohno, “Overview: Creating the Market Economy,” in 
Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market, eds. Kenichi Ohno and Izumi 
Ohno (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 1-50; and Toshio Watanabe, “Designing Asia for the Next 
Century,” in Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market, eds. Kenichi Ohno 
and Izumi Ohno (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 201-19. Another valuable treatment is Masaki 
Shiratori, “Afterword to the Japanese Translation of the World Bank Report the East Asian Miracle,” in 
Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market, eds. Kenichi Ohno and Izumi 
Ohno (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 77-83. 
286 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid (268) asserts that this development approach, based on the experiences of 
Japan and other East Asian countries with industrialization, emerged as early as the early 1990s, in reaction 
to Western economic neo-liberalism.  
287 According to this view, the basic philosophy of Japanese aid is based on “economic cooperation” or 
“development cooperation” between Japan and developing countries, not just on “aid” or “assistance” 
being given by “donors” to poor “recipient” nations, the common aid philosophy of many Western donors 
(Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, Chapter 1). 
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outcomes.288 From the mid-1990s, Japan has sought to incorporate more accountability, 
efficiency, transparency, and effectiveness into its aid, and to de-emphasize more 
conventional, large-scale, state-centric programs that neglect the needs of the poor.289 
 By the late 1990s, several critics noted basic differences in Western and 
Japanese aid philosophies. For example, they argued that most Western industrialized 
nations prefer an aid approach that favors helping the poorest nations to eliminate 
poverty, not helping to finance development of financial infrastructure. Japan, on the 
other hand, prefers to help with the latter, providing most of its aid through yen loans, to 
encourage LDC’s efforts to build economic and social infrastructure:290 
Japan’s view is that many developing countries require capital to build 
infrastructure for continuous economic development and that the countries cannot 
build enduring democratic systems, with continuous improvements in living 
standards, unless economic growth backs their efforts. Sustainably improving the 
living standards of the poor through their own self-help efforts is possible only 
when the economy of the country is fundamentally sound. The general belief in 
Japan is that its support for development in Southeast Asia — through a 
combination of ODA, trade, and private investment — played an important role in 
the region’s economic development and increased standard of living.291 
 
This emphasis on “self help” is often emphasized in Japan’s aid philosophy.292 
 How has Japan’s “aid philosophy” (or lack of one) evolved in the last decade?  
According to official sources, the purpose of Japan’s ODA is to contribute to global 
peace and prosperity through helping to stabilize the international economy, by 
                                                
288 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 117-119. 
289 Ibid., 119. For example, under the Hashimoto cabinet, in 1998, the ODA Reform Council released a 
report that called for improving aid reforms through “human-centered development” and relieving poverty, 
to be accomplished through improvements in areas including: partnerships with fellow donor nations, 
country-level coordination and planning, aid evaluation, field office presence, civil participation in 
recipient nations. These concerns are integrated with more conventional Japanese aid goals in the Medium 
Term Policy Outline (1999) (Ibid.). 





supporting “…economic infrastructures and social development in developing countries.”  
Japan’s aid philosophy continues to emphasize self-help and self-reliance, often through 
the provision of ODA loans,293 a request-based system,294 and goals for political 
development, such as democratization and human rights.295 This system (of loans, aid 
requests, and political goals) is influenced by Japan’s own experience in international 
relations and development.296 Since 2000, to try to better customize aid programs for 
recipient nations, Japan also initiated the preparation of Country Assistance Programs,297 
following principles in the 1992 ODA Charter and the 1999 Medium-Term Policy, the 
latter guiding overall aid policies for major recipient nations.298 In the early 2000s, Japan 
announced goals to use aid in diplomatically strategic, assertive ways.299 The 2003 ODA 
Charter stresses additional goals about the effects and efficiency of Japanese aid, 
                                                




294 Japan’s aid continues to feature a request-based system, to respect the sovereignty of recipients, and to 
reduce wasteful requests. The stress on “self-help” is to encourage national pride in the minds of the 
recipients. In line with this thought on self-help and reduction of waste, most of Japan’s aid is offered as 
yen loans (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 268-269). A request-based system inherently gives more priority to 
recipient governments than to other civic participants in an LDC (Ibid., 117-119). 
295 This information is from these following websites (all accessed 17 September 2003): 
http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/about/overseas/A23/p15.php; http://www.jbic.go.jp/ 
english/base/about/profile/index.php; http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/ getcd.p15?ed20030917al.htm; 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/01.html.  
296 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 117-119. These influences include emphases on strong, state-led efforts, 
infrastructural development, the need to respect the sovereignty of other nations, and a desire to respect the 
wishes of Western and other international donors. 
297 Some country evaluation reports of JICA’s technical aid to various countries can be found at 
http://jica.go.jp/english/publication/studyreport/country (Morrison, “World Bank,” 40, n46). 
298 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 101-103. 
299 Ibid., 103-104. Yamauchi stresses the “unique” nature of Japan’s aid diplomacy, and the initiation, in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, of special diplomatic goals for Japanese aid in four areas: infectious 
diseases, conflict and development, and aid in two regions: Africa and East Asia (Yamauchi, “Trends in 
Development,” 103-104).  
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especially on the international level.300 The stress on the “Japanese” or “Asian” 
development model, on development as a state-led process of trade and industrial growth 
driven by industrial projects that feature related technologies, seems to have resurfaced in 
Japan’s aid philosophy in the 2000s.301 It has both positive and negative aspects. Among 
the negative ones, critics argue that many developing countries do not have the 
institutional capacity to prepare applications for the complex Japanese system, and that 
the requirement for aid requests mainly from national governments shuts out other public 
and civil sector actors in LDCs.302 We also gain valuable perspectives on the philosophy 
of Japanese aid (in practice) by studying the perspectives of aid recipients about Japanese 
aid.303 
 
                                                
300 The 2003 Charter incorporates both national and international goals. According to the Charter, the 
effectiveness of Japanese aid must be improved.  It defines the purpose of Japanese aid as “contributing to 
the peace and development of the international community and thereby ensuring the nation’s security and 
prosperity,” amid complex problems associated with globalization, including human rights, pollution, 
terrorism, religious and ethnic conflicts, and the gap between rich and poor. The revised Charter continues 
to affirm traditional Japanese goals of giving priority to aid to Asia, physical infrastructural problems. But 
it fails to mention the MDGs (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 270, 272-273).  
301 Ibid., 268-269. 
302 Ibid. 
303 For example, according to Chinese scholar Feng, Japan’s ODA to Asia serves as an important policy 
tool for economic diplomacy. Its ODA to China serves in part to compensate China for its claims to war 
reparations (Shaokui Feng, “Japanese Aid to China,” in ed., David M. Arase, Buying Power: The Political 
Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid [Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995], 206). Fiji-based scholar 
Sandra Tarte finds that in its aid to Pacific Island states, in principle, Japan supports such international aid 
norms as poverty reduction, sustainability and self-reliance in development, human rights/security, and 
advancing its own national and foreign policy interests. In practice, however, Japan’s aid has a large 
presence in these nations in terms of amount, but not in political influence, due to Japan’s aid policy 
emphases on self-help and on non-interference in aid recipients’ political affairs (Sandra Tarte, “Japan’s 
ODA in the Pacific Island States,” in ed., David M. Arase, Buying Power: The Political Economy of 
Japan's Foreign Aid [Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995], 250-251). Thai scholar Anuman 
Leelasorn reports that technical Japanese aid to Thailand increasingly incorporates international, 
participatory norms (Anuman Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan and Other Donors in Thailand,” in ed. Arase, 
Japan’s Foreign Aid, 258-259). 
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 In Takamine Tsukasa’s analysis, there are five major approaches to analysis of 
the meaning of Japanese foreign aid:304 the commercial instrument approach,305 the 
approach of mercantile realism306 or strategic pragmatism,307 the reactive state 
approach,308 the proactive state approach,309 and the institutional analysis approach.310 
                                                
304 Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 7. For more details on Takamine’s categorization of analytical 
approaches to Japanese ODA, see the appropriate footnoted portions in this section. 
305 The commercial instrument approach refers to analyzing Japanese aid regarding its connections to 
commercial interests in Japan. Historically, Japanese aid was well known for having a high percentage of 
officially tied aid (the requirement that Japanese business interests be used for the provision of services or 
infrastructure connected with the aid). Scholars associated with this approach include Margee Ensign 
(Margee M. Ensign, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Japan's Foreign Aid Program (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992); and David P. Wright-Neville, The Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, 1950-1990: 
The Impact of Culture, Politics, and the International System on the Policy Formation Process (Clayton, 
Vic: Monash Development Studies Centre, 1991). Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid (7-8) criticizes the 
commercial instrument approach as inadequate to explain the complex factors, especially political and 
strategic elements, connected with Japanese ODA.  
306 Mercantile realism, Samuel’s analysis of major Japanese foreign policy goals, is directly related to the 
concept of technonationalism as ideology. See the definition of technonationalism as ideology in the 
Glossary section. 
307 The mercantile realism approach, developed by Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels (Eric 
Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” International 
Security 22(4) [Spring 1998], 171-203) stresses how Japan’s diplomatic and international economic 
policies emphasize enhancing its economic and technological positions in the international system, rather 
than its military one. According to their explanation, Japan’s technological and economic security interests 
are more primary determinants than its military ones (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 9). Mercantile 
realism is based on the rational actor model, which assumes the dominance of a single, unified, rational 
actor in the process (Ibid., 16). It is a variant of structural realism, the international relations theory that 
mainly military interests, rather than other interests, drive the foreign policies of nations. Related to 
mercantile realism is the strategic pragmatism approach, which refers to Japan’s diplomatic and foreign 
economic policies focused on technology and economics. Schmiegelow and Schmiegelow argue that in the 
1980s, Japan’s model of development inspired many developing countries in East Asia (including China 
and the Soviet Union) and Latin America in their own development efforts (Henrik Schmiegelow and 
Michèle Schmiegelow, “How Japan Affects the International System,” International Organization 44(4) 
[Autumn], 553-88). Takamine concludes that mercantile realism and structural pragmatism stress how well 
Japan uses it technological and economic capacities, including ODA, to enhance its global economic and 
political security interests (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 8-10).   
308 The reactive state approach, advocated by scholars Kent E. Calder and Robert M. Orr, Jr., argues that 
Japan’s foreign policy has tended to follow the pattern of a reactive state, where its policy change most 
commonly results from outside pressure, and where “…reaction prevails over strategy…” (Calder, Crisis 
and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986 [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1988]). While Calder concludes that Japanese ODA tends to react to U.S. pressure, Orr 
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These approaches do not address the same issues, but answer three main questions 
concerning Japanese ODA policy issues: 1) the mercantile realism and commercial 
instrument approaches ask what policy goals are pursued by Japan’s ODA and 
international economic policies. 2) The proactive and reactive state approaches ask 
whether mainly domestic or international interests drive Japan’s ODA actions. 3) The 
institutional analysis approach explores how institutional structures and forces formulate 
                                                                                                                                            
argues that Japanese ministries and political actors modulate that pressure to suit their own agendas and 
battles in domestic policymaking (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 11; Paul A. Summerville, The 
Politics of Self-Restraint: The Japanese State, and the Voluntary Export Restraint of Japanese Passenger 
Car Exports to the United States in 1981 [unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tokyo: Univ. of Tokyo, 1988] 
cited in Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid], 108; and Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 11). 
Tsukasa Takamine argues that in the case of Japanese aid to China, especially after 1972, Japan has made 
its own policies, independent of pressure from Washington. The reactive state approach tends to over-
assume the role of external pressure, and underestimate the input of domestic political and other factors.   
309 In the proactive state approach, Dennis Yasutomo, a major proponent, stresses the independence and 
“proactivity” of Japanese foreign policy, and the capacity of the Japanese state to formulate its own 
coherent foreign policy that operates in its own interests (Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, and New 
Multilateralism, 36-48, cited in Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 12, n58, n59). Like mercantile 
realism, the proactive state approach is also based on the rational actor model of decision-making (Ibid., 
16). A major difference in the proactive and reactive state positions is disagreement on whether domestic or 
international factors are more influential in Japanese ODA policymaking. The proactive state approach also 
supports the concept of comprehensive security (sôgô anzen hoshô), a doctrine in Japanese foreign policy 
uniting various political, social and economic goals, first articulated under the Ohira administration in 1980 
(Ibid., 12).   
310 In the institutional analysis approach, similar to the bureaucratic politics model of Graham Allison, the 
issues of what institutional actors or procedures determine and shape policy are asked. In this approach, no 
single, rational policy actor or agency is assumed (Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis [Boston: Little, Brown Co., 1971], 10-36, 145-7; and Allison and Halperin in 
Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 13). Alan Rix and Robert M. Orr, Jr. use this model in their 
discussions of Japan’s ODA policymaking (Ibid.). Rix, Japan's Economic Aid, identifies the bureaucratic 
wrangling that occurs among the “Big Four” ministries in ODA policy (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the 
Economic Planning Agency (EPA), also known as the yonshocho (the “four ministries”) (Arase, Japan’s 
Foreign Aid, 10). Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid, confirms these findings but also adds the 
influential pressure from the United States In the treatment of Rix and Orr, the model used stresses the 
influence of policymaking in smaller bureaucracies within the larger Japanese government. David Arase 
expands this analysis by examining the ODA policy system in the broader government structure (including 
the ruling political party, ministries and the Diet) and between the government and the private sector. Arase 
concludes that Japanese ODA allows Japan to pursue economic, political and security goals simultaneously 
(Arase, Buying Power, cited in Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 14-15). Takamine further argues that 
his own study goes beyond the “Big Four” explanation of Rix and Orr, and the expanded institutional 
argument of Arase (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid) by stressing the importance of competition between 
MOFA bureaucrats and politicians in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (the ruling party for most of the 
postwar period) as a key determinant in Japan’s ODA policymaking, especially for aid for China in the late 
1990s (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 15, 158-159). 
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Japan’s ODA policies.311 David Arase lists five rather similar approaches to analyzing 
Japanese aid, including the conflict of “trade versus aid,”312 bureaucratic politics 
explanations,313 strategic explanations,314 ODA as “corrupt and unaccountable…,”315 and 
gaps between Japan’s ODA system and the international, Western-dominated ODA 
system (Arase 2005a: 9-12).316 In this study, I categorize the major approaches analyzing 
Japanese ODA as the following: strategic approaches, institutional/bureaucratic politics 
approaches, comparative approaches, perceptual/cognitive approaches, economic 
approaches (which focus on the effects of trade interests on ODA), cultural/historical 
approaches, and human rights approaches. More details of each approach follow. I also 
review some of the major findings of each. 
 
 
                                                
311 Ibid., 7. 
312 “Trade versus aid” refers to the argument that Japan has been less able than other aid donors to meet the 
ODA standards and expectations of the international development community, due to the historically strong 
connection between its ODA and national trade interests (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 9). See also my 
discussion of Arase’s treatment of this issue later in this chapter, where I discuss economic approaches to 
the analysis of Japan’s ODA system.   
313 Arase’s discussion (Ibid., 10-11) of bureaucratic politics mentions the work of Rix and Arase, stressing 
that the huge bureaucratic involvement in Japan’s ODA has created an “…entrenched…” system that 
“…ensures that Japanese ODA, barring a radical structural reform, will continue in balkanized fashion to 
serve national economic and commercial interests and will stop short of meeting international ODA norms” 
(Arase, Buying Power, quoted in Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 11).  
314 Arase notes how MOFA began coordinating Japanese ODA with U.S. strategic interests, in response to 
criticism in the 1980s that Japan was “free-riding” on U.S. security efforts to protect it. Arase puts the work 
of Orr, Yasutomo, Miyashita and others in this “strategic” group (Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid; 
Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid; Yasutomo, Manner of Giving; Shafiqul Islam, Yen for Development: 
Japanese Foreign Aid & the Politics of Burden-Sharing [New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1991]; Akitoshi Miyashita, Limits to Power: Asymmetric Dependence and Japanese Foreign Aid Policy 
[Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2003]; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 11). Miyashita argues, after 
examining five historical cases of Japanese foreign aid, that Japanese aid policy is not merely reactive to 
the demands of U.S. pressure on Japanese, but also proactive and strategic, that it represents intentional 
action reflective of Japanese interests (Miyashita, Limits to Power). 
315 On this point, see my discussion on the perceptions of the Japanese public/media/civil sector on Japan’s 
ODA, later in this chapter. 
316 On this item, please see the section later in this chapter where I discuss the perceptions of other donors 




 Japan’s ODA may be assessed through the lens of strategic analysis. Japan 
became more assertive in the implementation of its aid programs and foreign policy, and 
aid acquired an increasingly strategic nature since the 1980s. Japan now regularly 
rewards or denies aid according to whether the behavior of the potential recipient nation 
is in line with Japan’s economic and political strategic interests. While earlier motives for 
foreign aid included export promotion and insuring stable supplies of natural resources, 
in the 1980s, ODA became a strategic “…foreign policy tool for achieving political and 
security objectives as well as economic benefits.” The government reduced or withheld 
aid from Cuba, Angola and other nations for political reasons, and extended or denied 
economic aid for strategic reasons deemed important to international Japanese security.317 
This reflected increasing activism in Japanese foreign policy since the 1980s. Japan was 
no longer willing to be “an economic giant and a political dwarf.” Because of Japan’s 
1947 peace constitution, its contributions to international “burden-sharing” for most of 
the postwar period have necessarily and mainly been non-military. According to 
Yasutomo, no other nation so enthusiastically embraced foreign aid as a cornerstone of its 
foreign policy, or increased it so rapidly, as Japan did at this time.318  
 But there have been several problems with “strategic aid.” Japanese prime 
ministers must carefully guide it through a myriad of difficulties involving the budget, the 
policy process, and the nature of Japanese aid itself. There have been problems with aid 
                                                
317 Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, 4, 9. 
318 Ibid., 9-10, 14, 19, 22-24, 26-27, 34-38, 41-42, 46-47, 111-114. 
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disbursement, the aid application process,319 and other areas, though the government has 
been trying to address several of these areas since the 1990s. Because of the experience 
of World War II, and “…the sensitivity of other Asian nations to the notion of any kind 
of strategic Japanese concept for the region,” Japanese government officials in 1980s 
never openly used the term “strategic” aid. They also denied the existence of the concept 
to the Japanese public.320 Some scholars argue that there is no proof that foreign aid 
“…produces internationally pacific conduct.”321 
 Historically it has often been argued that Japan’s aid policy forms in reaction to 
U.S. pressure.322 J. Robert Orr emphasizes the formulation of Japan’s aid policies as 
largely shaped by external pressure (gaiatsu) from the United States.323 Orr also treats the 
influence of the U.S. and its strategic interests on Japan’s ODA, including attempts at aid 
cooperation and joint projects between the two nations. Concerning ODA through the late 
1980s, Orr’s argument sees Japan as largely a reactive, not proactive, state.324 
 
                                                
319 Ibid., 59-61, 63-64, 67, 70-71. Since the 1990s, the Japanese government has adopted many 
administrative reforms to try address these problems. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2008, JBIC and 
JICA will merge into one super aid agency. But the main question is, how much have these reforms 
effectively addressed actual problems in aid disbursement, effectiveness, evaluation, and other areas? 
320 Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid, 6, 58. 
321 Klauss Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 200-201, quoted in Yasutomo, 
Manner of Giving, 119. 
322 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 349. 
323 Koppel and Orr agree somewhat, but also argue that realistically, it often formed because of diverse 
influences, as seen in their case studies of Japanese ODA to various Asian countries (Ibid.). 
324 Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid, 144-145. 
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Institutional / Bureaucratic Political Approaches 
 A study by Alan Rix in 1980 aims to elucidate the foundations of Japan’s aid 
policy through a bureaucratic politics and organizational analysis approach.325 Rix argues 
that Japan’s ODA system, explained as part of its global economic policy, is largely 
driven by domestic factors: “…conditions, [bureaucratic] structures, and forces.” He 
stresses the complexities of Japan’s aid decision-making processes,326 and applies many 
classical arguments of political science studies of bureaucratic politics to the politics of 
Japanese aid.327 In Rix’s argument, aid processes are dominated by procedures in a policy 
environment in constant flux, in turn influenced by ideas of aid, aid processes and 
organization, the priority of aid in Japanese domestic politics, patterns of policymaking, 
and the competition of the interaction of agencies, officials and procedures versus the 
Japanese government’s aid policy options.328 Rix calls the bureaucratic politics of 
Japanese aid vigorous, and its organizational processes resilient.329  
 Concerning studies in the 1990s, J Robert Orr’s The Emergence of Japan's 
Foreign Aid Power (1990) portrays Japan’s aid policies as greatly influenced by the 
                                                
325 Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid (270-271), draws on the pioneering work of Judith Tendler in analyzing 
organizational influences on the policy outcomes of the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid). Rix found that a strong factor in aid policymaking in Japan was continuous 
coordination of goals, activities and perceptions at the level of the primary workgroup within a ministry or 
agency, rather than coordination of decisions across agency or ministerial lines. This is similar to the 
findings of Hugh Heclo and Aaron B. Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money; Community 
and Policy Inside British Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) who found, in their study 
of British budgeting, that effective policy coordination can include “…personal ties characterized by 
personal trust and confidence, constant exchange of information and ideas, and the voluntary constraint of 
conflicts within reasonable bounds” (Ibid.).  
326 Ibid., 9. 
327 Ibid., 12, 16. For example, Rix argues that, like policies everywhere, Japan’s aid policies are affected by 
the push and pull of policymaking, standard operating procedures and incrementalism, among other forces. 
328 Ibid., 12-13. 
329 Ibid., 269. 
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complexity of Japan’s bureaucratic politics.330 David Arase’s 1995 study investigated in-
depth the influences of Japanese bureaucratic politics on Japan’s aid policies. He 
concluded that the latter are influenced by a multiplicity of factors, and that institutions 
that shape Japanese aid policy are influenced not merely by individuals, organizations, or 
rules, but also by international, domestic, crisis and ideological factors.331  
 In the early to mid-2000s, Arase argued that there were various institutional 
factors in Japan’s ODA bureaucracy that limited its capacity to change. The “entrenched” 
bureaucratic structure dates back to the 1950s, the era of postwar war reparations to other 
Asian nations. Larger ministries and agencies related to aid are linked by horizontal ties, 
and implementing agencies, such as JBIC and JICA, by vertical connections. The 
political party ruling Japan for almost all of the postwar period, the Liberal Democratic 
Party, resisted attempts at major reform, and made it unlikely that effective reform 
legislation would be introduced in the Diet.332 Yet Japan is continuing to attempt 
aggressive reform of its aid policy system (treated further below. 
Comparative Approaches 
 
 There is great value in comparative studies and approaches. The broadest, most 
significant comparative study of Japanese ODA to date is Arase 2005a, though there are 
others. Objective, factual comparisons of Japanese aid have high value. In his 2005 
study,333 Arase notes that his contributors, from both donor and recipient nations, offer 
many significant critiques of Japanese aid, largely in the light of the latest international 
                                                
330 Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid, 4, 6-14. The other major factor Orr identifies as influencing 
Japan’s ODA policy is outside pressure from the U.S. See also my discussion of Orr’s (Orr, Emergence of 
Japan's Foreign Aid) treatment of strategic approaches earlier in this chapter. 
331 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. 




standards for foreign aid, that to improve aid, aid policymakers must better engage and 
listen to aid recipients and the poor.334 Next I survey the landscape of major works 
offering comparative perspectives on Japan’s aid, including comparisons with Western 
and international donors, with Eastern (other Asian) donors, comparative studies of the 
effects of Japanese aid on aid recipients, and cross-regional studies of Japanese aid.335 
 A significant group of studies comparing Japan’s aid with major Western and 
international donors, including the World Bank, Britain, Sweden, Australia, the United 
States, and Canada, appears in Arase’s Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New 
Directions (2005).336 They compare Japanese ODA with prevailing international norms 
of ODA in such areas as “…field presence, policy coordination, user-friendly aid 
procedures, priority of lowest income countries, partnership with other government 
donors [and] …civil society actors…; and priority accorded to human development.”337 
                                                
334 Ibid., 2-3. 
335 Major cross-regional, comparative studies of Japanese aid include Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid; 
Douglas A. Van Belle, Jean-Sébastien Rioux, and David M. Potter, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign 
Aid: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Japan (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004);  and Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. Van Belle et al explores the influence 
of media coverage on how foreign aid is allotted by five major donor nations, including Japan. They find 
that more media coverage of particular recipients correlates with increased aid offers. For more comments 
on the other two works, see the comments that follow. 
336 Ibid. The following studies are several of such comparative studies in Ibid. On the ODA of the World 
Bank and Japan, see Morrison, “World Bank.” On British and Japanese aid, see David Seddon, “Japanese 
and British Overseas Aid Compared,” in David M. Arase, Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New 
Directions (London: Routledge, 2005), 41-80. Kay B. Warren, in “An Overview of Japanese ODA to Latin 
America: Comparative Observations on Social Development Initiatives,” in David M. Arase, Japan's 
Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions (London: Routledge, 2005), 95-103, presents a 
comparison of social development aid from the United States, Latin America and Europe. Rix (in “Japanese 
and Australian ODA,” in David M. Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions 
[London and New York: Routledge, 2005], 104-116) compares Australian and Japanese ODA, while 
Beaudry-Somcynsky looks at Canadian and Japanese ODA (Micheline Beadry-Somcynsky, “Japanese 
ODA Compared to Canadian ODA.” in ed. David Arase, Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New 
Directions, 142-51. London: Routledge, 2005], 141-152. David M. Arase’s “Japan’s and the United States’ 
Bilateral ODA Programs,” in David M. Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions 
[London and New York: Routledge, 2005], 117-32) compares bilateral aid from Japan and the United 
States. A common area explored in these essays is technical aid from the various countries. 
337 Ibid., 14. 
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Among the findings are that Japan’s ODA focuses heavily on the construction of 
infrastructure, the need for Japan to develop a more effective structure for aid 
management and core competence, that it can learn valuable lessons from other donors, 
and that there are possibilities for cooperation between Japan and other major donors.338 
The ways in which Japan’s ODA system differs from those of Western countries include 
the higher (yen) loan component in Japanese aid (to support “self-help” ideals in recipient 
nations), a higher emphasis on the development of economic infrastructure, a major 
regional emphasis on Asia,339 and its overall philosophy of aid. 
 Other notable studies comparing Japan’s ODA system with Western and 
international aid systems include studies of development cooperation policies in Japan, 
the United States and Germany,340 in Japan and Germany,341 of Japan’s ODA system 
within the international aid system and comparisons with major Western systems,342 and 
of major trends in Japan’s ODA policy compared to other national and international 
donors.343 King and McGrath study the role of knowledge in the aid policies of several 
major donors, including Japan.344 David Arase’s essay “Japan’s and the United States’ 
Bilateral ODA Programs” provides a valuable overall comparison of the bilateral aid 
systems in the United States and Japan, including their aid philosophies, schemes, and 
                                                
338 Ibid., 14-15; Alan Rix, “Japanese and Australian ODA,” 104-116; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 131-132. 
339 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 83. 
340 Ippei Yamazawa and Akira Hirata, Development Cooperation Policies of Japan, the United States and 
Europe (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1992). 
341 Kozo Kato, The Web of Power: Japanese and German Development Cooperation Policy (Lanham, MD 
and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002). 
342 Akira Nishigaki and Yasutami Shimomura, The Economics of Development Assistance: Japan’s ODA in 
a Symbiotic World (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1999). 
343 Takamasa Akiyama and Masanori Kondo, Global ODA Since the Monterrey Conference (Tokyo: 
Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development, 2003). 
344 Kenneth King and Simon McGrath, Knowledge for Development? Comparing British, Japanese, 
Swedish and World Bank Aid (London and New York: Zed Books and Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2004). 
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administrations.345 Lancaster’s 2007 study Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, 
Domestic Politics explores the impact of domestic politics in five nations, including 
Japan, on aid donor policy decisions.346 
 A new, emerging area of comparative study is comparisons with “Eastern” 
(Non-Western, often Asian) donors, such as South Korea, the People’s Republic of 
China, India and Taiwan.347 In their comparative study of Japanese and South Korean aid, 
Kim and Seddon’s 2005 essay notes numerous similarities between the Japanese and 
South Korean aid programs. South Korea’s program was intentionally structured with 
Japan as its model.348 While there are several differences in the two systems,349 soon both 
may face similar struggles: demands of highly varied domestic bureaucratic interests and 
external pressures to meet international (largely Western) aid standards for partnership 
with donors and recipients, and for poverty reduction.350 To date, there have been few 
                                                
345 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. 
346 Lancaster, Foreign Aid. 
347 Perhaps we should include additional, significant actors in this group, for example, Saudi Arabia. It 
depends on how we define “Eastern.” 
348 Sang-Tae Kim and David Seddon, “ODA Policy and Practice: Japan and the Republic of Korea,” in 
Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions, ed. David M. Arase (London: Routledge, 2005, 
152. In both countries, ODA was initially strongly connected to domestic economic development and trade. 
Both are poor in natural resources, and have undergone similar economic development processes (Ibid., 
159-164). There are structural similarities in both countries’ ODA systems. Up to 2008, both have been 
decentralized, with aid decisions and implementation split among various ministries and agencies (Ibid., 
166). The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), South Korea’s agency for technical aid and 
cooperation, was modeled after JICA. Both agencies have many similarities (Ibid., 170, 176-178). The 
bilateral loan programs in each country operate similarly, and make up a high proportion of each nation’s 
total ODA. The largest portion in each goes to Asia (Ibid., 171-175). Both nations have had systems 
without overt philosophies, lacked a leading development agency or ministry, had much aid tying, and been 
rather weak in development research and having adequately trained development specialists (Ibid., 183, 
186-188; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 16). Recently new programs for training specialists in international 
development and cooperation have increased in both nations. 
349 For examples, see Kim and Seddon, “ODA Policy and Practice,”171. 
350 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 16. 
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comparative studies of the aid systems of Japan and other non-Western donors.351 There 
are many interesting possibilities. Beyond comparing the histories, structural features, 
philosophies, strategic functions or distribution and contribution patterns of these 
emerging systems, a rich field for investigation is comparative study of the impacts of 
non-Western aid systems on other regions,352 perhaps contrasted with Western and/or 
international/multilateral systems.353 
                                                
351 A brief study comparing the distribution patterns of Taiwanese and mainland Chinese aid is Teh-chang 
Lin, “The Donor versus the Recipient Approach: a Theoretical Exploration of Aid Distribution Patterns in 
Taipei and Beijing,” Asian Perspective 24, no. 2 (2000), 153-71. A comparative study of Japanese and 
Chinese contributions to the Asia Development Bank is Joel Rathus, “China, Japan and Regional 
Organisations: The Case of the Asian Development Bank,” Japanese Studies 28, no. 1 (2008), 87-99.  
352 Some “Eastern” donors have given aid to “Western” regions. For example, in the early 1990s, Japan 
began giving aid to former communist states in Europe (Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 151-175; Koppel 
and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 347-348). There is also significant non-Western aid to other Eastern regions 
such as Central Asia. Since 2006, China, India and Japan have all hosted major international conferences 
highlighting each nation’s huge new plans for aid, trade, and investment in Africa. Studies of Asian aid to 
Africa include Jide Owoeye, “The Linkages between Japanese Psycho-Cultural Perceptions and Foreign 
Policy Behaviour: A Study of African Images in Japan,” Korean Journal of International Studies 17, no. 2 
(1986), 23-45; Tabassum Jamal, Economic and Technical Co-Operation between India and Africa 
(Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1992); Peter J. Schraeder, “From Berlin 1884 to 1989: Foreign Assistance 
and French, American, and Japanese competition in Francophone Africa,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 33, no. 4 (1995), 539; Kweku Ampiah, “Japanese Aid to Tanzania: A Study of the Political 
Marketing of Japan in Africa,” African Affairs 95, no. 378 (1996), 107; H. Stein, “Japanese Aid to Africa: 
Patterns, Motivations and the Role of Structural Adjustment,” Journal of Development Studies -London 35, 
no. 2 (1998), 27-53; Bolade M. Eyinla, “The ODA Charter and Changing Objectives of Japan’s Aid Policy 
in Sub-Saharan Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 37, no. 3 (1999); Spyke, Japanese Forein 
Aid Policy; T. Motoki and S. Taichi, “Can ‘the Miracle’ Be Replicated? Official Development Assistance 
and Technological Transfer from Japan to East Asia and Southern Africa,” Journal of Developing Societies 
15, no. 1 (1999), 61-94; Andrew Sunil Rajkumar, A Study of Public Finance and Fiscal Management in 
Developing Countries, thesis (Ph.D.) (University of Maryland, College Park, 2000); John Tuman and 
Ayoub Ayoub, “The Determinants of Japanese Official Development Assistance in Africa: A Pooled Time 
Series Analysis,” International Interactions 30(1) (2004), 43-57; Kweku Ampiah, “Nigeria’s Fledgling 
Friendship with Japan: The Beginning of a ‘Special Partnership’?” African and Asian Studies 4, no. 4 
(2005), 547-73; Howard P. Lehman, “Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy to Africa Since the Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development,” Pacific Affairs 78, no. 3 (2005), 423-42;  Howard P. Lehman, 
“Japan’s National Economic Identity and African Development: What Can Africa Learn from Japan’s 
Development Experiences?” Annual Meeting 2007, Conference Paper 2005; Toyomu Masaki, “Japanese 
Contribution to Malaysian Economic Development: Lessons for Africa,” African and Asian Studies 4, no. 4 
(2005), 575-01; E. Wayne Nafziger, “Meiji Japan as a Model for Africa’s Economic Development,” 
African and Asian Studies 4, no. 4 (2005), 443-64; Kenneth King, “Aid Within the Wider China-Africa 
Partnership: A View from the Beijing Summit,” www.cctr.ust.hk/china-africa/papers/ King,Kenneth.pdf 
accessed 15 August 2008; Lancaster, Foreign Aid; Deborah Bräutigam, Rogue Donor? Chinese Aid and 
Economic Engagement in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming) and “China’s Foreign Aid 
in Africa: What Do We Know?” in China in Africa: Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Considerations, ed. 
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 Major comparative studies of the effects of Japanese aid on aid recipients 
include Koppel and Orr’s 1993 study, one of the first studies to comparatively analyze 
Japanese aid policy by studying how it has unfolded in various countries and regions.354 
Their unique contribution is to examine what Japan’s aid does through recipient country-
focused analyses of Japan’s bilateral economic and political relations, in an attempt to 
explain variation in Japanese ODA policies.355 They conclude that in the late 1980s, a 
variety of bilateral relationships and influences, pressures from Japan’s obligations to the 
United States and the West, and Japan’s international “obligations” influenced Japan’s 
ODA policies. Japan’s ODA was not so hugely different from that of other countries, but 
its management of ODA was.356 Marie Söderberg’s 1996 study examines the business 
aspects and effects of Japanese aid in several Asian countries.357 David Potter’s 1996 and 
1997 studies compare two Southeast Asian recipients’ experiences.358 Schraeder, Hook 
and Taylor’s 1998 essay compares the effects of foreign aid flows from four major 
industrialized donor nations (France, Japan, Sweden, and the United States) on Africa in 
the 1980s.359 Arase 2005 study360 includes several brief studies of Japan’s aid to countries 
                                                                                                                                            
Robert Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming); and Harsh Pant, “China in 
Africa: The Push Continues But All’s Not Well,” Defense &; Security Analysis 24, no. 1, (2008), 33-43. 
Yet so far there are no studies comparing the African aid efforts of these three nations. How will these 
plans unfold, how do they compare, and what will be their impacts? 
353 A recent study comparing Japanese and World Bank aid is Morrison, “World Bank.”  
354 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 1. 
355 Ibid., 13, 341. 
356 Ibid., 349-350. 
357 Marie Söderberg, The Business of Japanese Foreign Aid: Five Case Studies from Asia (London:  
Routledge, 1996). 
358 David M. Potter, “Accommodation and Recipient Interest in Japan’s Foreign Aid,” Journal of Third 
World Studies 14 (December 1997), 37-66; Potter, Japan's Foreign Aid to Thailand. In the second work, 
Potter examines viewpoints of Japanese ODA in the Philippines and Thailand. 
359 Schraeder, Taylor, and Hook, “Clarifying Foreign Aid Puzzle,” conclude that their data contradict donor 
claims that aid is meant to primarily contribute to humanitarian relief. Their data confirm the importance of 
strategic and ideological factors in cold war era foreign aid, and of trade and economic factors in the donor 
strategies of industrialized nations. 
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and regions in Asia, the Pacific, and beyond, including recipients’361 and other donors’362 
viewpoints.  
 A key area of current interest among scholars is the comparison of Japan’s ODA 
system and its performance with international ODA norms and standards.363 Both 
Japanese and international norms have evolved over time.364 Prevailing international 
norms that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s include a new “results-oriented” 
emphasis on “development partnerships” for poverty alleviation through measurable 
progress and improved “stakeholder coordination.” In 2000, the United Nations’ 
Millennium Summit approved eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that seek to 
strengthen aid donor and recipient cooperation so that poverty alleviation may be 
                                                                                                                                            
360 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. 
361 These include Japan’s aid to Pakistan (Tahir Andrabi, “Japanese Aid to Pakistan,” in Japan's Foreign 
Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions, ed. David M. Arase [London: Routledge, 2005], 193-202), to 
China (Feng, “Japanese Aid to China”), to South and Southeast Asia (Haider A. Khan, “Japanese Aid to 
South and Southeast Asia: a Comparative Analysis,” In Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New 
Directions, ed. David M. Arase [London; New York: Routledge, 2005], 224-234]), Pacific island states 
(Tarte, “Japan’s ODA”), and Thailand (Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan”). I will discuss several of these 
studies later in this chapter in the section on perceptual and cognitive approaches to analyzing Japan’s 
ODA. 
362 Seddon, “Japanese and British Overseas Aid,” in Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New 
Directions, ed. David M. Arase (London: Routledge, 2005), 41-80, compares the British and Japanese aid 
systems, offering a comparative history and overview of trends in both. Among the interesting findings, 
Seddon notes that as precursors to today’s aid, Britain’s experience in imperialism goes back over 300 
years, while Japan’s experience began about 100 years ago. This gave Britain long, extensive skills in 
interacting with and developing governance mechanisms to deal with its colonies and the now independent 
Commonwealth. But Japan has had to develop governance and foreign aid mechanisms for LDCs much 
more rapidly (Seddon, 41-46).  
363 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid (354) question the eventual effects of new ODA goals 
incorporating humanitarianism, environmentalism and democratization, and Japan’s increasing multilateral 
contributions. David Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid (131) finds that the bilateral ODA systems of the United 
States and Japan are gradually growing similar in their mutual recognition of the value of international aid 
goals encompassing areas such as aid partnerships, sustainability, gender, and NGOs. 
364 Some of the international norms prevalent in the past included a stress on quantitatively measured inputs 
(such as aid quantity, regional, sectoral and income group-based allocations of aid, and concessionalities) in 
the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s, knowledge of the success of industrial-led development in East Asia, 
and the debt crisis in Latin America, led to a neo-liberal Washington-based consensus that stressed aid as a 
reward for political and economic liberalization, and reliance on trade and the private sector as the main 
paths to economic development. In the 1990s, it became clearer that policy conditionality was hard to 
coordinate among donors, and economic liberalization alone would not succeed in the absence of adequate 
infrastructure, governance and stability (Ibid., 7-8).  
86 
 
improved.365 These new goals have resulted in new methods of aid delivery that stress 
“country-led strategies” (“poverty-reduction strategy papers,” PRSPs) in development 
jargon), aiming to encourage increased “ownership” over aid by recipients and 
partnerships between them and other actors (domestic and international civil society 
groups and others) on the local level. Donors are also expected to improve their 
partnerships and coordination of aid efforts with other so all these efforts can encourage 
more effective achievement of the MDGs in each nation. Meeting these goals is a 
challenge for all bilateral aid donors, but particularly for Japan, which Arase contends 
likely does not have the “…structures,” protocols, or staff to achieve the flexible 
coordination of interests demanded by this new participatory, on-the-ground method of 
aid delivery.366 Some of the major possible lessons emerging from Arase’s 2005 
comparison of Japanese aid with new international aid standards are that the former is 
well intended, but largely incapable of responding to international pressures for new 
norms, due to the structural weaknesses of Japanese ODA administration.367 Several aid 
                                                
365 The Millennium Development Goals are: “1) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) to achieve 
universal primary education; 3) to promote gender equality and empower women; 4) to reduce child 
mortality; 5) to improve maternal health; 6) to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 7) to ensure 
environmental sustainability; and 8) to develop a global partnership for development, which emphasizes 
close coordination involving donors, recipients, the private sector, and all levels of civil society in each 
endeavor.” These goals are further “…broken down into 18 policy targets with 48 progress indicators…” to 
allow donor to better focus, monitor and measure their progress (Ibid., 8-9).   
366 Ibid., 7-9. Carol Lancaster asserts that in the 1970s, in its aid agencies, consulting firms and NGOs, 
Japan lacked adequately trained staff to implement aid to meet basic human needs on the local level 
(Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 119). Though challenging, given new priorities for social development at JICA 
since 2003, and new graduate programs in international development, this situation should gradually 
change. 
367 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 13-14, 267. According to Arase, scholars and aid experts praise Japanese 
aid projects’ overall quality and quantity, and Japan’s recent attempts to strengthen aid delivery methods, 
they note other limitations. These include poor clarity and a mismatch between ODA policy goals and 
implementation, due to administrative issues; poor overall policy coherence; rather inflexible policymaking 
and excessively complicated implementation; a struggle to meet recipient needs in technical cooperation 
programs; a generally poor capability in meeting diverse recipient needs; the need to increase policy 
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practitioners from JICA take issue with many of these criticisms, arguing that somehow 
Japanese aid has a big image problem.368  
Perceptual, Cognitive Approaches 
 
 These approaches, consisting of the study of the perceptions of Japanese foreign 
aid by Japanese, other aid donors, and aid recipients, can greatly enrich our understanding 
of foreign aid, how it is seen, and how it has developed. Some of this work is 
comparative. In his study of Japanese ODA to China, Takamine argues that multiple 
perceived national interests, commercial, strategic, political, and diplomatic (among 
others), drive Japanese ODA policy.369 Japanese aid can promote multiple interests and 
policy objectives at the same time. He also argues that Japanese ODA policy is driven 
more by domestic interests than by international pressures. These policies are not made 
by a central or unitary, rational authority, but more determined by   
…bargaining (or politics) among different domestic actors with competing 
perceptions of national, organisational and personal interests. It is primarily the shift 
in the balance of aid policy-making power among these different actors [and their 
perceptions] that brings about changes in Japanese ODA policy and the goals of that 
policy.”370 
                                                                                                                                            
dialogue with recipients and other aid donors, especially at the national level; and the fairly weak presence 
of aid staff in the field (Ibid.). 
368 Yamamoto Aiichiro and Kuwajima Kyoko, “Whither Japanese Aid?” Social Science Japan Journal, Vol. 
9, no. 6 (2006), 276, 280. Yamamoto and Kuwajima defend aspects of Japan’s ODA policy, arguing that it 
is not excessively tied, or unconcerned for international norms of poverty alleviation. Rather, they argue it 
attempts to address poverty comprehensively, through infrastructural growth including social development. 
They defend JICA’s technical aid, countering that Japan has “long experience” in partnering with local 
peers, based on Japan’s cultural history of perseverance, hard work, and a corporate culture of effectively 
gathering knowledge of foreign markets on the ground level.  They charge that Arase misses new efforts to 
reform Japan’s ODA administration, including changes at MOFA, JICA, increased local collaboration with 
foreign partners, field-based efforts, and movement toward more cooperative, unified aid administration 
(Ibid., 275, 277-278, 280-281). 
369 All italics in this section are added. 
370 Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 16-17. 
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Aid programs inevitably have certain effects on aid recipients, and perceptions of those 
influence future aid policies. Assessing perceptions of Japan’s ODA is vital in analyzing 
Japan’s aid policymaking.371 
  My study aims to uncover some of the key historical perceptions and ideas that 
lay at the root of the Japanese aid system. Such a nuanced understanding is necessary, to 
better comprehend what is happening in Japanese aid policymaking, and why. For more 
breadth and richness of analysis, it is useful to study and compare the perceptions of four 
groups, to start: 1) the Japanese public, media and civil sector, 2) Japanese ODA experts, 
3) other aid donors, and 4) aid recipients, their people and communities (the grassroots 
level affected by Japanese aid), both short- and long-term. Though such study is beyond 
the scope of this study, I will highlight several in the following paragraphs. 
 Concerning the perceptions of the Japanese public, media and the civil sector, 
until the late 1980s or so, Japan’s ODA did not receive too much public or press attention 
in Japan, but this changed as it gained a higher profile, both domestically and 
internationally, and took more funds from Japanese taxpayers.372 In this period, Japanese 
aid emerged as a key source of controversy and publicity in Japan’s popular media. Many 
scandals and other reports of aid problems resulted in much press coverage, in 
newspapers and books. The Japanese public also liked to hear about the achievements of 
Japan’s aid. This media attention reflected increased public attention to aid. The Japanese 
government could not ignore the emerging debate.373 
                                                
371 Ibid., 19. 
372 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 13. 
373 Ibid., 45-46. 
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 Non-academics in Japan’s popular media, opposition parties, civil society, and 
even within the government have leveled critiques of Japanese ODA system since the 
1980s.374 They have criticized the policy system as wasteful, corrupt, unclear, 
unaccountable, and inconsiderate of recipients’ needs. This pressure has created more 
transparency and accountability, encouraging the 1992 ODA Charter, and limited NGO 
involvement in the aid policy process.375 As Japanese ODA goals have become more 
public and visible due to documents such as the 1992 ODA Charter and new movements 
for more public accountability, it has indeed faced increased public scrutiny.376 
 In the early 1990s, Japan’s young non-governmental organization (NGO) 
community also reflected this rapidly emerging public concern.377 Overall, this increased 
public scrutiny has put more pressure on the government for public openness than it 
would have preferred. In general, aid officials and bureaucrats have borne more pressure 
to respond than politicians. Increased pressure on Japan’s ODA system emerged on three 
sides, from: expanded public awareness about aid, greater media coverage of aid 
problems, and greater public involvement in NGOs. Greater public pressure undoubtedly 
created more pressure for reform of the ODA system.378 Hirata Keiko argues that the 
economic decline of Japan in the early 1990s sped the weakening of the “iron triangle” of 
Japan’s postwar political establishment of the LDP, business, and the bureaucracy, 
                                                
374 Prior to the release of the 1992 ODA Charter, various Japanese critics, including Keidanren (the 
Federation of Economic Organizations), opposition parties, and several leading government agencies, such 
as some in the Economic Planning Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued for a more firmly 
articulated aid philosophy. Several of these arguments were based on rational choice economic theory, and 
Japanese aid’s stress on self-help (noted above in the aid philosophy section). Arguments for self-help and 
respect for the sovereignty of other nations potentially conflict with international calls for more 
humanitarian intervention and aid conditionality (Ibid., 38-41). 
375 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 11. 
376 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 363. 
377 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 45-46. 
378 Ibid., 70-71. 
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creating unprecedented space for the emergence of Japan’s civil society and increasingly 
assertive NGO community. Hirata sees Japan’s ODA policy as the key foreign policy 
arena where NGOs and the state interact and where the former press for ODA reform. 
She seeks a more nuanced understanding of state-society relations that may be a model 
for other East Asian nations imitating Japan’s development model.379 She concludes that 
today there are more opportunities for citizens’ involvement in Japan’s aid/development 
activities, that the developmental state has weakened,380 more are involved in civil 
society, political pluralism has increased, and that millions of Japanese support more 
NGO involvement in ODA.381     
 Regarding the perceptions of Japanese aid experts, Rix’s 1980 study notes how 
several past studies of Japanese aid and policy attributed its patterns to primarily 
perceptual factors,382 and assumed that Japanese perceptions of aid were fairly uniform. 
Rix realistically disagrees, concluding that the process of Japan’s aid policymaking is 
much too complex and subject to too many influences for such an explanation to be 
effective.383 The cumulative effect of varied forces and relationships concerning aid, 
along with organizational influences, conflicting ideas and perceptions of aid of the 
relevant ministries and agencies, has produced different processes for varied types of 
                                                
379 Hirata, Civil Society, 1-3, 5-6. 
380 Hirata argues that while the developmental state successfully built the Japanese state from the 1950s to 
the 1970s, it created several “monsters” now out of control, including corruption, economic crises, 
weakened industries that can no longer be protected, and increasing demands for citizen participation. 
Other developing nations should be wary (Ibid., 162-163). 
381 Ibid., 154-155 
382 See Hasegawa, Japan’s Foreign Aid; Edgar C. Harrell, Japan’s Postwar Aid Policies (New York: 
Columbia University. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1973), 269; and Jon Halliday and Gavan 
McCormack, Japanese Imperialism Today: “Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia” (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1973) cited in Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid, 15. A more recent study, Owoeye, “Linkages,”  
explores Japanese images of Africa in the early 1980s, their connections with Japanese foreign policy 
toward Africa, and how images and policies might be improved. 
383 Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid, 14-15. 
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aid.384 Competition among ministries, ideologies, structures, and perceptions contributed 
to bureaucratic change regarding Japanese aid, but Rix argues that through the late 1970s, 
bureaucratic interests were the main force driving how Japanese economic cooperation 
and aid policies were expressed.385 Boundaries around policies are constantly in flux as 
they interact with changing structures, procedures, and bureaucratic power shifts. These 
shifts affect how policymaking happens and how it is perceived. Before the late 1970s, 
shifting policies and perceptions of Japan’s aid helped hide inter-ministerial conflicts, but 
this became harder as public goals for aid became more visible. Rix contends that this 
increased visibility would harden and narrow Japanese perceptions of aid,386 but has this 
been the case? How have perceptions of aid affected the aid policy process in Japan, 
whether within or outside the bureaucracy? 
 The first extensive treatment of Japanese ODA in mainstream literature in Japan 
occurred from 1973 to 1975, before and after the first oil shock. Its general findings 
pointed to economic concerns as a major factor in Japan’s ODA, the challenges of 
Japan’s complex aid bureaucracy, the regional focus on Asia, and Japan’s tough 
standards for granting aid. Many complained that Japan’s ODA was subservient to the 
United States. A second period of extensive treatment happened in the late 1980s to the 
1990s, focusing on the conditions, politics, rationales, effectiveness, impacts, and policy 
processes of Japan’s ODA. Much of the second stream of literature was critical, alleging 
ODA policy’s high level of corruption, negative effects on the environment, over 
politicization and emphasis on infrastructural development, and selfish, consuming 
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nature.387 A pro-Japanese school of literature also arose in the early 1990s, arguing that 
Japan’s aid was the most liberal and untied of all major donors, more multidimensional 
than other donors’ aid, a motivator of change in LDCs, including democratic values, 
infrastructural development in Asia, a valuable diplomatic tool, an integral part in sharing 
Japan’s development expertise, and a foundation of its continuing global engagement.388 
A weakness of Japanese and foreign literatures on Japan’s ODA through the mid-1990s 
was their emphasis on bilateral aid, to the neglect of Japan’s multilateral efforts.389 In the 
early 1990s, most Japanese aid experts attributed the motives behind Japanese aid as 
“…economic welfare and security, self-aggrandisement, and political influence and 
leverage.” Rix also called motivations for aid a result of various gimu (duties) of Japan as 
a main regional and global economic power.390 
 Among other subjects, Takamine studies Japanese aid experts’ perceptions of 
the political, social and economic effects of Japan’s massive aid to China on that 
country’s development.391 Japan’s aid to China began in 1979, with only brief 
interruptions following China’s Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and brief tensions in 
                                                
387 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 17-18, 20-22. 
388 Ibid., 22-26. 
389 Yasutomo lamented the general neglect of the analysis of Japan’s multilateral aid in the Japanese and 
foreign aid literatures on Japan’s ODA in the mid-1990s (Ibid., 31-32), and hoped to overcome it with his 
own work. See also the brief discussion of Japan’s regional and multilateral aid efforts later in this chapter.   
390 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 29-30. Problems with these explanations included shifting priorities, unclear 
definitions, and diverse views of Japan’s ODA in the aid system. 
391 The two questions Takamine investigates are 1) how Japan’s China ODA policymakers, specialists, and 
academics perceive the effects of Japan’s aid on China, and 2) the relationship between these perceived 
effects and the Japanese government’s policy goals, seen in its aid to China. Takamine acknowledges the 
impossibility of proving direct cause and effect between Japan’s ODA and China’s development in various 
sectors. The chapter on the effects of Japan’s ODA on China shows how Japan’s China aid policymakers 
assess those effects, and correlations between Japan’s ODA and development effects in China. Takamine 
notes the importance of the perceptions of Japan’s policymakers, since they had direct effects on future 
decisions on Japan’s aid to China (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 136). From the Japanese side, he 
concludes that implementation of Japan’s ODA to China has not been totally based on rational plans, but 
rather on strong competition between MOFA bureaucrats and LDP politicians in aid policymaking, 
influenced by their perceptions of personal, national and organizational interests (Ibid., 159).   
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2006.392 Japanese aid experts generally conclude that Japan’s aid to China has brought 
positive changes in China’s economic development, increased its market reforms, helped 
to better integrate it into the world economy, encouraged more pluralism in Chinese 
society, and opportunities for further political reforms.393 In the view of these experts, 
Japan’s aid to China has encouraged the latter’s transition from Communist 
totalitarianism to an authoritarian developmental state, and deepened Sino-Japanese 
economic relations to the point that neither state can afford serious conflict with the 
other.394  
 On the perceptions of other aid donors, in the early 1990s, Rix noted the general 
international image problems Japan had to handle concerning its ODA.395 Canadian aid 
practitioners Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook find that the Japanese aid system is highly 
complex and hard for outsiders to understand.396 This hampers its cooperation with other 
donors. In Marie Söderberg’s 2005 study of Swedish perceptions of Japanese foreign aid, 
Swedish aid and foreign policy experts characterize Japanese aid as lagging twenty years 
behind [Sweden’s system], complicated, bureaucratic, dictated by Tokyo, heavily 
                                                
392 Japan briefly suspended aid to China in from March to June 2006, following tensions over natural 
resources and the history of World War II (China Daily, “Japan provides millions of dollars of aid loans to 
China,” 30 March 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-03/30/content_6659549.htm, accessed 
July 2008.)  
393 This might include the eventual furtherance of democratization in China, although this is neither a direct 
goal nor outcome of Japan’s aid (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 157). Japan’s China aid experts also 
note several negative aspects of China’s development, such as rising pollution, military spending, 
unemployment, gaps between development in rural and urban areas, East and West China, and in income 
(Ibid., 137).  
394 Ibid., 136-137, 156-157. 
395 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 1-2, argues that in the early 1990s, few citizens in countries receiving Japan’s 
aid knew very much about it, and foreign aid in general generates little public interest in most countries. 
Even if they were informed, in Rix’s opinion, most people would attribute Japan’s aid to further attempts to 
buy international influence.  
396 Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System. 
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stressing infrastructure, and weak in transparency, human rights and democracy issues.397 
Other critiques by international experts have recently stressed gaps in the effectiveness of 
Japan’s ODA system compared with international, Western-dominated norms. They 
commonly focus on how to improve the performance of Japanese aid by helping it to 
come more in line with those standards. Critiques often look at the “policy coherence” 
and “administrative organization” of Japan’s ODA (both criticized as fragmented).398 The 
most common suggestions are for the Japanese government to implement a more unified, 
national level aid strategy, to be carried out by a national, cabinet-level agency. Arase 
concludes that such critiques may be somewhat naïve, but serve to highlight for Japanese 
national policymakers key problems and possible answers for Japan’s ODA policy 
system.399  
 In the eyes of some, despite huge amounts of Japanese ODA since the late 
1980s, it has had big image problems in the West. These problems may stem from 
Japan’s emphasis on state-led development, seemingly contrary to free market 
preferences of the United States, the World Bank and other Western donors, poor mastery 
of English, timidity in asserting its ideas in international forums, and difficulties in 
realigning its ODA structures to better meet new global norms. Ultimately, Lancaster 
charges that Japan has become a “niche player,” not a global leader in aid.400 Western 
observers of Japanese aid have recently offered various lessons for Japan’s aid, based on 
                                                
397 Marie Söderberg, “Swedish Perceptions of Japanese ODA,” in Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities 
and New Directions, ed. David M. Arase (London: Routledge, 2005), 83, 88-90. Söderberg also finds that 
Japanese ODA is basically unknown by the Swedish public, who are very knowledgeable about aid (Ibid., 
81). 
398 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 12, Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System. 
399 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 12. 
400 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 110, 124-126, 128-129.  
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Western and multilateral systems,401 but fail to adequately recognize lessons that 
Japanese or other Eastern systems may offer their own systems,402 namely, how actual 
economic development can really happen. Is this ethnocentric?403 
 Through the early 1990s, there were many studies of Japanese aid and of Japan 
as a donor, but few studies of Japanese aid recipients, especially of the impacts of Japan’s 
ODA at the grassroots level.404 Arase’s 2005 study includes several studies of Latin 
American, Chinese, South Asian, Southeast Asian and South Pacific recipients’ 
perceptions of Japanese aid.405 While these studies note recipients’ positive appraisals of 
several distinctive contributions of Japanese aid, such as its sectoral, infrastructural and 
regional strengths and high levels of funding, they mention weaknesses noted by other 
donors, including struggles with sustainability, adjusting to local needs, transfer of 
                                                
401 For example, Keith Morrison argues that Japan should decrease its economic infrastructural allocations, 
increase social allocations, decentralize aid staff and decisions to the country level, improve aid 
evaluations, and end the request-based system (Morrison, “World Bank,” 37). Rix, “Japanese and 
Australian ODA,” 114-115, argues that Australia may be a model for Japan to emulate, that dispensing 
technical aid might be best delegated to one agency, that Japan should intervene more in recipients’ aid 
decisions, give less attention to economic infrastructure and more to social issues. Arase, Japan’s Foreign 
Aid, 132, concludes that USAID’s norms (focusing on aid results, evaluation, field-centered emphasis and 
community building) are closer to international norms, and thus provide possible lessons for the reform of 
Japan’s ODA. While applauding Japan’s reform efforts, and acknowledging the challenge of reforming a 
system much larger and more complex than Canada’s, Beaudry-Somcynsky, “Japanese ODA Compared to 
Canadian,” 142-151, offers several lessons for Japan from Canada, rather than the reverse, especially on 
technical aid. 
 
403 This reminds one of the numerous critiques of postwar Western development policies by Western 
anthropologists that deem “development” as a total failure, such as Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine, and 
Escobar, Encountering Development. East Asian experts cannot help but notice how these critiques 
virtually ignore the significant development experiences of various East Asian nations. There is also great 
reluctance in Western dominated international financial institutions to admit the high degree of success, on 
some levels, of Eastern experiences of development, such as Japan’s (World Bank, East Asian Miracle). 
Many of these stress strongly state-led development schemes. All of this seems ethnocentric on some levels 
404 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 6. 
405 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. On Japanese aid to Latin America, see Warren, “Overview Japanese 
ODA.” On aid to China, read Feng, “Japanese Aid to China.” Regarding perspectives of Pakistan, see 
Andrabi, “Japanese Foreign Aid;” and on South Asia and Southeast Asia, please see Khan, “Japanese Aid.” 
Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan,” explores Thai views of Japanese aid; and Tarte, “Japan’s ODA,” the 
perceptions of Pacific island nations. 
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technology, and appropriateness of project design. Among the findings are that Japanese 
aid needs increased flexibility, field presence, and soft aid/social analysis capabilities.406 
Several commentators note the predominantly state-to-state nature of Japan’s ODA 
efforts, and its weaker capabilities on the ground.407   
 David M. Potter’s work on Japanese aid to Southeast Asia, focusing on aid 
recipients, finds that recipients obtain funding for many desired projects as they learn to 
tailor their requests to the Japanese ODA system.408 Söderberg studies the 
implementation of Japanese aid to four Asian nations,409 from donor and recipient 
viewpoints.410 Recipients exercise considerable influence.411 Multiple actors in both 
donor and recipient nations, including opinion makers, politicians, bureaucrats, the 
business community, the media and the public, can influence the process, and do. What 
transpires depends on differentials in each case, project, and country.412 On aid to South 
and Southeast Asia, Haider Khan finds that while Japanese aid has contributed 
successfully to budget issues for some recipient governments, it is too donor oriented, 
and weak in addressing ground level recipient issues.413 Aid recipients in Bangladesh and 
                                                
406 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 16-18. 
407 Khan, “Japanese Aid.” Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA” argues that historically, most Japanese aid 
to Latin America has stressed state-to-state development projects, with negotiations conducted at high 
levels, not grassroots development projects representing local needs. This emphasis in Japanese aid may 
have helped limit it from implementing more projects related to social and participatory development in 
Latin America (Ibid., 96-97). 
408 Potter, “Accommodation and Recipient” and Japan’s Foreign Aid. 
409 The nations studied include China, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (Söderberg, Business of 
Japanese Foreign Aid). 
410 Ibid., 4-5. 
411 Ibid., 277-279. Here, China was particularly strong. 
412 Ibid., 286-289. 
413 Khan, “Japanese Aid;” Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 17. For example, Khan finds that Japanese ODA 
has weak partnership with indigenous NGOs, has transferred technologies that are unsustainable, 
inadequate field presence, and poor progress in addressing social issues such as gender, education, and 
health.   
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Indonesia find Japanese aid to be chiefly geared toward economic and humanitarian 
purposes, and better than aid from the United States, but too bureaucratic, opaque, and 
donor-driven.414 Recipients in China and Thailand note positive contributions of Japanese 
ODA to their nations’ development, but regret having to deal with Japan’s overly 
complex technical aid schemes and bureaucracy.415 
 Anthropologist Kay B. Warren’s research on Latin American perceptions finds 
that Japan’s economic motivations have been a primary factor behind its aid there. Latin 
Americans perceive business interests as the key motivation. Though much Japanese aid 
is now untied, Latin Americans continue to believe that it largely goes to Japanese firms, 
especially for technical projects. It was only in the early 2000s that many Latin 
Americans learned that Japan was Latin America’s number one foreign aid donor from 
1985 through the early 2000s. Other cultural factors also shape Latin American 
perceptions of Japanese ODA.416 
Economic Approaches (Effects of Trade Interests) 
 
 Since the beginning of Japan’s postwar reparations to other Asian nations in the 
early 1950s, aid has been associated with Japan’s economic development and security.417 
From the mid-1960s, analysts have noted the persistent connection of Japanese aid with 
                                                
414 Ibid., 230-232. 
415 Feng, Japanese Aid; Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan”; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 17-18. In the 1990s, 
another Chinese commentator, Zhao Quansheng, lamented what he saw as the donor- rather than recipient-
oriented nature of Japan’s aid to China, often focused on Japan’s energy issues (Quansheng Zhao, “Japan’s 
Official Development Assistance to China: A Bilateral Megapolicy,” in John D. Montgomery and Dennis 
A. Rondinelli, eds. Great Policies: Strategic Innovations in Asia and the Pacific Basin [Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1995], 184-186 and [1993], 167, 169). 
416 Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA,” 97-98, 100-102. Additional cultural factors shaping Latin 
American perceptions of Japanese aid include issues related to the organizational cultures of Japanese aid 
agencies, and Japanese handling of the concepts of democracy, gender, language and training issues. See 
the treatment of cultural issues later in this chapter.   
417 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 13. 
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Japan’s own trade and economic interests.418 When Japan completed its postwar 
reconstruction and rose as a modern industrialized nation, it gained several strong reasons 
to recycle some of its capital account and structural trade surpluses to ODA, to diversify 
foreign direct investment away from the United States, to improve relations with 
developing countries, and to relieve trade friction with many countries. As a country for 
which imports of key commodities including food, energy and key industrial inputs are 
mandatory, ODA could help stabilize Japan’s economic security.419 In the 1970s, as 
Western aid standards moved toward better addressing recipient nations’ needs and 
interests, Japan came under increasing criticism for the strong trade component of its aid. 
Hasegawa argued in the 1970s that in its aid, Japan had to balance the extremes of 
internal kokueki (national interests, including domestic development and trade) and 
external tsukiai (pressures for humanitarian, untied aid and other obligations imposed by 
Japan’s membership in international organizations and agreements) factors.420 Although 
many conventional explanations of Japan’s ODA have correctly identified the strong 
connections between Japan’s economic and trade interests and its ODA, Koppel and Orr 
also note great variation in Japan’s ODA policies, and in the interests of various parties 
supporting the policies.421 
                                                
418 John White, Japanese Aid (Odi publications. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1964); Martha 
Fetherolf Loutfi, The Net Cost of Japanese Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1973), noted in Arase, 
Japan’s Foreign Aid,  9. 
419 Saburo Okita, Lal Jayawardena, and Arjun Sengupta, The Potential of the Japanese Surplus for World 
Economic Development: Report of a Study Group of the World Institute for Development Economics 
Research, WIDER study group series, no. 1 (Helsinki: WIDER Publications, World Institute for 
Development Economics Research, 1986), quoted in Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 13. 
420 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, noted in Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 9-10. 
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 There are additional studies of the “trade versus aid”422 conflict in Japanese 
from the 1980s to the present. Margee Ensign, Michael Hoffmann, Steven Hook, Guang 
Zhang and Marie Söderberg note the national-interest aspects of Japanese ODA, while 
not ignoring the “trade versus aid” dichotomy.423 Global trade pressures in the 1980s and 
1990s forced Japanese corporations to move more production overseas to Southeast Asia 
and China. If ODA could encourage the development of economic infrastructure to 
support this, it might benefit Japan’s overall trade competitiveness.424 Yet Hanabusa 
Masamichi stresses how Japan’s ODA also benefits other donors and recipient nations.425 
“Trade versus aid” evolved into the question of which agency is more influential in Japan 
aid policy, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, formerly MITI), 
reflecting the economic/national interest side of aid, or MOFA, which leans more toward 
the international/Western norms for aid.426 This conflict is real, and representative of 
basic tensions in Japanese ODA policy, but Arase concludes that Japanese aid policy is 
much too complex for this model to serve as the sole explanatory model of its aid 
policymaking.427 Overall, the trade and economic motivations of Japanese aid can be 
                                                
422 See the definition of “trade versus aid” in the footnotes in the introductory section on Japanese ODA 
earlier in this chapter. “Trade versus aid” refers to the debate over whether the presence of economic 
interests in Japanese aid limits Japan’s ability to meet international aid standards. 
423 Michael Hofmann, Japan’s Development Assistance: A German View. V.R.F. series, no. 119 (Japan: 
Institute of Developing Economies, 1985); Ensign, Doing Good?; S.W. Hook and G. Zhang, “Japan’s Aid 
Policy Since the Cold War: Rhetoric and Reality,” Asian Survey 38, no. 11 (1998), 1051-66; and 
Söderberg, Business Japanese Foreign Aid; all mentioned in Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 10. 
424 Okita, Jayawardena, and Sengupta, Potential Japanese Surplus, quoted in Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 
13. 
425 Hanabusa, “Japanese Perspective,” mentioned in Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 10. 
426 Saori Katada, “Japan’s Two-Track Aid Approach: The Forces Behind Competing Triads,” Asian Survey 
42, no. 2 (2002), 320-42; Hook and Zhang, “Japan’s Aid Policy.” 
427 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 10. 
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partly viewed as a policy tool to encourage Japanese economic competitiveness in this 
age of rapid economic globalization.428  
 Several studies from the 1990s and 2000s examine and compare the economic 
effectiveness of Japanese aid to different world regions and nations, including Africa, 
South and Southeast Asia.429 Söderberg’s Business of Japanese Foreign Aid (1996) does 
not examine aid effectiveness, but comparatively studies the methodologies, procedures 
and business factors connected with the implementation of Japanese ODA, as seen in 
OECF loan projects in five Asian nations.430 Söderberg concludes that receiving loans, 
rather than simply grant aid, complicates the process,431 but that aid processes in the mid-
1990s, though rather complex, were fairly open. Numerous factors, including recipient 
country viewpoints, influence the process.432  
Cultural and Historical Approaches 
 
  The histories and cultures of donor countries affect the types of aid they 
dispense. Japan is just one example.433 Similar to my arguments, Alan Rix contends that 
                                                
428 Ibid., 13. 
429 Haider A. Khan, “Aid and Development: What Can Africa Learn from the Macroeconomics of Foreign 
Aid in Some Southeast Asian Economies?” (Unpublished paper, 1998); Haider A. Khan, “How Effective is 
Japanese Aid: Econometric Results from a Bounded Rationality Model for Indonesia,” (Unpublished paper, 
2002); and Haider A. Khan, “Japanese Aid.” 
430 Söderberg, Business Japanese Foreign Aid, 4-5. OECF was a forerunner of today’s JBIC. The five 
nations studied are China, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Söderberg’s study aims to gain a fuller 
comprehension of how the Japanese ODA system operates by studying it from multiple viewpoints (the 
Japanese government, the private sector in Japan, and those of other donors and recipient nations) (Ibid., 4-
5). 
431 Ibid., 277-279. 
432 Ibid., 4-5, 286-289. Söderberg urges persons wishing to influence the Japanese ODA process to learn its 
policy basics and get involved (Ibid., 288-289). 
433 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 83; Söderberg, Business Japanese Foreign Aid, 85-86, 90-96. 
Söderberg notes how the aid systems of different donor countries reflect the sociocultural systems of their 
nations. For example, Sweden’s ODA values are derived from long traditions of giving to religion 
(Christianity), sending missionaries abroad, and helping the poor in their midst. They also have a positive 
value of charity, that giving makes people feel good, especially when they expect nothing in return. On the 
other hand, Japan’s ODA seems to reflect its business culture, where businesses value reciprocal, loyal 
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the objectives and philosophy of any foreign aid program emerge out of sociocultural 
values, not just economic and political interests.434 According to Sato Seizaburo, five 
important attitudinal (psycho-cultural) factors have been important in Japanese foreign 
policy since 1890:  
1) a strong sense of belonging to Japan and the Japanese race coupled with deep-
rooted feelings of inferiority; 2) an intense concern with improving the country’s 
international status; 3) a deep anxiety over being isolated internationally; 4) a desire 
to conform to world trends; and 5) an emotional commitment to Asia, which has 
resulted in a policy that emphasizes the region.435  
 
Orr sees these same basic attitudes as influential in Japan’s foreign aid policymaking 
through the late 1980s. The first four factors created the “psychological climate” for 
America’s influence in Japanese aid, and Japan’s experience in World War II and the 
occupation only strengthened its general sense of weakness and inferiority since then.436 
Culturally, Japan has sometimes seen itself as a “development bridge” or model between 
East and West, North and South, and/or the first and third worlds, given its recent 
development experience and influences from both Asia and the West.437 
                                                                                                                                            
relationships, and gratitude. Sweden has a long history of transparency in governance, reflected in its ODA 
system, while Japan does not. Its efforts to create more transparency in ODA are only recent.  
434 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 15. 
435 Sato, Seizaburo, “The Foundations of Modern Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Robert A. Scalapino, ed. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), quoted in Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid, 375. 
436 Ibid., 4-5. There are multiple, complex factors involved here. Orr also argues that psycho-cultural 
factors in U.S.-Japan relations have influenced Japan’s attitudes toward its aid policymaking. For example, 
Japan’s total defeat in World War II and the U.S. occupation created a periodic attitude of amae (big 
brother-little brother dependence) toward the United States in postwar Japan. And America’s wartime 
image as oni (demons in Japanese folklore who bear both gifts and potential destruction) relates to U.S. 
pressure on Japanese politics, which is often seen as both positive and negative (Ibid.). These arguments fit 
Orr’s characterization of Japan’s ODA policy as reactive, rather than proactive. For more on amae, see 
Takeo Doi, The Anatomy of Dependence (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1971). Regarding the oni image 
in Japan’s wartime images of the United States, see John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power 
in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 236, 305.      
437 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 30-31, argues this has sometimes been a problem, given the historic 
weaknesses of Japanese ODA regarding recipient development (as opposed to Japan’s own development).  
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 The link between aid policy and cultural values is related to how predominant 
cultural norms influence the behavior of nation-states in foreign policy,438 and also how 
domestic influences and contexts do.439 How has Japan’s own cultural and historical 
experience influenced its modern aid program? Japan’s history of foreign aid shows 
influence from important trends in Japanese culture and history, including during the 
Meiji period.440 A second feature of the cultural influence on Japanese aid has been 
allegedly weak values of charity toward the weak in other countries,441 supposedly a 
reflection of “traditional” Japanese religious and social values.442 A third cultural 
                                                
438 Louis Joseph Halle, The Nature of Power: Civilization and Foreign Policy (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 
1955), 40, cited in Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 15. 
439 Ibid. Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, mentions these studies that debate the influence of domestic 
forces on foreign policy: Henry Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” Daedelus 95, no. 2 
(1966), 503-29; James N. Rosenau, The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967); 
Peter J. Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); John G. Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael 
Mastanduno, eds. “The State and Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization 42, no. 1, 1-243; 
H. Richard Friman, “Rocks, Hard Places, and the New Protectionism: Textile Trade Policy Choices in the 
United States and Japan.” International Organization 424 (1988), 689-723; and Ethan A. Nadelmann, 
“Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society,” International Organization 
444 (1990), 479-526. On Japan, studies include Nobuo Tomita and Yasunori Sone, Sekai seiji no naka no 
Nihon seiji: takyokuka jidai no senryaku to senjutsu (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1983); Calder, Crisis and 
Compensation;  and Kent E. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the 
Reactive State,” World Politics 40, no. 4 (July 1988), 517-41 (Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 198, 
n4). 
440 Ibid., 15. In the Meiji era, these cultural features included intentional learning from the West, solid 
domestic leadership, policies promoting nationalism and education, and colonialism for the support of 
Japan’s domestic growth. These policies succeeded. Japan’s current stress on self-help and self-reliance in 
aid recipients is reflective of its own development experience. Japan’s need for economic development, 
overseas markets and scarce natural resources also led to the aggressive drive for imperialism and 
“mercantilist trading policies” (Ibid., 15-16). 
441 David Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese, 34, n64, identifies several Japanese cultural concepts that 
he argues are related to Japanese aid: on (obligation), giri (duty), ninjo (empathy), and jizen (charity, 
philanthropy). Wright-Neville argues that jizen appears to apply the least (of these four terms). I comment 
further on Wright-Neville’s arguments later in this section. 
442 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 16, notes this argument, that Japan has historically lacked a universal ethic of 
charity such as found in Christianity. Rather, in Japanese social and religious ethics, the spirit of charity 
traditionally has focused on one’s own family. Weakness in Japanese charitable values is noted in 
Gaimushô, Wagakuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo 1989, 2 volumes (Tokyo: Kokusai Kyôryoku Suishin Kyôkai, 
1989), 19, as cited by Rix (Ibid.). Rix mentions a report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that 
highlights Christian heritage and principles as one reason for Western European cultures’ commonly strong 
support for foreign aid (Gaimushô, keizai kyôryokukyoku keizai kyôryoku kenkyûkai, Keizai kyôryoku no 
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influence on aid is Japan’s sense of cultural insularity and isolationism, reflected in 
Japan’s historic focus on aid to Asia, in pursuit of its own domestic self-interests.443 
Additional cultural factors influencing Japan’s ODA have included Japan’s own sense of 
cultural uniqueness and difference,444 its hierarchical view of nations,445 and 
                                                                                                                                            
rinen: seifu kaihatsu enjo naze okonau no ka [Tokyo: Kokusai kyôryoku suishin kyôkai, 1984], 75). Other 
Japanese authorities argue that nations with a Judeo-Christian heritage are more likely to give charitable 
donations than nations that lack it (Ibid.; and Chie Nakane, Tekiô no jôken: Nihonteki renzoku no shikô 
[Tokyo: Kodansha, 1972], cited in Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 18, 199, n15). Yet one should not discount 
the tremendous generosity reflected in Japan’s enormous aid flows during the 1990s, even if they 
originated in Japan’s own self-interests. Also related to the religious origins of charity, Orr, Emergence of 
Japan’s Foreign Aid, 139, notes that Japan lacks the “missionary” sending experience common to many 
Western nations with Christian traditions.   
443 Toru Yano, “Kokusai Kankyô to Nihon gaikô no kadai,” Hôgaku seminâ sôgô tokushû, No. 18, 246-
248, and Kokusaika no imi: ima "kokka" o koete (Tokyo: Nihon Hôsô Shuppan Kyôkai), 180, quoted in 
Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 16-17, Chapter 5. Rix reports that Japanese commentators note that Japan’s 
historic sense of racial homogeneity and “island-nation consciousness” has contributed to tensions in its 
international relations (Ibid., 16).  
444 This sense of “uniqueness” is seen in MOFA reports on Japanese ODA that repeatedly stress cultural 
differences between Western donors and Japan as reasons behind the uniqueness of Japan’s aid (Ibid.). One 
report argues that Western European nations have historically been wealthy, had high incomes, and 
extensive experience with other races [and cultural groups], while Japan has not (Gaimushô, Keizai 
kyôryoku, 75). Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 24-27, notes important official aid documents from the late 1980s 
that contend that, along with common global concerns of humanitarianism and interdependence, Japan has 
“unique circumstances” as an aid donor: 1) a peace constitution and need for a stable trading environment 
and world peace, 2) the need for official aid to balance Japan’s huge private LDC investments, 3) generous 
ODA to counter Japan’s dependence on imported resources by encouraging economic stability and pro-
Japanese attitudes in LDCs, and 4) lessons for LDCs from Japan’s “unique” experience as a recently-
developed non-Western nation that can help Japan be a bridge between North and South, and West and 
East, “Japan’s world historical mission.” This is reminiscent of the 1930s ideology of hakkô ichiu (Japan as 
a beacon of world peace and civilization) discussed in Chapter 8, and philosopher Nishida Kitaro’s prewar 
treatment of Japan’s “mission” (Khan, e-mail communication with Richard Shannon, 25 March 2008). 
MOFA has called Japan’s stress on “self-help” in recipients a unique aspect of Japan’s aid (Ibid., 33). Rix 
counters that these arguments fail to identify fully why Japan is truly “unique” compared to other resource-
poor, industrialized donors like Germany and the Netherlands, and that they subsume concern for recipient 
development under overarching concern for Japan’s long-term economic health and prosperity (Ibid., 25, 
28-29).   
445 I comment on the related theme of the hierarchical view of foreign nations in the worldviews of several 
past Japanese leaders in coming chapters. An excellent example is Kato Hiroyuki. Herbert Passin noted in 
the 1950s that Japanese ranked developing countries as far down their perceived order of nations with 
influence and status (Herbert Passin, “Socio-cultural Factors in the Japanese Perception of International 
Order,” Japan Institute of International Affairs Review [1952], 51-75, cited in Ibid., 17). For much of the 
postwar period, Japan’s attentions in international relations have been primarily focused on attaining status 
and recognition from other advanced nations, not from impoverished nations receiving aid (Ibid., 17). This 
may be slowly changing, however, as Japan continues to recognize its need for resources from developing 
nations, and its competition with other nations for those resources. A current example is Japan’s 
“competition” with China in extending aid to Africa (King, “Aid Within”; Japan’s White Paper, 
“International Cooperation”; and “Japan Vows To Double Aid to Africa by 2012, International Herald 
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“exclusivity” in dealing with developing nations.446 Other cultural issues affecting current 
Japanese aid include the organizational cultures of Japanese aid organizations such as 
JICA,447 and how they handle such issues as democracy,448 gender,449 training and 
language issues450 in the aid they disperse.451 Interestingly, Japan has given some support 
for “strategic partnerships” where some Latin American nations do development projects 
in others. This is seen as innovative in Latin America, and helps solve some of the 
cultural and linguistic problems that Japan has faced in the region (Warren 2005: 97). 
                                                                                                                                            
Tribune [28 May 2008], www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/28/africa/africa.php).  Japan also hopes its expertise 
in handling economic development, environmental pollution, and energy shortages will prove helpful for 
developed and developing nations, and help it to exercise increasing leadership on the international stage. 
Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo encouraged other industrialized nations attending the G-8 summit in 
Hokkaido (July 2008) to embrace goals similar to Japan’s achievements in saving energy for the purpose of 
controlling climate change.        
446 Rix notes that regarding aid, exclusivity is especially relevant to the Japanese presence in developing 
countries, as shown by anthropologist Nakane Chie (Nakane, Tekiô no jôken, noted in Rix, Japan’s Foreign 
Aid, 17, 198, n12).   
447 JICA’s recent organizational culture has been highly influenced by the bureaucratic concerns of the 
ministry that oversees it (MOFA). Also influential is the common Japanese system of the staffing of 
executive positions by retired leaders of leading ministries (amakudari). Seconded staff tend to emphasize 
the Japanese system of tatewari gyosei, where decision-making and loyalties function along the lines of 
their previous bureaucratic loyalties. This reportedly makes decision-making at JICA slower and more 
complex. Additional organizational factors include staffing patterns at JICA headquarters, which is staffed 
by a small number of professionals and field staff, augmented by outside Japanese development experts. 
JICA staff are also frequently rotated (every 18 months), and under pressure to continually learn new 
procedures, and new social development guidelines (Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA,” 100).  
448 Regarding democracy, a major question is what kind of democracy should Japan’s ODA encourage, a 
form modeled on Japan’s own system and experience, or more localized or alternative forms (Ibid., 101)? 
449 Warren notes the importance and success of WID (Women in Development)/gender programs in Japan’s 
aid programs in Nepal. Through the early 2000s, not many of these programs had been implemented in 
Latin America (Ibid., 101-102). 
450 It is challenging for aid agencies in both Japan (JICA) and South Korea (KOICA) to develop an 
adequate number of personnel sufficiently trained in regional and local languages and cultures, required if 
they are to successfully customize aid to meet local needs and the new international norms for participatory 
development. In both cases, drawing on the expertise of returned overseas volunteers may help (Ibid., Kim 
and Seddon, “ODA Policy,” 187-188). New graduate programs in international development in Japan and 
South Korea seem weak in cultural training, but not in economic issues. Khan, Japanese Aid, notes that 
while Japanese ODA is perceived positively in South Asia because of distant cultural links such as 
Buddhism, training for Japanese aid workers in cultural knowledge (recipients’ history, cultures, languages 
and geographies) and technical skills is optimum. 
451 Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA,” 100-101. 
105 
 
Culture can either be a boon or a barrier for aid cooperation.452 Compared with several 
European donors with longer experience with imperialism and colonialism than Japan’s, 
Japan has had more cultural isolation, and less extensive numbers of Japanese interacting 
with foreigners, especially in foreign countries.453 Cultural values have influenced 
Japan’s rationales for ODA, and Japanese aid officials often cite differences between 
Japan and other cultures as a partial justification for Japan’s ODA system.454 This leads 
to the important question of how cultural values and experiences like these interact with 
current Japanese aid policy, beyond the scope of the present study.455  
 Studying the rationales and cultural logics underlying aid can help us uncover 
the motives of aid donors. The literature on aid through the early 1990s lists four main 
areas of donor motivation: 1) humanitarian motives to relieve third world poverty with 
development, 2) the political goal of “image-enhancement” for the donor, 3) the political 
goal of national security promotion for the donor,456 and 4) promoting the economic self-
                                                
452 An example of cultural boon is Leelasorn’s argument that Japan has cultural compatibility with 
Thailand, another “Oriental” country, and that this helps the two countries to work together in ODA matters 
(Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan,” 261). An example of “barrier” is how Swedish aid professionals assert that 
Japan’s ODA work as less cooperative than other donors’ work, since the Japanese “tend to keep to 
themselves,” and sociolinguistic barriers separate them from other donors (Söderberg, “Swedish 
Perceptions,” 91). Tarte, “Japan’s ODA,” 243, argues that language is a barrier in the provision of Japanese 
aid to education in Pacific island states. 
453 Seddon, “Japanese and British,” 41. Britain is one such donor (Ibid.). Others include France, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden. 
454 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 17. 
455 Rix argues that cultural values interact with and helps to shape Japan’s aid policy outcomes: “social and 
cultural values help set the parameters within which policies develop, and the speed at which they change. 
Aid policies therefore provide a vivid reflection of a donor’s social values and culture, despite the strength 
of political, economic or bureaucratic considerations” (Ibid.). To better uncover such details, ethnographic 
research is required. 
456 According to Rix, this argument is commonly based on the dubious idea that aid will bring economic 
growth, political stability, and then benefits for the donor. The security argument has often been applied to 
Japan’s policies toward Southeast Asia 1945 (Ibid., 18). 
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interests of the donor.457 In a democratic society, a donor’s motives for aid must have 
some social basis or public legitimacy for aid programs to continue. The interpretation of 
aid objectives by aid practitioners will also influence the acceptance of aid in a donor 
society’s social and political contexts.458 Comparing cultural influences on the motives of 
Japanese and Western ODA systems, while some critics have called Japan’s ODA self-
serving, and Western aid arising from a sense of noblesse oblige, more in-depth study 
sometimes reveals these assertions to be false.459 
 A study that extensively investigates the cultural aspects of Japanese ODA is 
Wright-Neville’s 1991 study.460 His perspective on Japanese ODA is based largely on 
political science. His study aims to develop a more holistic, historical view of Japanese 
ODA.461 Many of his arguments are based on culture. Wright-Neville uses a 
“conventional” political science view of culture, arguing that culture is a problematic 
concept, to be handled with caution.462 I find his cultural arguments fascinating and 
                                                
457 These economic interests of a donor may include obtaining preferential treatment regarding to an LDC’s 
markets, its aid contracts, and its resources (Ibid., 18-19). 
458 Ibid., 19. 
459 Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 2-3, cites cases of self-serving Western aid, for example, from 
France and the United States (Ibid.). 
460 In his study, Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, 7, examines Japan’s aid through three 
primary lenses: impacts of the government bureaucracy, Japanese culture, and the international 
environment, over time (from 1955 to 1990). He criticizes Japanese aid in the late 1980s and early 1990s as 
lacking coherent logic, having poor coordination in its delivery, and suffering from bureaucratic 
complexity.  
461 Ibid., 1, 7, 28-30. 
462 Wright-Neville (Ibid., 31) draws on rather “conventional,” static political science notions of culture, 
mentioning definitions of culture from Clifford Geertz and Max Weber, how humans are suspended like 
animals caught in webs of meaning. Wright-Neville assumes that culture is static and enduring. He also 
draws on Lucian Pye (Ibid., 42), a political scientist who draws on anthropological concepts of culture. 
Pye’s work emphasizes the “national character” approach to analyzing Asian political cultures, how 
“national” patterns of childrearing shape the later behavior of leaders. Anthropologists such as Ruth 
Benedict also worked in this genre. Some of Pye’s other work focused on the “national” political cultures 
of China and Japan (Lucian W. Pye and Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions 
of Authority [Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1985]; Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: 
China's Political Cultures [Ann Arbor, Mich: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan, 
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creative, yet rather shallow.463 Some of Wright-Neville’s cultural arguments parallel my 
work here. He mentions similar concepts, including cognition and worldview,464 
holism,465 and comparisons of Japanese and Western cultures.466 My cultural arguments 
are offered in greater depth. While Wright-Neville examines a segment of the postwar 
period (1955-1990), my project covers a longer time frame (nearly one hundred years), 
and focuses on precursor influences to the Japanese aid system. I disagree with Wright-
                                                                                                                                            
1988]). More contemporary anthropological conceptualizations of culture see it as contested and 
fragmented, not static.  
463 Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, argues that the Japanese way of handling aid that is 
different from all other major donors. While this may have been largely true in 1991, above we noted the 
many similarities between Japan’s and South Korea’s current ODA systems; as do Kim and Seddon, “ODA 
Policy and Practice.” Other non-Western donors are likely copying at least some aspects of the Japanese 
system. Wright-Neville also contends that differences in the Japanese bureaucracy and Japanese customs 
regarding giving, the latter involving the Japanese concepts of on (favor, obligation), giri (duty, debt of 
gratitude), and ninjo (empathy, kindness) have been especially influential in making Japanese aid unique 
(Ibid., 8-9, 33-39). He applies the on argument to his treatment of Japanese aid from 1955-1972, and giri to 
the period 1973-1990. Many of his observations about Japan’s bureaucracy and its “unique” features, such 
as inter-ministerial competition over aid, are accurate (Ibid., 9-11, 42-54, and 62-74).  
464 Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, 23-25, mentions the work of White (Japanese Aid, 
6) and Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid. He asserts they both argued, at points, that Japanese aid is 
essentially based on unique aspects of Japan’s culture and national interests: according to Hasegawa’s 
findings, “Japan’s approach to aid was the product of a particular world view and an essentially Japanese 
interpretation of what was after all, an idea with its roots in the West” (Ibid.).  
465 Wright-Neville (Ibid., 28-30) argues for the value of using a holistic yet historical perspective that 
integrates cultural and structural elements, including cultural logics, over time: “if we wish to understand 
those forces that shape Japan’s aid policies it is therefore necessary to examine not only those attitudinal (or 
cultural) and structural factors preeminent in Japanese decision-making, but how they interact; how the 
particular logics contained within them reinforce or contradict each other over time.”  
466 I have already noted Wright-Neville’s characterizations of Japanese culture that he finds relevant to aid 
(on, giri and ninjo). Regarding Western cultures (primarily those of Western Europe and the United States), 
he argues that they have incorporated altruistic values of sacrifice and moral imperatives to help poorer 
nations, based on “Judeo-Christian culture,” and that the extensive presence of non-governmental 
organizations in those countries is evidence of this. While admitting that values of altruism are not totally 
absent in Japan, he argues that the “culture of giving” in Japan, based on values incorporating on, giri and 
ninjo, are very different from those in the West (Ibid., 32-40). I would counter that today there is absolutely 
a genuine spirit of altruism in Japan, despite shrinking aid budgets, and a growing presence of NGOs, even 
if the number is still proportionately smaller than in many Western nations. Wright-Neville (Ibid.) also 
notes that Japanese aid has been affected by conceptions of a “hierarchy” of nations, that the highly 
developed nations are superior to “backward” nations of the Global South, and by ethnocentric notions of 
racial and cultural superiority. Of course Western nations and their views of colonialism and aid have often 
been similarly affected.   
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Neville’s conclusions that Japanese aid system is like no other in the world, though 
historically, in many respects, it has differed from Western aid.467 
 Another study with a somewhat similar historical approach to this study is 
Hasegawa 1975. One of its analytical lenses is the “historical national evolutionist view,” 
which attempts to uncover “…the objectives and nature of Japanese foreign aid…  
[, through an] historical perspective [of aid] as an instrument of Japan’s evolving national 
policy.”468 The approach stresses how aid is used by the Japanese state to promote 
national interests (kokueki). Kokueki and national goals vary over time. Hasegawa 
differentiates Japan’s kokueki from 1945 to 1972469 from those in the prewar period in 
terms of “secularized postwar Japan”470 He contends there was a fundamental break in 
the outlooks of prewar and postwar Japan. According to Hasegawa, kokutai (national 
essence or polity), an ideology strongly influenced by religion and spirituality,471 and the 
colonial ideology of Daitowa Kyoeiken (the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)472 
dominated prewar Japanese worldviews and policies. The national interests of the 
                                                
467 I would counter that Japanese aid has certain similarities to the emerging aid systems of other Asian 
countries, which often find the Japanese aid system as a useful model. This is the case for South Korea’s 
aid system (Kim and Seddon, “ODA Policy and Practice”; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid). As another 
example, it has been noted that Chinese aid to Africa, like Japanese aid in general, has a tendency to avoid 
analysis of cultural and internal factors such as human rights, and focuses more on technical and economic 
aspects. This is very different from recent Western patterns of foreign aid analysis.  
468 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, 7-8. 
469 Ibid. Hasegawa’s 1975 study stops in 1972 with the return of Okinawa to Japan and President Nixon’s 
historic visit to China. 
470 Ibid. 
471 See the brief discussion of kokutai in Chapters 4, 7, and 9.  
472 This was a proposed policy designed to influence Japan’s colonial policies for China and the South 
Pacific during World War II, mentioned briefly in Chapter 8 (Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of 
Modern Japan [New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000], 397). Also see “Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity,” in Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993), 475. 
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secularized kokutai and increasing influences of Japan’s regional and global communities 
(chiiki kyodotai and sekai kyodotai)473 have governed postwar Japan.474 While  
Hasegawa’s study examines the evolution of Japanese aid over twenty years,475 the 
present study focuses on a longer time frame, preceding the aid period: the evolution of 
ideas and contexts surrounding the birth of Japanese aid policy. Though legal formalities 
on the mixing of religion and state changed greatly between prewar and postwar Japan (it 
is now prohibited), in practice, how much have core spiritualities at the root of most 
Japanese worldviews changed? I would argue they have not changed that much. 
Hasegawa’s distinction, on the difference between the prewar “spiritual” Japan state and 
the postwar “secular” one, seems essentially false, true only on the surface, on 
institutional, formal and legal levels. This is an example of the Flaw of the Excluded 
Middle. 
 A more recent study incorporating cultural and historical approaches similar to 
this study is Spyke 1999. Spyke stresses the study of history and culture as fundamental 
to providing more grounded, in-depth knowledge of international relations and foreign 
                                                
473 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid,12-13, argues that as Japan’s global trade and interaction increased in 
the postwar period, it manifested an increasing desire to fit in with and get along with the international 
community, to preserve the collective interests of nations, and to contribute to them as it was able. 
Contemporary Japan also connects with these goals, evidenced by its desire to gain a permanent seat at the 
United Nations, to gain international prestige, and to influence the international system in ways that will 
contribute to the trade, peace, and prosperity of the world and for itself. In turn, these ideals have served as 
motives for Japan’s huge contributions to foreign aid and various multilateral programs.    
474 Ibid.,  9-10, 12-13. Despite these differences between the two periods, Hasegawa argues that security, 
development, and ascendancy among world powers were common Japanese goals for both eras, to varying 
degrees.  
475 Ibid. Hasegawa’s study concludes that through 1972, aid was much more intended to enhance Japan’s 
growth than to aid developing nations in the areas of greatest need. He argues that there was a discrepancy 
between what Japanese aid claimed its goals were, and what it actually accomplished. In poststructuralist 
studies, Western anthropologists often explore this theme (differences between development rhetoric and 
reality) for Western aid and development programs (Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine; and Escobar, 
“Anthropology and Development” and Encountering Development). Also see Teresa Hayter and Catharine 
Watson, Aid: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Pluto Press, 1985).  
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policy. Her study explores various influences and motivations behind Japanese foreign 
aid policy: 
the main emphasis… [is] on how the motivations for Japan’s aid policy have been 
formed through time. Historical factors …combine with psychocultural factors to 
help determine the lens through which Japanese actors view the world and also 
through which Japan perceives the world views them.476 
  
Her approach integrates various factors and contexts, including selected historical and 
cultural elements since the 1500s, Japan’s economic development, U.S.-Japan relations, 
domestic factors, and a case study of how these factors play out in Japanese aid to Africa. 
While Spyke grounds her study in valuable fieldwork and a broad, historical lens, her 
treatments of worldview and culture lack the basic anthropological perspectives that the 
present study includes.477 While Spyke draws on similar ideas to this study,478 such as the 
importance of culture and history in shaping Japan’s aid policies, her study only 




                                                
476 Spyke, Japanese Foreign Aid Policy, 10, argues that several cultural values, including Japan’s 
ambivalence of superiority toward some countries and inferiority toward others, its sense of isolation from 
Asia and the West, and its sense of “non-whiteness,” are important influences on Japan’s aid policy. She 
explores Sato Seizaburo’s five stage explanation of cultural factors in Japanese foreign policy throughout 
her study (Ibid. 12-15). See my discussion of Sato’s points earlier in this chapter.    
477 At various points, Spyke mentions worldview, but never clearly defines it. Her concept of worldview 
often equates with Japan’s “view of the world” (her terminology) (Spyke, Japanese Foreign Aid Policy), 
not an anthropological or political science sense of worldview as defined in the Glossary section of the 
present project. It would be helpful if Spyke offered clear definitions of culture and worldview. 
478 Other similar ideas that Spyke mentions include the West contrasted with the non-West, Japan’s 
hierarchical view of nations, the role of religion and charitable values, and of international and domestic 
forces in shaping Japanese aid policy. When mentioning the influence of religion, Spyke mentions Japan’s 
contentious interaction with Christianity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and argues that it is 
difficult to distinguish among Shinto, Buddhist and Confucian influences in Japan’s history (Ibid.). To a 
large extent, the last point is true, but in the period studied in the present project (1850 to 1945), it is 
possible to distinguish, to some degree, the influences of State Shinto from Buddhism and Confucianism on 
Japanese politics and society. The Japanese state carefully created and institutionalized the influence of 
State Shinto during this period, and it is particularly seen in the life and actions of Emperor Hirohito. For 
more on State Shinto, see Chapters 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9, in particular. 
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Human Rights Approaches 
 
Hoshino 1999 addresses the issue of human rights conditionality in foreign aid 
programs, especially Japan’s. Hoshino specifically studies the impact of the 1992 ODA 
Charter on Japan’s bilateral aid allocations (Hoshino 1999: 199). He concludes that 
Japanese aid is not allocated in any systematic way concerning human rights performance 
in recipient nations. Although the idea exists in the 1992 ODA Charter, the situation in 
recipient nations is too complex,479 and the general will in Japan is not strong enough for 
this to be effectively accomplished.480 
 
Japan’s Foreign Aid Bureaucracy and Policymaking 
 
 
Key Domestic Aid Bureaucratic and Policymaking Actors  
 
 On the domestic level, in the 1980s, four main ministries and agencies (MOFA, 
MOF, MITI, and the EPA) considered each loan request in the aid policymaking process. 
As of 1988, Japan had no field aid missions, and no more than five or six aid officials in 
any recipient country at one time. Aid implementation was principally divided between 
JICA, which administered about half of all of Japan’s ODA grants, and the OECF, which 
dispersed loans.481 There was also pressure from the powerful private sector that lobbied 
“…the policy makers in…” particular directions, and from foreign interests, including the 
United States.482 
                                                
479 For example, some recipients have the human rights infrastructure but not the political will to support 
human rights, and for other nations, they have the will, but not the means (Eiichi Hoshino, “Human Rights 
and Development Aid: Japan after the ODA Charter,” Debating Human Rights: Critical Essays from the 
United States and Asia, ed. in Peter Van Ness [London and New York: Routledge, 1999], 225-226). 
480 Ibid. 
481 Robert M. Orr, “The Aid Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations,” Asian Survey, 287 (1988), 743. 
482 Khan, “Japanase Foreign Aid,” 6-7. 
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 At present, the primary domestic actors and forces shaping Japan’s ODA policy 
include the national government (including the bureaucracy and the Diet), municipal 
governments, public opinion, NGOs, and the private sector.483 Each of these forces has 
varied in its influence in different time periods. Critics have called the Japanese 
government bureaucracy handling aid cumbersome.484 At present, the most important 
institutional actors in Japan’s national aid bureaucracy include the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the “new” JICA, along with 
numerous other ministries and agencies.485 In recent decades, the three most important 
government agencies implementing aid have been the OECF (the Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund), JBIC (the Japan Bank for International Cooperation), and JICA 
(Japan International Cooperation Agency).486  














                                                
483 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 5-9; Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, chapters 3 
to 6. 
484 Orr, “Aid Factor,” 743. 
485 The two major, contemporary aid implementation agencies, JBIC (its OECO division) and JICA, 
merged into one super aid agency, the “new” JICA, in October 2008. 
486 For more details on these agencies, see the entries for JBIC, JICA, and OECF in the Glossary section of 
the appendices.  





























Aid Policymaking Process 
 Hasegawa’s analysis of Japan’s aid policymaking from the 1950s to the early 
1970s examines inter-ministerial competition between several leading ministries and 
agencies involved in aid policy.488 Competing views and interests hampered the 
coordination of Japanese aid. Language and cultural struggles also somewhat limited 
success for technical aid programs.489 Significant, new conflicts in Japan’s aid policy 
goals have intensified since at least the early 1990s. Since the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan 
has promised to improve the quality of its ODA. Later in the 1990s, there was increasing 
pressure to reduce the ODA budget, which has occurred regularly since 1998. Along with 
the pressure to improve aid quality in the midst of budget decreases, Japan’s ODA policy 
has become more assertive in seeking to support Japan’s national interests in foreign 
security and economic policy.490 Pressures exerted by Japanese public opinion, the media, 
and other international donors are noted elsewhere in this chapter.   
 David Arase and other foreign experts identify several weaknesses in Japan’s 
current aid process, making it perhaps the most complex of any major donor in the 
world.491 The state of Japan’s ODA 
…seems to suffer from a lack of policy coherence (i.e. a tight focus on poverty 
alleviation), an unwieldy and overly complex system of policymaking and 
implementation, and a limited ability to tailor aid to the specific needs of diverse 
recipients.492 
 
                                                
488 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, v-viii. These ministries were MOFA, MITI, and MOF. The agencies 
were the Export-Import Bank of Japan, the OECF, and the OTCA (Ibid.). 
489 Ibid. 149. 
490 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 1. 
491 Ibid., 6. 
492 Ibid., 267. 
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Recipients must request bilateral assistance. For them, the approval process is complex, 
opaque, and lacks uniform procedures or standards.493 In another example, grant aid 
administered by MOFA tends to focus on tertiary issues such as urban sanitation, urban 
hospitals and higher education, rather than on primary needs where the impact for the 
less-served poor would be larger. Critics find that Japan’s technical cooperation is 
complicated, varies in quality, and needs improved coordination. While the traditional 
part of Japan’s technical aid includes accepting trainees, sending experts and volunteers 
overseas, project aid, and development analysis, JICA implements only half of such aid. 
Nearly every ministry and agency in the Japanese government also has its own technical 
aid programs. JBIC implements loan aid usually used for production-oriented projects, 
large-scale physical infrastructure, and a limited amount of microlending.494  
 Coordination of this system has been difficult since Japanese has lacked a 
central aid agency. Though this was assigned to MOFA in the early 2000s, MOFA still 
did not make policy for all of the agencies involved, but had to shepherd numerous 
bureaucratic actors toward policy consensus.495 In the mid-2000s, foreign critics further 
critiqued the ‘opaqueness’ of bilateral aid policy, due to Japan’s having no central aid 
agency, no Diet legislative authority over ODA, bilateral aid policy delegated to over a 
dozen ministerial agencies, according to a vaguely worded ODA Charter lacking Diet 
approval, and multiple forms of ODA (grant, loan, and technical aid) implemented by 
different agencies.496 
                                                
493 Ibid., 6. 
494 Ibid., 267. These functions of JBIC will only continue through September 2008, after which the OECO 
portion of JBIC will be absorbed into the new JICA agency. 
495 Ibid. 
496 Ibid., 6. 
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The top policymakers in this system are usually long-term bureaucrats who are 
skilled generalists but who lack in-depth training in development theory or work in the 
field. Aid experts are hired for only limited tasks, and most staff of JBIC and JICA are 
consumed with clerical tasks rather than significant research and analysis. Field personnel 
are largely hidden. The major aid actors such as MOFA, JICA, and JBIC have had 
separate field offices that seldom coordinate their efforts. Most field staff spend their time 
managing relations with and documents from Tokyo. NGO involvement has been weak, 
comprising less than three percent of the recent budget for NGO activities.497 Japan’s 
ODA has also lacked systematic program evaluation, which could encourage overall 
change. Though Japan’s aid bureaucracy, including MOFA, is attempting to tackle these 
challenges,498 they are great. All of this has created problems for ODA policy 
coordination and clarity, as might be expected. 
Reform of Recent Japanese ODA Policy 
 
 Rix 1993 examines Japan’s capacity for institutional reform of its aid policy, in  
the face of various domestic and international pressures.499 At the foundation of Japanese 
ODA policy’s capacity for innovation are several ideas of aid: what Japan wants its aid to 
do, and how these ideas have changed. Rix considers the concept of aid philosophy 
                                                
497 For more details on the involvement of NGOs in Japanese ODA policy, see Hirata, Civil Society; 
Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 97-101; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 11, 71, 92, 131, 139, 140, 268; 
and Akiko Nanami, “Showing Japan's Face or Creating Powerful Challengers?Are NGOs Really Partners 
to the Government in Japan's Foreign Aid?” A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirement for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the University of Canterbury. Thesis (Ph.D.) 
(University of Canterbury, 2007, 2007), http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/etd/adt-NZCU20070420.101120; 
accessed 9 August 2008.  For example, Nanami studies the government’s interaction with three NGOs, and 
concludes that pressures favoring the bureaucracy have made genuine openness to NGOs difficult. NGOs 
also face a host of new challenges, in an era of economic retraction and high staff turnover.  
498 Ibid., 267-268. 
499 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2-3. 
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seminal in this.500 Closely related are domestic pressures for aid reform, both bureaucratic 
and public. Rix concludes that in the early 1990s, Japan’s ODA system continued to 
suffer from over-centralization and ineffectual administrative reform.501  
 But since the early 1990s, Japanese aid has undergone highly significant 
administrative restructuring, a continuing process. Though some pressures for ODA 
reform existed earlier, they accelerated in 1991 with the collapse of Japan’s bubble 
economy and several scandals. The second cabinet of Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro 
(in office from 1996 to 1998) sponsored six major reforms in Japanese governance, some 
of which affected Japan’s ODA.502 Before certain reforms passed in 1997, nineteen 
different ministries had their own ODA operations budgets.503 Other major reforms of 
this period included the merger of the OECF and the Japan Export-Import Bank into 
JBIC, completed in October 1999,504 passage of the 1998 Basic Law for Central 
Government Reform, initiating certain reforms of Japan’s complex ODA administration 
system,505 and the reorganization of MOFA’s Economic Cooperation Bureau and of 
JICA, in the late 1990s to early 2000s.506 New reforms for cooperation with Japanese 
                                                
500 Ibid., 7. See the discussion of Japan’s aid philosophy, and Rix’s treatment of it, earlier in this chapter.  
501 Ibid., 7-8. 
502 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 91-92. For a more detailed discussion of the many reform 




506 Ibid. 95-97. Reforms affecting have JICA included, first, sweeping internal changes begun in 1999. 
These created a new country focus in JICA’s operations (Country Assistance Programs), such as regional 
departments along with sectoral departments at JICA headquarters. Regional departments are now in 
charge of both making country-specific plans and implementing them. A specific goal is to technical plan 
aid for entire countries and their various sectors in more holistically. More authority has been delegated to 
JICA’s field offices. Second, JICA was reorganized in October 2003 as an “independent administrative 
institution,” to hopefully aid in separating policy planning from implementation, to improve the success of 
aid projects (Ibid.).  
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NGOs were also introduced.507 Since the early 1990s, other reform issues have included 
the need to delegate more authority to the field, increasing the number of ODA staff in 
various agencies such as JICA, overcoming challenges presented by Japan’s 
compartmentalized aid administrative system, addressing Africa’s special problems, 
reconciling differences between emerging global aid standards and Japan’s, and 
improving collaboration between JICA and JBIC.508 Both JBIC (its OECO division) and 
JICA attempted to move toward increased public openness and accountability since the 
early 2000s, and merged into one new super aid agency in October 2008.509 In practice, 
what will this merger mean for the effectiveness of Japanese aid delivery and results? 
Have the continuing administrative changes since the early 1990s improved Japanese 
ODA? These are paramount questions, beyond the scope of the present study.    
 
                                                
507 From 1996, important ODA agencies including MOFA, JBIC and JICA began increasing their 
communication with Japanese NGOs. From 1999, JICA began assigning entire projects (of a small level) to 
NGOs and other actors such as universities and municipalities. The Japanese government is also moving to 
create more financial support for Japanese NGOs. It also created an initiative called “Japan Platform” in 
2000, to coordinate aid Japanese aid efforts among the government, NGOs, and the business sector for 
humanitarian and refugee crises (Ibid.).  
508 Ibid., 107-112. 
509 The new combined agency, still to be called JICA, will have an annual budget of approximately $8.5 
billion, and be one of the largest bilateral aid agencies in the world. It will allow Japan to provide technical, 
grant and loan assistance “all ‘under one roof’ for the first time,” so that hopefully aid can be delivered 
more “effectiveness, efficiency, and speed,” along with increased sensitivity to field conditions, grassroots 
initiatives, and public openness. In the words of Sadako Ogata, JICA’s current director, “when all of these 
changes are completed, it will mark the most important turning point in the history of Japan’s ODA” (JICA,  
http:www.jica.go.jp/English/about/pres.html; accessed 9 August 2008). 
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Types and Amounts of Aid 
 
 
Types of Aid 
 
 Japan’s ODA is channeled through government channels, some in cooperation 
with the private sector.  There are three primary elements—bilateral loans,510 mainly used 
for industrial and economic infrastructure, bilateral grant aid,511 and multilateral 
contributions and subscriptions.512 Bilateral aid made up the lion’s share of aid 
disbursements through the mid-1990s (since the early 1990s, 70 to 75 percent of Japan’s 
ODA budget).513 Bilateral loans are granted through a request-based system.514 How does 
the bilateral aid given by Japan compare with that from other DAC donors? Until the 
early 2000s, Japan was mainly known for the huge amounts of aid it gave, but still lagged 
behind other DAC countries in most measures of the quality of aid given.515 Loans 
                                                
510 Bilateral loans were formerly disbursed and evaluated by JBIC’s OECO division, but since October 1, 
2008, are disbursed and evaluated by the new JICA agency, which has absorbed the OECO. 
511 Bilateral grant aid is provided by JICA. Grant aid includes general grant aid (aid for social and cultural 
projects dispensed directly by MOFA) and technical cooperation (knowledge transferred by human 
exchange and by equipment transfers, mainly handled by JICA (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 5). 
512 Taken from JICA, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/01.html; accessed 17 September 2003. Note that 
the OECO will be absorbed into the new JICA agency in October 2008. 
513 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 5. For example, in 1989, bilateral flows ($6.779 billion) made up 75.6 
percent of the total ODA disbursements ($8.956 billion) for that year. The remainder ($2.186 billion, 24.3 
percent) was multilateral flows, which went to “…multilateral institutions such as the World Bank or the 
Asian Development Bank” (Ensign, Doing Good, 27-28). 
514 Ibid. 
515 For example, as of the early 2000s, though its total aid amount has been large, compared to its national 
income, Japan’s level of giving has been below the DAC median, far below the recommended DAC 
median amount of 0.7 of GDP. The general terms of the aid that Japan offers have slowly improved, but 
continue to be less generous than those of other DAC countries, due to the high amount of loans in aid it 
offers. The DAC also has developed measures comparing how its members are meeting the challenges of 
poverty and other humanitarian needs, by examining aid across geographic regions, recipient nations’ 
income levels, and sectors. Japan’s aid continues to be largely focused on Asia, continues to have a fairly 
high level of focus on industrial sectors (despite some sectoral change). While Japan’s aid to the poorest 
countries has increased over time, it still ranks near the bottom of all DAC members. From 1970 to 2000, 
while Japan slowly increased its aid generosity and focus on the poorest nations, overall, in quality its 




continue to be a very important component in Japan’s total ODA.516 What seems obvious 
in Chart 2.1 (Japan’s ODA Allocation by Sector) is that aid for physical infrastructure 
was a very high percentage of Japan’s ODA from 1993 to 2005, and continues to be so. 
Aid for social infrastructure has consistently been lower than for the physical area. This is 
graphic evidence of the long-term emphasis of Japan’s ODA on economic infrastructure. 
 
Graph 2.1 Japan’s ODA Allocation by Sector: 1993-2005.517 
 
 
Note: The figure above includes assistance to Social and Administrative Infrastructure, 
Economic Infrastructure, Production and Multi-Sector and does not include Commodity 
Aid and General Program Assistance, Debt Relief, Administrative Expenses and Others. 
 
 
                                                
516 Though loans were 67 percent of Japan’s total bilateral ODA in 1970, they decreased to 35 percent in 
2002. Yet this figure for all DAC members, including Japan, drawn from aggregate data for 2002, was only 
2.3 percent (Ibid., 5).   




 Multilateral aid has increased in importance. Since the early 1990s, up to 20 to 
25 percent of the ODA budget has gone to multilateral programs and agencies (Arase 
2005s: 5). Multilateral aid is generally less studied than bilateral aid. Yasutomo argues 
that the importance of Japan’s multilateral ODA channeled through multilateral 
institutions is increasing, and worthy of study, since it represents increased Japanese 
assertiveness in foreign policy. This new assertiveness through multilateral ODA is the 
result of a slow evolutionary policy. Yasutomo attempts to prove this through his study of 
Japanese behavior in three multilateral banks providing aid for post-Soviet Russia: the 
IBRD, the ADB, and the EDBRD.518  
 Historically, much of the aid that Japan offers has been “tied.” Japan’s ODA 
program has often been criticized for its tied nature.519 Critics have long charged that 
Japan’s ODA has a definite trade/commercial promotion link.520 There can be economic 
or political security reasons for tying aid. In Japan’s case, Ensign argues that in the 
1980s, the reason was chiefly economic, coupled with “Japan’s regional aid biases 
toward the Asian countries….”521 In her study on the impacts of Japan’s tied aid to six 
Asian countries from 1982 to 1989, Ensign concludes that 
                                                
518 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, vii-x, 119-148. For a study of Japan’s relationship with the Asian 
Development Bank through the early 1980s, see Yasutomo, Japan and Asian Bank; for an updated version 
of the topic as a reflection of Japan’s emerging multilateral aid policies, as of the early 1990s, see 
Yasutomo, “Japan and the Asian Development Bank: Multilateral Aid Policy in Transition,” in Japan's 
Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, eds. Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1993), 305-40. 
519 This refers to its connection with promoting Japanese commercial interests and purchases from Japanese 
firms. The amount of Japanese aid that is tied has been steadily decreasing, however. By 1999, almost all 
ODA loans were untied (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 4). 
520 Ensign, Doing Good, 32-33. 
521 Ibid., 83-84. 
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...Japanese aid and trade are linked. Specifically, aid to infrastructure projects  
in [the six nations] …is positively correlated with trade in infrastructure. Tied aid 
benefits the Japanese economy and industries. Capital projects support the exports 
of Japanese goods.522 
 
Ensign notes that from the early 1980s, most Japanese aid to other Asian countries went 
to infrastructural development, and that there were potentially harmful impacts on each 
nation’s environment and local groups that might hamper a nation’s capacity for 
economic development.523 Tied aid has likely had mixed results, contributing to both 
economic development and environmental damage in some countries. 
 There are several types of aid flows that make up Japanese aid and economic 
cooperation. Budget-determined official flows consist of official development assistance 
(ODA) and “other official flows.” They are “…administered solely by the government.” 
Part of ODA consists of technical cooperation, such as the transfer of proprietary 
knowledge, the education of students and trainees from LDCs, the dispatching of experts 
and advisors, and help with feasibility studies in the LDCs.524 
 Compared with Western aid systems, Japan’s aid system has been unique for its 
significant component of private sector involvement.525 Ozawa calls one type of this 
“public-private aid flow” hybrid aid, defined as 
…joint financing arranged by the government in collaboration with the private 
sector.  Examples are joint loans and syndicated equity investments that [were 
formerly] …arranged by [the] …OECF [, later by JBIC] and private corporations 
for investment projects in the developing countries, and by co-operative loans 
organized by the Ex-Im Bank of Japan and Japanese commercial banks. [These 
organizations have served] …as risk-sharers for these financial arrangements. In 
                                                
522 Ibid., 84, 92-93. 
523 Ibid., 92-93. 
524 Ozawa, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses, 99, 101. 
525 Das, Yen Appreciation, 167-169. See Söderberg, Business of Japanese Foreign Aid; and Arase, “Public-
Private Sector,” for more in-depth explorations of private aid to Asia and public-private aid coordination 
from Japan in the 1990s. 
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addition, the commercial banks’ subscription of the bonds issued by such 
international financial organizations as the World Bank, [and] the Asian 
Development Bank… can …be classified as hybrid flows.526 
 
Another form of public-private aid flow is market-coordinated flows, “generated by 
market forces and include foreign direct investment, bank loans, and donations by private 
institutions.” In the late 1980s there was a rapid increase in this form of aid from Japan, 
due to the yen’s rapid appreciation. As production in Japan became more expensive, 
more financial capital (foreign securities, real estate, and other assets) and industrial 
production overseas were transferred overseas. In the 1980s, the transfer of these surplus 
industries, including managerial expertise and production technologies, was especially 
strong to the Asian NICS and China, but also to Europe and North America.527 Ozawa 
predicted that in the 1990s, Japanese aid would move toward increasing transfer of 
industrial activities to neighboring countries, especially China, which happened, and the 
development of new forms of “hybrid” aid packages, combining official aid with private 
sector transfers of capital, technology, know-how, and organizational skills.528 
 
                                                
526 Ozawa, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses, 99. 
527 Ibid., 99, 106-107. Ozawa concludes that market-coordinated flows stood at the base of Japan’s 
economic cooperation with LDCs in the late 1980s, and that Japan’s government relied more upon 
“privatized aid” because of budget constraints, and “…its belief that foreign direct investment is the most 
effective conduit through which Japanese corporations can transfer the crucial development resources they 
possess.” The drawback of such aid is that it tends to flow mainly where profits lie (Ibid., 99, 108). 
528 Ibid., 7, 9-12. Ozawa believed that other Asian nations, especially China, were uniquely positioned to 
benefit from this new form of aid, and that Japan was unique in pioneering such an approach. Dubbed 
“comprehensive development strategy,” or Minkatsu, it aimed to make “…optimal use of private sector 
vitality to enhance productivity and efficiency in the entire economy.” It seems likely that other Asian 
nations, such as China and South Korea, given their strong experiences of state-led development, will also 
offer similar hybrid types of aid packages (Ozawa, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses). 
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Amounts of Aid 
 In terms of total financial flows, Japan’s aid increased from about .5 percent of 
GNP in the early 1960s to almost one percent in the early 1970s.529 The rise and decrease 
in the amounts of Japanese ODA have roughly followed Japan’s growth as an advanced 
industrial nation (its GDP growth). After Japan joined the OECD in 1964, it increased its 
ODA in concert with its increase in GDP, becoming the fourth highest OECD donor in 
1973. From the late 1970s to 1999, there was an unprecedented rise in Japan’s aid budget, 
followed by rapid declines from 2000 to the present.530 In 1978 Japan ranked as the third 
largest donor, and after several massive increases in ODA amounts, became number two 
in 1983, and in 1989, number one, cresting at $15.3 billion (net ODA) in 1999. Japan 
dropped to the number two spot again in 2001, at $9.8 billion. Though Japan will stay a 
fairly wealthy nation for the near future, it faces great competition from the meteoric rise 
of China, and pressure from the United States, the European Union, and new powers like 
Russia, India, and Brazil.531  
 
                                                
529 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, 145. 
530 From FY 1997 to FY 2004, Japan’s ODA budget decreased 30 percent (Arase, Japanese Foreign Aid, 
4). 
531 Ibid. 3. 
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Graph 2.2 Trends in Japan’s ODA Budget and Other Major Expenditures.532 
 
 It is interesting to compare the spending decreases in Japan’s ODA account 
from 1997 to 2007 (about 40 percent from 1997 levels) with the Japanese government’s 
public works related spending over the period, which also a somewhat similar decrease 
(19 percent) (see Chart 2.2). Clearly the spending levels of Japan’s ODA have paralleled 
the state of Japan’s overall economy. The chief reason behind Japan’s ODA reduction 
seems to be its general economic decline since the early 1990s, when Japan’s famous 
bubble economy “burst.” By 2002, various government economic stimulus packages 
ballooned the national government debt to 140 percent of Japan’s GDP. Another 
emerging socioeconomic crisis is the nation’s rapidly aging population. The loss of 
Japan’s reputation as a global superpower was humiliating, contributing to a rising sense 
that Japan was must do less for others and more for itself. There are also political 
motivations for the decrease in Japan’s ODA budget, especially MOFA’s loss of face 
                                                
532 Ministry Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/html/zuhyo/ 
zu020031.htm, accessed 15 August, 2008. 
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with the Japanese public. MOFA has been the chief public face for ODA. Its efforts to 
decrease loan tying of Japanese aid, to bring it up to current international standards, 
caused a large decrease in the number of loan contracts awarded to Japanese firms. This 
made many in the ruling LDP and the Japanese business community doubt that ODA was 
still crucial to their interests. Frosty relations between China and Japan from the late 
1990s to 2008 increased domestic calls to end Japanese ODA to that nation, with charges 
that Japan’s aid contributed to China’s economic rise and military build-up, to Japan’s 
harm. MOFA was also tainted by a series of scandals from 2000 to 2002. All of this 
contributes to the likelihood that Japan’s ODA budget will not be significantly increased 
until the government carries out needed reforms to help renew the Japanese people’s 
confidence in ODA.533 While the Japanese government is indeed carrying out quite a 
number of reforms, the question remains whether they will maintain or increase the 
effectiveness of Japan’s aid, in the face of continuing economic challenges. Many foreign 
critics doubt they will.  
 
Bilateral, Regional, Multilateral/International 
 
Aid Policies and Contributions 
 
 
Bilateral, Regional Aid Policies, Contributions 
 
 Please see Chart 2.3 for details on the major aspects of the distribution of 
Japan’s bilateral ODA to major world regions. One thing that is obvious here is that Asia 
has always occupied a high percentage of Japan’s regional giving, through 2006, yet that 
is changing. It is notable that giving to the Middle East and Africa greatly increased in 
                                                
533 Ibid., 3-5. 
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2005 and 2006. In 2006, Japan’s bilateral ODA to Africa surpassed aid to Asia for the 
first time, a highly significant change.   
 
Graph 2.3  Trends in Bilateral ODA by Region (Net Disbursement)534 
 
 
Aid to Asia 
 Sato Seizaburo has characterized an emphasis on Asia as one of the pillars of 
Japanese foreign policy since the 1880s.535 Traditionally Japan has maintained a very 
strong regional focus in its foreign aid programs, especially centered on Asia: the 
ASEAN states,536 Korea, and since 1978, China. Japan feels a certain commonality in 
heritage and history with its neighbors. Historically, they contained many natural 
                                                
534 Ministry Foreign Affairs, available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/ 
white/2007/ODA2007/html/zuhyo/zu020041.htm, accessed 9 November 2008. 
535 Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid, 4. 
536 Concerning ASEAN, Indonesia has often been Japan’s top or second highest aid recipient. 
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resources, such as oil, natural gas, rubber, copper, and bauxite.537 In the late 1980s, more 
Japanese aid was given to South and East Asia (65-70 percent of total aid in the 1980s) 
than to other regions. 30-35 percent of the total was reserved for ASEAN, more than the 
Japanese ODA given to Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America combined. The 
emphasis on one world region or group of countries is not unique to Japan.  In the late 
1980s, 70 percent of Britain’s aid went to Commonwealth countries.538 
In the mid-1980s, China developed into ASEAN’s chief rival for Japanese aid 
…in terms of amounts and special treatment. ASEAN views of the growth of 
intimate Sino-Japanese ties uneasily. ASEAN governments sense that Japan 
considers China the real priority because of …[traditionally stronger] ties to the 
mainland. Their concern is understandable since the most outstanding development 
in Japanese aid policy in the 1980s …[was] the sudden rise of China as Japan’s 
…largest bilateral aid recipient…. [in] record time.539 
 
Through the early 1990s, Japan’s aid philosophy has continually stressed aid to Asia.540 
In 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro announced two major initiatives designed to 
enhance Japan’s economic cooperation with and aid to the ASEAN nations.541 Other 
studies that examine various aspects of Japan’s aid to Asia and ASEAN include studies 
by Orr,542 Potter,543 Söderberg,544 and Khan,545 many already mentioned above.   
                                                
537 Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, 91. 
538 Orr, “Rising Sun,” 42, 45. 
539 Ozawa, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses, 96, 121-122. 
540 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 22-24. 
541 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 105. The first initiative, announced in January 2002, called IDEA 
(Initiative for Development in East Asia), included efforts to “confirm the significance of East Asian 
development, to promote intra-ASEAN cooperation, and to share their experience with other countries and 
regions.” The Koizumi Initiative of late 2002, announced just before the Johannesburg Summit, stressed 
that Japan would push acknowledgement of IDEA and of East Asian development as a model for other 
nations, and promote growth-oriented development against the PRSP development approach supported by 
the World Bank and other Western donors, among several other goals (Ibid.).     
542 Orr, “Rising Sun,” studies Japanese aid to ASEAN, the Pacific Rim and South Korea. 
543 Potter, Japan's Foreign Aid and “Accommodation and Recipient,” examine the viewpoints of two 
Japanese ODA recipients in Southeast Asia, Thailand and the Philippines. 
544 The Söderberg, Business of Japanese Foreign Aid, study investigates Japanese aid to five different 
Asian nations from largely a business point of view. 
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 Since the 1980s, China has often been the top recipient of Japanese ODA. Two 
recent studies of Japan’s aid to China are Takamine,546 which examines Japan’s aid to 
China in-depth from Japanese points of view (the donor’s), and Feng, which briefly looks 
at the subject from the recipient’s point of view.547 Takamine asserts that the case of 
Japanese aid to China reveals the capacity of a donor nation to pursue multiple foreign 
policy goals through its aid to a recipient country. In the past, Japan used aid to China to 
encourage positive economic and political developments, but since 1995, has used its aid 
as a “diplomatic weapon” to support Japan’s security interests there.548 For his study of 
Japanese aid to China, Takamine chooses the analytical approaches of mercantile realism, 
proactive state, and institutional analysis as the best for his case.549 Takamine argues that 
institutional analysis characterizes Japan’s foreign aid policymaking as  
…intensive bargaining (or politics) among various Japanese policy-making actors, 
each of which engages in ODA policy-making on the basis of different perceptions 
of national, organisational and personal interests. In fact, the politics of foreign aid 
is a battle among competing ideas that all claim to represent the national interest 
[italics added].550 
 
                                                                                                                                            
545 Haider A. Khan investigates Japanese aid to Indonesia, Bangladesh, and to the regions of South and 
Southeast Asia. See Haider A. Khan, “How Effective is Japanese Aid: Econometric Results from a 
Bounded Rationality Model for Indonesia,” (Unpublished paper, 2002); Khan, “Japanese Aid.” 
546 Takamine, Japan's Development Aid. 
547 Feng, “Japanese Aid to China.” See my comments about Feng earlier in this chapter. 
548 Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 158. 
549 Ibid., 15-16. These three approaches are discussed earlier in this chapter. The first approach helps 
address the complex connections between Japan’s attempts to further its strategic and diplomatic concerns 
in the international system on the one hand, and its international economic policy and ODA on the other. 
The proactive state approach correctly stresses the input of various domestic “indigenous” factors in 
influencing policy outcomes in Japan’s aid policies. So while the mercantile realism and proactive state 
approaches are useful for identifying the interests within and the objectives behind Japan’s ODA, they do 
not explain actual policymaking processes, and they assume the input of solitary, rational actors in the 
policy process, a naïve assumption for foreign aid in democratic societies (Ibid.). 
550 Ibid. Takamine concludes that the institutional analysis approach sees Japanese politics as a battle 
among politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders, and well supplements the weaknesses of the 
mercantile realism and proactive state approaches (Ibid.). Hence, Takamine’s study goes slightly beyond all 
of the existing studies. 
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Thus, Takamine’s work on China concurs with the some of the chief arguments of the 
present research, that perceptions, worldviews and ideas are paramount forces in shaping 
a donor’s aid policies (in this case, Japan’s), among other factors. Since 1978, the rise of 
China in Japan’s regional aid goals has been paramount. 
Globalization of Aid 
 
 Japan has moved toward globalization of its aid beyond Asia since the early 
1970s, resulting from a desire to contribute to stability in resource-rich areas, and second, 
from its status as a great economic power. Japanese aid to Latin America increased, and 
was influenced by U.S. policies.551 Japan aid to Africa increased over seventy fold from 
1972 through the mid- 1980s, and was humanitarian in nature. Aid to the Middle East in 
this period varied, but Egypt tended to receive a lot because of its strategic importance.552 
Other regions receiving new infusions of Japanese aid since the early 1990s include 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet states in Europe and Asia.553  So Japan has used 
economic aid as a significant foreign policy tool. Although Japan tried to become a 
global player, regional concerns, focused on Asia, figured prominently in its foreign 
policy and economic aid programs. The first significant, major non-Japanese study of the 
                                                
551 For a more recent treatment of trends in Japanese aid to Latin America, especially on social 
development issues, see Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA,” and my comments on Warren’s work earlier 
in this chapter. 
552 Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, 81-89, Brooks and Orr, “Japan’s Foreign Economic,” 332-334. 
553 Note my brief comments on Japanese aid to Russia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet states in 
Central Asia in the early 1990s earlier in this chapter. Japan especially gave aid to encourage 
democratization, human rights, and free markets in these regions through the late 1990s (Hirata, Civil 
Society, 172-173). For the latest trends in JICA’s aid to these regions, see JICA, available from 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/countries/ index.html, Internet; accessed 30 June 2003, and click on the 
appropriate links (East Asia, Europe, or Central Asia and the Caucasus). 
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effects of the distribution of Japanese aid to major world regions was Koppel and Orr’s 
1993 study.554 
 Earlier in this chapter I commented on aid trends from Eastern donors, including 
Japan, to Africa.555 In the 1990s, Japan announced significant new initiatives to address 
poverty and development problems in the region, in contrast to major Western donors 
who temporarily began to cut their aid to the region, due to “post-Cold War aid fatigue.” 
The Japanese government has also organized four major international conferences on aid 
to Africa, called the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD), 
in 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008.556 These efforts are laudable, but some Japanese have 
complained that much of sub-Saharan Africa is not yet capable of receiving 
investment.557 It is crucial that Japanese aid efforts to Africa continue to be realistic in 
approach.558 Care must be exercised in offering aid to Africa in areas such as 
infrastructural, agricultural and social development, transferring elements of the East 
Asian and Japanese development experiences, and partnering with European donors who 
have more experience in the region.559 In Africa, Japan also hopes to encourage South-
                                                
554 See my comments on Koppel and Orr earlier in this chapter. 
555 Please see my comments earlier in the chapter for references to several of the significant studies on this 
subject. 
556 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 104. Among these efforts, Japan has announced intentions to 
increase aid on several occasions, including at the TICAD IV, held in May 2008. One of the notable new 
trends emerging in the last several years is Japan’s new competition with China in offering aid to Africa, 
also mentioned above.  
557 Ibid., 104, n.51, 110. 
558 Ibid., 104. 
559 For example, while the United Kingdom’s DFID has more experience in Africa and less in Asia, Japan 
is in the opposite situation. Partnering with other donors more experienced in different regions can multiply 
development’s effectiveness in lean economic times (Ibid., 110, 111, n.63). 
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South partnerships, “self-motivated development,” and cooperation with other regional 
development efforts, such as NEPAD.560  
 The Japanese government also seeks to increase partnerships with other bilateral 
donors. Cooperation among donors is also a key goal in the Western-led global 
development agenda. Since Japan is one of the world’s most significant aid donors, 
Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook 1999 was written to encourage that process, to help 
introduce the Japanese aid system to Western audiences.561 Beaudry-Somcynsky and 
Cook’s 1999 study attempts to offer an overall guide to the highly complex Japanese aid 
system in the mid- to late 1990s, which foreigners find hard to understand.562 A better 
understanding is necessary if foreign countries are to partner effectively with Japan. The 
multiplicity of ministries and agencies involved, their relations with NGOs, relations 
between the public and private sectors, and complex decision-making and approval 
processes all contribute to the complexity. 
 
                                                
560 Ibid., 110-111. NEPAD is a framework for the development of Africa that was approved by the 
Organization for African Unity (now the African Union) in July 2001 (available from 
http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php. Internet; accessed August 9, 2008.) 
561 Alain Berranger, preface to Japan’s System for Overseas Development Assistance, eds. Micheline 
Beaudry-Somcynsky and Chris M. Cook (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999); 
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-32158-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html, accessed 18 June 2008.  New partnerships in 
development are also a goal of Canada’s IDRC. Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook 1999 was the fruit of 
attempts at partnership between the IRDC and Japan’s RIDA, and between Canada’s CIDA, and JICA. 
562 The two main goals of the book are to “to provide a better understanding of the full range of the 




Table 2.8  Top 10 Recipients of Japan’s Aid by Type in 2006 (Calendar Year)563 
Bilateral ODA Total (Net disbursement basis, unit: US$ million, %) 
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Table 2.9  Top 10 Recipients of Japan’s Aid by Type in 2005 (Calendar Year)564 
Bilateral ODA Total (Net disbursement basis, unit: US$ million, %) 
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563 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/html/zuhyo/index.htm, accessed 9 November 
2008. 
564 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from 
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Table 2.10  Top 10 Recipients of Japan’s Aid by Type in 2004 (Calendar Year)565 
Bilateral ODA Total (Net disbursement basis, unit: US$ million, %) 
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 Ten-country total 3,442.30 57.81 
 
 
                                                
565 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2005/ODA2005/html/zuhyo/index.htm (both kinds of aid, 
accessed 9 November, 08.  
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 Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 present data about the top ten national recipients of 
Japan’s bilateral ODA in 2004, 2005, and 2006. In 2004, Asian nations made up eight of 
the top ten recipients of bilateral aid from Japan. The Middle East and Africa were also 
present in the top ten (one nation each). The pattern of broader globalization of the 
distribution of Japan’s aid was significantly present in 2005 and 2006, but not in 2004. 
Along with the broader globalization of aid, there is also a strategic element, supporting 
the foreign policy goals of both Japan and the United States. In 2005, we see evidence of 
a pattern of emphasis on Asia with increasing globalization in the disbursement of 
Japan’s bilateral ODA. Though five Asian nations were among the top ten recipients, 
other major world regions are well represented: Africa (two nations), and the Middle 
East, Eastern Europe and Latin America (one nation each). In 2006, many of the nations 
were highly important to Japan for economic reasons, due to their geographic presence in 
Japan’s Asian market (China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Pakistan and Malaysia). Also in 
2006, two of the top ten recipients were important (or potential) suppliers of oil (Nigeria, 
Iraq). Several of the top recipients in 2006 were of high strategic interest for the general 
foreign policy concerns of the United States (especially Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan). 
2004 disbursements also reveal sensitivity to current strategic U.S. interests in several of 
the recipients (again, to the same three nations). 
Multilateral / International Aid Policies  
 
 By the end of the period 1953-1973, Hasegawa argues in his study of Japanese 
aid that Japan had gained more influence in Asia, but not globally. Japan’s participation 
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in international bodies like the World Bank was relatively small.566 Today Japan is an 
active member and large supporter of many international institutions dealing with 
development, such as the United Nations, the IMF, the IDA, the ADB (in which Japan 
has been particularly active since its founding), the IADB, the AfDB and Fund, and the 
World Bank. Japan is also one of the top contributors to international relief and food aid 
organizations. It has actively joined many groups founded by other nations, yet 
maintained a low profile until the 1990s, with the rise of new “assertiveness” in its 
dealings in influencing multilateral banks and organizations.567 By the mid-1990s, a new 
Japanese theme for its involvement in multilateral development banks arose: “ideas, not 
just money.” The goal was now to contribute lessons from Japan’s own experience for 
the development of other regions, both the third and former second worlds.568 By this 
time, ODA became a very complex foreign policy tool; it could “…no longer be 
understood in one-dimensional terms. It [had become] …a diverse, multidimensional 
policy tool with multiple objectives.” But the question was why, and what the impacts on 
future Japanese foreign policy would be.569 
 
                                                
566 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, v-viii. 
567 Brooks and Orr, “Japanese Foreign Economic,” 334; Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, 3. For details on 
Japan’s role in the Asian Development Bank, see Yasutomo, Japan and Asian Bank, 1-3, 5, 6; and 
Yasutomo, “Japan and the Asian Development Bank: Multilateral Aid Policy in Transition,” in Japan's 
Foreign Aid, eds. Bruce Koppel and Robert M. Orr, 305-40 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); and 
Yasutomo, New Multilateralism in which Japan’s role in multilateral development banks is explored.  
568 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 15. 
569 Ibid., 16. 
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Current ODA Issues and Trends 
 
Recent Domestic Trends, Issues in Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
 
 A major issue in Alan Rix’s 1993 study Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge is what 
Japan’s capacity for ODA administrative reform means for Japan’s potential for future 
global leadership.570 Rix argues that Japanese ODA practice and policy on the 
international level can tell us much about this question. By studying Japan’s pattern of 
aid giving, we can uncover much about Japan’s relations with and roles in other Asian 
nations, other regions, its relations with other significant powers, and whether Japan can 
take over the “hegemonic” role of the United States in international relations.571 The 
continuing global presence of the United States, the recent rise of China, the increasing 
role of the European Union, and the return of Russian influence combine with other 
factors to make “Japanese hegemony” in global international relations or Asia alone 
doubtful at this time.  
 In the opinion of Alan Rix, in the early 1990s, the complexities of Japan’s aid 
bureaucracy meant that Japan was unable to effectively, completely respond to 
international calls for reforms in its aid and for increased global leadership. Some aid 
officials in Japan began to doubt the suitability of Japan’s “unique” approach to aid as 
suitable for other donors. Rix concluded that possibilities for a “convergence” of Western 
and Japanese aid models seemed doubtful. Increasingly assertive, active public relations 
                                                
570 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2-3. 
571 Ibid., 9-11. Rix notes that Japan’s significantly increased aid amounts and aid visibility in the 1990s 
(and later) do not necessarily mean that it will become a global leader. But its capacity to manage aid more 
effectively might be tangible signs of its ability to manage issues in specific sectors (such as development) 
or regions, i.e. Asia (Ibid.) 
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efforts from the Japanese government failed to dispel domestic or international criticisms, 
and reforms remained slow.572  
 But much has changed in the new millennium. The September 11 terrorist 
attacks increased international support for ODA, even in Japan somewhat (for the short 
term). Support for the MDGs has also increased in Japan. Earlier in this chapter I noted 
the intense domestic pressures in Japan for ODA reform, including the reorganization of 
major elements of JICA, JBIC, and MOFA, the merging of parts of the first two agencies, 
and the increasing presence of social development and field/country-based initiatives.573 
The overall amount of Japan’s ODA general account decreased 38 percent from 11.687 
trillion yen in 1997 to 7.293 trillion yen in 2007,574 though Japan has pledged to increase 
aid in certain areas, for example to Africa, in the next few years. Historically, Japan has 
shown a much greater preference for aid for economic infrastructure in its aid than for 
social infrastructure. This is basically the opposite of many major Western donors.575 
Another major trend is that Japan’s ODA has continued to include a significant 
proportion of yen loans.576     
 
                                                
572 Ibid., 190-191. 
573 Akiyama and Kondo, Global ODA, 2-3; Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 83; Arase, Japan’s 
Foreign Aid, 267-268. 
574 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www/mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/ 
html/zuhyo/zu020031.htm, Internet, accessed August 15, 2008. 
575 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 84-87. 
576 Yamauchi describes Japan’s motive for the high dependence on loans as due to the fact that “Japan 
achieved miraculous economic development with self-help efforts and financial assistance from the World 
Bank and other donors, and made sure that all debts were paid on schedule. From this experience was born 
a belief that yen loans motivate recipient countries by imposing repayment obligations” (Ibid., 89). 
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Recent International Trends, Effects on Japanese ODA Issues 
 Recent international (Western) trends in ODA are moving toward increased 
emphasis on human development and institutions, among others.577 Since the 
announcement of the MDGs in 2000 and the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, there 
is increased stress on recipient participation, institution-building, poverty reduction, 
preventing poverty-related phenomena that may breed terrorism, democratization, 
increased coordination of donor efforts, more comprehensive development, human 
security, analysis of social and political factors in development, and a greater results 
orientation.578 In Japan, there has been faltering public support for ODA, and increased 
stress on aid efficiency and effectiveness, even in the light of scarcer resources, resulting 
in significant administrative reforms of Japan’s ODA efforts and attempts at improved 
coordination among its ODA-related agencies.579 As noted earlier in this chapter, 
international critics charge that there are various gaps in how successfully Japan is 
meeting current international norms for ODA. Yet such gaps exist among other donors. 
David Arase notes that research has shown that even “altruistic” Sweden, noted for the 
highly transparent, humanitarian nature of its aid, has historically shown preference for 
socialist governments in its Africa aid. “Given the fact that bilateral ODA is influenced 
by a donor’s unique combination of values, ideologies, available resources, and interests, 
one might expect donors to have concerns in addition to simple poverty alleviation.”580 
Japan is no exception, and neither are other donors. 
                                                
577 Note that these trends are especially predominant in Western donors’ goals, and in the goals of the 
international financial institutions that Western countries tend to dominate, such as the World Bank. 
578 Akiyama and Kondo, Global ODA, 1-8. 
579 Ibid., 2-3. 
580 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 12. 
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 Japanese development scholars have offered several critiques of recent 
international trends, including the following.581 While there are significant efforts in 
Japan to integrate these trends, the basic thought in many of the MDG goals runs counter 
to many assumptions of Japan’s and East Asia’s own development experiences. Some 
Japanese scholars argue that the MDGs put too much stress on poverty reduction, and not 
enough on growth promotion.582 While the MDGs emphasize social development goals 
incorporating health, the environment, and education, they neglect goals of economic 
growth. In the development experiences of Japan and other nations in East and Southeast 
Asia, effective economic growth in itself reduces poverty.583 Denial or reduction of aid to 
countries with poor governance may leave those countries behind, resulting in even 
further poverty.584 The new stress on social and political goals and institutions will 
increasingly challenge the traditional loan delivery approaches of the regional and 
international development banks and of Japanese yen loans. Do the organizational 
structures and personnel of these institutions have the capacity to deal with the challenges 
that will result?585 In the experience of East Asian nations, trade has a paramount role in 
effective development. Many developing nations are begging for more trade, not more 
                                                
581 I devote slightly more space here to these Japanese critiques with the assumption that many of my 
Western readers will be less familiar with the Japanese arguments. 
582 Examples of Japanese scholars offering this criticism of excessive stress on poverty reduction include 
Shigeru Ishikawa, “Hinkon sakugen ka seichô sokushin ka,” Nihon Gakushiin Kiyo 56, no. 2 (2002); Izumi 
Ohno, “Diversifying PRSP” (Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2002); and Kenichi 
Ohno, “Development with Alternative Strategic Options” (Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies, 2002); all cited in Akiyama and Kondo, Global ODA, 9, n10. 
583 Akiyama and Kondo note that this is the experience of Japan’s as a result of aid it received from the 
World Bank, and of East and Southeast Asian countries receiving the largest proportion of Japanese aid 
(Ibid., 8). 
584 Ibid., 8. 
585 Ibid., 9-10. For example, project costs incorporating extensive political and social analysis will be 
greater and involve more complexity. It is also costly for these organizations to develop such expertise in-
house, and it will likely have to be contracted out (Ibid.). 
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aid.586 As the liberalization of world trade proceeds, developing countries will be allowed 
fewer options in protecting their emerging markets, and in other trade issues.587 
Achieving the MDGs by 2015 will be very difficult; many developing countries lack the 
capacity to even measure their progress. Will questionable progress result in even more 
donor fatigue in the future? International pressure for increased donor coordination may 
bring more long-term aid sustainability and efficiency, but also greatly increased 
complexity and costs in development projects, reform of traditional aid methods and 
basic restructuring of aid agencies.588 Greater aid harmonization could also result in 
fewer aid options for recipients, and in aid less customized for the needs of particular 
regions, countries, and populations, a basic premise of the Japanese development concept 





 From our overview of Japan’s ODA system, we see that Japan has both 
benefited from Western aid (especially from the United States and the World Bank), and 
sought to become a highly active participant and player in the Western-dominated 
international development system. While Japan has participated very actively in this 
system for over fifty years, its aid has a huge image problem in the West. Though both 
Japanese and Western scholars of East Asia have extensively studied Japanese aid, 
                                                
586 Many LLDCs have small markets, so some involvement with trade is unavoidable (Ibid., 10). 
587 Ibid., 10-11. 
588 Ibid., 11. 
589 See the definition of translative adaptation in the Glossary section. 
141 
 
Japan’s “unique” approaches to development and aid seem misunderstood and 
underappreciated by Western scholars at large, especially by non-Asia specialists.  
 Japan’s aid system is highly complex, and analysts have struggled to explain 
many aspects of this. Koppel and Orr conclude that variation is a big theme in Japanese 
ODA policy, in practice and policy, asking two key questions: 1) does the variation result 
from a central theme, or is the central policy a rational articulation of various policies and 
interests? 2) What mix of domestic and international forces strongly influences these 
differences? Differences revolve around the central objective of offering Japanese aid to 
countries of economic, strategic or humanitarian importance to Japan, to support Japan’s 
own comprehensive security, economic connections between these countries and Japan, 
and recipient nations’ capacities for self-help to economic growth and development. 
Reasons for variation include influences from Japan’s varied bilateral relations, 
bureaucratic competition in Japan, and pressures from the United States. Koppel and Orr 
conclude that there is enormous variation in what Japan’s aid does, why and how. 
Variation revolves around these central themes and others, but Koppel and Orr conclude 
that there is no comprehensive aid policy in Japan that can explain or account for all 
change.590 
 Japan’s own beliefs about development and philosophy of aid are based on its 
experience, which is logical. In Japan, while many factors, including a rather unique set 
of postwar circumstances (i.e. an unusually open global trading system and a massive 
infusion of economic support from the United States) contributed to the nation’s 
redevelopment and growth, Japan’s own hard work in economic production, trade, and 
                                                
590 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 355-358. 
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the strong role played by the state were all paramount. Despite the seeming incoherence 
and complexity of Japan’s aid bureaucracy, domestic and international criticisms have 
forced the government to articulate the goals of aid more clearly than ever before.  
 In several areas there is essential conflict between many of the basic 
assumptions of the norms of the international, Western-dominated development agenda, 
and Japan’s (and much of Asia’s) own development experience. David Arase and other 
scholars find that Japan may be attempting to “harmonize” these conflicts by offering two 
tracks of aid, one stressing Japan’s own growth-oriented approach, and the other focusing 
on helping to meet the global agenda of poverty reduction and coordination of donor 
efforts.591 Scholars using economic approaches also note this “trade versus aid” 
dichotomy, seen in basic policy conflicts between MOFA and METI. Is it possible for 
such a two-track approach to work? What will be the effect of the merger of JICA and 
part of JBIC in late 2008? Is it realistic to expect Japan to abandon its own capital-
intensive, infrastructural approach to aid, which, though based on its own experience, has 
proven effective in many other Asian nations, even while the aid and development efforts 
of many Western and international donors in the third world are often condemned as 
failures?592 This seems unlikely.  
 Above we noted the massive increases in Japanese aid and its huge decline since 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, due to Japan’s economic recession since the early 1990s. 
The ODA program enjoyed extremely high public support for decades, but came to be 
dogged by various scandals and accountability problems. The Japanese government has 
                                                
591 Arase, Japan's Foreign Aid; Katada, “Two-Track Aid.” 
592 For example, see Escobar, Encountering Development. 
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aggressively responded to domestic and international criticisms by resorting to great 
fiscal and administrative reforms of ODA. Leading Western scholars of Japanese aid still 
complain about many problems they observe in Japan’s system, and express doubts at 
reform attempts.593 We also noted how other countries’ aid programs are not free of 
problems and bias, not a surprise. But this is not to discount the many astute observations 
of foreign scholars about Japan’s ODA. 
 Among the approaches to analyzing Japan’s aid, many factors have been studied 
on the domestic and international levels, especially strategic and institutional/bureaucratic 
politics aspects. Several areas can benefit from more attention, including the comparative 
study of the aid systems of non-Western donors, and the effects of those systems on 
developing regions. More in-depth ethnographic study of Japan’s ODA system by 
Japanese and foreign anthropologists and other social scientists, both in Japan and 
overseas, is sorely needed. Japan’s own development and its significant aid system are 
too important for Western poststructuralist anthropologists to largely ignore, even if parts 
of Japan’s experience and its effects run counter to many of their long-held assumptions 
about development and its “universal” failures.594 Currently many non-Japanese aid 
scholars are interested in how well Japan’s ODA system meets global aid standards. 
Despite their doubts, given the rapid pace of current reform in Japan’s aid system, the 
answer to this question is far from settled.  
                                                
593 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. 
594 For example, see James Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine and “Anthropology and Its Evil Twin: 
‘Development’ in the Constitution of a Discipline,” in The Anthropology of Development and 
Globalization: From Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism, eds. Marc Edelman and 
Angelique Haugerud (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 140-159; and Escobar, Encountering Development, 
among many other writings. 
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 To date, few studies have attempted to systematically examine how perception 
affects Japanese aid policymaking. David Arase’s 2005 study,595 building on Koppel and 
Orr’s 1993 work,596 goes a long way in some respects, noting the perceptions of 
numerous other donors and aid recipients. It is especially valuable in its contribution 
regarding recipient viewpoints, generally an understudied subject. As we saw in our 
survey, perceptions occur on many levels, international and domestic, public and private, 
expert and generalist. Unfortunately Arase’s study fails to incorporate historical factors, 
especially those from before Japanese aid began, which this present study does, from the 
donor/Japanese side.  
 Many Asian recipients praise the economic contributions of Japanese aid, but 
lament the challenges it finds in meeting and assessing differences in varied field 
conditions. This criticism agrees with the findings of Western donors and scholars. 
Above we noted the challenges that Japan faces in developing the cultural and linguistic 
expertise to properly assess ground level conditions that its ODA encounters, though 
some of its responses are quite creative.597 But at least efforts to meet these challenges 
have begun.598 Scholars investigating the business and economic aspects of Japan’s ODA 
also note this challenge. Given the past successes of Japanese marketing researchers in 
effectively analyzing highly complex business climates and consumer tastes in markets as 
                                                
595 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. 
596 Koppel and Orr, Japan's Foreign Aid. 
597 I am referring to Japan’s recent creative practice, noted above and in Warren, “Overview Japanese 
ODA,” of partnering different aid recipients in one region (Latin America) together in some projects, to 
help each other (and Japan) overcome problems affected by culture and language differences. 
598 Remember the program in ethnographic training and development led by Kikuchi Yasushi at Waseda 
University, Tokyo, mentioned earlier. Also note graduate programs in international development and 
cooperation that have begun in Japan since the 1990s. 
145 
 
varied as the United States, Europe and China, I predict eventual success for Japan in 
these efforts. 
 Similar to perceptual and cognitive approaches, few past studies of Japan’s aid 
have effectively incorporated cultural and historical factors. While astute observations of 
Japanese cultural values and charitable/religious traditions have been uncovered, results 
have not been systematically surveyed or assessed. The present study exceeds past efforts 
by applying a more sophisticated, nuanced understanding of culture, and related factors 
such as worldview and cultural logics, to Japanese aid. The cultural concepts used here 
are developed from both anthropology, the social science that has investigated culture 
and related concepts the most extensively, and from political science. Past studies of 
Japanese aid in political science and international studies have failed to adequately 
integrate crucial cultural perspectives from anthropology with those of political science, 
which the present study does for the first time. More sophisticated, grounded knowledge 
of the aid systems of Western and non-Western countries, especially based on 
ethnography, can help free us from false stereotypes about international development and 
aid. They also greatly deepen our understanding of how aid has evolved, how it 
functions, what it does, and why, both on the levels of policymaking and implementation. 
 Previous studies of Japanese aid using cultural and historical approaches briefly 
allude to religious and spiritual influences, especially in terms of how Japanese spiritual 
values and traditions may have affected Japanese concepts of charity, both in Japan and 
for others living abroad.599 As we noted above, religion and spirituality are highly 
significant factors in worldview, one of the most significant components of culture. But 
                                                
599 See Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid; and Spyke, Japanese Foreign Aid Policy. 
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previous studies fail to assess how religious and spiritual factors have affected Japanese 
worldviews beyond charity, yet equally related to aid, i.e. worldview factors affecting 
concepts of technology, development, and policy. Past studies also fail to adequately 
assess how these religious factors have evolved over time,600 and important worldview 
factors on the micro level, namely views of significant Japanese political actors, in this 
case, historical ones. The present study overcomes these weaknesses by examining how 
significant leaders’ views of spirituality and religion from 1850 to 1945 relate to the aid-
related themes of technology and development, among others. As noted in Chapter 1, 
general study of how religion contributes to foreign aid and international development 
cooperation is a fairly new field and generally understudied. The present project deepens 
findings on the case of Japan, in particular.    
 The bureaucratic and policymaking processes governing Japan’s ODA policies 
have been among the world’s most complex aid systems, the subject of much study and 
criticism. Due to various domestic and international pressures since the early 1990s, 
Japan has mounted significant efforts to introduce large-scale reforms. Foreign critics 
such as Alan Rix have long doubted the capacity of Japan’s government to introduce 
truly effective, long-term reforms. Future studies will undoubtedly investigate this current 
stage of Japan’s ODA development, one of the most significant in the history of the 
Japanese system. In reality, the system is under constant reform of some type.601  
                                                
600 Remember how the historical national evolutionist analytical approach used by Hasegawa, one of 
several in his study (Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid), makes a flawed distinction between the basic 
spiritual character of prewar and postwar Japan, calling the earlier era essentially religious and the later one 
primarily secular. Above I call this distinction an example of Paul G. Hiebert’s concept of the Flaw of the 
Excluded Middle (Hiebert, “The Flaw of the Excluded Middle,” 35-47, and Hiebert, Anthropological 
Reflections).  
601 Spyke, Japanese Foreign Aid Policy. 
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 Another issue presently undergoing change is the disbursement of Japan’s 
bilateral and multilateral aid. As noted earlier, from October 2008, all three major forms 
of Japan’s bilateral aid (loans, grants, and technical cooperation) will be disbursed 
through one agency, the “new” JICA. Will this new centralization of Japan’s ODA result 
in improved, streamlined policy processes, as foreign critics have argued for some years? 
The new JFC will also assume responsibility for both domestic and international aspects 
of Japan’s policies for finance, including public policies for foreign direct investment and 
international economic cooperation activities of the private sector. In essence, this will 
separate the international financial operations (IFO) and OECO activities of JBIC, while 
uniting major ODA activities within the new JICA. What effects will this move have on 
the effectiveness of Japan’s overall ODA, both public and private? 
 Amounts of aid have logically always followed Japan’s own general economic 
fortunes. In the face of various economic and political pressures, though Japan’s current 
ODA budget has pledged slight increases in several areas, what effects will these 
pressures have on the long-term effectiveness of Japan’s aid, both its capacities to 
contribute to effective development and global poverty reduction, and to support Japan’s 
foreign policy and security aims? How significant a player is Japan in the global war on 
terror? Can aid quality be maintained or strengthened, and the public’s confidence 
restored?  
 Japan’s aid has made enormous contributions to the economic development of 
several regions, Southeast Asia and China in particular. The latter is the perspective of 
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both Japanese and Chinese aid experts,602 though public opinion in China likely varies. 
Japan has contributed massive amounts of money to other world regions, increased its 
efforts to contribute to the global development agenda and multilateral efforts, and to 
coordinate its bilateral aid with other donors. Yet many foreign aid experts continue to 
complain and critique Japan’s aid for its lack of quality and effective coordination with 
global standards. One of the best-informed publics in the world on ODA, the Swedish 
public, barely knows anything about Japan’s aid.603 Clearly Japan’s aid continues to have 
enormous international image problems, and it is hard to know what Japan can do to 
improve this, despite hiring a wonderful, well-known public diplomat like Ogata Sadako 
to lead JICA in 2003.604 JICA’s extensive public relations on the domestic level in Japan 
may bear better fruit.605  
 Another essential conflict in Japan’s current ODA involves intense international 
pressure for reform of Japan’s current system to bring it more in line with the objectives 
of international, chiefly Western, donors. These goals, largely revolving around increased 
poverty reduction, grassroots development, and public accountability, also have much 
support from the Japanese public. Japan highly values face, and the government seems to 
be trying to meet as many global goals as possible. Yet enormous counter pressures flow 
from Japan’s economic challenges, and the resulting large budget austerity measures 
                                                
602 Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid; and Feng, “Japanese Aid to China.” 
603 This point was noted earlier in the chapter. See Söderberg, Business Japanese Foreign Aid. 
604 Lancaster, Foreign Aid. 
605 These efforts include hiring Sadako Ogata, huge administrative reforms, establishing an extensive 
network of domestic offices, libraries and centers open to the public across Japan, and maintaining the 
Global Plaza in Tokyo to communicate with the Japanese public. JICA also participates in the 
government’s annual “Global Festa Japan” festival, held by various public agencies and NGOs to better 
engage the public about Japan’s international cooperation activities. For more on JICA’s current public 
relations activities and national network, visit JICA, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/ index.html. For 
more on Global Festa Japan, see http://www.gfjapan.com/2007/index.html, accessed 15 August 2008. 
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imposed on most public agencies. At present, this makes significant reform of Japan’s 
ODA system extremely challenging.  
 Despite the profound development experiences and accomplishments of Asian 
societies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China, there is a general failure of 
Western scholars, aid activists and development practitioners in many Western-
dominated international development institutions and NGOs to fully absorb what that 
experience means, especially for other regions. Western scholars reflect on many aspects 
of East Asian development, and Western scholars of East Asia study them in depth. 
Japanese scholars have done much more study of what East Asia’s experiences may 
mean for other regions. Western anthropologists also need to study this issue more. Is it 
not obvious that we must learn from the experiences of non-Western countries where 
development has worked, at least in terms of economic growth, despite the enormous 
associated human costs? Similar costs have occurred in the West. To ignore these lessons 
is ethnocentric and even more costly. Reforms and learning in international development 
should not just be one way. 
 What can the West and Western-dominated IFIs learn from the development 
and aid experiences of Japan and other Asian countries, for themselves and their 
development work in other regions? This deserves serious, pragmatic consideration that 
does not merely repeat the West’s Japan-worshipping craze that happened during Japan’s 
1980s economic boom. Western scholars should also not fall into the trap of writing off 
Japan as a second-rate power in the face of the recent spectacular growth of China, a 
much larger nation.  
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 The criticisms of Japanese development scholars of recent trends in the global 
development agenda, such as the MDGs, are interesting, and worth serious consideration 
by Western development experts and institutions. Much more profound are the insights of 
Japanese development economists and other social scientists, based on Japan’s 
interaction with the West as the former developed, concepts such as “modernization,” 
internationalization and translative adaptation. These concepts offer crucial findings 
about how development can occur, and challenge many of the present universalistic 
development assumptions of the West and its development institutions.  
 In coming chapters, we will explore the views of some of Japan’s most 
important leaders on these subjects, and Japan’s historical experience with them, during 
the pre-aid period of 1850 to 1945. What Japan’s aid is today inevitably flows from what 
came before. To explore the key questions of this research, about how Japan’s 
experiences with technology, development and foreign relations affect its contemporary 
aid policies, how novel development concepts such as translative adaptation may reflect 
that experience, and how Japanese spirituality may affect its aid, we will now proceed to 




































Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895) 
 






The purpose of Chapter 3 is to survey some of the ideologies of Japan’s most 
influential key decision-makers from 1850 to 1895 (the period of pre-colonialism) about 
important aspects of Japan’s experience with technology and development during that 
period, especially concerning sociocultural issues on the domestic level.606 These are the 
key themes relevant to this project’s overall goal of examining worldview impacts on 
Japan’s later foreign aid. Chapter 4 examines the period’s domestic political economy 
issues for the period, and Chapters 5 and 6 will cover Japan’s external relations in the era.  
It is necessary to examine these factors starting at the dawn of modern Japan’s opening to 
the outside world (about 1850), at the end of the Tokugawa period, ending approximately 
two hundred fifty years of national isolation. Doing so will also give us a flavor of some 
of the historical and ideological forces at work at the end of the last age of pre-modern 
Japanese society.  
                                                
606 The historical periods mentioned in this chapter include the Tokugawa Period (1603-1867), the Meiji 
Period (1868-1912), and the Taishô Period (1912-1926). 
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 What is the importance of the leaders/thinkers examined in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4? The key leaders/thinkers studied in these two chapters are:  Fukuzawa 
Yukichi (1835-1901), Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909), Mori Arinori (1847-1889), Kato 
Hiroyuki (1836-1916), and Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922).   
 Fukuzawa Yukichi was a prominent educator, best-selling writer, proponent of 
Western knowledge, and influential in the formation of modern Japanese business.  The 
height of his career was about 1854-1901.  He became a great scholar of western 
learning, and accompanied some of the first missions from Japan to the West in the mid-
1800s.  His life mission was to educate Japanese in the principles of western civilization.  
Fukuzawa essentially believed that Japan lacked modern science and a spirit of 
independence, and therefore was backward.  He sought to replace traditional Japanese 
ideas with concepts from Western positivism and liberalism.  He both used and 
developed concepts of keimô (enlightening the Japanese) and jitsugaku (the practical use 
of foreign knowledge and sciences).  Fukuzawa founded Keio University, a top university 
for many of modern Japan’s business leaders, and established several prominent 
businesses, including a major bank, a leading newspaper, and a future national bookstore 
chain. 
 Ito Hirobumi was one of the most prominent leaders of Meiji Japan.  He had a 
highly distinguished career in public service, including the posts of foreign minister, four 
terms as prime minister, and many top leadership positions in the new Meiji government, 
starting in the 1860s.607  He was the major author of Japan’s first constitution (1889), and 
                                                
607 Kenji Hamada, Prince Ito (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1979), 55-56, 75. Ito 
served on the State Council, and in the areas of foreign affairs, legislative reform, and public works. 
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served as the first Japanese resident- (governor-) general of Korea from 1905-1909, 
before it became a Japanese colony in 1910.  The height of Ito’s career was about 1863-
1909.  
 Mori Arinori was an important educator, statesman, diplomat, national 
policymaker, and a leading proponent of Western thought and educational and social 
reform in the Meiji period.  He introduced important educational principles for Japan’s 
national education system during that time.  Perhaps his most controversial proposal was 
for Japan to adopt English as its national language.  A controversial figure, he was 
assassinated in 1889.  The height of his career was about 1868-1889.  We can place both 
Mori and Fukuzawa, mentioned above, in the bunmei kaika (enlightenment) movement of 
1870s Japan.  Mori’s writings reflect the liberal idealism of most members of the 
Meirokusha debate society for intellectuals that he and Fukuzawa founded.608  Mori’s 
thought, at its most advanced stage, also reflects social evolutionism, which Swale calls 
social organicism.609     
 Kato Hiroyuki was a leading educator and intellectual of the Meiji period, later 
a public official.  As a youth, he studied briefly at a Dutch studies school.610  In 1860 he 
became an official at the Bansho Shirabesho, and began studying German.611  In the late 
1800s, he was a leading intellectual who applied German Social Darwinism to Japanese 
                                                
608 John E.Van Sant, ed., Mori Arinori’s Life and Resources in America (Maryland: Lexington Books, 
2004), xxix. 
609 Swale, Political Thought, 4, 181-183.  
610 Dutch studies (or Dutch learning) is the term the Japanese used in the Tokugawa period to refer to 
knowledge and learning imported from the West during that period.  The only Western country allowed to 
trade with Japan during that time, at Nagasaki, was the Netherlands, and Japan received most of its Western 
knowledge from the Dutch. 
611 Winston Davis, The Moral and Political Naturalism of Baron Kato Hiroyuki (Berkeley, Calif.:  
University of California, Center for Japanese Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, 1996), 10-12. The Bansho 
Shirabesho was the Tokugawa Shogunate’s “Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books.”  German 
was the language of the country considered to be most “advanced” nation in Europe. 
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thought.612  He helped to introduce German studies, Social Darwinism and evolutionary 
principles into Japan, and opposed movements for democracy.  The major period of his 
career was from 1868 to the early 1900s.  Winston Davis concludes that Kato was not a 
profound philosopher.  Borrowing from many diverse sources, his writings are filled with 
various contradictions, but he took the ethnocentric theories of German Social Darwinism 
and transformed them “… into a theory of Japanese development.”  He wrote almost 
until 1916, but his philosophical system was developed by 1893.  Academics respected 
him, but his popularity decreased as more attractive, nationalistic philosophers 
appeared.613       
 Yamagata Aritomo was a major Japanese political and military leader in the 
Meiji and Taishô eras.  His career was at its height from about 1873-1905.  He was prime 
minister twice, chief planner of the local governmental system, head of the Privy Council, 
and the main architect of the army.  After Ito Hirobumi’s death in 1909, Yamagata’s 
faction was the most powerful in government.  Yamagata was influential in many areas, 
including the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), international relations, and wars 
with China and Russia.  Hackett calls Yamagata “an institutional innovator and a 
manipulator of men,” not a great thinker, but one of the fifteen-twenty most influential 
                                                
612 Hiroshi Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism: Hiroyuki Kato and the Reception of Darwin’s Theory in Modern 
Japan from the 1880s to the 1900s,” History and Anthropology 11, nos. 2-3 (1999), 235-236, 240; Davis, 
Moral and Political, vii-ix. Foreign instructors first introduced natural selection into Japan in the 1870s.  
Intellectuals in Europe, Asia, and other world regions attempted to apply Darwinian natural selection to 
support their intellectual agendas, especially on issues involving any form of competition (Unoura, 
“Samurai Darwinism,” 235-236, 240).  Unoura argues that Social Darwinism encompassed such a wide 
range of meanings and usages that it almost defies definition.  However, he offers this attempt:  Social 
Darwinism is “… a set of attitudes held by individuals or that are prevalent within a society, which purport 
to explain social phenomena through the application of Darwin’s theory.”  
613 Ibid., 107-108. 
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decision-makers on Japan’s development in the early Meiji period, contributing much.614  
Yamagata used certain “traditional” ideologies and values, and Western ideas and 
institutions, to strengthen Japan, reforming the military (conscription), local government 
and constitutional politics.615  By 1914, he was one of four surviving elder statesmen 
(genro) advising the government.  Recently many historians view him as a force for 
moderation during World War I, but for much of postwar scholarship, he was called the 
“evil genius” of Japanese militarism.616 
 Below I examine the views of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato on Japan’s domestic 
society. Toward the end of the Tokugawa period, they were in their years of early 
adulthood.  The bulk of each man’s career occurred during the Meiji era.  Each 
encountered the dangers facing Japan, including the need to rapidly develop 
economically and quickly handle the Western cultural influences and ideologies flooding 
the country.  Two of them, Fukuzawa and Mori, had unusual chances to learn Western 
knowledge and travel abroad when very few Japanese were able.  They eagerly embraced 
these opportunities and faced their uncertainties with courage.  Internationally, Japan 
faced a variety of perceived “threats” from distant Western powers and from its regional 
neighbors. Technological systems on a very general level also affected these worldviews.  
Consider the powerful image of Commodore Perry’s black ships suddenly appearing in 
Edo Bay, and the amazement of Japanese when a small steam locomotive, imported from 
the West, was first demonstrated. I will note further examples as we proceed. 
                                                
614 Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,”  243, 268-269; and Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 40-42. These 
key Meiji era leaders were not all unanimous in their beliefs and actions concerning Japan’s early 
development.  Yet they often showed surprising uniformity, and Hackett believes that Yamagata is an 





 On the third key question of the dissertation, the possible relationship of 
spirituality and Japanese foreign aid, religion and spirituality were believed to be an 
important part of Japanese identity and worldview by early Meiji policymakers. One 
interesting thing I find is the rather important role of religion and spirituality in some of 
the policies from the Meiji period onward to protect Japan’s culture. After studying the 
role of state churches in European society, politics and development, the Meiji 
government chose to make Shinto, a Japanese spiritual practice, into Japan’s national 
religion, to protect Japan’s core culture and identity, and to give the people more courage 
and strength during the difficult reform process.  Thoughts about religion and spirituality 
played a somewhat important role in the thinking and actions of several of the five 
leaders studied for this period, and other leaders, through 1945. Some leaders wanted 
Japan to bring more Christianity, a religion they saw as “Western,” into Japan’s culture, 
since they thought it played an important role in helping people in the West to work hard 
and make the West stronger.  Other leaders disagreed, and thought that only some form 
of religion that was truly “Japanese” (for example, Shinto) could be used for that purpose.  
An additional issue is the role of science and spirituality in the worldviews of significant 
Japanese leaders, and whether those elements conflicted. If so, how did these conflicts 
play out in the policy outcomes encouraged by such leaders throughout Japan’s modern 







Contexts of Domestic Sociocultural Issues (1850-1895): Major Trends 
 
 
Contexts of Technological Development 
 
 From 1850 to 1895, important developments occurred in Japan’s natural 
sciences.  During the Tokugawa period, both traditional science and Western (Dutch) 
learning from abroad followed what might be deemed an indigenous pattern up until 
about 1868, the year of the Meiji Restoration.  After the opening of Japan to the full 
range of foreign influences at that time, science began to fully develop, freely and in a 
manner and level of quality similar to Western science.617  Dutch learning (Rangaku), 
later called Western learning (Yôgaku), refers to Western subjects learned by the 
Japanese during the Tokugawa period.  The chief subjects studied included medicine, the 
physical sciences, art, foreign languages, and late in the Tokugawa period, military 
science and international affairs.618  Late in that period, western medicine, learning and 
science, especially military weaponry, were seen as very practical and useful.619  
 Prior to the end of the Tokugawa period, the Shogunate sent six official 
missions to the West (the United States and Europe) in the 1860s.  Several of the 
                                                
617 Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia, 1983, “Natural Sciences,” 1068.  
618 The term Dutch learning was used first, since most Western knowledge came via Dutch traders at the 
island of Dejima in Nagasaki harbor, the only Westerners legally allowed to trade with Japan during most 
of the Tokugawa period.  See, Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia, “Western Learning,” 1697. 
619 Carmen Blacker, The Japanese Enlightenment; A Study of the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1964), 14-16.  Also in the late Tokugawa period, a debate raged about which 
issue was most urgent—the threat of foreign invasion or the internal decline of Japanese society.  There 
were two schools of thought.  The first school, Jôi (“expel the barbarians”), favored the internal problem, 
and saw problems with reconciling the “spirit of the West” with the “Japanese spirit.”  In the Jôi school, 
Westerners were seen as preoccupied with the external form of physical things, as opposed to their internal, 
moral essence (the Confucian view, inherited from China).  Japan needed western techniques to defend the 
country, but must prevent certain western values (i.e. Christianity) from also seeping in.  Hence the Jôi 
school gave the internal decline of the Japanese spirit the most attention.  The second school, Kaikoku 
(“open the country”), argued that Japan should be opened to limited foreign intercourse to forestall a 
Western invasion.  Renewing the internal Japanese spirit was of secondary importance.  Only in science 
was the West seen as superior.  According to Sakuma Shozan, only eastern ethics (for the internal problem) 
and western techniques could save Japan (Ibid., 16-22).   
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missions were sent to negotiate trade problems associated with the Ansei commercial 
treaties with Western nations (signed in 1858), while the purpose of two of the missions 
was to gather technological knowledge.  Beyond these goals, the missions opened up 
surprising perspectives for the delegates and students who journeyed to the West, causing 
them to question the wisdom of Japan’s traditional sociopolitical order.620 
 Japan began to develop industrial technologies later than most Western nations, 
and the Japanese government invested heavily in the development of technology and 
industry in order to build up the wealth and independence of the nation.  Success in the 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and additional conflicts contributed to the rise of Japan’s 
industries.621  The term research and development (kenkyû kaihatsu) usually refers to the 
development of both industrial and military technologies.  The roots of Japan’s postwar 
R&D system began with the establishment of significant scientific training capabilities in 
higher education during the Meiji era (1868-1912).622 
 In technological development in this era, the issue of Japanese response to 
outside/Western influences quickly emerged, to collect, master and apply the world’s best 
scientific and technical knowledge.  This reaction inevitably affected Japan’s culture.  
Encountering the West’s “superior” technologies and power made Japan feel weak, and 
spurred it to aggressive action. In the late Tokugawa era, it also made emerging leaders 
question many of their neo-Confucian assumptions.  Japan’s reaction to Western 
                                                
620 Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia, “Shogunate Missions to the West,” 1406. 
621 These additional conflicts were the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and World War I (1914-1918).  
Ibid., “Technology, Modern,” 1540. 
622 Ibid., “Research and Development,” 1255. 
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influences changed its politics, expanded its economy and wealth, and soon led to 
imperialism and wars. 
Domestic Society Contexts 
 
 National identity signifies the “…sense of belonging that links individuals to the 
modern nation state.”  Governments develop this sense in their citizens through rituals, 
symbols, ideas, education, and popular culture. Japan-leaning scholars in the late 1700s 
developed some images of Japanese national identity in the Kokugaku intellectual school 
by drawing on ancient myths and folk beliefs of the Shinto (“way of the gods”) spiritual 
tradition.623  For the new Meiji government after 1868, developing a sense of national 
unity and identity were paramount tasks, to defend the country against Western 
colonialism, since in the Tokugawa period, Japan was divided into a large number of 
feudal domains, and early Meiji Japan had much regional variation.  The Japanese dialect 
of Tokyo’s educated class became the national standard, imposed on all of Japan, in new 
colonies in Hokkaido and Okinawa, and in additional colonies such as Taiwan and Korea 
after 1895.  Important images of national identity during the early Meiji period included 
the emperor recast as a powerful royal figure, Confucian ideals applied to national life, 
including loyalty, the family and its hierarchical structure (the ie system), and the idea of 
kazoku kokka (the family-state).  To create additional symbols, the government drew on 
both indigenous and foreign sources, such as the hinomaru (rising sun flag) and the 
Japanese love of nature.  Debates about Japan’s racial origins followed.624 
                                                
623 Kokugaku is briefly discussed in Chapters 3, 4, 7, and 9. 
624 “National Identity and Minorities,” in Encyclopedia of Contemporary Japanese Culture, ed. Sandra 
Buckley (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 344-345. 
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 Two social groups important in early Meiji Japan were shizoku and women.  
Shizoku was the term for descendents of the former samurai class, five percent of Japan’s 
population in 1873.  Their hereditary stipends were a difficult public burden until ending 
in the 1870s.625  The history of women in Japan reveals how their status often connects 
with broader social forces.  In the Tokugawa period, they were granted fewer legal rights 
than men, but in more prominent families, led lives not quite as severe as those of women 
in lower classes.  In the early Meiji period, the spread of universal primary education 
increased female literacy, but their education still lagged behind males’.  With 
industrialization, women began working in the textile and other industries, contributing to 
Japan’s rural productivity.  Some women contributed to politics, struggles for the Meiji 
Restoration and democratic rights.626  Rural women in the Tokugawa era endured heavy 
burdens in agriculture and making clothing for their families.  In early Meiji Japan, eighty 
percent of the population was rural.  Changes brought by industrialization affected rural 
Japan and its women in many ways.627 
 Important social movements and ideologies started or occurring in the Meiji era 
included feminism, pacifism, and Nihonshugi.628  Feminist thought and arguments for 
women’s rights began in the 1880s, part of the broader liberal movement for human 
rights in Meiji Japan.629 Western missionaries introduced pacifist concepts in the late 
1800s, but they found little acceptance, since most of Japan had no recent experience 
                                                
625 The traditional classes of Tokugawa Japan (samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants) were replaced, in 
1869, with the new social classes of peerage, shizoku, commoners, and the imperial family, Japan: An 
Illustrated Encyclopedia, “Shizoku,” 1399. 
626 Ibid., “History of Women in Japan,” 1702-1703, 1706. 
627 Ibid., “Rural Women,” 1708. 
628 See the brief discussion about Nihonshugi in Chapter 4. 
629 Encyclopedia of Contemporary Japanese Culture, “Feminism,” in Sandra Buckley, ed., 141. 
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with war.630 The war with China (1894-1895) greatly affected Japanese society, 
furthering Japan’s national integration.631 
 Important changes affecting Japanese society in the late Tokugawa and early 
Meiji eras occurred in several areas.  Several elements of Tokugawa society gave Japan 
an excellent foundation for modern mass communications, including the nation’s 
relatively compact size, relative cultural homogeneity and political centralization through 
the Shogunate, and a fairly educated, increasingly urbanized citizenry.632  The newspaper 
business began in the 1870s, with two types of newspapers, focused on political debate or 
light entertainment.633                 
 In the Tokugawa period, the Shogunate and feudal domains established schools, 
and private schools were located at shrines and temples.  Schools of “Dutch learning” for 
the study of Western knowledge were also founded.  Nationalism and support for 
industrialization were strong forces in education in the early Meiji period.  The 
government founded a national system of public education, based on imported models.634  
The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) contained important principles for Japanese 
education such as loyalty and filial piety for the support of the throne, and became an 
essential tool for political indoctrination and nationalism.635  Military training in public 
schools was introduced in the 1880s, in support of the fukoku kyôhei ideology.636  
                                                
630 Japan had only had two minor civil wars in the previous two hundred years. Japan,  “Pacifism,” 1180. 
631 Bix, Hirohito, 33-34. 
632 Ibid., “Mass Communications,” 931. 
633 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Newspapers and Magazines,” in Sandra Buckley, ed., 352.  
634 Japan, “History of Education,” 323-325. 
635 Ibid., “Imperial Rescript on Education,” 596. 
636 Ibid., “Military Education in the Schools,” 962. 
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Education included moral training, starting in 1872.637  Prestigious imperial universities 
were established in Tokyo and Kyoto during this period for the training of scholars and 
bureaucrats.638  Scientific learning focused on medicine from the mid-1700s, and on 
military technology from the mid-1800s.  After 1868, national science education was 
institutionalized, and Western scientific experts brought to Japan to teach.639  
Government policy established universal primary education for both genders, but there 
were more opportunities for males.640  
 In the arts, literature in the late Tokugawa period was influenced by the 
prosperity of the national economy.641  Fiction on contemporary society was popular.  
Neo-Confucian scholars studied early literary texts, such as the Manyôshû and The Tale 
of Genji, to clarify the Japanese worldview as it existed before the influx of Chinese 
traditions.  After 1868, the rapid importation of western technology and culture caused 
the decline of the Chinese tradition in Japanese literature.642  The novel was re-
established as a serious genre.  Colloquial Japanese language in prose, free verse in 
poetry, and romantic influences on literature occurred by the mid-1890s.643  Western 
influence in this period contributed to the rise of new forms of popular fiction, including 
science fiction.644  Since 1868, “traditional” forms of drama such as Kabuki have 
continued, but tend to stage pre-1868 productions.  Modern theater was at first influenced 
                                                
637 Ibid., “Shûshin,” 1427.  
638 Ibid., “Imperial Universities,” 596.  
639 Ibid., “Natural Sciences,” 1069. 
640 Ibid., “Women’s Education,” 1708. 
641 Lack of space limits this survey of Japanese arts to primarily literature. 
642 While the Japanese language long contributed to Japanese literature, the influence of Chinese language 
and traditions dominated the Japanese literary tradition from the seventh century until the early Meiji 
period. Ibid., “Literature,” 895.   
643 Ibid., 895-896.  
644 Ibid., “Popular Fiction,” 1218; Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Science Fiction,” Sandra Buckley, ed., 
Japanese Culture, 443. 
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by somewhat of a rejection of traditional forms, seen as stagnant, along with acceptance 
of imported forms of western drama.645  The Meiji government used an imported western 
cultural institution, museums, to showcase nationalistic values and new areas of 
education, science and technology.646 
 Regarding philosophy and religion, Tokugawa era Confucianism provided a 
useful tool for social and political thought that otherworldly Buddhism did not.  
Confucianism was granted official status in the 1600s, and began to achieve its highest 
creativity in Japan.  Confucian ethics were spread in the samurai class by feudal domain 
schools, and at the popular level by terakoya (“village schools”).  While the influence of 
Buddhism and Shinto on society was greater, the effect of Confucian ethics was 
important among intellectuals.647  In the mid-1800s, as Japan faced the threat of Western 
culture and ideas, the Mito School of Confucianism completed influential histories with 
pro-imperial, anti-foreign arguments. After 1868, the flood of Western ideas seemed to 
erase Confucian influence, but it continued in the expanded bureaucracy.648 After the 
Meiji Restoration, young scholars sent abroad brought back influence from Western 
movements and thinkers such as utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill), positivism (Comte), 
and democracy (i.e. Rousseau).  An important early Meiji intellectual group was the 
                                                
645 Japan, “Modern Drama,” 296. 
646 The Meiji government opened the first museums.  Imperial museums at Kyoto and Nara used 
ethnography and archaeology to weave portraits of history and culture that contributed to both Japan’s 
national and emerging colonial goals.  Museums were an additional tool of the government using science, 
technology and culture for the construction of national identity in Japan (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, 
“Museums,” 335-336).      
647 These ethics included filial piety, social hierarchy and harmony. 
648 Japan, “Confucianism,” 223-224.  An example of such influence is kôkoku shikan (emperor-centered 
historiography), an influential school of historiography in Meiji Japan that stressed the importance of the 
imperial line in shaping Japan’s history and national polity (kokutai) (Ibid., “Kôkoku Shikan,” 815).  
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Meirokusha society of the bunmei kaika movement.649  In religion, in the Tokugawa era, 
Buddhism and Shinto became more formalized, attracting broad popular participation.  In 
the early to mid-1800s, the phenomenon of new religions began.650  One of the most 
significant developments in religion in this period was the initiation of State Shinto by the 
Meiji government.651  This form of nationalism was a powerful tool for the building of 
Japanese identity through the end of World War II.  
 Regarding the domestic society context, society’s contributions to Japanese 
national identity and nation-building, and important social and cultural changes in 
response to the West, are key themes in this era. Japan’s government sought to enhance 
its goal of nation-building by instilling new patriotic values through various symbols, 
rituals and social institutions. Key social changes included the start of the shift of labor, 
including women, from farming to the industrial sector, and the emergence of modern 
mass media and the national education system.  Both of the latter had large influences on 
the nation-building process.  In the area of culture, in literature, Japanese scholars 
attempted to identify authentic examples of “Japanese” tradition, in response to the rapid 
influx of Western influences.  To stress its chosen examples, the Meiji state responded 





                                                
649 Bunmei kaika stands for “civilization and enlightenment” (Ibid., “Modern Philosophy,” 994). 
650 Ibid., “Religion,” 1252. “New religions” draw on elements of older spiritual traditions, including 
Buddhism, Shinto, Christianity, and folk religion.  One of the most famous of the new religions founded in 
the 1800s is Tenrikyo, headquartered near Nara, but there are many others which are more recent (Ibid., 
“New Religions,” 1078; Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Japanese New Religions,” 350-352).     
651 On the nature of State Shinto, see the brief discussion in the section on Domestic State Contexts in 
Chapter 4, and my general discussion at the end of Chapter 3.   
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Views of Domestic Sociocultural Issues, 1850-1895 
 
 
Worldviews on Japan’s Technological Development 
 
 After noting each leader’s thoughts about and experience with technological 
development, I will compare their views of Japanese technology and culture, if known, 
their views of Western science, technology, culture and Japan, and each leader’s 
willingness to be exposed to Western technology and culture, evidenced by each one’s 
training in Japan or abroad.  
 Fukuzawa Yukichi.  To Fukuzawa, the two parts of the slogan “eastern ethics, 
western techniques” seemed irreconcilable. Japan needed both western technology, and a 
new spirit.  On his first trip to the United States in the early 1860s, while impressed by 
technologies like gas lights, Fukuzawa was keen to understand everyday political and 
cultural phenomena, such as couples dancing, life insurance, and the postal system.652  
According to Fukuzawa, Japan was not blessed with the highest level of civilization.  It 
had emphasized Chinese ethical knowledge, to the neglect of scientific knowledge.  The 
new “queen bee” of knowledge should be science, not ethics.   Yet Fukuzawa argued in 
his concept of jitsugaku (practical knowledge) that material values should not replace 
spiritual ones.  Rather, a new spirit was needed.653  Fukuzawa also believed that Japan’s 
independence could only be maintained through strengthening it with science and 
                                                
652 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 6-8. 
653 Ibid., 28-29, 53-56. On his second voyage to the United States in 1867, Fukuzawa gathered many books 
of practical knowledge to take back to Japan (Norio Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 1835-1901: The Spirit of 
Enterprise in Modern Japan [Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001], 55). 
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technology.  Otherwise, it would lose to the “formidable foreign enemy”—“the 
aggressive foreigners.”654 
 Ito Hirobumi.  As a youth, like many Japanese in the late Tokugawa period, Ito 
was wary of interacting with foreigners, but greatly admired Western science.655  At 
about age eighteen, he went to Nagasaki to study basic western military technology.656  In 
the United States in 1870, Ito studied transportation, mechanical, and electrical 
systems.657  Overall, Ito felt that Japan should advance to greater strength, respect and 
equality with advanced nations through absorbing their civilization and technologies.  
Japan’s domestic development and growth must take precedence over potentially costly 
wars of conquest, such as against Korea.658 
 Mori Arinori.  As a young man from the Satsuma feudal domain in the late 
Tokugawa period, Mori attended the domain academy of Western science and 
technology.  He excelled, and was secretly sent along with eighteen other male Satsuma 
students in 1865 to spend three years in London, Russia and the United States.659  In the 
mid-late 1800s, evolutionary thinking that influenced the cultures of Western nations and 
Japan suggested human progress in society, morals, and other areas through industrial 
technologies.660  All of this thought influenced Mori.  
                                                
654 Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 90. 
655 Hamada, Prince Ito, 14-16. 
656 Ibid., 20-21. 
657 Ibid., 62. 
658 Ibid., 64-68. 
659 Van Sant, Mori Arinori, xviii, xx-xxi, xxv. 
660 Swale, Political Thought, 4. 
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 Yamagata Aritomo.  Yamagata had a mixed attitude toward modernization.661  
He was open to major innovations using Western science and technology, but he 
supported certain limits on the political system.  In the military arena, both he and many 
other major Meiji leaders supported the use of Western science and technology, while in 
Japan’s political system, he supported a strong Emperor and imperial system.662   
 Kato Hiroyuki.  Kato believed that scientific principles affected all areas of life, 
and that soon mathematics and statistics would form the basis of all disciplines.  Science 
yields eternal principles (tensoku).  The same basic laws and factors of heredity and 
adaptation drive all forms of evolution, whether biological, social, or other.663 
Comparison of Worldviews on Technological Development (1850-1895) 
 
 Concerning their views of Japan’s own technology and culture, all five of the 
leaders studied for the period 1850-1895 highly valued Japanese culture.  Each of them 
loved Japan, and none felt that it should forever be “inferior” to the West.  They desired 
to protect and strengthen Japan for its survival.  Implied in their views is that Japan was 
now weaker than the West, and that if Japan did not improve its capabilities in 
technology quickly, it would be subjugated to the latter.  Because of the West’s 
“temporary” technological superiority to Japan, several of these leaders were tempted to 
feel that the culture of the West was now “superior” to Japan’s culture in certain areas.  
                                                
661 When modernization or forms of the tern are not in quotation marks, I am referring to the conventional, 
now archaic definition of this concept in Western social science, of the specific stages through which a 
developing society must pass in order to become modern. When modernization appears in quotes 
(“modernization”), I refer to the concept of Japanese development economists of the 1990s, which is the 
process that occurs as a non-Western, undeveloped country is absorbed into the Western-dominated global 
economy, but where the cultural core of the developing society stays fundamentally non-Western (see 
“modernization” in the Glossary).    
662 Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 272-273. 
663 Davis, Moral and Political, 35-36, 38-39. 
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Kato and Fukuzawa felt that Japan was presently somewhat inferior to the West, 
especially in technology, but they still felt superior to other Asians.664   
 The five leaders vary in their general views of Western science, technology and 
culture, and their relation to Japan.  They all felt that Western science and technology 
were presently superior to Japan’s, and that Japan must import the former to survive.  But 
they differ in how positively they viewed Western products and ideas and how much they 
should be absorbed into Japan.  Mori and Fukuzawa felt the most positive about the value 
of importing Western technology and culture.  They valued Western technology because 
they believed in many cases it was superior to Japanese technology.  They also highly 
valued certain ideas and ideologies that they believed underlie the success of Western 
science and culture, concepts such as freedom, independence, human rights, and the 
emancipation of women.  Mori was the most extreme in the degree to which he called 
Japan to westernize.665  He was strongly influenced by Western evolutionary thinking, as 
were other Japanese intellectuals and policymakers of Meiji Japan, including Kato 
Hiroyuki.666  Kato applied the ideologies of Social Darwinism to Japan’s situation itself.  
Both Ito and Yamagata were ambivalent regarding Western technology and knowledge.  
When young, Ito was very wary about its importation and its potential impact on Japan.  
Later he and Yamagata argued for selective adaptation of certain Western technologies 
                                                
664 See Sushila Narsimhan, Japanese Perceptions of China in the Nineteenth Century: Influence of 
Fukuzawa Yukichi (New Delhi: Phoenix Pub. House, 1999) for an in-depth treatment of Fukuzawa’s views 
of China. Superiority to other Asians is also seen in the willingness of Yamagata and Ito to participate in 
war or colonization in Korea, in order to accomplish Japan’s purposes in Asia.   
665 For example, Mori called on Japan to abandon its use of the Japanese language, and to use the English 
language instead.  If Japan had become a longstanding colony of the United States or Britain, such as the 
Philippines or Hong Kong, perhaps this could have happened somewhat. 
666 For more in Mori Arinori’s evolutionary thought, and influence on him from Herbert Spencer and 
others, see Swale, Political Thought.  
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and ideologies to certain sectors of political or military affairs, where they believed it 
would definitely strengthen Japan. 
 All five of the leaders (1850 to 1895) realize the superiority of Western 
technology in this period, and valued ideas and principles from the West to strengthen 
Japan.  While all five studied Western technology, culture and philosophy in Japan, they 
varied in their direct exposure to the West.  Fukuzawa, Mori, and Ito accompanied 
various tours to the West, some official, and spent periods abroad studying Western 
knowledge, culture, and technology.  While neither Kato nor Yamagata had extended 
periods of study and residence abroad, both desired to use Western ideas and/or 
technologies to strengthen Japan.667 
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Technological Development (1850-1895) 
 
 Development Issues: To assess development-related aspects of these 
worldviews on technological development, I will use the concepts of 
“internationalization,” “modernization,” and “translative adaptation.”  
Internationalization concerns leaders’ views about Japan’s external engagement, 
“modernization,” the external and internal processes of Japan’s absorption into the 
Western-dominated global economy, and translative adaptation, Japan’s internal 
adaptation to external forces. 668 On internationalization, each of these leaders desired to 
                                                
667 Given Kato’s enthusiastic embrace of German Social Darwinism, it seems that he felt more strongly 
about the West’s cultural and technological superiority than did Yamagata, whose acceptance of Western 
ideas for Japan was more limited and qualified. 
668 Several Japanese development economists and cultural anthropologist Maegawa Keiji developed these 
concepts.  See the definitions in the Glossary.  To analyze development issues connected with technological 
development, I include internationalization, “modernization” and translative adaptation.  But for 
development issues and the areas of domestic state, market, and society, I will only use the latter two 
concepts.  Briefly, internationalization refers to the process where the “active” West absorbed the “passive” 
non-West, for the sake of its own development.  The non-West has included Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the 
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use Western technology and culture to strengthen “passive” Japan, in various ways, so 
the “active” West would not invade Japan politically and economically.  The period 
1850-1895 was in some ways a high point of the West’s invasion of the non-West, 
especially of Africa, Asia, and Oceania, though not so much for Latin America, whose 
subjugation came earlier.  All of these leaders realized the West’s technological 
superiority to Japan at this time, but varied in their views about the West’s cultural 
superiority.  Japan’s external engagement with the West was unavoidable at this point; 
Japan was forced open both by external pressures (such as the arrival of Commodore 
Perry’s black ships in 1853), and internal ones (i.e. pressure on the Tokugawa Shogunate 
from the feudal domains to open Japan to foreign trade and knowledge).  These five 
leaders also varied in their views about how much Japan should be externally engaged 
with the West and the world.669  They were unanimous in the conviction that Japan must 
use Western technology and knowledge to avoid Japan’s outright invasion and 
colonization.  Exactly how much external engagement was necessary for Japan to 
                                                                                                                                            
Americas, and a high degree of exploitation and subjugation. (K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11-12.)  
“Modernization” is the process where the core West forces weaker peripheral peoples into the global 
economic system, for its own development. (Ibid.)  Beyond internationalization, “modernization” adds this 
anthropological component:  it includes “…the adaptive acceptance of Western civilization under the 
persistent form of the existing culture [of a non-Western society]….” (Maegawa, “Continuity Cultures,” 
174).  Non-Western societies will evolve and become like Western ones, adapting to Western culture and 
the market, but their core areas will never become western (Ibid., 175).  In translative adaptation, a non-
Western culture adjusts to imported elements of Western culture by “reinterpreting” them through its own 
values.  The non-Western society’s institutions continue, but are changed. For such a society to develop 
economically, there must be compatibility between its indigenous institutions and values, and the imported 
organizational structures and technologies.  If the indigenous and foreign aspects are not effectively 
integrated, the “base society” of the receiving culture may be destroyed.  For development to succeed, each 
society’s government must ensure that its development path is customized according to the society’s own 
unique conditions (Ibid., 174-175; K. Ohno, Overview, 14-15).      
669 We will examine this issue further in Chapters 5 and 6, as we consider Japan’s external relations with 
the outside world (1850-1895). 
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effectively absorb these areas of knowledge, and yet avoid cultural, if not political and 
economic, invasion?670  These leaders varied in their conclusions. 
 Examined through the lens of “modernization,” 671 developed by Japanese 
anthropologists, what do these worldviews on technological development show about the 
West’s absorption of Japan into the global economic system, and how Japan imported 
Western cultural elements?  On the external side, all of these leaders worried about the 
Western threat Japan faced.  They recognized the powerful role of Western science and 
technology in the West’s power, and their potential to help Japan resist that threat.672  The 
leaders here who most overtly advocated Japan’s use of Western knowledge to repel 
Western invasion and colonization were Fukuzawa, Yamagata and Ito.673  Of the three, 
Yamagata most strongly supported the use of technology for this purpose.  On the 
internal side, Fukuzawa and Ito varied slightly in their attitudes about the internal 
elements of “modernization.”  Both supported the use of Western technology to 
strengthen Japan, and wanted Japan’s independence and cultural integrity maintained.  
But Fukuzawa seemed to support more adaptation of Western cultural elements.  Mori 
was a more extreme Westernizer when young.  Later he moderated, desiring Japan to 
                                                
670 These are profound questions with which many non-Western societies, such as China, India, Vietnam, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and others, continue to struggle today.  The answers that each society develops to these 
questions vary greatly. 
671 The assumption in “modernization” is that through the process of interaction with external (Western) 
forces, both the overall form and society of the receiving (non-Western) nation/culture will remain 
essentially intact, though somewhat altered. 
672 It seems we can conclude this, even though I did not find any specific quotes or writing from these five 
leaders concerning the issue of technological development and Japan’s absorption into the world economy. 
673 Yamagata modernized Japan’s military technologies to counter the West, though not directly concerning 
economic issues.  Fukuzawa heavily promoted the use of economic knowledge for this purpose.  As a 
leading official in the national government in the 1870s, Ito promoted the development of some of Japan’s 
public infrastructure.  But his major reforms occurred in the areas of constitutional law and foreign 
relations.       
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strengthen its national pride, though not through jingoistic means.674  This suggests he 
also wanted Japan to maintain its essential cultural core and identity.  Yamagata was a 
strong advocate of modern technology for the nation’s military defense.  Given his 
conservative politics, it seems he would abhor the destruction of Japanese culture in the 
Western ideological invasion.  Kato tried to draw on “scientific” evidence in 
“indigenous” Japanese socio-cultural phenomena to protect Japan’s cultural core, while 
supporting Japan’s aggressive use of Western scientific thought to strengthen itself 
against the West, and to take advantage of the resources of nearby Asian countries.675  
While varying in their convictions, all five leaders recognized the strong role of 
technology in the West’s power to invade Japan and other non-Western societies, its 
potential to help Japan defend itself against the West, and the dangers it presented to 
Japan’s own cultural integrity. 
 Our five leaders (1850-1895) varied concerning the issue of translative 
adaptation, 676 or how Japan should handle its internal adaptation to Western technology 
and culture.  None of them supported the wholesale invasion of Western technology and 
culture into Japan, to the point where Japan’s existing culture was erased.  Even the most 
extreme pro-Westernizer, Mori Arinori, was highly nationalistic in his support of 
                                                
674 This is discussed below in the section on domestic society worldviews, and is seen in Mori’s policies for 
national education in the 1880s.  In these policies, Mori advocated the promotion of patriotic values in 
education, in support of Japanese nationalism, but he did not support the use of the Shinto religion for this 
purpose, which the Meiji state and other pre-World War II governments later did.   
675 These “indigenous” institutions included Shinto and the new emperor system.  I use italics because 
although the Meiji government wanted Japanese to believe that these two institutions were indigenous in 
their current form, it tried to revitalize them into new forms more supportive of Japanese nationalism. For 
more details, see my comments on Kato later in this chapter in the section on domestic society worldviews. 
676 In translative adaptation, the focus is on a non-Western society’s degree and quality of internal 
adaptation to external forces.  Here the assumption is that the base society of the receiving culture will 




Western knowledge to strengthen Japan.  These five leaders varied in the degree of their 
“wariness” toward Western culture and its impacts on Japan.  Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato 
were highly supportive of “superior” elements of Western culture and ideas, and their 
ability to strengthen Japan.  While Ito and Yamagata saw value in Western technology 
and culture to empower Japan, they clearly valued parts of Japan’s “indigenous” or 
“traditional” culture and society, and wanted to strengthen and maintain them. 
 Technology Issues: Regarding technology policy-related issues in these 
worldviews, a helpful analytical tool is Thomas Glick’s anthropological definition of 
technology, which emphasizes the social meanings and uses of technology in daily life 
and work, within a technology’s broader social, political and historical contexts.677  
Through this lens, we see that all five of our leaders studied technology through a 
national scale of perspective—how Japan as a nation could use technology to repel 
Western invasion.  Kato’s thought seems more universalistic and theoretical, although he 
applied Social Darwinism to a particular national context, Japan’s.  Ito and Yamagata 
also emphasized the analysis of technology for the national level.  Fukuzawa’s 
conception of technology seems the most anthropological.  When he visited the United 
States, while intrigued by individual technologies, he was more interested in their social 
contexts, uses in daily life, and implications for American social institutions.  But his 
overall emphasis was national, to discern how Japan should use these technologies for its 
                                                
677 In the sections where I refer an “anthropological” approach to technology, I will be referring to Thomas 
Glick’s definition.  See my discussion of Glick’s definition in the Glossary.  Many recent anthropology 
scholars of technology use systems theory to study technology as a socio-technical or techno-economic 
system, and how “people employ artifacts to accomplish social purposes in everyday life.”  Technology is 
viewed as a socially-constructed phenomenon closely connected with the organization of work.  Historical 
study of a technology’s cultural and cognitive aspects is also helpful (Thomas F. Glick, “Technology,” in 
The Dictionary of Anthropology, ed. Thomas Barfield [Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997], 466).   
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national defense and survival.  His concept of jitsugaku (practical knowledge), that 
foreign knowledge must be applied for practical purposes emphasis, fits well the 
pragmatic spirit of applied anthropology.  Fukuzawa’s concern for a technology’s social 
contexts is also seen in his conviction that the cultural context or “spirit” surrounding a 
technology’s application must be mastered for the technology to be successfully 
transferred.  Mori was also very practical concerning technology, emphasizing its 
application for the national defense of Japan, and the effective mastery of the spirit and 
culture behind it.678  Most of these leaders directly examined technologies in other 
cultural contexts, to varying degrees.  All five grappled with how to effectively transfer 
different technologies or technological principles into the Japanese cultural context.  
 On the issue of technonationalism as ideology, 679 all five of the leaders here 
manifest the idea that Japan should defend itself through technology, especially against 
the West, by becoming wealthy and strong. The strongest direct support is seen in the 
views of Fukuzawa, Ito, and Yamagata. Yamagata presupposes strong, wealthy, 
productive industries in Japan in order to build the strong military forces he believes are 
needed to defend the country. Kato indirectly reveals support for technonationalism in his 
support for the evolutionistic concept of the survival of the strongest nations, which of 
                                                
678 Mori’s practical emphasis was instilled from his education about Western science at the Satsuma 
domain academy.  He utilized this approach in his diplomatic work in Washington to help a visiting 
Japanese delegation study American science and technology, and in his later work on Japan’s national 
education policy (see my discussions later in this chapter).  All of these applications were intended for 
Japan’s national defense.  Anthropologically, like Fukuzawa, Mori was greatly concerned about the cultural 
contexts and “spirit” behind the technologies and knowledge he studied.  He directly observed ideals of 
freedom, entrepreneurship and the emancipation of women and slaves in the United States that he found 
quite astonishing.  Mori’s firsthand observation of these phenomena overseas was more extensive than 
Fukuzawa’s, while the former reflected and wrote more deeply about them back in Japan.  Like Fukuzawa, 
Mori believed that unless Japan mastered the chief contexts and factors behind the imported technologies, 
its national defense would fail.       
679 See the definition of technonatonationalism as ideology in the Glossary section.   
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course must also be wealthy. Mori also communicates support in his extensive 
documentation of America’s economic and technological resources for Japanese in his 
Life and Resources in America.680  
Cognition Issues. Image. Concerning worldview and cognition issues in these 
views of technological development, next I will assess aspects of image, worldview, and 
cultural logics.681 These five leaders’ predominant images of technological development 
can be organized into five major areas. On their general images of science and 
technology, all five leaders see science and technology as powerful.  Fukuzawa and Kato 
stress science as the basis of all knowledge and life.   
Regarding images on science, technology and the nature of the world, Mori 
believes that through science and industrial technologies, the West has progressed.  He 
and Kato support science and evolution as the basis of all progress.  Kato argues that 
evolution is the primary force of change in all knowledge and life.  Fukuzawa, Mori and 
Kato identify potential conflicts between material and ethical/spiritual values.  Fukuzawa 
and some of the others worry that the material power of Western technology may 
overwhelm Japan’s “spirit.”  Fukuzawa and Mori argue that mastering material 
techniques is not enough for Japan’s survival; it also needs new spirits of freedom and 
individualism.  To Mori and Kato, the material-spiritual dichotomy may be false; 
progress in technological development may positively affect morality and social life.   
 On images of the role of science and technology in modern life, Fukuzawa and 
Mori imply that Japanese must understand how technologies fit into and function in 
                                                
680 On the point on Mori, see Van Sant, Mori Arinori, 2004. 
681 See the definitions of image, worldview, and cultural logics in the Glossary section.  
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Western societies.  Kato stresses that science affects all of life.  This holistic view is also 
seen in images of science as the foundation of all knowledge (Fukuzawa and Kato).  
 Concerning scientific and technological development in Japan, prevalent images 
in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras see its scientific development as grossly 
lagging the West’s.  Japan greatly needs advanced knowledge to counter the West.  It 
must place priority on quickly gaining it, and on its scientific and technological 
development in various sectors (all five leaders).682  Japanese must apply knowledge of 
Western technologies to help such technologies function better in Japan.  Japan’s 
weaknesses in modern science and technology make it weaker than Western societies.683   
 On images of Japan’s response to Western science and technology, all five 
leaders see Western science as admirable and superior to Japan’s, so Japan must study 
them.  On reconciling perceived conflicts between Western technology and Japanese 
culture, they vary.684  On science, technology and international relations, Yamagata 
believes that much of the West’s power comes through modern science and technology.  
For Japan to defend itself, it must also master them.  By effectively absorbing Western 
                                                
682 Each of these five leaders placed emphasis on gaining advanced scientific and technical knowledge in 
different sectors.  Fukuzawa encouraged economics and business, education, and broad social acceptance 
of technology. Ito emphasized development of Japan’s public infrastructure, general science, politics and 
law. Ironically, though earlier he prioritized Japan’s domestic development above foreign adventures, he 
later went to Korea as governor-general, after Japan gained it as a sphere of influence following the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905. Mori stressed Japan’s general growth in technology, education, religion and 
morality, and Yamagata, applied technology, military sciences and technologies. Kato developed scientific 
theories for public policy and public morality, and tried to identify “scientific” bases of indigenous cultural 
institutions for application to modern issues.  
683 Both of these last two points are from Fukuzawa.   
684 While more conservative leaders like Yamagata supported Tokugawa era thinker Sakuma Shozan’s 
famous slogan “Eastern ethics, Western techniques,” (wakon yosai; see Wakon yosai in the Glossary 
section). Fukuzawa and Mori felt that both Western ethics and techniques were needed. In his philosophy 
of jitsugaku (practical knowledge), Fukuzawa argued that a new spirit integrating positive aspects of 
Western culture with Japan’s was needed.  
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science and technology, Japan will become stronger, gain more respect, equality, and 
protect itself against the West.685 
 How do these images of technological development function as perceptual 
filters or organizing devices?  The overwhelming power, progress and benefits that the 
West derived from scientific and technological development make these five leaders 
emphasize science and technology as major factors as they envision Japan’s development 
task.  Material factors are stressed over non-material ones.  Despite pressure to emphasize 
the material and scientific in all areas of reform, wise leaders, including Fukuzawa and 
Mori, realize that Japan cannot successfully develop, or counter the West, if it neglects its 
own soul.  Proper spirit and values must undergird Japan’s technological development, 
both for development’s success, and so Japan’s identity will not be destroyed.686  All five 
leaders grapple with how to achieve this balance.  In response, they reflected on the role 
of technology in Western societies, and on Japanese society in general, among other 
areas.687  As I argue below, the power of the West’s technology, global military and 
economic achievements has caused the Japanese to overwhelmingly favor Western over 
East Asian models as the major source of their contemporary learning from the Meiji era 
to the present (2000s).688 
                                                
685 This point is from Ito. 
686 There is a huge literature on the role of religion, ethics, and spiritual values in development.  One of the 
most pioneering works in this area is Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.  
687 For example, Fukuzawa and Mori wrote on the role and state of technology in the West, while Kato 
reflected on how to incorporate Shinto and the emperor system into scientific and patriotic justifications for 
Japanese heritage and its emerging political system. 
688 In spite of the emphases on Western knowledge and learning, Japanese indigenous sources of 
spirituality, such as Shinto, and sources generally considered indigenous, such as Buddhism, have remained 
important and enduring in Japanese life, up to the present.  
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 Worldview. In the primary worldview emerging from these images,689 science 
and technology are the most powerful force in the universe, regarding its origin, meaning, 
and very organization.  All life, knowledge, change and growth flow from and around 
science and technological improvement.  This new worldview, tending to de-emphasize 
spiritual values, contrasts greatly with previous Japanese worldviews, which tended to 
naturally assume that spiritual influences and forces are integrated with human existence.  
Yet Japan as well as China became highly secularized states centuries before their 
counterparts in Europe, and in various periods, Japan’s national government struggled to 
contain or distance itself from religious influences.690  The fact that leaders and forces 
including Fukuzawa, Mori, and the Meiji government all believed that Japan’s successful 
technological (and other forms of) development must incorporate supportive “spiritual” 
and ethical” values suggests that in the mind of these leaders, this material-spiritual 
dichotomy was rather weak.  While the leaders varied on how Japan should respond to 
the challenge of balancing scientific/”Western” values and ethical/”Eastern” ones, they 
                                                
689 See the definitions of worldview in the Glossary, especially my own, which I use for analytical purposes 
in this project. Here are the steps I will follow as I construct worldviews (cognitive frameworks) for this 
research: after identifying the basic images about the selected topic, I will note aspects of images that 
identify beliefs about the nature of the world, how it works, its order (how it is organized), views of the self 
(the self’s actions, beliefs and roles) and views of the non-self/others (non-selves’ actions, beliefs, and 
roles).  Next I will organize the images into a coherent framework or whole (perhaps a diagram), look at 
how the environment and worldviews affect each other, influences on the actors’ perceptions, uses of 
information and understandings of events and their causes, and any impacts from technological systems. 
690 The high degree of “secularization” of contemporary Japan and China, more extreme in the Japanese 
case, is discussed in R. Inglehart and W. E. Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of 
Traditional Values,” American Sociological Review 65 (2000), 19-51, though the characterization of Japan 
as “secular” in the literature in English on Japanese religion may be difficult, since the common Japanese 
cultural demarcation between spiritual and non-spiritual (or ‘religious’ and ‘secular’) may be different from 
most Western distinctions (Timothy Fitzgerald, “‘Religion’ and the ‘Secular’ in Japan: Problems in 
History, Social Anthropology, and the Study of Religion,” Electronic Journal of Japanese Studies (2003). 
Database on-line:  http://japanesestudies.org.uk/ discussionpapers/Fitzgerald.html; accessed 10 July 2003. 
One example of the Japanese state seeking to distance itself from religious influence is when the 
government relocated the national capital from Nara to Kyoto (Heian-kyo) in 794 A.D., to limit excessive 
Buddhist influence on the court (“Japan,” in New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 22 (Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1993), 280.   
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all agreed that Western technology was a key source of power for the West, and should 
be for Japan as well. 
 The environments surrounding these worldviews of technological development 
included Japanese perceptions of and influences regarding the natural sciences, modern 
technology and its applications, and Western knowledge and learning in the late 
Tokugawa and early Meiji periods.  In the late Tokugawa era, many Japanese leaders, 
national and regional, recognized the power of Western technology, and its importance 
for Japan.  Various feudal domains, especially in southwestern Japan, took steps to 
enhance their learning about Western knowledge, even in violation of the national 
isolation policy.  Shortly after the nation opened to the West, the Tokugawa Shogunate’s 
official trade missions to the West reflected its belief in the urgency of importing Western 
knowledge.  This was a period of tumultuous, unusual change and urgency for Japan, and 
wisdom in Japan’s leaders was crucial for the nation’s survival.  The five leaders here 
(Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori, Yamagata and Kato) responded with urgency, much hard work and 
study to meet this challenge, but varied on how much they felt Japan should accept 
elements of Western culture.  How did these environments affect these five leaders’ 
worldviews of technological development?  The power of Western economic and military 
technology forced itself on Japan with the arrival of Commodore Perry’s ships in Edo 
Bay in 1853.  Wise Japanese leaders and scholars realized the power of Western 
technology and knowledge, even earlier.  When it was no longer possible for Japan to 
maintain national isolation, its leaders had to discern how to respond to the Western 
challenge.  Japan’s historical legacy of importing knowledge from China and Korea from 
over a millennium earlier inevitably influenced its eager knowledge importation 
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campaign at this point.  The overarching factor in the late 1800s was the urgency of the 
task, and the need for a greatly accelerated, intensified response, in comparison with the 
earlier process.691  
 How did these worldviews and their environmental interactions influence these 
leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes?  
Regarding perceptions, the actual and symbolic power of Western science and technology 
led these Japanese leaders to focus on science and technology as one of the most 
overwhelming forces behind the West’s military and economic strength, and as the 
leading possible “savior” for Japan in its quest to avoid colonization.692  Science and 
technology were the crucial forces that explained the West’s superior military and 
economic achievements, and likely also the key tools that would enable Japan to 
development and resist the West.  On information, the West’s superior science and 
technology led many contemporary Japanese scholars and leaders to prefer the West as 
the leading source for their ideas and information, not seemingly backward, undeveloped 
countries of East Asia, such as China.  To understand events and their causes, “scientific” 
ideas and theories, including evolutionism and Western political liberalism, rapidly 
became influential in the Japanese intellectual landscape.  As a part of their struggle to 
integrate new Western knowledge with Japanese culture, more ideologically conservative 
                                                
691 The earlier formal process of importing knowledge from China and Korea, starting in about the sixth 
century A.D., continued for centuries, not decades, as in the contemporary case.   
692 Ironically, not long after, science and technology would also become tools in Japan’s own quest to 
colonize and influence several nearby regions.  
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scholars, such as Kato Hiroyuki, turned to Japanese sources of tradition to find 
“scientific” justifications for “Japanese” cultural phenomena and institutions.693 
 How did technological systems affect these worldviews on technological 
development, and if so, which aspects?  Some relevant technological systems in operation 
in this era (1850-1895) were Japanese government scientific and technological 
institutions, including educational ones, similar institutions in several feudal domains and 
in leading Western nations.694  There were also the technological systems in daily 
operation that several of the five leaders, namely Fukuzawa, Ito, and Mori, observed in 
their travels in the West.695  These Western systems greatly impressed these future 
Japanese leaders.  Of the leaders here, Fukuzawa devoted the most significant effort, in 
his popular writings, to educating the Japanese public regarding technological issues.  
The writings of leading scholars and thinkers, many from the West, can be called a part 
of this system.  Elements of these institutions and leading writers had a great effect on the 
                                                
693 I will discuss what Kato did below in the section on domestic society worldviews (1850-1895).  In brief, 
he sought to justify new Meiji policies for reforming Shinto and the emperor system with “scientific” 
explanations. 
694 One famous national institution in late Tokugawa Japan was the government’s Bansho Shirabesho, the 
Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books. The Satsuma domain school of science and technology 
that trained young Mori Arinori is a good example of a feudal domain school.   In the early Meiji era, 
several public universities important for research, such as Tokyo Imperial University, were organized.  
Leading scholars from many Western countries, including the United States, Great Britain, Germany and 
France, had an important role in training young Japanese leaders in science, scientific thought, and 
technological applications.  Some Western scholars came from leading Western educational institutions.  A 
good example is William S. Clark, a president of the forerunner of the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst, who (in 1876-1877) helped establish Hokkaido University, today one of Japan’s top universities.  
695 In other parts of this chapter I discuss how technologies in San Francisco impressed Fukuzawa. Mori 
documents the overall state of technology and resources across the United States (Van Sant, Mori Arinori).  
Ito studied transportation, mechanical and electrical systems in the United States in 1870 (Hamada, Prince 
Ito, 62).  
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worldviews of several of these five leaders.696 These technological systems greatly 
affected the worldviews of technological development of the five.   
 The sheer economic and military power of the West impressed the pragmatic 
Japanese.  The fact that these technologies worked so well, and brought the West so 
many tangible benefits, seemed obvious proof of the truth and strength of modern science 
in practice, and of modern scientific thought as the key explanatory guide to the universe.   
The conflicts of Western technology with Japanese values, including the material-
spiritual dichotomy, seemed overwhelming at first, due to the high intensity and speed of 
entry of Western knowledge into Japan.  It took great effort by Japanese leaders in the 
generations after the Meiji Restoration (1868) to devise answers to these issues.  Their 
conclusions, and success in addressing them, varied.697  
 Several leaders, such as Fukuzawa and Mori, wisely recognized that Japan must 
not only master techniques, but also understand the Western contexts and “spirits” behind 
technology, and Japan’s contexts, to successfully transfer this knowledge and not destroy 
Japan’s soul.  This led to Japanese scholars to intensively study technologies and their 
cultural contexts in the West.  That the West’s superior technological power caused 
Japanese to view Japan as a weaker nation reflects a long-standing sense of psychological 
weakness in many modern Japanese, that their nation is very resource-poor and 
                                                
696 Two examples of this influence are the writings of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer.  I discuss the 
influence of Herbert Spencer on Mori Arinori below, in the section on domestic society worldviews (1850-
1895).  It is also treated in depth in Swale, Political Thought. 
697 Ultimately, how successful were Japanese leaders in balancing these conflicts?  The answer must wait 
for the conclusion of this project. 
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overpopulated, so they must work harder than other nations for mere survival.698  Despite 
this momentary sense of inferiority to the West, the Japanese government quickly began 
importing Western knowledge, industrializing, and building the military.  Japan was not 
going to be passively invaded as other non-Western nations might be.699   
 Cultural Logics. Regarding the cultural logics behind these worldviews of 
technological development (1850-1895), the global phenomena to which they responded 
included Western science, Western technology, modern scientific research and 
development, Western scientific theories and ideas, military technologies, Western 
medicine, modern industrial technologies, Western science education, and Western 
technology in various other sectors, such as areas of public infrastructure.   
 The cultural logics behind the five leaders’ beliefs about technological 
development can be organized into perhaps four main areas. In the logics on science, the 
universe, life and human progress, observable things are more powerful than invisible 
ones.  Through science, they are verifiable by processes that are logical, observable, and 
replicable. So science yields rules and regularity behind all natural phenomena.  Science 
gives us powerful ideas help us to know the origin of the universe, how it works and is 
organized. Science is the foundation of everything in the universe, living and non-living, 
material and non-material, because it can be seen, measured and “proven.”  Science 
explains everything we know; to be worthwhile, knowledge must be explainable through 
                                                
698 This “sense” of Japan’s weakness vis-à-vis the West, a common theme in Japanese society since 1868, 
perhaps lessoned in the 1980s, as Japan’s postwar bubble economy took off to unprecedented heights (for 
Japan) of development and wealth. 
699 That Japan refused to “passively” respond to the actions of the “aggressive” West suggests that it is an 
exception to the characterization in the concept of internationalization of Japanese development economists 
that non-Western nations have usually “passively” responded to the aggressive attempts of the West to 




science.  Science gives us the power to be in control of our lives, to be richer, wiser, to 
change the world.  We do not have to be passive victims.   Evolution is the key scientific 
explanation that explains processes of change, including that in humans and human 
societies, proven by scientific observation in nature.  Weaker species, societies and 
characteristics do not survive.   
 Regarding logics on science, materialism, and spiritual values, science, the most 
important phenomenon in the universe, causes and explains everything, including 
spirituality and ethics.  Neither people nor technology are merely material; without 
proper motivation and spirit, scientific and economic development cannot succeed.  
Scientific and Western values must complement Japan’s values and culture, not destroy 
them.  Christianity has perhaps been a strong force contributing positive ethics and values 
for scientific and economic development in the West.  Japan should learn from this, 
although wholesale adoption of Christianity is probably not possible.   
 On logics on science, Japan, the West, and the world, modern science and 
technology can make a country powerful, seen in the example of the West.  To survive, 
Japan must learn about science and technology.  To be rich, strong, and defend itself 
against the West, Japan needs modern military technologies, medicine, industrial 
technologies, and a strong public infrastructure.  Japan doesn’t have these technologies, is 
weak, and needs them, so it can be strong and grow.  If Japan is strong in technology, it 
the West will respect and not attack it.  It needs the West’s help to learn about 
technologies, but hopefully not for long.  Japan must develop its own capacities in these 
areas. Japan must fit these new technologies smoothly into society, and develop itself and 
its own technological capabilities, before engaging in foreign adventures.  Japan needs 
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these superior technologies to survive, but not destructive Western cultural influences, so 
it must be very selective in what it imports, and how.   
 Finally, concerning logics on “conflicts” between Japanese culture and Western 
science and technology, in “traditional” Chinese philosophy, normally all of life and 
nature exists in harmony and unity.  This differs greatly with the common Western view, 
which sees essential conflict between the material and non-material worlds. Yet the West 
has become very strong in science and technology, partly due to supportive ethics and 
values.  Japan may want to carefully import some of these values and balance them with 
its own, so its culture is not harmed.  Identifying the “scientific” bases of Japanese 
culture will help.  Balancing the conflicts between Western and Japanese cultures is hard, 
but Japan must do so, or it won’t develop and survive, which it must. 
 The five leaders’ responses to the global phenomena identified above were to 
learn relevant Western languages, study all they could through books and foreign 
teachers in Japan, travel abroad for observation or learning, if possible, and/or to read and 
write about the application of these technologies to Japan’s context, in terms of ideas and 
at times, policy applications. And what were the cultural logics under these responses?  
They included that the West has the best knowledge about science and technology. 
Japanese must study their languages, to absorb the knowledge and begin to translate it 
into Japanese.  Without this knowledge, Japan cannot defend itself, will remain weak, 
and will not remain independent, but become a colony of the West.  Japanese must learn 
this knowledge in the most efficient ways possible, by bringing in top foreign books and 
experts into Japan, and sending a few leaders and scholars abroad to study. 
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Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Society Contexts   
 Fukuzawa Yukichi.  To change Japan and strengthen its capacity to compete 
with the West, Fukuzawa believed that it needed two things, a deep appreciation for 
scientific laws, and a spirit of independence.  To achieve these, a fundamental shift in the 
people’s worldview, “…the whole people’s way of thinking from its very foundations,” 
was necessary.  Fukuzawa believed that errors in Japanese society stemmed from its 
Confucian “rejection” of science and the scientific spirit.  Most of Fukuzawa’s writings 
of the 1870s and 1880s were meant to help Japan in this task of worldview change.700  
Overall, most Japanese remember Fukuzawa as Meiji Japan’s most influential 
enlightenment thinker, because of his prolific writings on the West and on the meaning of 
civilization.701  
 Mori Arinori.  Mori saw society as a growing, living organism, whose parts 
must all be in proper relation.  This organic thinking (social organicism) influenced his 
concepts of the nation, administrative institutions, and the organization of knowledge.  
One of the leaders of this thought was Herbert Spencer, with whom Mori had direct 
contact.  Spencer’s notions of historical gradualism and incremental social change fit 
Meiji Japan’s conditions very well.  It is not surprising that they influenced Mori and 
other Meiji reformers.702 
                                                
700 Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 10-11. These writings started with Fukuzawa’s Gakumon no Susume (An 
Encouragement of Learning), and many of his serialized writings in the Jiji Shinpo newspaper. 
701 Ibid., xxv, 168. Fukuzawa also contributed to the worlds of Japanese business, journalism, politics and 
education (Ibid.). 
702 Swale, Political Thought, 4, 181-183. Meiji Japan faced the conflicting task of needing to quickly 
absorb outside knowledge and technologies, and maintain its domestic social cohesion.  The principles of 
evolutionism fit this need well by allowing social change while prescribing particular social arrangements 
at different stages of historical development (Ibid., 13). 
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 Concerning Japan’s domestic society, early in his career, Mori was critical of 
Japan’s “inferior ways,” and wished to raise the morality and intelligence of all Japanese, 
to build a modern, more advanced society. He called for Japan to abandon its language 
for English, since the latter was more “rational.”703 Returning to Japan in 1868 after his 
first study overseas, Mori became a Meiji government official. Soon he submitted a 
proposal calling for all non-government affiliated samurai to give up their swords.704  In 
early Meiji Japan, anti-Christian sentiment continued.  Mori argued that freedom of 
religion and Christianity must be allowed, to gain the respect of Western nations.705  Mori 
viewed religion as the domain of the individual, ideally free from government promotion 
or interference.706 
 In his proposed reforms for Japanese society, Mori took a very pragmatic, 
utilitarian approach that Swale calls Keizaishugi (“economism”).707  Mori stressed 
policies of duty and support for the nation and emperor in education and other areas.708  
Some of Mori’s thought on educational reforms was influenced by Herbert Spencer’s 
social evolutionary thought.709  Education was one of the most important elements in the 
task of building a modern nation melded with the state.  Mori understood that a proper, 
internal spirit stood at the center of this.  Only a new, comprehensive worldview could 
                                                
703 Van Sant, Mori Arinori, xxix; Swale, Political Thought, 179. 
704 At first seen as outrageous, this became national policy three years after Mori’s original proposal (Van 
Sant, Mori Arinori, xix-xx). 
705 Ibid., xxvi-xxvii. Soon this became official policy, but Mori’s proposal that Christianity be adopted as 
the official religion of Japan was never followed.     
706 Ibid., xxviii, xxxi. Mori did not support the infusion of religion-based nationalistic philosophies from 
Shinto or neo-Confucianism into Japanese education, but this infusion did occur in the Imperial Rescript on 
Education (issued in 1890, after Mori’s death in 1889) (Ibid.).   
707 Swale, Political Thought, 180-181. Later, Mori emphasized a “kuni no tame ni” (for the sake of the 
nation) spirit (Van Sant, xxix-xxx). 
708 Ibid. In Japanese education, the strict system of physical and moral training that Mori initiated as 
Education Minister in 1885 continued its influence through 1945 (Ibid.). 
709 Swale, Political Thought, 18-20. 
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supply this, and Spencerian evolutionism would be very useful.710  Mori believed that for 
Japan to develop into a modern state, the Japanese needed a sense of individuality before 
the nation’s institutions could operate effectively on a large scale.  He was impressed by 
the ability of Westerners to regulate their behavior, at times, through internal 
principles.711  Yet his educational reforms included institutional, educational and cultural 
standardization, to create citizens capable of being integrated into a modern nation-
state.712   
 Kato Hiroyuki.  Kato’s thought on Japan’s domestic society touches on 
morality and religion.  In his mature theory of morality, there were two types of ethics, a 
priori theories founded on inborn moral knowledge (natural law), and a posteriori 
theories, where morals develop in particular situations or to aid society.  Kato preferred 
the latter, and believed that morality evolved from natural sources, controlled by natural 
laws.713  Concerning religion, although Kato was atheistic, he participated in Shinto 
practices, including worship at the Grand Shrine of Ise.  He defended this by arguing that 
worship at Ise was merely an expression of gratitude for the “great achievements” of the 
imperial ancestors.  He later agreed with the government’s assertion that Shinto was not a 
religion, but a patriotic “cult” practice (Shinto hishûkyô-setsu), and that comparing Shinto 
gods with the Buddha or the Christian God would harm the former.714      
                                                
710 Ibid., 15-16. 
711 Ibid., 178. 
712 Ibid., 18-22. 
713 Davis, Moral and Political, 52-54, 56-59. 
714 Ibid., 98. 
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Comparison of Worldviews on Domestic Society (1850-1895) 
 Concerning society, both Fukuzawa and Kato strongly believed that Japanese 
must develop an appreciation for the scientific basis of society (the former, for general 
scientific laws, and the latter, for science and nature as morality’s basis).  Fukuzawa 
valued science as a key part of needed social change for Japan to effectively counter the 
threat of the West.  Kato saw morality as controlled by natural laws.  Mori’s view of 
society developed from a “scientific” source, Spencerian evolutionism.  He saw society 
as an evolving, living organism.  This organic thinking also influenced his concepts of 
politics, institutions, and knowledge.  For Fukuzawa, weaknesses in Japanese society 
stemmed from Japan’s reliance on unscientific Confucian ethics.  For Mori, they 
stemmed from most Japanese lacking a Westernized “scientific” education, which he 
believed gave them a lower level of morality and intelligence than most Westerners.  For 
Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato, Japanese society was weaker than Western societies, and 
needed strengthening to survive.  For the last two, this view was evolutionary in origin.  
For all three, the strength and superiority of Western societies came from their higher 
level of scientific and technological advancement.  For Mori, religion and Christianity 
seemed to play a significant role in the development of Western societies.  Some values 
associated with Western religion might be helpful for Japan’s development.  Kato 
rejected this view, preferring to strengthen Japanese spiritual traditions to support Japan’s 
nation-building. The religious practices and policies of the Meiji state supported his view. 
 Regarding social change and reform, Mori, Fukuzawa, and Kato all supported 
the necessity of social change for Japan’s survival.  The views of the first two developed 
more pragmatically, while Kato’s mature thought was more theoretical. While Fukuzawa 
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and Mori supported the adaptation of various Western attitudes and social phenomena in 
Japan, earlier in his career, Mori supported it to a more radical degree.715 Both Fukuzawa 
and Mori believed that Japan needed an entirely new worldview as the foundation for all 
social change, to survive.  Both rejected the Confucian, “anti-scientific spirit” inherited 
from Chinese society and philosophy, which they saw as a cause of failures in Japanese 
society.716  Both supported a new “spirit” of independence for Japan, to undergird needed 
social change and scientific endeavors.  Mori believed that a spirit of self-regulation and 
control must be practiced on an individual level.717  He observed this quality of self-
regulation in Westerners, admired it, and thought it was a key reason for the West’s 
“success.”  Without the “spirits” of independence and self-control, Japan could not 
successfully develop into a modern nation and defend itself.  Fukuzawa also believed that 
without adequate scientific “spirit,” Japan would not modernize.  Mori believed that 
Japanese must acquire the “spirit” of self-regulation first, to build national social 
institutions to support Japan’s development into a modern nation-state, and that education 
was a key tool in all these tasks. 
 Concerning their worldviews of morality and religion, Kato preferred a more 
evolved, “scientific” morality that could be applied and strengthened to aid the practical 
needs of society, which he felt “in-born” morality could not.  Mori believed that the 
Japanese had a lower moral standard than Westerners.  Kato and Mori both believed that 
                                                
715 For more on the radical nature of Mori’s early reform recommendations for Japan, see the policy 
impacts section on domestic society in Chapter 10 (Conclusions, Part 2). 
716 In Mori’s case, these two points are implied. 
717 Mori’s belief about Western self-control, self-reliance and independence contrasts sharply with Japanese 
psychologist Takeo Doi’s famous ideal of amae, or intense psychological dependence on others.  Doi 
argues in The Anatomy of Dependence (Doi, Anatomy) and other works that amae is a basic characteristic 
of the personality of most Japanese. 
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through a more scientific, educated approach to morality, (Japanese) society could 
evolve, be strengthened, and face the challenge from the West.  Fukuzawa was not very 
religious.  Mori respected religion and Christianity in the United States, and reflected a 
lot on it during his time there.  It seems he felt that the “can-do” spirit of independence 
and entrepreneurship in the United States in part came from Christianity.  Mori supported 
Western-style religious freedoms for Japanese.  To him, freedom of religion closely 
paralleled other basic human rights.  For Mori and Fukuzawa, unless Japan acquired the 
spirit of independence of the West (especially of Americans), it could not make the 
progress needed to survive.  Mori saw freedom of religion and belief as an important 
foundation for Japan’s successful development as a society and nation, and admired the 
role of religion in American society.718  Kato was an atheist, distrusted Christianity, and 
rejected comparisons of “Japanese” and “Western” religious beliefs and traditions.719 
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Domestic Society (1850-1895) 
 
  Society, Culture, and Technology Issues. Concerning society and culture, 
relevant questions emerge from the relationship of technology and culture that will help 
our analysis,720 including 1) what were the social conditions and contexts in Japan (1850-
1895) affecting its receipt of technological and related social phenomena (or specific 
technologies) from abroad?721  2) How well prepared was Japanese society to receive 
                                                
718 It seems that Mori also believed that freedom of religion, faith, belief and religious practice were 
important in America’s national development and growth [implied]. 
719 Yet Kato was generally negative in his descriptions of religious and ethical traditions he deemed 
“foreign,” meaning any tradition that did originate in Japan, including Confucianism, Buddhism, and 
especially Christianity. For treatment of this subject, see the section in Chapter 6 on Japan’s external 
cultural relations.   
720 See the discussion and definition of Technology and culture in the Glossary section.  
721 This question emerges from the arguments and evidence of several scholars that technology includes 
cultural values, that its acceptance into a new society (or organization) is constrained by the existing social 
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certain technologies?  Did it have or develop the indigenous expertise to use them 
well?722  I cannot consider these issues in depth, but will discuss relevant points from the 
worldviews of the three leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato) considered here.  
  About the first question, the nation had a degree of openness to receiving 
Western knowledge perceived to be “scientific” or helpful for national survival, seen in 
the willingness of Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato to receive and draw on such knowledge.  
The perceived weaknesses they saw in Japanese society also helped increase their 
openness to importing scientific knowledge.723  Both they and Japan were open to 
receiving certain cultural values associated the West’s success in science and technology, 
such as democratic or religious values, to varying degrees.  Some leaders and citizens 
were less open.  Without adequate mastery of the proper knowledge and values, needed 
social change would not happen.  All three of these leaders supported the social change 
that they believed was necessary for Japan’s survival.  Despite the emphasis on group 
conformity in Japanese culture, the willingness of Fukuzawa and Mori to embrace very 
individualistic concepts is notable.  They argued at several different points that Japan 
                                                                                                                                            
structures and values of the receiving society/organization, and that the technology in turn affects those 
social conditions (Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52-54; Edward Holland Spicer, Human Problems in 
Technological Change, A Casebook [New York: Russell Sage Foundation,  1952]; Margaret Mead, ed.  
Cultural Patterns and Technical Change [New York: New American Library, 1955]; George McClelland 
Foster, Traditional Societies and Technological Change [New York: Harper & Row, 1973]; Pertti J. Pelto, 
The Snowmobile Revolution: Technology and Social Change in the Arctic [California: Cummings Pub. Co., 
1973]; H. Russell Bernard and Pertti J. Pelto, Technology and Social Change [Illinois: Waverland Press, 
1987]; Jean-Jacques Salomon, Francisco R. Sagasti and Celine Sachs-Jeantet, The Uncertain Quest: 
Science, Technology, and Development [Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 1994], 6-8; 
Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 10.  See my more extended discussion under Technology 
and culture in the Glossary. 
722 This question is considered in a little more depth in Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52-54, and in my 
discussion of Technology and culture in the Glossary. A third question that occurs is during this period, 
what were the cultures and structures of relevant organizations that affected Japan’s receipt of technologies 
or technological knowledge? For more on this issue, see Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development. 
There is not enough evidence in the worldviews of the three leaders to consider this third question here. 
723 These perceived weaknesses included Japan’s reliance on “unscientific” Confucian philosophy, and its 
technological weakness compared to Western military and technological power. 
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needed a whole new worldview.  Did they really realize what massive changes such a 
step would have meant for Japan?724  It seems they did not.  Japanese admired the “fruits” 
of science and Western religious and political values that the West had attained, and were 
eager to gain those fruits for themselves, especially to be able to resist the West.  While 
the fruits were most tempting, most Japanese were highly resistant to many of their 
sources.725  We see these varying degrees of resistance in the worldviews of the three 
leaders examined here.                 
 How well was Japan prepared (socially) to receive new forms of technology?726 
All three leaders (Fukuzawa, Kato and Mori) were correct in asserting that Japanese 
society must develop more appreciation for a scientific worldview, and that science was 
                                                
724 Consider the massive changes in Chinese society since the 1840s (the time of the Opium War with 
Britain), partly brought on by its encounters with the West and the ensuing changes in its predominant 
worldviews.  At first the approach of the British “Southern Barbarians” was an annoyance to the Qing 
dynasty, which managed for a short period to keep them at the fringes of the empire, on the southern and 
eastern coasts.  While a few Qing officials in the late 1800s believed that China needed to import Western 
knowledge in a manner similar to Meiji Japan, most did not.  The Confucian worldview and sense of 
China’s superiority predominant at the time did not allow effective engagement with or importation of 
Western knowledge to a degree to enable China to reform enough to repel the West as Japan did.  Perhaps 
China’s vast size, in comparison with Japan, made this impossible.  Interestingly, the importation of a 
Western ideology, Marxism, was what finally helped to prepare China for the globally unprecedented, 
massive degree and scale of social and economic change it has experienced since 1978.  I agree with 
Chalmers Johnson’s argument (Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power; The 
Emergence of Revolutionary China [Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1962]), that without 
Japanese imperialism and Japan’s savage rampage in China in the 1930s and 1940s, it is unlikely that 
China’s peasants could have been effectively mobilized.  Mao Zedong and Chinese Marxists were the one 
force with the adequate discipline to organize and channel the peasants’ rage.  It is also interesting that 
Marxism, a Western, foreign ideology, is the philosophy that proved sufficient for this task.  While the 
social, political and economic changes brought about in China after the Communist Revolution were huge, 
perhaps it was the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that perhaps finally dismantled remaining residual 
elements of Chinese “traditions.”  But in the midst of today’s rapid economic development in China, we see 
a massive, rapid embrace of capitalism, the profit motive, a re-emergence of new and traditional Chinese 
religions, and explosive growth in Christianity.  Perhaps “traditional” Chinese values have proven more 
enduring than was long believed.  Nevertheless, today’s level and pace of change in the Chinese nation and 
society, based on its encounters with Western worldviews and ideologies, are perhaps on a scale 
unprecedented in human history.        
725 Conservative Japanese in this era were especially resistant to such sources as liberal, democratic 
political values and the Christian religion.  The general resistance to the latter has generally proven 
enduring in Japanese society. 
726 It is beyond the scope of this study to consider Japanese society’s receptivity to specific technologies, 
although it is relevant to consider its overall receptivity to technology in general. 
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an important foundation for many of the social and technological changes it needed to 
counter the threat of the West. It is not true that all elements of Confucian philosophy or 
thought were “unscientific” or had to be jettisoned for Japan to reform,727 Nor is it true 
that all aspects of evolutionary theory were “scientific” or without flaw.728  The perceived 
need of the Japanese to obtain scientific knowledge, and to become “scientific” in their 
society and thought to resist the West, contributed greatly to the appeal of “scientific” 
knowledge and philosophies like evolution.  Was the view of these three leaders correct, 
that Japan needed a high level of social or worldview change to become a technologically 
advanced nation?  Since numerous societal structures, values and institutions are needed 
to support an industrial economy, they were correct.  Kato and Mori in particular applied 
“scientific” ideals to their goals for morality and religion needed to support Japan’s 
economic and technological development to face the West.  While Mori also found value 
in religious values and freedoms in American Christianity that seemed to support 
development, Kato resisted them, and sought such values from Japanese religious 
“traditions.”  In general, Japanese society seemed highly receptive to developing the 
                                                
727 As I commented above, there are many profound, deep insights in Confucian philosophy, and it served 
China extremely well in helping the nation to maintain social stability and growth for many centuries (with 
many interruptions), to the point where China developed into the most populous, wealthiest society on earth 
until about the late 1700s. Dr. Leonard Humphries, professor of East Asian history at University of the 
Pacific, made this claim in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  I also believe there are positive aspects in 
Japanese society today resulting from its Confucian heritage.  An example of a great Japanese philosopher 
who examined Japanese culture and philosophy, especially Buddhism, in the light of the modern world, 
was Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945).  He was also a prominent philosopher in the Kyoto School, which has 
sought to meld important aspects of Eastern and Western philosophies.  We do not have time to explore his 
work further.   
728 The flaws in evolutionary thought in this period are seen in its social application in several areas.  For 
example, Western anthropologists in this period contributed to “scientific” arguments for the racial 
superiority of certain human groups, based on their supposed evolutionary line of descent.  This type of 
racist argument was later used in “scientific” support of the Nazi regime in Germany.  As another example, 
some Victorian era anthropologists argued for the suitability of women for domestic tasks given the smaller 
average volume of female human skulls, and therefore female brain size, compared to that of male human 
skulls.   
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scientific infrastructure needed to resist the West.  Evidence in the worldviews of 
Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato reflects that.  Did Japanese society have the indigenous 
expertise to use and develop the imported technologies well?  How supportive were these 
worldviews on domestic society for this task?729  In general, Japanese society in this era 
had this expertise, given Tokugawa society’s fairly high level of economic, capitalistic 
and educational development when it opened to the West, and the economic, industrial 
and technological progress that Japan made until several economic slumps in the 
1920s.730   
 A major question that must be answered is how Japan’s interaction with the 
West affected Japan’s domestic society. Did it maintain its relative distinctiveness at this 
time, as the West attempted to absorb Japan into the global economic system for its own 
benefit and development?  Seen through the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato on 
domestic society, did the attempt to increase knowledge and appreciation of science in 
Meiji Japan help to crush the indigenous society, social organization and social values?  
And what about the impact of evolution upon Japanese society? To answer these and 
additional questions here, I will again use the “modernization” concept. The attempt to 
import scientific values led to the rise of new social institutions, such as public schools, 
universities, research laboratories, and state-affiliated Shinto shrines.  Some of these 
institutions enhanced the spread of scientific values and philosophies into Japanese 
                                                
729 It is beyond the scope of the project to consider how supportive Japan’s social conditions were of 
indigenous expertise on specific technologies.  These issues are discussed somewhat in Okawa, Kazushi, 
and Gustav Ranis, Japan and the Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford [Oxfordshire]: 
Basil Blackwell, 1985); Hayashi, Japanese Experience; and Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Technological 
Transformation of Japan: From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1994), among others.   
730 For more details on these economic conditions from 1850 to the 1920s, see my discussions of the 
contexts of Japan’s domestic market from 1850 to 1895 (Chapter 4) and from 1895 to 1945 (Chapter 7). 
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society.  How did these affect the indigenous society?  The influx of science, technology, 
and scientific values gave average Japanese much more knowledge about the world and 
its conditions than during the Tokugawa period.  Did this or evolutionary thought destroy 
“indigenous” social organization or values? According to the evidence I have studied, 
they did not.  As more people moved to cities, worked in factories, went to school or 
served in the military, Japanese society was greatly affected by new scientific and 
technological values.  But in this period, it does not seem that most elements of Japanese 
society were destroyed, though they were greatly altered.  Did evolution make Japanese 
feel inferior?  Perhaps it did somewhat.731  It also provided some justification for Japan’s 
actions in neighboring countries such as Korea.732   
 Did the view of Fukuzawa and Mori, that Japan’s “unscientific” Confucian 
heritage made it weak, affect Japanese society negatively?  And what effect did these 
scientific worldviews have on “traditional” Japanese religious systems?  Rather than 
destroying Japanese ethical, moral, and religious traditions, it seems that the “threats” of 
the West, Christianity, and Western technologies and philosophies in this period partly 
enhanced Japanese religions and values.733  Kato’s commitment to Japanese spiritual 
values increased.734 
                                                
731 As I note elsewhere, according to Kato’s evolutionary thought, while Japanese were evolutionarily 
inferior to Westerners, they were superior to other Asians.              
732 We will consider this issue in chapter 5, in the sections on Japan’s external political relations and its 
imperialism from 1850-1895. 
733 The threat of the West led Meiji officials to adopt “state” Shinto as Japan’s national spiritual tradition, 
similar to the role of state religions in European nations, for the purpose of promoting Japanese 
nationalism.  All Japanese were expected to participate.  This favoring of Shinto may have been somewhat 
to the detriment of Buddhism, however.  So in the area of religion, harsh competition from the West, 
militarily, culturally, and philosophically, caused a large amount of “standardization” and 
institutionalization of Japanese religion, especially of Shinto, than had previously occurred. 
734 This was noted above in the section on Kato’s views of domestic society (1850-1895).  His evolutionary 
thought did not lessen these spiritual convictions. 
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 Did the types of social and worldview change supported by these three leaders 
destroy indigenous Japanese society, values or institutions?  Did the total degree of 
worldview change supported by Fukuzawa and Mori occur?  It appears that most 
Japanese citizens were willing to embrace the new social values and changes supportive 
of science advocated by the Meiji state.  They applied a similar degree of hard work, 
devotion to and respect for learning to the new system that their Confucian heritage 
encouraged.  They generally did not totally embrace the “spirits” of independence or 
individual self-control that Fukuzawa and Mori supported.735  The social change in Japan 
caused by its engagement with the West from 1850-1895 was huge, painful, and costly.  
But it did not destroy fundamental, indigenous Japanese values, social structures, or the 
central worldviews of most Japanese.  I will explore this further in the next section.  
 Development Issues. Through the concept of translative adaptation, the issue 
that emerges is whether domestic Japanese society successfully adjusted to the imported 
elements of Western culture and social values, and how that adjustment affected its 
response to science, technology and development issues.  How compatible were Western 
values with Japanese social institutions and values?  Did core elements of Japanese 
culture continue basically intact, though perhaps altered?  What evidence do we see in the 
worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato here?  From our limited examination of these 
worldviews, we cannot reach any firm conclusions on overall social change in Japanese 
society.  More specifically, to the degree that Japanese society imported the scientific 
                                                
735 One can certainly argue that many Japanese have exhibited a spirit of “self-control,” but given the small 
percentage of Japanese who subscribe to Christianity, the group-oriented nature of Japanese society, and 
the general rejection of “individualism” as a positive value in Japanese society, it is doubtful that the 
Japanese learned these values/traits from the “West.”  In Japan, individualism has often been equated with 
“selfishness” or “egoism.” 
199 
 
institutions or embraced the social changes supported by these leaders, did its “base 
society” continue intact?  The social changes that Japan underwent in support of 
industrialization were quite traumatic, affecting labor patterns, rural-urban relations and 
migration, the lives of women and families, and other areas of daily life.  Did the total 
worldview changes supported by Fukuzawa and Mori happen? They did not.  Japanese 
worldviews in many areas evolved and changed during this period (1850-1895), but it 
seems likely that certain core areas of Japanese worldviews and culture proved enduring, 
though perhaps articulated or institutionalized in some new ways.736  
 Technology Issues. To assess the technology-related aspects of these domestic 
society worldviews (1850-1895), I will use Glick’s definition of technology as a socially-
constructed, sociotechnical system related to daily life to the issue of Japan’s domestic 
society.  Several questions arise:  1) the effect of societal attitudes about technology upon 
Japan’s reception of it, 2) the effect of general societal attitudes on Japanese views of 
technology and technological change,737 3) how technology fit into the social system, 
daily life and work of the time, and 4) if technology was a socially-constructed 
phenomenon during this era.  Do we find any answers in the worldviews on domestic 
society of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato?  About the first issue, clearly societal attitudes 
toward science and technology could greatly affect Japan’s receipt and adaptation of 
them to resist the West.  From the start of the Meiji period, these three leaders argued that 
Japan must have positive views of science, or its reform process would be doomed.  The 
                                                
736 An example of this is the new forms of Shinto worship institutionalized through the establishment of 
State Shinto, as opposed to the many forms of informal, localized ujigami worship that were studied by 
Yanagita Kunio in the 1920s and 1930s.  See discussion of this topic below in Chapter 7, and later in the 
section about policy impacts of worldviews on domestic society (1850-1895) in Chapter 10 (Conclusion, 
Part 2). 
737 By general societal attitudes, I mean attitudes toward society, social change and morality/religion.   
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attitude of Japan’s leaders toward science and technology was extremely positive, and 
they tried to set the example for the rest of society.738  
 What was the effect of general societal attitudes (and these leaders’ attitudes) 
about society, social change, morality and religion on Japan’s views of technology and 
technological change?739  It appears that the leaders’ highly supportive views of science 
and technology helped to encourage their spread more widely in Japanese society.740  
Social change in Japan during this era, while great, did not change the basic conservative 
orientation of most members of the public.  Some Western attitudes (“spirits”) believed to 
be behind technology, like individualism, were mostly rejected.  The three leaders 
supported “foreign” or Japanese religions to the degree that they could help Japan adopt 
needed technologies and modernization,741 and rejected them when it seemed they would 
not.  Despite the public’s generally conservative (though enthusiastic) responses to the 
influx of Western society and technology, Japan’s economy grew greatly, and the nation 
won victories in several foreign wars.  The ideologically conservative response of 
Japanese society to Western technologies and knowledge in this era did not prevent 
Japan’s “successful” mastery of these forms of knowledge. 
 Through the three leaders’ views of domestic society, do we learn anything 
about how technology fit into Japan’s social system, daily life and work of the era?  At 
                                                
738 The attitudes of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato toward technology were all positive.  I am not aware of any 
Meiji era leader whose attitude was negative. It is beyond the scope of this project to examine the attitudes 
of other levels of Japanese society toward technology.    
739 I cannot respond directly to the second question about the effect of societal attitudes on technology.  My 
data does not include such information, only about several leaders’ attitudes toward technology. 
740 Given the huge popularity of Fukuzawa’s writings, Mori’s work as national minister of education, and 
state support for Kato’s mature theories, this seems like a fairly accurate reading.  
741 Here I mean modernization in the common political science sense, not the Japanese definition we use 
throughout this project.   
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first, Fukuzawa and Mori saw quite a gap between how technology fit into the daily life 
of the West, and how it fit in Japan.742   Western societies seemed “superior,” since they 
had more advanced scientific and technological products in daily life, which seemed to 
affect those societies’ advancement and standards of living.  Japanese society was 
therefore backward, unscientific, “Confucian,” and weaker than the West.  Japan’s 
rejection of science, and failure to develop technologies and science as powerful as the 
West’s, seemed glaring proof of its weakness.  For Japanese society to become stronger, 
it must become like the West in technology, science and certain supportive value 
systems, though not necessarily in spirituality.743  To become strong and absorb these 
technologies, these three leaders believed that Japan must embrace a high degree of social 
and worldview change.  
 Do the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato suggest that technology was a 
socially-constructed phenomenon in Japan at this time?  Their belief that Japan must 
become a more scientifically conscious society suggests that they would support the 
concept that technology is, to some degree, socially-constructed.744  All three saw 
science, technology and their supportive values as key to Japan’s future and survival.  
Implied is that Fukuzawa and Mori believed that the social conditions conducive to 
technology were partly found in certain values they saw as intrinsic to Western culture, 
including independence, democracy, individualism, Christianity, and freedom of belief 
and conscience.  Kato believed that needed values could, to some extent, be found within 
                                                
742 While these worldviews suggest various possibilities about the nature of Japanese society during this 
period, without studying actual accounts of Japanese society at the time, we cannot be certain.  
743 Fukuzawa and Kato expressly rejected the idea that Japan must adopt the main religion of the West, 
Christianity, to become strong, while Mori was more open to the possibility. 
744 Also implied is the attitude that if Japan did not quickly develop the social conditions and attitudes 
conducive to rapid scientific and technological advancement, it would not remain independent. 
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indigenous Japanese society.745  But these worldviews do not concretely tell us much 
about the actual social conditions or construction of technology in Japan in this era. 
 The worldviews of the three leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) on Japan’s 
domestic society reflect the concept of technonationalism as ideology rather strongly. On 
general society, note their views that the true nature of society itself reflects science 
(Mori), and that Japanese society must incorporate values supportive of science for Japan 
to survive.  The implication is that without science and technology Japan will be weak 
and conquered by the West.  With them, it can become modern, strong, and powerful.  
Science and technology are two of the key tools that will enable Japan to stand up and 
strengthen itself against the West.  Here there is a strong connection between technology, 
society, and national security.  Japan also needed vital reforms, social and worldview 
changes for it to master the knowledge and technologies needed for the nation’s defense.  
Japan must quickly adopt the Western, “scientific” worldview, and shed its Confucian, 
“anti-scientific” heritage (in the view of the three leaders).  Japanese must also adopt 
daily habits of self-control and regulation, for the nation to survive and flourish.  Through 
a more “scientific” approach to morality (Kato), and by adopting values connected with 
Western scientific success, even religious ones (Mori), Japanese society can support 
needed technological growth that will enable Japan to survive.746 
 Cognition Issues. Image. To analyze the cognition aspects of the domestic 
society worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato (1850-1895), I will first examine their 
                                                
745 As noted above, Mori supported Christian influence in Japan, while Fukuzawa did not.  Kato supported 
values that he believed were found in indigenous Japanese spirituality, specifically Shinto, as did the Meiji 
state.  




images of the basic nature of society, then of Western and Japanese societies.747  They all 
believed that society has a scientific basis, and evolves.  The scientific nature of social 
issues must be fully grasped.  All saw Western societies as more scientific, technological, 
positive, moral, advanced and stronger than Japanese society, which was weak and 
unscientific.  Weak societies like Japan and China were poor in science.  An unscientific 
society like Japan was weaker, negative, and therefore less moral. 
 Regarding social change, whatever made Japan stronger for its survival was 
positive.  An unchanging society was negative.  Social change was mainly based on 
science and new knowledge.  Social stagnancy was based on (Confucian) ethics, and a 
lack of science and scientific investigation.  For Japanese society to change, it needed the 
proper “spirits” (atmosphere and values) supporting science and social change, often 
based on individualism, self-control and independence.  These “spirits” were abundant in 
the West.  A totally new, more Western, scientific worldview would be positive for 
Japan, enabling it to survive (Fukuzawa and Mori).  In the view of Kato and the Meiji 
government, a more scientific worldview would help Japan, but must not destroy the 
extant worldview and society.  Rather, scientific foundations and justifications for 
Japan’s worldview and society must be highlighted.  Only this would allow Japan to 
survive and flourish against the threat of the West.  
 Views on religion contrasted.  Kato, the Meiji state, and the majority of 
Japanese people preferred to find spiritual and religious values supportive of science and 
change from Japan’s existing spiritual traditions, especially Shinto.  To them, “Japanese” 
                                                
747 For consideration of the overall frameworks into which these images and worldviews should be placed, 
see my discussion below of the global phenomena connected with these worldviews, in the section on the 
cultural logics behind these worldviews of Japan’s domestic society, 1850-1895. 
204 
 
spiritual traditions seemed more positive and natural for handling social change.  A 
“foreign” religion like Christianity seemed unsuitable, since it did not “fit” Japanese 
culture.  Images held by a minority saw Christianity as a positive force for change in the 
West, and capable of giving Japan positive values for change.748  To Mori, freedoms such 
as freedom of religion gave some Western societies, like the United States, a spirit of 
hard work, independence and entrepreneurship, all positive.  Education was seen by him, 
the Meiji government and others as a key tool to help Japan become more scientific, 
moral, and strong to face the West.                
 How did these images function as perceptual filters for the three leaders, and 
affect Japan’s domestic society?  The heavy emphasis of science and technology in these 
images caused Japan’s leaders to prefer to learn from and interact with (Western) 
societies that were more scientific and materialistic than with those that were more 
philosophical, ethical or spiritual.  Societies with rapid technological and social change 
were preferred over those with more social stability or “stagnation.”  Japan’s leaders 
would prefer interacting with non-Western societies that had successfully emulated the 
West and grown more scientific and powerful, butt such a nation yet did not exist.  
Japan’s leaders tended to scorn or look down upon societies that refused to learn much 
from the West, change, or which isolated themselves, such as China and Korea.  Most 
Japanese leaders, such as Kato, preferred to “filter out” features of Western culture that 
                                                
748 This was the view of Mori, and leading Japanese Christian intellectuals including Uchimura Kanzo, 
Nitobe Inazo and others. Uchimura focused on the issues of pacifism, and the need to develop an 
indigenous form of Christianity in Japan.  To Mori, freedoms such as freedom of religion gave some 
Western societies, such as the United States, a positive spirit of hard work, independence and 
entrepreneurship, all positive. 
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they found incongruent with Japanese culture, such as Christianity.749  While most 
leaders were not very accepting of the Christian faith, most were open to related “spirits” 
of independence, hard work, and thrift that might help Japan modernize.  They hoped to 
identify and mobilize such values from Japan’s indigenous spiritual traditions.   
 What effect did these images have on Japan’s domestic society? The emphasis 
on learning from scientific, material societies caused some Japanese to scorn learning 
from China and other “stagnant” Asian cultures, both concerning the past and the present.  
For a time, the emphasis on Western values by extreme pro-Westernizers, such as the 
bunmei kaika movement, tempted some Japanese like Mori Arinori to reject some values 
or ideologies seen as indigenous or “traditional,” such as Confucianism and Buddhism.  
But wise Japanese realized that the positive, noble elements of Japan’s Confucian and 
other heritages must be enhanced in order for Meiji Japan to withstand the almost 
unprecedented onslaught of Western values into the country.750  Even so, this desire to 
strengthen Japan’s indigenous cultural traditions for the nation’s survival sometimes took 
an imbalanced, extremist direction in later decades, where, for example, Shinto was 
manipulated as a nationalistic ideology that nearly destroyed the nation and much of East 
Asia and the Pacific.  But this response to enhance “Japanese” values could not negate 
the power or attractiveness of many Western ideas and ideologies for leading 
intellectuals.751  The social changes that resulted from the influx of new Western ideas 
                                                
749 This feeling was partly due to widespread prejudice against Christianity in late nineteenth century Japan.  
Christianity was proscribed 1637-1873, during the entire Tokugawa period, and into the early Meiji period.    
750 The only other previous period that seems somewhat similar was when Christianity began to enter Japan 
in the sixteenth century.  But in that time, the degree and speed of foreign influences and ideologies 
entering Japan were much slower and to a less intense degree than during the Meiji period. 




and Japan’s interaction with the West were tumultuous.752  Whether one looks at leaders 
and scholars who favored more “indigenous” responses to the West or more “Western” 
oriented ones, the impacts on Japan were enormous.753     
 Worldview. Based on the above images, what are some of the main aspects of 
the worldviews of the three leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) about domestic society?  
About the nature of the world and how it works, domestic society is driven by science 
and material concerns.  Social systems change and evolve over time.  Weaker societies 
must improve and grow stronger (more scientific) to survive.  If we want to understand, 
improve or change society, we must use science as the foundation.  The world’s social 
organization can also only be understood through science.  Japanese society is weak, but 
has noble aspects that should be strengthened to support Japan’s national survival (Kato, 
Fukuzawa).  Western societies are more scientific, powerful, and advanced than Japan 
and other non-Western, philosophy- or ethics-based societies.754  Certain scientific 
aspects and values of society, many coming from the West, can strengthen Japanese 
society if carefully adapted and applied (Fukuzawa, Mori, Kato).  Most leaders of Japan, 
including Kato, see positive aspects of indigenous Japanese spirituality that can be 
                                                
752 We will briefly discuss some of these changes in later sections and chapters.  Some of them included 
increasing urbanization, the spread of mass education, costly wars, social and economic impacts from 
Japan’s rapid industrialization, several economic depressions, changes in women’s lives and roles, and so 
forth.  Then there was the destruction of Japan during World War II, and the rapid social and economic 
changes resulting from the rebuilding and economic development of the nation in the postwar period.  The 
fact that Japanese society and culture, although greatly altered, have survived as intact as they have, is a 
complement to their amazing durability and strength.    
753 We have already commented on some of the impacts resulting from the Meiji state’s adoption of Shinto 
as a nationalist spiritual ideology for nation-building.  Christianity has also had a large impact on education 
in Japan.  Western missionaries and educators helped establish many leading public (national) and private 
universities in Japan, including Hokkaido University, Sophia University, Aoyama Gakuin University, 
Doshisha University, International Christian University and others.  Japanese Christians have also been 
extremely active and influential in the intellectual life of the nation.  One example is the leading twentieth 
century Catholic novelist Endo Shusaku. 
754 In the Meiji era, such societies included China, the Indian subcontinent, and Korea. 
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mobilized to strengthen the nation.  They tend to reject the direct application of 
“Western” spirituality (Christianity) for this purpose (Kato, Fukuzawa), even though they 
recognize it offers some positive values for economic development.  A few leaders 
supported such application, at times, to help the nation grow (Mori and others). 
 The environments surrounding the three leaders’ views of domestic society 
included domestic and international aspects.  Domestically, these leaders faced a time of 
rapid social change and an uncertain future. I noted above how all three men (Fukuzawa, 
Kato, and Mori) tended to view Western nations with respect and a degree of admiration, 
yet fear, about the threat of domination by the West.  They tended to look down upon 
Japan’s Eastern neighbors, which were less “scientific” and more “philosophical” in 
nature.  These environments made the three leaders’ views on domestic society more 
open to input from Western scientific worldviews than from Confucian societies like 
China.755  How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions 
influence the three leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, understanding of events and 
their causes?  They caused the three leaders to prefer “scientific” explanations of society 
and social phenomena like social change and values, and to mostly favor “scientific” 
solutions and applications of “Western” values and knowledge over “Eastern” or 
Confucian ones.  The latter form of explanation dominated Japanese society for nearly all 
of its written history, but now seemed greatly discredited.  Some Japanese thinkers like 
                                                
755 One example of this is Mori’s extensive exchanges with Herbert Spencer on sociological issues.  This 
had a deep influence on Mori’s “scientific” views of society and its evolution.  
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Kato worked to develop creative new “scientific” explanations for Japan’s own social 
features.756      
 Technological systems on a broad level affected these worldviews of these three 
leaders. Remember the wonder of Fukuzawa felt at various technological marvels and 
their supportive social systems in San Francisco?  And there is the impressive record of 
Mori’s reflections on the advanced social and technological features of post-Civil War 
American society.757  Whether military or civilian technologies, the West’s technologies, 
power and wealth that these Meiji leaders saw in their travels to the West and its colonies 
strongly impressed them.  These were powerful, symbolic evidences of the power of 
science and technology in the modern world, and of the wealth and power that came to 
those who mastered them.758  The sheer power of these technologies was a strong 
motivator to these leaders, and helped lead them to believe that Japan must master them 
to survive.  Since the West had produced these impressive technologies, Japanese 
observers were tempted to assume that Western societies and culture were in some ways 
superior, and that Japan must copy elements of Western social and cultural features to 
develop similar technologies.  To become a modern, technological society, Japan must 
become like the West, in the view of some.  Eventually most leaders, even extreme pro-
Westernizers like Mori, realized that Japan must not jettison its entire heritage.  Rather, 
valuable aspects of that heritage must be enhanced to support the acquisition of new 
(scientific) knowledge and technologies from abroad.  Some of the social values seen to 
                                                
756 While Kato preferred Western, evolutionary explanations for social phenomena, he carefully crafted 
those explanations to defend some Japanese indigenous institutions, including the emperor system and 
Shinto worship (however, as each was newly defined by the emerging Meiji state).  
757 See Van Sant, Mori Arinori, which is a new, edited edition of Mori Arinori’s work Life and Resources 
in America. 
758 These technologies were powerful both in a literal, physical sense, as well as symbolically. 
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be supportive of this knowledge, such as Western individualism and the Christian 
religion, seemed to clash greatly with Japanese culture.  A chief problem Meiji leaders 
wrestled with was how to instill (Western) social values and institutions supportive of 
science and technology in Japanese society without destroying the latter in the process.  
Their answers varied, but tended to be ideologically conservative, in support of existing 
or renewed indigenous institutions.  
 Cultural Logics. Concerning the cultural logics related to these worldviews 
about domestic society (1850-1895), the global phenomena to which the three leaders 
(Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato) responded included Western science and knowledge, 
Western technology and technological systems,759 new ideas about the nature of society 
(including Social Darwinism and Spencerian evolutionism), social values, social change, 
morality, social institutions (such as education), the nation-state, the individual’s role in 
society, human freedom,  and “Western” religion (Christianity).760  All societies were 
assumed to include certain common features.  Yet these leaders believed there were 
unique aspects of Japan’s culture that made it challenging to adjust to the flood of 
Western ideas.  
 The cultural logics under the worldviews about domestic society included the 
assumption that material, physical and measurable forces govern the universe, the world, 
                                                
759 I use the term Western here to signify that most of these specific scientific and technological ideas 
originated in the West (the geographic region commonly called the West), which here refers to Europe 
(including European Russia and Siberia), and North America (the United States and Canada).  This is not to 
suggest that technologies or science that Japan imported or observed in this era had any inherently 
“Western” cultural qualities about them. 
760 Here I put “Western” in quotes because while most Japanese have always conceived of Christianity as 
primarily a foreign religion originating in the “West,” it originated in a Semitic culture in the Near/Middle 
East (Southwestern Asia) in Israel.  Today the majority of the world’s Christians live not in the West, but in 
the non-West (Africa, Asia, and Latin America).  For more on the demographic shift of global Christianity 
to the non-West and its possible long-term implications, see Phillip Jenkins, The Next Christendom 
(Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2002).   
210 
 
and human and social affairs, and must be understood through science.  Material and 
scientific forces affect non-material aspects of human society, such as ideologies, 
morality and religion.  Society grows and changes similarly to a biological organism.  
Any social or biological organism that is weak will not survive.  For Japan to grow 
strong, it must become materially and technologically rich.  Japanese society must be 
more supportive of science and technology in its social values and institutions, or Japan 
will not grow strong, socially or as a nation.  To survive, Japan must change socially and 
increase its support of science.  Scientifically and technologically strong societies are 
superior to those that are weak in those fields.  Societies that emphasize spiritual, ethical 
or philosophical values are inferior.  Western societies are positive models for Japan, 
because they are scientifically strong, while China and other “Eastern” cultures are not, 
since they are too “philosophical.”  Western cultures and Eastern ones like Japan clash on 
many levels.  Japan must very carefully import and apply Western knowledge, or its 
society and culture will be destroyed.  Science and Western knowledge must be used to 
strengthen Japan’s existing social institutions and values, where the latter are positive.  
One reason that Western societies grew strong is that they support notions of hard work, 
self-control, initiative, and innovation on the individual level.  The underlying spirits of 
independence and freedom, so strong in the West, seem to be the foundation of the 
scientific “spirit.”  Japan must also support these spirits to the degree possible, without 
destroying its own society, to become a more scientific, technological society. 
 Japan’s response to the global phenomena just mentioned was to seek to master 
the new areas of scientific and technological knowledge believed necessary for the 
nation’s survival, including reflection on new thought about society and social issues.  
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Some scholars studied emerging approaches overseas.  Many more studied them in Japan.  
Some leaders were more pro-Western, while others were more cautious about reform, and 
sought to strengthen Japan’s indigenous social institutions and values.  The overall desire 
of Fukuzawa, Mori, Kato and other Meiji era leaders was to carefully balance Japan’s 
internal social and cultural features with the imported ones, so that Japan might be 
strengthened, not conquered.  Among the cultural logics under the responses were that 
without new areas of social knowledge, Japan would remain weak, and be colonized.  
Science drives society, underlies it and other social phenomena.  Without understanding 
this, we cannot solve social problems.  Like other areas of Western knowledge, Western 
social theories are superior to “traditional” Japanese or Confucian ones.  Like other areas 
of modern knowledge, Japanese scholars now believed that the West had the world’s best 
knowledge on social and human issues, best absorbed by study abroad.  More pro-
Western leaders also often enthusiastically adopted the idea that Western society was 
superior to Japan’s.  The more cautious thinkers believed there were noble aspects of 
Japanese culture that must be preserved.  They agreed that Western social thought should 
be studied, but only carefully applied to Japan.  Behind the desire of Fukuzawa, Mori, 
Kato and other Meiji leaders to balance Japan’s internal social features with imported 
ones was the assumption that if they were not balanced, Japan’s culture would be erased 
or destabilized. 
 If we compare the cultural logics under these worldviews on domestic society, a 
(potential) conflict between material and non-material phenomena emerges. The three 
leaders here prefer materialistic, “scientific” Western approaches. Social change and 
development are viewed through “scientific” lenses influenced by evolutionary thinking.  
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More “assertive,” supposedly “scientific” values, such as independence and freedom, are 





 From our broad survey of domestic contexts from 1850-1895, we saw that Japan 
faced sudden, multiple challenges to its political, economic and social integrity. The first 
key question of this project concerns the impact of Japan’s experiences (and leaders’ 
views of) technology, development and foreign relations on Japan’s current ODA policy. 
Here I will treat these possible connections on a general level, while in the first 
concluding chapter (9), I will draw them out more clearly. On sociocultural issues, one 
lesson from 1850 to 1895 that emerges is the need for LDCs to be willing to learn 
relevant, practical knowledge and institutions from more advanced countries, and to 
apply them in contextualized fashion to their societies. Japan did this in this period, and it 
is obvious that Japan seeks to encourage this goal in its current aid. The idea is also 
consonant with translative adaptation. Despite Japan’s rhetoric that it wishes to apply 
more localized aid, most critics note that it is weak in this area. A related sociocultural 
issue from 1850 to 1895 was the role of nationalism and related ideologies in Japan’s 
social change and economic development. Japan’s state was heavily involved in Japan’s 
development during this time, including the promotion of several development 
ideologies. 
 On the issue of culture and development, Japan’s leaders thought deeply about 
how policies could protect the nation’s culture, and about what technologies and products 
should be imported or rejected. But government policy placed more priority on economic 
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development and international security issues. Understandably, today’s LDCs often do 
the same, and historically, Japan’s ODA policies have also placed a greater priority on 
economic issues than cultural ones. 
 On religion, spirituality and development, from 1850 to 1895, Japan’s 
government studied the issue, and considered how religion and spirituality could be 
mobilized to aid Japan’s development. It chose to modify a version of indigenous 
spirituality, Shinto, for that task. But the government made some mistakes. It suspended 
freedom of religion and conscience, and infused State Shinto with a high level of 
nationalistic propaganda. This trampled on human and religious rights in Japan, damaged 
Shinto itself, strangled civic sources of accountability that could have helped limit state 
excesses, and helped to nearly destroy Japan in World War II. It is wise for future LDCs 
to consider religion and spirituality’s role in development and aid, but coercion, 
propaganda and mixing of religion and state must be discouraged. 
 Regarding the second key question of this dissertation, from 1850 to 1895, do 
the concepts of “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation, as 
reflected in these worldviews of technological development and domestic society, present 
an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development? While I 
cannot yet answer this question for the whole period under study (1850 to 1945), if I 
examine views for each period, eventually an answer should emerge.  
 What are the leaders’ basic views of the concepts of internationalization, 
“modernization,” and translative adaptation in this chapter? In their worldviews of 
technological development, all five leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori, Kato, and Yamagata) 
reveal basic concordance with the development related concepts of internationalization, 
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“modernization,” and translative adaptation, but vary in the details. All five leaders 
support internationalization, that Japan must use technology to externally engage the 
West, but vary on how much engagement is necessary to avoid political, economic, or 
cultural invasion. On “modernization,” all five leaders agree that technology has a strong 
role in the West’s power to invade Japan, in Japan resisting that threat, and that it 
presents potential threats to Japan’s own culture, but vary on many points. On translative 
adaptation, the leaders differ on how Japan should handle its internal adaptation to 
Western technology and culture, though none wants Japan’s culture destroyed. Regarding 
development issues connected with leaders’ domestic society worldviews, viewed 
through “modernization,” importing scientific values led to new social institutions, partly 
enhancing the former.761 “Threats” such as Christianity and Western technological ideas 
ultimately strengthened Japanese religions and values. For example, Meiji officials 
adopted “state” Shinto as the national spiritual tradition. Social change in Japan was 
great, but did not destroy basic social structures or values. Seen through translative 
adaptation, Japanese worldviews often changed, and yet many of their core areas proved 
enduring, though articulated in new ways. 
 How well do these views reflect Japan’s experience with technology and 
development from 1850 to 1895? In Chapter 3, which covers sociocultural contexts, the 
primary meanings of technology here include those connected with technological 
development.762 In the context section on technological development in this chapter, the 
                                                
761 These new social institutions included universities, public education, publicly-funded scientific 
laboratories, and State Shinto. 
762 My own definition of technology, based mostly on anthropological sources, is: tools, knowledge, 




main sense of technology that emerges is that of the practical and industrial application of 
Western scientific knowledge in Japan for mainly industrial and military purposes. In 
domestic society contexts, the primary sense of technology is the use of various forms of 
social knowledge, institutions and ideas, some of it incorporating scientific theories from 
the West, to encourage broad support for the new sense of national identity that the Meiji 
state sought to instill in its subjects. The primary senses of development relate either to 
the context of technological development, or social development. In the context of 
technological development, the main meaning of development relates to Japan’s change 
and growth in scientific and technological knowledge. In the late Tokugawa period, this 
knowledge, called Rangaku and later, Yôgaku, was limited due to Japan’s national 
isolation policy. Japan’s development of scientific and technological knowledge greatly 
accelerated after 1868, due to many intentional government policies in both the industrial 
and military sectors. Social development in this period includes the Meiji state attempting 
to instill a sense of national identity in the Japanese people, change affecting important 
social groups, such as women, social change and support for nationalistic values 
encouraged by such social institutions as the new national education system and State 
Shinto network.  
 How well do the above views of internationalization, “modernization,” and 
translative adaptation reflect these experiences? The sense of internationalization related 
to technological development supports the idea that technology must be used by Japan to 
build up the country through science and technology, so it can counter its external threats. 
On “modernization,” the main views of technology are that it can both bring Japan’s 
political and/or cultural invasion, or help to prevent it (the former), and that new 
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scientific and technological ideas helped to strengthen several Japanese social 
institutions. Technology seen through the lens of translative adaptation reveals that 
although these leaders varied on how Japan should internally adjust to the impacts of 
Western technology, technology did change Japan. Yet many of its core values proved 
enduring in this period. Regarding Japan’s experiences with development in this period, 
viewed through “modernization,” the application of new scientific values strengthened 
some social institutions, such as schools. Development seen through translative 
adaptation reveals that even though technological development was huge, and changes in 
social development also were great, in my analysis, many core values of Japanese society 
remained fairly stable. These three concepts well reflect Japan’s experiences in this 
period.  
 To answer the third key question of the dissertation, whether Japanese 
spirituality, as an important part of worldview issues, has affected Japanese foreign aid 
policies, I must consider how views of spirituality may have affected general policies in 
each period, the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and 
science and similar conflicts, and the impacts of these issues for foreign aid over the long 
run. 
 The views of spirituality and religion fall into four general categories here. The 
first is views of general spirituality. Above, I commented on the view of Fukuzawa and 
Mori of the need for proper “spirits” (atmosphere and values) such as freedom, 
individuality, and independence to accompany successful science and technology 
development. They observed and admired elements of these spirits in locations in the 
West, including the United States. Fukuzawa and Kato wisely conclude that it is not 
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necessary for Japan to blindly copy all elements of Western culture or religion. The threat 
of the West and its seeming cultural clash with Japanese culture increased the resistance 
of Kato and others to use Western spirituality (Christianity) and certain “un-Japanese” 
“spirits” (such as individualism and selfishness) as motivators for scientific development. 
In the above general worldview (cognitive framework) of domestic society I generated, it 
seems that most of the leaders studied here were open to “spirits” that were positive but 
not overtly Christian, for example, hard work and independence. Most Japanese were 
open to such spirits. In the long run, Kato Hiroyuki, the Japanese government, and most 
Japanese preferred to use Japanese spiritual traditions, such as Shinto, as sources of 
inspiration for Japan’s techno-social change and nation-building, where possible.  
 Second, in their worldviews of spirituality, these leaders presume that science 
underlies spirituality and all other phenomena, material or non-material, in the universe. 
There are varied views about possible conflicts between material and spiritual forces. 
Although both were seen as integrated in “traditional” Japanese worldviews, in the new 
scientific worldviews of these Meiji leaders, spirituality seemed to be de-emphasized.  
While several of the leaders believed that there might be conflicts between the material 
and the spiritual,763 in the long run they might be false, since the material side of life can 
positively influence the moral and spiritual, or the reverse.764 In these worldviews, there 
is the view that Japan needs proper “spirits” for Japanese society to embrace the social 
and technological change needed to properly support science. In the cultural logics under 
domestic society here, these spirits and values seem closely connected to the successful 
                                                
763 Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato. 
764 Mori and Kato later reached this second conclusion. 
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practice of science. In the main worldview I constructed for domestic society, these 
leaders preferred learning from scientific Western societies rather than from “spiritual,” 
scientifically inferior Asian ones. Yet, at first, the “clashes” between Western and 
Japanese values seemed overwhelming. 
 Regarding the views of these leaders toward religion, I noted that although in 
the “traditional” Japanese worldview there was not much separation of the material and 
spiritual worlds, there has long been a separation of religion and the state in Japan.765 In 
the cultural logics I identified underlying Japanese domestic society, material forces 
govern both the spiritual and religious realms. While a clash between Western religion 
and Japanese culture is generally assumed in the worldview of domestic Japanese society 
I constructed for this period,766 threats from the West strengthened Japanese religion in 
some cases in this era.767 
 Fourth, regarding the role of spirituality and economic development, Japanese 
leaders were not opposed to the use of spirituality and morality to encourage positive 
social change in Japan, as long as they would contribute positively to Japanese adopting 
science and technology. Some leaders were willing to use spirituality to support 
economic development. While Mori was willing to look to Christianity as a source of 
moral support for development,768 Kato was not. The young Meiji state observed the use 
of Christianity as most European nations’ state churches, how it often provided their 
                                                
765 What happened in the 1930s and the 1940s, where spiritual and religious ideology mixed closely with 
the state, was an aberration, not a typical pattern in Japanese history. 
766 I noted above how Kato disliked Christianity and preferred Shinto, and how Mori looked favorably on 
what Christianity did for the West, and what it might do for Japan. 
767 This was the case for State Shinto. 
768 Mori believed that Christianity had contributed much to Western economic and social development, and 
might help Japan, too. 
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people courage and motivation to work hard, fight wars, and even save money. These 
ideologies also served as justification for state coercion, at times. They concluded that 
Japan needed a similar tool to build the nation, one that was uniquely Japanese, and 
decided to create State Shinto, a nationalistic reinvigoration of Japan’s indigenous 
spiritual practices, for that purpose.   
 What impacts did these views possibly have on policies in this period? For a 
brief summary of these views, and their possible policy implications, see Tables 3.1, 3.2 
and 3.3 on the next few pages. Regarding views of spirituality and possible impacts, the 
spiritual views listed generally encouraged policy impacts that strengthened Japan’s 
knowledge and embrace of science and technology, in the midst of navigating 
challenging issues on how to respond to Western culture and influences. The views of 
religion listed in Table 3.2 all list the tendency to mix religion/spirituality and politics in 
this period, to a degree that is unusual in Japanese history since medieval times. 
According to Table 3.3, the generally pragmatic attitudes of Japanese people and their 
leaders encouraged a willingness to embrace spirituality for building of the nation’s 
scientific, technological, and defense capabilities, where it could help, as long as the 
spirituality was not perceived to be too incongruent with Japanese culture. 
 
Table 3.1. Selected Views of Spirituality and Possible Policy Impacts, 1850 to 1895 
View:       Possible impacts: 
Japan needs proper “spirits” to support 
science and technology 
Fukuzawa, Mori had much impact on Japanese 
society through culture, education, writing. Possible 
impacts: great. Encouraged broad support  
throughout Japanese society for science.  
Japan mustn’t blindly copy all of 
Western culture or spirituality 
This is common sense. Japan has followed this, in 
principle, if not always in practice. 
Western culture clashes with Japanese 
culture. Japan mustn’t import Western 
Common sense, view of many Japanese. They likely 
followed this (except for the euphoria of extreme pro-
220 
 
religion and cultural values that don’t 
fit it 
Westernizers like the bunmei kaika movement).  
Science underlies everything in the 
universe, including the spiritual and the 
material 
Would encourage the state to support scientific and 
technological research, education in its policies. This 
happened. 
There is a conflict between spirituality 
and science 
Could cause rupture in “traditional” Japanese view of 
life, world. Cultural disruption. Didn’t really occur. 
There is not a conflict between 
spirituality and science 
No problem with mixing military and religious 





Table 3.2. Selected Views of Religion and Possible Policy Impacts, 1850 to 1895 
View:          Possible impacts:  
There is no separation of the 
material and the spiritual in the 
“traditional” Japanese 
worldview, but there is a long 
tradition of separation of 
religion and state.  
The movement to create imperial ideologies, State Shinto 
encouraged fusion of religion and state. Laid the foundation for 
later dangers for the Japanese nation (1895 to 1945); led to 
extremist political and military actions, using technological 
weapons, through religious/patriotic justifications. 
Western religion and Japanese 
culture don’t fit 
Led the Japanese government to resist allowing Christianity 
into Japan until forced to by Western nations. General 
resistance to Christianity continued (i.e., seen in opposition to 
Mori’s proposal that Japan should adopt Christianity as the 
national religion). Though much Christian influence entered 
Japan (e.g. founding of universities, hospitals…), more might 
have possibly slowed the creation of State Shinto and later 
militarist/nationalist tendencies of the state (1895 to 1945). 
Western threats strengthened 
Japanese religion 
Threats of the West on Japanese identity, culture led the 
Japanese to look for spiritual sources of their own identity, 
greatness. Formation of State Shinto may have partly been a 
reaction to this, and encouraged some leaders’ (i.e. Kato’s) 




Table 3.3. Selected Views of Spirituality and Economic Development, Plus Possible 
Policy Impacts, 1850 to 1895 
View:       Possible impacts: 
It’s okay to use spirituality and religion 
to encourage development if it supports 
science and technology too. 
Most Japanese and the government are pragmatic. 
Science/technology: one of the strongest things to build 
Japan against the West. If spirituality/religion does this 
too, then fine. 
Christianity should be used to help 
Japan develop economically 
Mori: it has helped the West, can help Japan too. 




Europe has state churches to motivate 
the people for development 
Highly influential view in Meiji government. Led to the 
formation of State Shinto. 
Japanese culture and spiritual traditions 
are better sources for Japan’s growth 
and change than Western culture 
Much support from Japanese government, Kato, and 
most Japanese. Likely impact: high. 
Common sense values (hard work, 
thrift…) are fine, even if from the West 
Support from the government, common sense from the 




 What are the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and 
science and similar issues for policy issues in this period? The major potential conflicts 
we have identified are: 1) those between the material and spiritual worlds, 2) conflicts 
between Western religion and spiritual values and those of the Japanese, 3) conflicts 
between Western countries’ “scientific” knowledge and Asian countries’ ethical, 
“unscientific” knowledge, and 4) conflicts between Western religion and culture and 
Japanese religion and cultural values.769 In Western worldviews, there had not always 
been such a strict separation between religion and the state, as we see by the power of 
religion in the political affairs of many European nations, such as Russia, up through the 
early twentieth century. According to the Flaw of the Excluded Middle, and the some of 
the work of anthropologists Paul Hiebert and Charles Kraft, the strict separation of 
spiritual and physical worlds in most Western worldviews really began with the French 
Enlightenment.770 Yet I noted earlier that Japan and China have had a tradition of the 
separation of religion from the state for many more centuries. It is the politico-religious 
views of some mid- to late-nineteenth century European states that had more traditional 
                                                
769 The second category refers to specifically to religion and spirituality alone, while the fourth includes the 
intersection of religion and cultural values.  
770 Kraft, Christianity with Power; Hiebert, “Flaw of Excluded Middle” and Anthropological Reflections. 
Their work was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. 
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mixing of religion with the state (such as Tsarist Russia) that the government of Meiji 
Japan copied, rather than the progressive, secularist views of a state like nineteenth 
century France.  
 As such, although the leaders we studied may have been momentarily disturbed 
by the seeming conflicts between the material and the spiritual in the Western accounts of 
science, evolution, and other studies that they read, these conflicts and the Flaw of the 
Excluded Middle were not really present in the models that the Meiji state copied when it 
chose to found State Shinto and incorporate both pro-religious and pro-science ideologies 
of nationalism into the educational and patriotic ideals of the new Meiji state. Western 
nations have never had trouble drawing on images of God and country (nor the Marxists 
drawing on Mother-/Fatherland and country) to wage war and drop bombs on other 
nations, and from 1895 to 1945, Japan did not either. In all cases, this has also involved 
the use of technology. 
 While Japan in this era did not have trouble knowing that it needed Western 
technology, and useful ideologies, even spiritual ones, to defend itself against the West, it 
could not accept cultural values or ways of life that were too disruptive to its own. Some 
of the chief cultural values that most Japanese simply could not accept included 
Christianity,771 and the “extreme” Western concepts of individualism (equated with 
selfishness and egotism in Japanese minds) and excessive freedoms, a concept with 
which Japan had virtually no background. While a few Japanese eagerly embraced these 
new, novel ideals, to most Japanese they remained quite strange and unfamiliar.    
                                                
771 Much of the resistance to Christianity was due to the residue of anti-Christian propaganda and 
repression in the Tokugawa period, which was just ending at the start of this period. 
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 The preference for Western, “scientific” knowledge, against the antiquated 
knowledge of Japan’s Confucian neighbors and heritage, had huge impacts on the future 
course of Japan’s international relations in Asia and the Pacific, starting in this era. The 
new military technologies and thought provided both the tools and justification for 
attacking weaker, unscientific neighbors like China or Korea, or a more powerful one like 
Russia, who stood as impediments to Japan’s “progress.” The influence of evolutionistic 
thought here is not overwhelming, but present nevertheless.   
 Where were the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign aid, 
over the long run? These will be revealed in leaders’ attitudes toward spirituality, 
technology, development, and Japan’s international relations, and how they developed 
over time.772 At this stage, I can say that the practical, pragmatic attitudes we see in 
Fukuzawa’s, Mori’s, and Kato’s attitudes both toward spirituality, development, science 
and the acquisition of Western technology and knowledge773 are manifested in several 
basic attitudes of contemporary Japanese foreign aid: i.e., the prevalence of loans in 
Japan’s ODA program and encouraging a spirit of “self-help” in aid recipients. We will 
trace these attitudes in various areas as we survey the worldviews of key Japanese leaders 
in multiple areas in the coming chapters, up through 1945. I posit that these attitudes have 
evolved over time in ways that are not disconnected, and which provide key foundations 
                                                
772 This hints at my working hypothesis, but I cannot answer it yet, not until the last chapters of the 
dissertation (9 and 10). 
773 Examples of this include Mori’s view that Christianity could provide Japan practical, pragmatic attitudes 
for development and reform as it had for the United States and other places in the West, his pragmatic 
suggestions for social reform which Swale calls Keizaishugi (“economism”) (Swale, Political Thought, 
180-181), and Fukuzawa’s philosophy of jitsugaku, knowledge put to practical use. On morality, Kato 
focuses on “scientific” ethics and morality to help Japan reform. On religion, he supports the Meiji state’s 
nationalization of Shinto as the national patriotic and spiritual (not religious) practice.  In both these areas, 
pragmatism, in both science and spirituality, is to be used for Japan’s nation-building process.  
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Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895) 
 






 In Chapter 4, we will explore important views of several key Japanese leaders 
on Japan’s domestic political economy, on Japan’s domestic state and political issues, 
and its domestic market and economy, in order to understand political and economic 
forces in this era (1850 to 1895) that have contributed to shaping Japan’s later foreign aid 
policies in the 1950s. Before examining their views in depth, I will present the major 
contexts and events in Japan’s domestic politics and market for the period. On the 
domestic state, we will study the views of Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ito Hirobumi, Mori 
Arinori, Yamagata Aritomo and Kato Hiroyuki, and on the domestic market, the views of 
Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato. After studying the views of these leaders, to assess 
development issues of domestic state and market worldviews, I will use the concepts of 
“modernization” and translative adaptation. Also for both the domestic state and market 
worldviews, on technology-related issues, I will use Glick’s concept of technology, 
Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, and technonationalism as ideology, and for 





Contexts of Domestic Political Economy Issues (1850-1895): Major Trends 
 
 
Domestic State Contexts 
 
 After the transition from the Tokugawa period into the early Meiji period, a 
small group of elite oligarchs (hambatsu, or domain cliques) from Japan’s feudal 
domains dominated the political system.774 From about 1889, parliamentary models from 
Britain and Germany, and Japan’s Meiji constitution, passed the same year, in particular 
influenced the early Meiji political system. The Meiji constitution placed primary power 
in the hands of the emperor and purposely limited the power of both houses of the Diet.  
The genro, retired elder chief counselors for the emperor, influenced real power.775 The 
Meiji constitution sought to balance competing principles:  gradual political change 
versus rapid democratic reform, and imperial sovereignty against constitutionally limited 
government. The constitution finally left the latter issue’s resolution to the political 
system.776 Additional forces important in early Meiji politics included the military, and 
Japan’s early political parties.777  The government viewed the development of a strong 
                                                
774 Japan, “Hambatsu,” 495. 
775 Japan, “Political System,” 1216. 
776 Japan, “Constitution of the Empire of Japan,” 232. 
777 The military exercised an important influence in Japan’s political affairs after the founding of Japan’s 
modern military shortly after the Meiji restoration (1868), since many of Japan’s leaders at this time were 
members of the military and often former samurai (Japan, “Gumbatsu,” 479).  The ideology of militarism 
(gunkokushugi), the concept that military values should dominate all areas of national life, was also 
influential during this period (Japan, “Militarism,” 961).  Japan’s complex system of political parties 
emerged after 1868, exercising increasing impact after the Meiji constitution went into force (1890) (Japan, 
“Political Parties,” 1212).      
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bureaucracy during the Meiji period, modeled on Prussia’s, as important for national 
unity and industrialization.778   
 A complex set of ideologies from both Japan and abroad influenced Japan’s 
domestic politics in this period.  Within Japan, ideas of nationalism (kokkashugi and 
minzokushugi) were perhaps the most foundational ideological base.779  Many similar 
Japan-focused ideologies emerged, including kokutai,780 patriotism,781 kazoku kokka,782  
Nihonshugi,783 and State Shinto.784  Influential political ideologies originating abroad 
                                                
778 The government viewed democratic movements as impediments to these national goals (Japan, 
“Bureaucracy,” 147). 
779 A clear sense of nationalism only began to emerge in Japan in the late 1700s, through the influence of 
Shinto-influenced scholars of Kokugaku (national learning), which sought, starting in the 1600s, to identify 
uniquely Japanese sources of tradition through the study of Japanese classical literature and other ancient 
writings (Japan, “Kokugaku,” 816-817).  External pressures from the West encouraged forces within Japan 
unsatisfied with the Tokugawa Shogunate’s passive treatment of the throne, including the ideology of 
sonnô jôi (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians), and patriotic movements after the Meiji Restoration 
such as fukoku kyôhei (“rich nation, strong army”).  After the restoration, the government developed a 
strong sense of national unity through its strong influence in encouraging a national level media, economy 
and education system.  At this time, the two forms of nationalism that became the most influential were 
statist nationalism (kokkashugi), which stressed the state as the highest target of political allegiance, and 
popular or ethnic nationalism (minzokushugi), which stressed the ethnic, historical and cultural unity of the 
Japanese people (Japan, “Nationalism,” 1059).    
780 Kokutai (national essence or polity), a scholarly line of inquiry in the Tokugawa era, stressed the 
uniqueness of the Japanese polity, through such ideas as the rule of Japan through the unbroken imperial 
rule, and Japan as a “family-state” (kazoku kokka) (Japan, “Kokutai,” 819).  
781 A true sense of patriotism (aikokushin) did not emerge in Japan until the Meiji era, when the nation’s 
political leaders skillfully manipulated education and pre-Meiji notions of feudal loyalty to require 
dedication to the emperor, state, and the newly established order (Japan, “Patriotism,” 1189).  
782 According to kazoku kokka (“family-state”), developed in the Meiji era, the national structure of Japan is 
similar to an extended family’s, where all the citizens (the children) are descended from the emperor (the 
father).  This idea was used to support the emperor’s absolute powers (Japan, “Kazoku Kokka,” 767). 
783 Nihonshugi (Japanism) was a conservative ideology influential from the late 1880s through about 1912, 
formed in response to the pro-Western policies of the Meiji government.  Advocates of Nihonshugi sought 
to preserve “traditional” Japanese institutions and values against the onslaught of Western ideas into Japan 
(Japan, “Nihon shugi,” 1087).  
784 State Shinto refers to the mandatory religious system developed by Japan’s government, starting in the 
Meiji era (1868-1912), which organized Japan’s indigenous system of nature worship into a national 
hierarchy of religious shrines dedicated to worship of the emperor and patriotic support for the state.  State 
Shinto was meant to strengthen the national identity of all Japanese people against the invasion of Western 
culture (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “State Shinto,” 478).    
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included democracy,785 liberalism,786 and anarchism.787   
 Important domestic political movements, acts and events from 1850 to 1895 
included the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement of the early Meiji period.  In it, 
former samurai (shizoku) and commoners pressed for their rights in the new political 
system.  The new Meiji constitution spelled the end of this movement.788  The Land Tax 
Reform of 1873-1881 (Chiso Kaisei), a total revision of the land tax system by the Meiji 
government that sought to standardize land values and tax burdens, provided an essential 
foundation for industrialization.789  The Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (1882) 
helped to inculcate nationalistic values of absolute commitment to the emperor and the 
nation that were transferred from the military to local regions as servicemen went 
home.790  The first famous citizens’ protest began in the 1890s, when farmers and 
fishermen in Tochigi prefecture protested against river pollution from the Ashio Copper 
Mine.791  
                                                
785 Japan’s experience with democracy began in the 1870s, shortly after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, 
when upset former samurai and landowners began a political movement for popular rights and 
representative democracy (the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement).  Political parties, influenced by 
ideas from French radicalism and English liberalism, followed in the 1870s and 1880s, but only slowly 
gained some acceptance in politics from 1898 (Japan, “Democracy,” 278).       
786 Liberalism was introduced to Japan from the West shortly after the Meiji Restoration.  Fukuzawa 
Yukichi used jiyû, a term that originally connoted “as one pleases,” to translate the concept of liberty, and 
so it was disparaged by some critics as selfish.  The Meiji constitution (1889) limited individual liberties, 
since it viewed the state as more important than the individual.  Only members of the Freedom and 
People’s Rights Movement tried to use liberalism in the early 1880s to oppose the authoritarian Meiji 
government.  In this period, it never became very important, since forces both on the right and left opposed 
it (Japan, “Liberalism,” 889).   
787 While some precursors similar to anarchy existed in earlier Chinese and Japanese thought, the modern 
concept was introduced to Japan in the Meiji period, based on the thought of Russian anarchists, and the 
philosophies of communism and socialism.  One Japanese thinker, Kotoku Shusui, argued in 1906 that 
Japanese workers should overthrow the existing political system.  For the most part, anarchism lost most of 
its influence in Japan by about 1923 (Japan, “Anarchism,” 36).     
788 Japan, “Freedom and People’s Rights Movement,” 407-408.  
789 Japan, “Land Tax Reform of 1873-1881,” 877. 
790 Japan, “Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors,” 596. 
791 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Residents’ Movements,” 420). 
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 In the domestic political context, the Meiji government sought to import 
relevant knowledge and institutions that would strengthen Japan against the West, for 
national survival.  Its response was ideologically conservative, though it adopted some 
institutions that seemed quite radical at the time. The political ideologies that emerged, 
especially those supported by the state, were mostly conservative. While the Western 
value of democracy was fairly influential, the government limited its application. 
Ideologies based upon nationalism were more prevalent. 
Domestic Market Contexts 
 
 Regarding the state of Japan’s overall economy, by the mid-1800s, the mainly 
agricultural Tokugawa economy had evolved into a national system of commodities and 
handicrafts, with well developed commercial, monetary and transportation sectors.   By 
1868, Japan had several positive attributes for economic growth:  a fairly well educated, 
hardworking, disciplined, cooperative population, a monetized economy, a prosperous 
merchant class, and talented former samurai to help administrate.  The new Meiji 
government initiated reforms for rapid growth.792  Emerging entrepreneurs and maturing 
factors of production aided this.  Particular industries given public encouragement 
included textiles, iron and steel, and banking.  The primary ideologies of economic 
development of Meiji Japan were fukoku kyôhei and shokusan kôgyô.793 Regarding 
                                                
792 Areas of reform included the class system, communication, transportation, agriculture, land, and 
currency systems (Japan, “Economic History,” 306-307).   
793 The government of the Meiji period used the slogan fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong army) to 
encourage the development of key industries to strengthen Japan against the encroachment of Western 
powers (Japan, “Fukoku Kyôhei,” 425).  Shokusan kôgyô (“increase production and encourage 
management”) signifies government policy in the early Meiji period, and was intended to encourage 
Japanese industries to pursue the goal of fukoku kyôhei.  The Ministry of Public Works and the Home 
Ministry, largely successful, were charged with introducing foreign technologies, railroads, and managing 
public enterprises (Japan, “Shokusan Kôgyô,” 1409). 
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problem areas, the late Tokugawa economy was plagued by low support for samurai and 
daimyo, inadequate taxes, and foreign pressures for trade.  And Japan’s opening in 1859 
exposed the economy to potential problems of colonialism and invading Western 
technologies, politics and economics.  Problems in the early Meiji economy included its 
dual structure of rapid industrial and slow agricultural growth.  Japan’s natural resource 
base was and remains weak, even today.794  
 In the industrial and private sectors, the foundations of early Meiji Japan’s 
industries were based on Tokugawa Japan’s industrial and economic development.795  In 
the private sector, Tokugawa merchants united the economy through money, with Osaka 
as the economic capital.  The Confucian concept of ie (“household”) was central to the 
organization of Tokugawa commerce.796 From 1868 to 1882, the government strongly 
promoted the development of the textile industry to decrease imports. The state-led 
industrial revolution began in the late 1880s.  After 1884, the private sector began to 
acquire state-promoted basic industries and light manufacturing.797  The structure of 
industry in the early Meiji period followed patterns typical of early national economic 
development.798  In the early Meiji period, leaders brought huge changes to the economy 
                                                
794 Japan lacks most energy resources and resources necessary for industry, although their variety is 
surprising (Japan, “Natural Resources,” 1065). 
795 This development benefited from the Confucian work ethic inspired by the samurai, widespread primary 
education, a national distribution system, and large amounts of capital held by landowners and merchants 
(Japan, “Industrial History,” 601). 
796 According to the ie concept in commerce, owner-families promised all employees lifelong employment, 
in return for their absolute dedication.  The system encouraged a strict positional hierarchy for those within 
it (Japan, “Corporate History,” 247). 
797 Japan, “Industrial History,” 601; Japan, “Industrial Revolution in Japan,” 603; Japan, “Corporate 
History,” 247.   
798 According to this thought, primary industries such as mining dominate the earlier stages.  In Japan, the 
shift of labor from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector was fairly slow, until the early 1900s 
(Japan, “Industrial Structure,” 603). 
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and military, superimposing Western institutions on them.799  Business went through a 
“pioneering” period (1868-1884) of pursuing financial stability and founding banks, and 
a growth period (from 1884), stimulated by Japan’s pursuit of imperial expansion, 
especially after the wars with China and Russia.800  Government favors encouraged huge 
financial and industrial combines to develop.801  Foreign instructors and prominent 
businessmen traveling abroad influenced early Meiji corporate culture.  More important 
was the heritage of Tokugawa Japan.802  These factors supported Confucian and 
indigenous Japanese values that formed the basis of modern Japan’s corporate 
ideologies.803             
 The employment system of the Tokugawa period divided employees into three 
groups: nenki (indentured servants), fudai (hereditary vassals), and hiyô (day laborers).804 
Japan’s labor movement, unions, and working class started emerging in the late 1800s.805 
In the Tokugawa period, most women worked in agriculture, but after the Meiji 
Restoration, some began to work in the textile industry.806  Management in the early 
Meiji period emphasized the samurai spirit, service for the nation, and public support for 
businessmen.807  
                                                
799 These changes included the abolition of samurai privileges, new freedom of movement, and the 
importation of foreign experts (Japan, “Corporate History,” 247).  
800 These wars occurred in 1894-1895 and 1904-1905, respectively.  Japan, “Corporate History,” 247, 250. 
801 These combines were called zaibatsu (Japan, “Zaibatsu,” 1768).  Important zaibatsu included 
Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo (Japan, “Mitsubishi,” 980; “Mitsui,” 982; and “Sumitomo,” 1471).  
802 This heritage included influences from the feudal and Tokugawa bureaucracies and important merchant 
trading houses (shôka) (Japan, “Corporate Culture,” 246). 
803 These ideologies included allegiance to authority, hierarchy, social stability, and patron-client relations 
(Japan, “Corporate Culture,” 246). 
804 Japan, “Premodern Employment System,” 340. 
805 Japan, “Labor,” 869; “Labor Unions,” 873.  
806 Japan, “Women in the Labor Force,” 1707. 
807 Japan, “Managerial Ideology,” 914. 
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 Concerning the domestic market context, despite the many challenges Japan 
faced, especially foreign pressure to trade and open its economy, its many strengths 
enabled it to emerge from national isolation and quickly begin economic reforms.   
Strong state involvement was key in marshalling resources, knowledge and goals for this 
purpose.  State involvement in this period stressed large-scale industries and businesses, 
and recognized the importance of the emerging private sector in the nation’s growth. 
Neo-Confucian values from the late Tokugawa era contributed key ideologies for Japan’s 
new industries and businesses.  The conservatism of Japanese politics and society 
encouraged government wariness concerning Japan’s new labor movement in the late 
1800s.  Changes brought by Japan’s industrial revolution (from the late 1880s) and shifts 
in labor patterns (from agriculture to industry) were often painful and costly. 
 
Views of Domestic Political Economy Issues (1850-1895) 
 
 
Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic State Contexts 
 
 Fukuzawa Yukichi.  Around 1862, after a trip to Europe, Fukuzawa Yukichi 
quietly criticized the corruption and backwardness of the Bakufu.808  In 1868, the time of 
the Meiji Restoration,809 Fukuzawa favored neither the Bakufu nor the imperial 
                                                
808 Bakufu refers to the Tokugawa Shogunate.  Fukuzawa criticized the regime to his friends.  He could not 
do so openly, for fear of execution.  In his early writings, like Seiyô Jijô (Conditions in the West, 1866, 
1870), Fukuzawa did not criticize the Bakufu, although he did so in his later writings (Blacker, Japanese 
Enlightenment, 8-9. 
809 This refers to the “restoration” of the Japanese emperor to a position of important prominence in the 
Japanese political system.  For many centuries, the emperor had not occupied a very powerful position in 
national Japanese politics, but this was about to change.  The restoration was partly symbolized by the 
relocation of the imperial court from Kyoto to the new national capital in Tokyo, and the enthronement of 
the Emperor Meiji in 1867.  
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restorationists.810  After the Restoration, Fukuzawa and other kemp (enlightenment) 
thinkers were delighted to discover that the new government included reformers eager to 
build “…a new Japan in a very western fashion,” not simply an imperialist anti-foreign 
policy.811  But Fukuzawa believed that the Meiji government was ineffective in limiting 
its sphere of power, and in exercising “unified” action in that sphere.812  
 Fukuzawa argued that no form of government is superior to others; this varies 
with each era’s need.  Government tends to evolve from more autocratic to democratic 
forms.  In a future time, government will be unnecessary.  Japan should never again 
revert to autocracy.813  The main duties of government are guaranteeing people’s rights, 
and making laws.  It should focus on limiting negative hindrances to the people’s 
welfare—through the military, war and peace, and enacting laws.  All other duties belong 
to the private sphere, separate from the public arena.  The balance between these is key to 
civilization’s progress.814  The average Japanese had a very poor understanding of the 
proper balance between these spheres, their rights, and the true meaning of 
independence.815  Fukuzawa preferred to be independent of politics, yet remain their 
critic and analyst.816  
                                                
810 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 8-9. 
811 Ibid., 28. 
812 Ibid., 113. Generally Fukuzawa maintained a position of neutrality toward the Bakufu and new Meiji 
regimes.  Earlier, he served as an official translator, but usually he worked independently at home, so that 
he could continue his intellectual [and entrepreneurial] activities (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, xxiv-xxv, 76, 
78-79).  He also argued that scholars should remain independent of the government (Ibid., 141-142).  
Several times the Meiji government offered Fukuzawa positions, but he usually declined them, avoiding 
close contact with politicians (Ibid., 142-143, 175-176).  Fukuzawa started a national newspaper, the Jiji 
Shimpo, generally pro-government.  On national security grounds, the paper was banned five times (Ibid., 
156-158).      
813 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 112-113, 119. 
814 Ibid., 106-109. 
815 Ibid., 110-111. 
816 Ibid., 120-121. 
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 Concerning government institutions, until 1879, Fukuzawa thought that Japan 
was not ready for a parliament; neither the government nor the people understood its 
basic nature or functions.  In 1879 he argued for a parliamentary system that would give 
the Diet sufficient power, within limits, and public approval, following the constitutional 
English parliamentary/cabinet model.817  The Emperor should be kept above politics.818 
 On human rights, in 1876 Fukuzawa argued that “people’s rights” must not 
compromise state power.  He believed that the state has two kinds of rights, rights of 
political power and human rights.  Human rights should not be neglected—eventually 
Japanese would be interested in their rights and freedom to discuss political ideas.819  All 
men are equal, as opposed to the traditional Japanese Confucian view, which said that 
society is naturally hierarchical.  Fukuzawa struggled to translate the concept of equal 
rights in terms understandable to the average Japanese.  If government became tyrannical, 
citizens should appeal to proper reason, even to the point of death.820 
Ito Hirobumi.  As a youth, like many from Choshu,821 Ito felt contempt for the 
Shogunate.  At eighteen, he chose to fight for the restoration of the Emperor.822  Ito 
contributed to many political reforms, including the legal system.823  By 1871, the 
national government adopted his doctrine of “feudal renunciation/civil hegemony,” where 
powers of the feudal fiefdoms were slowly reduced, and authority concentrated in the 
central government.  Ito believed that concentrating political power in national 
                                                
817 Ibid., 118. 
818 Ibid., 119. 
819 Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 140-141. In 1879, Fukuzawa denounced and divorced himself from the 
emerging Freedom and People’s Rights Movement (Ibid., 142).  
820 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 101, 104-106, 109. 
821 Choshu was a leading feudal domain in the Tokugawa era, located in southwestern Japan. 
822 Hamada, Prince Ito, 14, 17, 19. 
823 Ibid., 55-56, 75. 
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governments contributes to their success.824  In the mid-1870s, Ito proposed basic 
changes to alter the central government’s structure.825 
 By the late 1870s, as Japan’s top Councilor, Ito balanced hard political 
pressures for popular rights and a parliament versus the need for political stability.  He 
felt that the Japanese were not yet ready for full self-government, but advised the 
Emperor to grant a parliament soon.826  After his second premiership, Ito formally 
renounced “bureaucratic principles” that emphasized oligarchic dominance and limited 
public participation.  This was the first partial opening of the political system to the 
masses.  Soon the first political party system was allowed.827 
 In the 1870s and 1880s, Ito investigated the political systems of the U.S. and 
Germany.828  In 1884, he began crafting a constitution.  To “protect” the nation from 
drifting toward liberalism, he sought to set up a bureaucracy and institutions following 
the German model.829  Ito proposed to modernize the government structure with a prime 
                                                
824 Ibid., 57-58, 61. 
825 Ibid., 71-72, 74. The reforms were delayed because of a foreign policy crisis with Korea.  These 
included creating a Senate, an assembly of prefectural governors, a Supreme Court, and the separation of 
the National Council from the administrative ministries.  This was the first attempt to apply the lessons of 
Western political institutions to the conditions of Japan (Ibid.).  
826 Ibid., 81-83. The emperor agreed to grant a parliament by 1890. 
827 Ibid., 122-123. In 1900, Ito wrote the platform of the Seiyukai, one of Japan’s earliest political parties, 
which argued for the support of the constitution, the principles of the Meiji Restoration, the electoral 
system, industries and commerce, friendly international relations, the national interest, education, and the 
public welfare (Hamada, Prince Ito, 126). 
828 Ibid., 62, 84. 
829 Ibid., 85-86. These included the Ministry of the Imperial Household, and the Peerage Ordinance that 
established a system of nobility.  The 505 peers were the basis for the Diet’s Upper Chamber.  In the mid-
1880s, Ito was not an opponent of liberalism, but differed from some of his contemporaries about how it 
should be applied in Japan.  He preferred a moderate, gradual approach. 
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minister and cabinet of nine ministers.830  The first constitution (1889) was neither purely 
Japanese nor Western.831 
 Ito believed that many political and legal reforms were necessary.  He had 
evolving, mixed feelings about the West.  Like technology, regarding political systems, 
he was willing to borrow from the West, to craft a government that would earn their 
respect, and enable the country to be governed effectively for modernization.  The 
challenge was to work this out in practice.  Hamada calls Ito a “cautious realist” who 
sought to craft moderate policies—midway between the powerful Emperor and the 
masses eager for rights.832  Finding the right balance was extremely challenging. 
 Mori Arinori.  There is a close structural parallel between the political and 
educational thought of Mori and Herbert Spencer.833  Mori did not blindly copy Spencer, 
but later developed his own distinctive patterns of political thought.834 Concerning his 
political philosophy, while scholars have struggled to accurately categorize his thought 
overall, Swale calls Mori a progressive, not static, conservative.835  Mori believed that 
government was meant to serve citizens, who should be allowed life, liberty, and freedom 
of belief without the state’s interference, except in cases of threats to political stability.  
                                                
830 Ibid., 90-91. Ito became the first prime minister in late 1885. 
831 Ibid., 95-97. It divided the government into several branches, executive, legislative, judicial, and the 
Privy (advisory) Council for the Emperor, and allowed for the creation of ministries.  It defined mainly the 
fundamentals of various rights and duties of the Emperor and the citizens. 
832 Ibid., 94-95. 
833 Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was a prominent British sociologist, philosopher, and advocate of 
evolutionary theory.  
834 Swale, Political Thought, 17, 21. For Mori’s thought on education, see my discussion on Mori’s views 
of Japan’s domestic society.   
835 Ibid., 4-7. According to Swale, scholars have struggled to categorize Mori according to conventional 
political categories.  The two forms of conservatism mentioned here were both present among the 
Meirokusha members.  Progressive conservatives were willing to allow adaptation of the polity to current 
circumstances, while static conservatives emphasized maintenance of the national polity according to 
transcendent principles (Ibid., 1-2, 6).  For more on how progressive conservatism developed, (Ibid., 8-11).   
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He did not believe that the people and other political “outsiders” could handle much 
direct influence in politics.  Liberties were fine, but the “people” seemed unqualified for 
public office.836  Mori supported the constitutional monarchies of Germany and Britain, 
and the ideals of Japan’s first constitution (1889).  A significant political task in Meiji 
Japan was building Japan into a modern nation-state.837  Mori viewed the state in a non-
ultra-nationalistic fashion, as simply the government, one institution among many that 
had limitations of function.  The state “…evolved from a past and was subject to 
principles of development alike with all other institutions.”838 
 Yamagata Aritomo.  Yamagata argued in 1868 that national unity under the 
new Meiji government was the first priority.  He convinced the troops from some strong 
fiefdoms, including Satsuma and Choshu, to join the Imperial Bodyguard in 1871.  If the 
military was strengthened for external threats, there need be no anxiety over internal 
ones.  Its modernization went beyond technology to national discipline.839  From 1880-
1900, Yamagata argued that members of the military should be kept strictly separate from 
politics, but universal military conscription should be the first basis for increasing state 
power.840  Domestic reforms, based on Western models, were meant to win respect from 
and equality with outside powers.841  Yamagata’s approach to political development was 
gradual, cautious, and sought to strengthen national unity.  To accomplish the last task, he 
                                                
836 Mori did not support the democratic Freedom and People’s Rights Movement (started in the late 1870s 
by dissatisfied ex-samurai) (Van Sant, Mori Arinori, xxix-xxx).     
837 Ibid. According to Ernest Gellner, to build a modern nation-state, one must build a state that is 
coexistensive with a certain territory, and that has a fairly homogeneous culture for the people within that 
territory.  Technological innovation alone is not enough; political and cultural integration are also needed 
(Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1-38, summarized 
in Swale, Political Thought, 11-12).  
838 Ibid., 184, 187. 
839 Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 252, 254, 261. 
840 Ibid., 260-261, 268. 
841 Ibid., 244, 246. 
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supported Western-type political institutions (where useful), limits on popular freedoms 
and dissidence, and in the 1880s, closer connections between local and central 
governments.  His model was Imperial Germany.  A constitution, popular rights and 
political parties were needed for Japan to win Western respect, but must be limited, and 
the power of the emperor protected from popular encroachment.842  
 Kato Hiroyuki.  In his early political writings, before the late 1870s, Kato 
showed interest in progressive political ideas.843  In 1868, he became an official in the 
new Meiji government, and his thinking largely followed government preferences.844  In 
some writings of the late 1860s, he respects both incremental political change and 
Confucian virtues.845  Kato was heavily influenced by German ideas, and by 1879, 
“converted” to German-influenced Social Darwinism, which argued that nations and 
races, not just individuals, compete for survival.  The choice of German was crucial for 
the development of Kato’s worldview.846  Kato’s later thinking was rather dogmatic, and 
yet he developed his own system of evolutionary thought to analyze government, 
                                                
842 Ibid., 261-268. 
843 For example, in some of his earliest writings in the 1860s, Kato advocated the Shogunate’s policy of 
open-door policy of trade with the West (this was long after Japan’s encounter with Commodore Perry), as 
well as an independent judicial system, various civil and private rights, and the separation of government 
powers (Davis, Moral and Political, 11-12).   
844 Kato served in several ministries, including Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Education.  According to 
Davis, his greatest impact was in the last (Ibid.).  In the 1870s and 1880s, the Meiji government found his 
writings an embarrassment, so in the 1870s, he “converted” to more conservative thought.  At this point, 
writers such as Thomas Buckle and Montesquieu influenced Kato intellectually.  Both argued that social 
phenomena developed through natural, material forces (Ibid., vii-ix, 14-17, 38, 40-43). 
845 Ibid., 10-14. 
846 This exposed Kato to conservative German thinkers, who advocated specific limits and contexts for 
human rights, different from more liberal British and French scholars (Ibid., 14-16). 
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morality and society, arguing that politics and ethics should be grounded in natural, 
knowable ideas.847 
 On national sovereignty, Kato saw the nation as a “macromulticelled organism” 
(the “body”) and individual citizens as “cells.”  What is right for the nation is determined 
by the greatest welfare for the most people (kôan).  Nations result from the struggle for 
power over time.  Our struggle to survive has two forms, internal (within nations, 
between individuals, families and other groups) and external (among nations).  
Individualism and nationalism are closely connected—the state should not ignore the 
individual, but individuals may be sacrificed for the nation.848  Kato sees Japan’s state as 
both a legal entity (hôjin) and as a natural, organic nation (shizen kokka).  Where does the 
ultimate power and sovereignty of the state lie?  Japan’s “patriarchal sovereignty” lies not 
with public opinion or the people, but in the “natural, filial relationship between the 
                                                
847 Ibid., vii-ix, 14-17, 38, 40-43. For a discussion of Kato’s concept of morality, see the section on Kato’s 
views of domestic Japanese society.  His theory of evolution supported the ideas of empiricism, positivism, 
utilitarianism, nationalism, strict concepts of monism (the denial of many forms of dualism, such as matter 
vs. mind, nature vs. culture) and universal determinism (the law of causation applied to everything).  Matter 
and energy form all phenomena as the “world-substance” (German: Weltsubstanz).  The material “law of 
substance” (Substanzgesetz) drives nature, and laws of physical nature drive culture (Ibid., 35-36, 38-39).  
Regarding politics and morality, Kato argued that laws of nature (shizenhô) drive inequality and the 
struggle for existence.  The evolutionary struggle between human groups is more primary than that between 
individuals.  Power in the primitive stage is based on physical ability, and in the civilized stage, on 
knowledge, wealth, and cultural ability.  Primitive society was fairly egalitarian, but roles become more 
specialized over time.  Gender roles are an example.  Scientifically, Kato saw women as inferior to men.  
But he did not see this as an excuse for their mistreatment (Ibid., 38, 40-43).  Kato further argued that the 
behavior of all life forms is controlled by egoism, the natural instincts that drive the fight for survival.  In 
that fight, individual cells or organisms sometimes turn to cooperation with others (altruism).  Egoism and 
altruism are not static, but evolve along with society (Ibid., 43-45, 48, 52).  Also related to politics, Kato’s 
concept of progress is closely connected to his idea of development, expressed as evolution and 
development (shinka hattatsu) or progress and development (shinpo hattatsu).  Progress and political 
development result from competition, the struggle for survival, conflict, and war.  The strong in a society 
have the right to punish and discipline the weak (Ibid., 103-106). 
848 Ibid., 68-70. 
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emperor and his subjects.”  The people form the “branch families” of the imperial “stem” 
family.  The emperor is the nation.849  
 The Jiyû Minken Undô in the 1880s met the Meiji government move to 
authoritarian government to mobilize the nation for modernization.850  In response, the 
government sought a “scientific” theory to limit demands for human rights.  Kato wrote 
Jinken Shinsetsu (A New Treatise on the Origin of Human Rights) in 1882, the first 
articulation of his mature thought.851  He was the first Japanese to apply Social 
Darwinism in support of an anti-democratic theory, and used it to argue that the emperor 
was the fittest leader for Japan.852  Kato developed his “mature” theory of human rights 
over several years, after public reaction to Jinken Shinsetsu.  To him the idea of natural 
rights, endowed by God or gods, was ridiculous.  Animals do not have rights, so why 
would only one species (humans)?  Kato also felt that natural rights are based solely on 
                                                
849 Ibid., 71-72, 111. 
850 Jiyû Minken Undô, the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, was founded in the 1870s by political 
liberals and radicals who claimed they had a natural right to political freedoms.  They demanded the 
formation of a national congress and universal suffrage for men.  Natural rights and natural law were under 
attack in the West, and Kato applied similar arguments in Japan (Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 237, 240; 
Davis, Moral and Political, 3, 9).   
851 In this work, Kato argues that the Jiyû Minken Undô is scientifically incorrect, because variation 
naturally exists in all human and animal populations, and national equality is impossible (Unoura, “Samurai 
Darwinism,” 240-242).  Kato also argues that the concept of naturally endowed human rights violates the 
principles of cause and effect, and the “universal law of nature” (evolution), that affect all living beings on 
the earth.  Superiors win, inferiors lose.  Families gradually came together to form tribes, and then nations.  
The “seeds of rights” were planted.  As humans and their societies evolved, morality, customs and 
intellectual ability raised the level of various societies.  Natural selection gradually raised the position of 
upper-class commoners, and later the middle classes, in several societies.  Not all will have the same rights.  
Rights are not natural, but are given by stronger classes to the weak as social evolution continues.  Natural 
selection can produce both good and evil people.  The evolution of rights should be gradual.  Rights 
granted prematurely hamper the development of progress (Davis, Moral and Political, 25-33, 106). 
852 Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 240-242. The emperor was the fittest to lead since he had descended 
from the long imperial line of rulers who were all the fittest to lead.  Other critics contested Kato’s claims.  
Supporters of democratic rights attacked his arguments in the 1880s.  Another scholar, Toyama Masakazu, 
in order to bolster his own support for Herbert Spencer, attacked Kato’s claim that the emperor was the 
fittest leader for the Japanese people.  Kato changed in his thinking from political liberalism to Social 
Darwinism, and some Japanese historians have attacked him for this “conversion” (Ibid.).  
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observation of civilized societies.853  Rights result from power and violence.  The rights 
of the strong are the ultimate origin of development, civilization and progress.854  Kato 
identifies four stages in the evolution of human rights.855  But there are problems with his 
arguments.  Social Darwinism conflicted with the Japanese creation myth chronicled in 
the ancient writings of Kojiki and Nihonshoki.  Kato also argued that the emperor system 
was perfect and beyond scientific analysis.  His concept of the Japanese national polity 
(kokutai) depended on the unbroken continuance of the imperial family line.856  Most 
conservative Japanese intellectuals eventually rejected Social Darwinism because of 
inconsistencies such as these.  But Kato did not.857  
Comparison of Worldviews on the Domestic State (1850-1895) 
 
 How do the domestic-related political views of our five leaders (1850-1895) 
compare, especially related to science, technology, and foreign relations and influences?  
Concerning their general views of politics and government, all five supported various 
                                                
853 According to Kato, if we examine primitive societies, we may see savages have little knowledge of 
counting, farming or morality.  If human rights are natural, we should see wisdom and knowledge in 
savages (Davis, Moral and Political, 60-68, 111).  But in fact we do see their wisdom.  Scholars such as 
anthropologists now recognize that indigenous peoples have long had complex systems of indigenous 
knowledge of fields such as the environment, agriculture, ecology, mathematics, and complex cosmologies 
about the nature of life and the supernatural.  Today we realize that Kato’s arguments here are ridiculous. 
854 The strong have a right to “use” the weak, and the weak may resist.  All can act according to their own 
desires and intuitions.  Demands for equality occur when the weak are able to challenge the rights of the 
strong, but still, ultimate power is held by the strong (Ibid.).   
855 The four evolutionary stages of human rights are: 1) “the violent acquisition of rights by the strong,” 2) 
“the creation of new rights by the voluntary self-restraint of the strong,” 3) “the transformation of power 
into genuine rights” (which emerge when the strong gain the “tacit consent” of the weak”), and 4) “the 
emergence of equal rights” (Ibid.).  For a treatment of weaknesses in Kato’s mature theory of rights, see 
Davis, Moral and Political, 119-122.  
856 Kato claimed that all Japanese were descended from their tribal father emperor, related to him and each 
other in the “family-state” (kokka).   This conflicted with his arguments about the emperor as infallible, 
because the struggle for existence was weaker among the members of the same kinship group.  To 
overcome these conflicts, Kato argued that individual competition for survival in Japan was manifested as 
competition for the most devotion to the Emperor and the kokka.  This “moral evolution by self-selection” 
enabled the state to request unconditional obedience from citizens, to the point of death (Unoura, “Samurai 




forms of political development and evolution, but varied in how fast they thought it 
should occur in Japan.  Evolutionary principles were especially strong in Kato’s thought, 
and fairly so in Mori’s.  Concerning government’s responsibilities and duties, while 
Fukuzawa felt they should be strictly limited, Yamagata argued for limits on personal 
freedoms.  Fukuzawa and Ito argued for the need to balance various governmental 
functions (the former for balance between the public and private spheres, and the latter 
for balance between democratic rights and oligarchic control).  Mori and Fukuzawa had 
more liberal leaning political values.  Both were highly supportive of Western values to 
help Japan, and very nationalistic regarding the latter.  Ito, Yamagata, and Kato were 
more authoritarian leaning, and nationalistic. In their nationalism, Mori and Fukuzawa 
supported liberal values to strengthen Japan.  Fukuzawa especially supported the liberal 
and scientific values (and “spirit”) behind technology, in terms of their ability to 
strengthen and defend the nation.  Ito, Kato and Yamagata were more conservative in 
their nationalism.  For Yamagata, the focal point of Japan’s domestic politics was 
strengthening the military and national unity.  To him, the “spirits” of Japan-focused 
unity and discipline seemed more important for its defense than the Western technologies 
he used to modernize the military.  
 Regarding Japan’s government and its institutions, Fukuzawa and Ito were 
critical of the Tokugawa Shogunate; none of the five leaders supported it.  Fukuzawa was 
also critical of late Tokugawa imperial restorationists and the new Meiji government, 
while the other four leaders supported both.  Fukuzawa, Kato and Yamagata supported 
the emperor system in varied ways.  In his mature thought, Kato offers the most detailed 
arguments about the relationship of the emperor to the Japanese people and the national 
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polity, somewhat based on evolutionary principles.  Mori, Ito, and Yamagata were 
supportive of the Meiji constitution, though the latter two were conservative and cautious 
in their approach.  The former two also supported a conservative constitutional monarchy 
system for Japan.  Concerning political reform, Ito and Yamagata supported a more 
gradual approach, while Mori, Fukuzawa, and Kato tended to support a more rapid one.  
 Regarding the Japanese nation and state, all five leaders supported it strongly. 
Kato had the most complex view of the state, and again, his mature views were 
influenced by evolutionary thought.  Concerning the state’s power and authority, Mori, 
Fukuzawa and Yamagata believed that the government should have limited functions or 
be limited in certain ways.  Ito, Yamagata and Kato highly supported the concentration of 
power at the national level.  For Yamagata, increased national level power would 
strengthen national unity.  For Kato, state power flowed from the emperor and his 
relationship with the people.  On the issue of democratic rights and freedoms versus 
political stability and authoritarian control, Fukuzawa and Mori supported the former, 
while Ito, Yamagata and Kato supported the latter (Kato called freedoms “unscientific”). 
 On political and human rights, Fukuzawa strongly supported individual rights, 
but felt they must be carefully balanced with the state’s rights and stability.  Kato 
preferred state rights above the individual’s.  He and Yamagata supported limits on 
popular freedoms, rights and dissidence.  Kato based his arguments against human rights 
on evolutionary and “scientific” arguments.  Fukuzawa argued in favor of human 




 Concerning Western political influences, more of the thought of Fukuzawa, 
Mori, Kato and Ito leaned toward Western sources and models.  Of the four, the first two 
were more liberal in their political values, leaning toward the “Anglo-American” system 
for their ideas, and the latter two, plus Yamagata, were more conservative, gravitating 
toward Germany/Prussia as the source for their political ideas.  Of these five leaders 
(1850-1895), only Yamagata leaned more toward Eastern (Japanese and Chinese) sources 
than Western ones.  
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on the Domestic State (1850-1895) 
 
 General Approaches. To comparatively analyze the thinking of the five 
scholars (1850-1895) on domestic politics, I will use several conceptual approaches. On 
the issue of how external engagement and internal adaptation to outside forces affected 
domestic politics, Japanese scholars’ concepts of “modernization” and translative 
adaptation, both related to development, seem helpful.858  On technology and policy 
aspects, Thomas Glick’s approach to technology is helpful for domestic politics, since it 
can help us assess the effect of systemic issues on leaders’ views of politics over time.859  
It may also be helpful to consider the issue of industrial policy over time.860  I will also 
use Richard J. Samuels’ concept of technonationalism as ideology, a key example of how 
                                                
858 See the definitions of these two concepts in the Glossary. “Modernization” will be helpful since it helps 
us to think both about Japan’s interaction with outside influences, and how they have affected its internal 
politics.  “Modernization” seems more helpful than internationalization and translative adaptation, since it 
integrates both internal and external components.  
859 See the definition of technology in the Glossary, and my discussion of Glick’s treatment of technology 
in the section on technological development earlier in this chapter.  On domestic politics, if I can see how 
leaders’ views of politics are affected by technology, as part of a politico-technical system, then Glick’s 
approach is relevant.  This is also true for domestic economic and sociocultural aspects, if this approach 
helps me to think more systemically.  Finally, viewing the domestic state, market and society as part of a 
technology-related system across time (the historical aspect of Glick’s definition) is also useful.    
860 See Murakami’s definition of industrial policy in the Glossary.  According to Murakami, industrial 
policy includes all forms of (policy for) government intervention in the economy, and often involves 
technology issues.  Industrial policy will be relevant to domestic political issues in most time periods. 
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technology and international relations have affected Japan’s domestic politics.861   On the 
issue of how leaders’ worldviews and cognition affected Japan’s domestic politics, I will 
use again specified aspects of the concepts of image, worldview and cultural logics.862  
 Development Issues. Regarding the issue of the political worldviews of our five 
leaders (1850-1895) and Japan’s external engagement and internal adaptation to that 
engagement, if we examine it through the concept of “modernization,” 863 we see that on 
general politics and government, while the five varied in their political values (some were 
liberal, some more conservative), all five were nationalistic in their political values and 
goals.  All wanted Japan to strengthen its internal political system to effectively repel the 
threat of Western invasion.  Thus all five leaders supported the concept of 
“modernization.”  [All five varied on what types and degrees of Western political reforms 
should be imported, the pace of reform, and what degree of rights should be granted, but 
all wanted the core and overall form of Japanese society to continue intact.]  
  What do we learn if we examine the domestic political views of the five leaders 
through the lens of translative adaptation?864  From 1850 to 1895, how were the political 
structures and values in Japan affected by the worldviews of these five, as they mediated 
                                                
861 See the definition of technonationalism as ideology in the Glossary.  Samuels uses technonationalism to 
signify the belief that technology is a basic part of national security, and that it must be carefully developed 
in a country to make it wealthy and powerful.  He argues that the concept provides a helpful summation of 
Japanese beliefs about technology and security over several hundred years. (Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong 
Army,” ix-x).  One example of technonationalism as ideology is the slogan fukoku kyôhei (see Glossary and 
discussion of fukoku kyôhei earlier in this chapter). 
862 See the definitions of image, worldview, and cultural logics in the Glossary section.  
863 Remember the assumption in “modernization” that through the process of interaction with external 
(Western) forces, both the overall form and society of the receiving (non-Western) nation/culture will 
remain essentially intact, though somewhat altered. 
864 In translative adaptation, the focus is on a non-Western society’s degree and quality of internal 
adaptation to external forces.  Here the assumption is that the base society of the receiving culture will 
remain stable and primary, although a new dual (Western/non-Western) cultural identity in the society will 
emerge.   
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the importation of Western political ideas and institutions into the nation?  Did Japan’s 
institutions and values continue intact?  What effects did Western-derived scientific and 
technological values have on Japan’s internal political system?  The impact of Western 
scientific values on the political views and values of these five leaders was fairly deep.  
All five supported political change and development in Japan as necessary for Japan’s 
survival.  The basis of many of these ideas was Western-derived theories of evolution.  
Many of the five (Yamagata, Ito, Kato) argued for more state control and fewer freedoms 
for the people, to generate the rapid political and technological development believed 
necessary for Japan to compete with the West. In this early stage of modern Japan’s 
political development, the five were cautious, to varying degrees, about how quickly the 
people could handle political freedoms.865  All five supported the reform of Japan’s 
government and political institutions through the adaptation of Western type political 
reforms and institutions that they felt were best suited to the Japanese context.  All five 
leaders supported the concept of translative adaptation in their commitment to the 
strengthening and survival of the Japanese state and nation.  They planned to use Western 
type reforms to strengthen some of Japan’s own political institutions (i.e. the emperor), 
add some new ones (a parliament and a constitution), and replace others, if necessary 
(e.g. the replacement of the Tokugawa regime with the Meiji government).  But at the 
base of these reforms was the presumption that outsiders should not rule Japan, and that 
the core of its society and worldviews must be maintained, not destroyed.  On human 
                                                
865 While Western scholars might argue that more political freedoms could bring more scientific and 
technological advancement, most of the five leaders here would disagree.  Even Fukuzawa, who strongly 
supported liberal Western values that he believed underlay Western scientific and technological successes, 
was generally cautious about how quickly they should be applied to Japan.  In the view of these five 
leaders, too many freedoms granted too quickly invited political instability and national disunity.    
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rights, all of these leaders’ views were based on varied interpretations of Western 
concepts, but again, with support for Japan’s national survival and independence at the 
foundation.  The underlying goal of Japan’s national survival was the continuance of its 
core society and values.  Most of the five leaders (except Yamagata) leaned heavily 
toward Western sources for their political values. Yet the goal in all these areas of 
political reform was Japan’s survival as a nation, a people, and a culture. Surface 
appearances (of culture, technology, clothing, or the adoption of Western institutions) 
were usually considered less important.866 
 Technology Issues. Using frameworks emphasizing technology, from Glick’s 
definition of technology, I will investigate how technology affected these leaders’ views 
of politics over time, as part of a politico-technical system.  The five leaders’ views of 
politics and government were highly influenced by Western sources and models, as were 
their views of science and technology.  The influence of scientific and technological ideas 
on Japanese politics was great, both conceptually and in practice.  Whether political or 
technological in nature, most ideas or innovations for reform in this period originated in 
                                                
866 One example of this was the urging of zealous early Meiji reformers that Japanese quickly adopt 
Western dress, speak English, eat beef, or attend Western operas. It is interesting to compare the general 
Japanese attitude toward cultural and technological reforms (of caring more about a reform’s impact on 
core cultural values than about surface appearance) to the attitude of radical reformers in other regions. 
Some recent societies with conservative Islamic tendencies (post-1979 Iran, and Taliban-controlled 
Afghanistan), at times prohibited Western dress or outward cultural influences, in the view that such things 
corrupt a society’s cultural core. The attitude in Meiji Japan and later was more pragmatic. Japan was 
largely willing to learn western knowledge, technology and adopt Western institutions and attitudes in the 
hope that its core cultural and national identities could be maintained. Perhaps Japan’s long experience with 
importing overseas knowledge while maintaining its own distinct identity and traditions contributed to this 
belief. The Meiji government policy to import foreign experts, quickly absorb their knowledge, and quickly 
send them home is an example. If foreigners were kept at arm’s length and only allowed brief stays, their 
knowledge could be better absorbed without corrupting Japan’s core identity. This attitude may also be a 
reflection of the Japanese concepts of tatemae (surface expression of emotion and belief) and honne (true, 
heartfelt conviction). But the reform process was not easy for Japan.  Consider how the Meiji government 
sought a Japanese version of Social Darwinism (in the work of Kato Hiroyuki), to limit the impact of 
Western reforms to mainly science and technology sectors.  
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the West.  Science-based ideas such as evolution affected political thought in both the 
West and Japan, here especially Kato’s and Mori’s.  The fact that these political ideas 
seemed to have the backing of Western technology and science surely gave them more 
appeal in Meiji Japan.  In both the nineteenth century West and Japan, ideas of 
democratic politics, political philosophy, and science and technology underwent change, 
some rapid, some gradual.  Leading Japanese, including Fukuzawa and Mori, admired 
Western democratic values assumed to be behind the West’s technological successes. The 
dilemma was how to apply these ideas to Japan’s context in a way that strengthened the 
country against Western colonialism and invasion, but did not destroy Japan’s core 
culture and identity.  To protect Japan, the Meiji government and many leaders such as 
Yamagata and Ito insisted that these foreign political ideas only be very carefully applied 
to Japan, if at all.  Concerning Japan’s government and its institutions, the most overt 
example of science influencing the five leaders’ worldviews on the domestic state here is 
how Kato used evolutionary arguments to support of the emperor system.  On the 
Japanese state and nation, Kato’s somewhat complex views also had their origin in 
evolutionary thought.  The philosophical support that the three more conservative leaders 
(Ito, Yamagata, and Kato) offered for power at the national level would also contribute to 
the build-up of the state’s scientific and technological research capacity through the 
early- to mid-1940s.  The last two argued for limits against human rights and freedoms, 
and Kato used evolutionary arguments to support his position.  Most of the five leaders 
gravitated toward Western, not Chinese, models to provide political guidance for Japan, 
based partly in their belief in the superiority of Western science and technology to 
strengthen Japan against Western invasion. 
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 Viewed through Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, the main impact of 
the five leaders’ worldviews on the domestic state is seen in their desire to strengthen the 
Japanese state at the national level, which would soon enable the state to strongly support 
scientific, technological and economic development to a high degree.  This large level of 
state involvement was generally contrary to British and American political concepts of 
free trade, but closer to the autocratic ideals of the late nineteenth century Prussian state.  
The latter provided much inspiration for Yamagata’s military reforms, and Ito’s Meiji 
constitution. 
 Samuel’s concept of technonationalism as ideology stresses the use of 
technology to make a country rich and powerful for its own defense.  Examining the 
thought of our five leaders on domestic politics through this concept, we see that in their 
thought on political change, the overarching goal was to make Japan powerful enough to 
avoid colonization by the West.  Any change in the political system in Japan, whether in 
its political values, institutions, or the state, must support that end.  All five leaders were 
nationalistic and uniform in their support for strengthening Japan for that purpose, but 
varied on what degrees and types of change were needed to accomplish it.  Yamagata 





                                                
867 See footnotes earlier this chapter on fukoku kyôhei.  Yamagata desired to strengthen the military so that 
Japan could be effectively defended against Western encroachment.  We may assume that he also 
supported strengthening industries in Japan for that goal. 
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Cognition Issues. Image. Next I will examine domestic political worldviews 
(1850-1895) through analytical frameworks of cognition.868 Here images869 of Western 
governments as modern, superior, strong and forceful/invasive, and of Japan’s 
government as inferior, weak, stagnant and passive, predominate.  The image of Western 
governments’ strength in modern science and technology, and Japan’s weakness in those 
areas, is related.  The Tokugawa Shogunate is seen as weak and stagnant.  The varied 
images of the Meiji government generally support that regime.  As it became more 
powerful and achieved more foreign policy victories (i.e. the Sino-Japanese War, 1895), 
its image in the minds of these leaders (1850-1895) improved.870  Despite areas of 
stagnancy, honorable parts of Japan’s domestic political system (i.e. the emperor) may be 
“saved,” if relevant political institutions and values from abroad (i.e., constitutions, 
freedoms, and constitutional monarchy) can be carefully adapted and applied to Japan’s 
context.  The Japanese state is weak, in need of strengthening.871  On human rights, these 
leaders’ images varied.  More “liberal” leaders (Mori and Fukuzawa) saw them as helpful 
for strengthening Japan, while more “conservative” leaders (Kato, Ito, and Yamagata) 
                                                
868 For a discussion of the overall frameworks into which these images and worldviews fit, see my 
discussion below of the global phenomena connected with these worldviews, in the section on the cultural 
logics behind these worldviews.   
869 Throughout the dissertation, here are the questions I will ask as I consider what the leaders’ images of 
the topic under study are: what kind of images do leaders have of the basic variables under study?  Into 
what larger frameworks do they fit?  How do they function as perceptual filters or organizing devices?  I 
will examine images as both basic perception and perceptual filter, and seek to understand their larger 
frameworks.  
870 On the foreign policy point, an exception is Mori, who died in 1889. 
871 The main question in the minds of the five leaders (1850-1895) was what could be done to strengthen 
the Japanese state.  They varied in their answers, both in the particular elements to be strengthened, and in 
the values needed for the purpose. 
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saw them as a threat to its unity.  All believed they must be carefully and gradually 
applied to Japan’s context.872 
 How did these images function as perceptual filters for the five leaders, and 
affect Japan’s domestic politics?  Images of Japan as weak and the West as strong foreign 
threat must have blinded Japan’s leaders in certain ways, and led them to make certain 
policy choices. In the view of Japan’s leaders, if Japan did not respond rapidly and 
aggressively, it would not survive.  Their chosen images in this period led the nation 
toward increased political centralization, rapid growth in the economic and technological 
sectors to support the military, and soon, Japan’s own involvement in foreign wars and 
colonization.873  
 Worldview. Based on my own definition of worldview and the above images, I 
will now construct the predominant worldview(s) about domestic politics of our five 
leaders.874 About the nature of the world and how it works, our five leaders believe that 
the most powerful countries, presently the West, drive the world.  Strength in science and 
technology will enable military power, which will make a country strong, wealthy and 
successful.  Countries that are weak in science, technology and military power will be 
                                                
872 The more conservative they were, the more cautious these leaders were about the direct application of 
Western political reforms to Japan.  Virtually all of the five, Mori to the least degree, shared this caution. 
873 Consider Gandhi in India, and how powerfully he helped India to resist British imperialism.  What if a 
“Gandhi” like figure who emphasized peace and non-aggression had risen in Japan at this time?  What if 
Japan’s leaders had emphasized images of non-violence, non-aggression, peace, or strict neutrality, which 
they often stressed in the late twentieth century?  How would Japan’s political path and development have 
changed? 
874 Here are the steps I will follow as I construct worldviews (cognitive frameworks) for this research: after 
identifying the basic images about the selected topic, I will note aspects of images that identify beliefs 
about the nature of the world, how it works, its order (how it is organized), views of the self (the self’s 
actions, beliefs and roles) and views of the non-self/others (non-selves’ actions, beliefs, and roles).  Next I 
will organize the images into a coherent framework or whole (perhaps a diagram), look at how the 
environment and worldviews affect each other, influences on the actors’ perceptions, uses of information 
and understandings of events and their causes, and any impacts from technological systems.  
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weak, poor and conquered by stronger ones.  Our leaders do not agree on which political 
values will make a country strong (liberal or authoritarian ones).  The militarily and 
technologically powerful countries, now the West, drive the world’s political order, and 
decide the rules of international trade, war and diplomacy.  Japan, its government and 
other Asian nations (the “East” or “non-West”) are stagnant, weak, and poor in science.  
Japan is capable of learning knowledge from the powerful West, and growing strong.  
Non-self (others, including the West and other Eastern countries) is strong, scientific and 
modern in the West, and stagnant, unscientific, and too philosophical in the East.875  
 Our five viewers/actors see Japan’s surrounding environment as hostile and 
unfavorable.  If action is not taken, Japan will be conquered.  This environment, 
dominated by the scientifically powerful West, threatens to engulf and dominate Japan’s 
politics and culture.  This environment causes our leaders to see Japan as inferior in some 
ways, though they love it, believe in it, and will fight for it.  This environment makes 
them rely on scientific information and technologies from the West, and doubt aspects of 
Eastern knowledge and traditions.  
 This worldview supports the evolutionary thought predominant in the nineteenth 
century Western world, and in the cultural universe beyond which is under its influence.  
In this worldview, our five leaders tend to explain political events through evolutionary, 
“scientific” explanations of military and technological power.  Political values that 
support that strength, whether liberal or authoritarian, are superior.  Western 
technologies, both military and consumer-oriented, powerfully impress these leaders.  
                                                
875 Non-self means relevant worldviews Japanese hold of others besides themselves, in this case Western 
and other Eastern (East, South, and Southeast Asian) countries.  
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Militarily stronger nations will stay independent.  Consumer technologies and 
conveniences will bring health, wealth, and comfort to a nation’s citizens.  
 Cultural Logics. Regarding cultural logics behind these worldviews of the 
domestic state and politics,876 the relevant global phenomena about which our five 
leaders held worldviews and to which they reacted were political ideas, values and 
institutions from the West, including ideas about politics and government, governmental 
institutions, nations, states, human rights, what the West was, how these ideas applied to 
Japan, and how Japan’s political conditions compared with the West’s.  Related issues 
included scientific and technological ideas, military issues, and ideas behind Western 
politics, such as democracy, authoritarianism, and Christianity.  At the beginning of this 
era, when Commodore Perry’s “black ships” arrived to open Japan in 1853, a strong, 
overt manifestation of Western power appeared on Japan’s doorstep.877  Assumptions of 
Confucian harmony and the superiority of Eastern and Chinese ethics and philosophy, 
long questioned by some, defended by others, faced a challenge long anticipated by 
leading Japanese thinkers.878  The cultural logics behind the powerful nineteenth century 
Western system, including ideas of evolution, scientific rationalism, political liberalism, 
constitutional monarchy, and political authoritarianism, suddenly had great appeal among 
Japan’s leaders.  
                                                
876 Here are the steps I will use to identify cultural logics in this and other chapters: 1) What are the global 
phenomena relevant to the topic under consideration, about which the Japanese leaders hold a worldview, 
and to which they are reacting? 2) Try to identify the underlying cultural logics under the particular 
worldviews about the relevant global phenomena and under their responses to the relevant global 
phenomena (mention what the general responses were). 3) Compare the cultural logics under the 
worldviews and under their responses to the global phenomena.  
877 This is what Japanese called the ships of the U.S. Navy, sent by the U.S. government and led by 
Commodore Matthew Perry, when they arrived off the coast of Japan to force open the country in 1853. 
878 In the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, in the thought of Fukuzawa, Japan’s weaknesses in 
politics, science and technology were due to its reliance on “passive,” “stagnant” Chinese ethics and 
Confucian philosophy, which he saw as weak and unscientific [quotation marks added]. 
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 The cultural logics under these worldviews on domestic politics (identified 
above) in Japan (1850-1895) were more materialistic, and less spiritual.  It was assumed 
that the powerful rule and control the world, and that wealth, power, technology, military 
capability and knowledge make a country or people strong and successful.  Without 
these, a nation was weak. Underlying the desire for power was the desire for Japan to 
continue its independence, not as a colony controlled by outsiders.  Fukuzawa and Mori 
were not just concerned with overt manifestations of politics and power, but with the 
supportive culture or spirit surrounding them.  Mere blind copying of Western institutions 
and technologies would fail.  In their considerations about the “spirit” behind Western 
technology and wealth, they identified democratic freedoms, scientific inquiry, and in the 
case of Mori, religious/Christian values.  But the overall emphasis of the five leaders was 
more on the material side.  
 Countries and cultures like China or India that placed more emphasis on ethics 
and philosophy were weak, antiquated, unable to respond to modernity, and became 
colonies of aggressor nations.  If Japan did not want to be a colony, it must learn from the 
powerful West, carefully import and apply its political systems, and become strong.  
Practical, “scientific” political knowledge and ideas (democratic or authoritarian) that 
could make a country more powerful were better than “impractical” ideas that could not 
(i.e. Confucian philosophy or Buddhism).  The value of ideas was their practicality and 
power, not simply their truth or philosophical strength.  
 Despite Japan’s present weakness, there was a pride and love for the country, its 
culture, and beauty.  While it might be necessary to import political and other phenomena 
to “save” Japan from outside control, it must be done so carefully, or the heart of Japan 
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might be destroyed.   Despite Japan’s weakness, there was a belief that it could rise to 
this challenge.  Its people could learn from the West, as they learned from China for 
centuries, and make Japan stronger.  
 Japan was now the only Asian nation that could do this effectively.  It must help 
other Asian countries do this.  Because other Asian countries were weak, they were 
inferior.  The assumption of power applied to general international relations saw them as 
hostile. If Japan did not strengthen its internal political and other systems, it would be 
conquered, even by other hostile Asian powers.  This was the supreme motivator driving 
the intense push for domestic reforms in politics and similar areas in this period in Japan.   
 Japan’s responses to the global phenomena mentioned a few paragraphs above 
were to seek to import relevant areas of knowledge about political values and institutions 
from the West to strengthen itself against invasion and colonization.  By the end of this 
period, Japan embarked on huge political reforms within its society, including the 
importation of many Western political values and institutions.  In this importation, Japan 
was highly selective in what it brought in, and sought to strengthen certain “indigenous” 
political institutions, such as the emperor system.  The cultural logics behind these 
responses were that if Japan did not import the needed areas of knowledge, it would 
remain weak, be invaded and conquered.  Actual political reforms must follow; imported 
knowledge was not enough.  If Japan was not careful, the imported knowledge could 
destroy it.  Internal reforms to strengthen indigenous values and institutions were also 
necessary.  
 If we compare the cultural logics under the worldviews about the relevant 
global phenomena identified above, the most obvious comparison is between the ideas 
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underlying Western power and aggression against Japan and other Eastern countries, and 
the Confucian ideas so long influential in East Asia’s cultural universe.  Beyond their 
power as ideas, these Western ideologies seemed overtly powerful in the real world.  The 
fact that the Western powers were able to defeat China and other Eastern powers hinted 
at their ideas’ “superiority,” despite the fact that Confucian ideas had created the most 
populous, stable, and wealthiest society on earth (China) through the late eighteenth 
century.879  While there was obviously power and philosophical depth in Confucian ideas, 
despite their influence and success throughout East Asia for several millennia, Qing 
China was in serious decline.880 In the eyes of many Japanese reformers, “Eastern” 
worldviews and their supportive systems seemed incapable of matching the powerful 
West.  At the very least, new Western ideas must somehow be combined with the 
Confucian traditions of the East. 
 Probably the emphasis of material values over non-material ones in these 
cultural logics was unavoidable, given the West’s aggressive behavior and the powerful 
success of Western military technologies against China and other Asian countries.  In 
these worldviews about domestic politics (1850-1895) and their underlying cultural 
logics, we see a pragmatic, utilitarian emphasis on whatever would prove useful for 
“saving” Japan from being controlled by others.  Fukuzawa and Mori wisely understood 
that the “spirit” behind these ideas, institutions and technologies must also be 
comprehended and “mastered.”  If not, reforms could fail, and Japanese society be 
                                                
879 This claim was made by Leonard Humphreys, professor of East Asian history at the University of the 
Pacific in the 1970s and 1980s. 




engulfed, externally and internally.  The reform drive to match and repel the West would 
greatly alter “surface elements” of domestic Japanese political institutions and other 
societal features.  But it appears that many core elements and values proved extremely 
enduring. 
 The preference of the five Japanese leaders (1850-1895) was also for countries 
that could make Japan powerful and wealthy.  Because China, Korea and other Asian 
cultures were now weak, they were “inferior.”  If Japan could successfully modernize and 
repel the West, it would be “superior” to the other weak Eastern cultures.  It is interesting 
to compare the varied reactions of various East Asian cultures to the encroachment of the 
West, and how quickly Japan turned on its Eastern neighbors to make itself strong.881  As 
we will see later, from the very beginning of the Meiji era, Japan turned its eyes to its 
“weak” Eastern neighbors.  Certain leaders and forces in Japan soon expressed an interest 
in Japan’s involvement in those places.  A natural love for their own country and culture 
soon evolved into a perverse sense of “superiority” over other East Asian regions that 
would justify Japan’s involvement in their affairs.882  This sense of “superiority” partly 
came from Japan’s victories over China at the end of this era (1895), and additional 
victories (over Russia, 1905, and Korea, formally colonized in 1910), which followed. 
                                                
881 The reactions of such nations as Japan, Korea, China, Thailand, Burma, Vietnam and others were quite 
varied.  Most of these nations, except Japan and Thailand, became colonies of the West, to varying degrees.   
882 Most cultures possess a sense of ethnocentric pride over all other cultures, since any culture’s members 
will tend to naturally prefer their own worldviews and ways of life, which seem most natural to the 
culture’s members.  But we must also not forget that Japan was not the only country to respond 
aggressively to other world regions in this period.  Virtually every Western country that was able to also 
did so.  Were these reactions due to the influence of powerful evolutionary thought, or more due to human 
greed?  It seems doubtful that Japanese ethnocentrism, which may have helped to inspire Japanese 
aggression in Asia to some extent, was any more perverse than Western ethnocentrisms and racisms that 
inspired similar adventures in other regions. 
258 
 
 If Japan did not import the political knowledge it needed, it was assumed that it 
would remain weak, and could be destroyed.  If it did not do the reform process well, or 
if key elements of existing institutions were damaged in the process, it might also be 
destroyed.  Internal, appropriate reform was very important.  The nation faced dangers 
from both within and without.   
Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Market Contexts 
 
 Fukuzawa Yukichi.  In the 1840s and 1850s, Fukuzawa observed the rise of 
increasing trade and manufacturing among the townsmen (chônin) and members of his 
lower samurai class.883  On his journeys to the West, Fukuzawa bought back many 
English language books, and used many to write best-selling books, some on economics, 
which introduced a wide Japanese audience to modern economic and business practices 
and thought.884  His books and his translation works earned him a very large income, and 
his economic accomplishments were many.885  Fukuzawa Yukichi came to believe that 
economics was the highest subject every Japanese student should learn, since it explained 
the necessities of daily life (production, exchange, and distribution), applicable to a state 
                                                
883 Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 8. 
884 Fukuzawa’s first two books on economics were Minkan keizai roku (People’s Economics, 1877) and 
Tsuka ron (A Theory of Currency, 1878).  In the first book, he explained the basic functions of a modern 
(Western) economy in simple terms that even literate school children could understand (Ibid., 110).  His 
Bookkeeping (1873) introduced modern business practice, bookkeeping and statements of finance in 
modern joint stock companies to Japan (Ibid., 92).    
885 Ibid., xxiii-xxv. Fukuzawa became one of Japan’s wealthiest businessmen.  Among his 
accomplishments were the founding of the Yokohama Specie Bank (1880), to attract gold and silver to 
Japan (Fukuzawa supported paper currency, backed by gold and silver).  This aided the government in 
establishing the central bank, the Bank of Japan (1882), and achieving a stable currency.  Fukuzawa started 
his own businesses, including a publishing firm that became the Maruzen bookstore chain, and the Jiji 
Shimpo, a major, national newspaper for fifty years.  Maruzen used methods of western accountancy and 
modern management far ahead of other Japanese economic organizations. Fukuzawa advised two of 
Japan’s future great zaibatsu (financial and corporate combines), Mitsubishi and Mitsui.  He founded Keio 
University, which educated most of Japan’s early business elite, contributing much to Japan’s economic 
development (Ibid., xxiii, 103, 111-112).  Keio graduates became top leaders in many of Japan’s leading 
private firms (Ibid., 135-136, 170).  Finally, Fukuzawa introduced the idea of life insurance in Guided Tour 
of the West (Seiyô Tabi Annai, 1868), also a pioneering work on money and banking (Ibid., 62, 128).  
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or household.  If effectively mastered, Japan could become rich.  He believed his Keio 
College would play a role, and it did.886  He also believed that modern businessmen were 
a necessity for Japan.  They needed to receive a proper education, learn English, read the 
news, and have broad knowledge and good character.  His motto “Learn and earn, earn 
and learn” freed both himself and his students from the Confucian scorn for business, to 
be productive, and initiated Japan’s modern business elite.887      
 Ito Hirobumi.  While Ito’s major areas of action were Japan’s domestic politics 
and foreign relations, he was briefly involved in national economic policy.888  Like 
politics, it seems Ito believed economic lessons from the West must also be carefully 
applied.  His birth in southwestern Japan and his study in London in the 1860s exposed 
him to the power of Western politics, economics, and culture.889  These events influenced 
his willingness to learn from the West in those areas.  On domestic economic issues, he 
was happy to glean lessons from the West deemed relevant for and applicable to Japan’s 
situation.  He saw Japan as economically and technologically inferior to the West, and 
acknowledged Japan’s need to learn as much as possible.  Since he worked in the public 
sector throughout his career, likely most of his economic thought emphasized the public, 
rather than the private, sector.890  Based on his national policy actions that affected the 
economy, it seems he believed that government intervention in the economy was 
                                                
886 Ibid., 83. 
887 Ibid., xxv-xxvi, 171-172. 
888 Many of these comments are implied, because I did not find much explicit commentary on Ito’s views 
of economics.   
889 Ito was born in the feudal domain of Choshu (present-day Yamaguchi prefecture) at the western end of 
the island of Honshu. 
890 I do not have enough data to surmise Ito’s thoughts about the private sector and business. 
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important for national prosperity and survival.891  Given his generally conservative 
political views, which permitted only gradual democratic rights for citizens, it is likely 
that he took a cautious view of labor rights.  Due to his support of the autocratic Prussian 
system as the best governmental model for Japan, Ito supported principles of strong state 
economic intervention, rather than laissez-faire capitalism with minimal intervention.  On 
the major economic ideologies of the Meiji period, from this analysis, it seems Ito’s 
economic thought strongly supported the ideology of fukoku kyôhei, and was generally 
supportive of shokusan kôgyô.892  His conservative political views suggest that he viewed 
the economy as one of the main pillars of Japan’s modernization process, though not the 
only one.  On the economy’s social role, clearly Japanese society also needed to be 
connected to and supportive of important, more frontline political and economic changes.  
In the Constitution of 1889, Ito’s use of patriotic, emotive expressions and images was 
meant to shore up popular and political support, throughout society, for the state’s 
political and economic reform efforts.893  Ideologically, Ito’s approach in the Constitution 
is conservative, appealing to “traditional” images drawn from important Shinto legends 
and Japanese folklore about the people’s relationship to and descent from the imperial 
line.         
 What do the language and expressions used in the Constitution of 1889 (the 
Meiji Constitution) and related documents reveal about Ito’s attitudes about economic 
                                                
891 For more details on Ito’s policy actions affecting Japan’s economy in this period, see the later discussion 
(in Chapter 10) on the policy effects of leaders’ worldviews on Japan’s domestic market (1850-1895). 
892 The point about Ito’s view of shokusan kôgyô is implied. 




matters in the public arena?  What economic principles are revealed?894  In the 
Constitution, Ito employed very emotional, patriotic language and principles designed to 
promote political and economic strengthening of the state.895  Through the Constitution, 
he allowed the Emperor and the Imperial Government, not just the Diet, to have great 
power over decisions on public finance.896  The content of the Constitution does not 
reveal Ito’s thought about specific economic doctrines or policies affecting the private 
sector, but it shows that his general thought on economic matters in the public sphere was 
fairly conservative,897 given the great power of the Emperor and closely related political 
                                                
894 These documents are the Imperial Oath Sworn in the Sanctuary of the Imperial Palace (Tsuge-bumi), 
sworn at the promulgation of the Constitution of 1889, and the Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of 
the Constitution (of 1889).  Both of these, and the English translation of the Constitution of 1889 and its 
Preamble, I took from 1889 Japanese Constitution, “The Constitution of the History of Japan”; from 
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/1889con.html; accessed 13 May 2007, all excerpted from Hirobumi Ito and 
Miyoji Ito, Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Tokyo: Igirisu-Horitsu Gakko, 1889.  
All quotations and data in this section (about the Constitution of 1889 and related documents) are taken 
from these sources.  
895 From documents related to the Constitution of 1889 and the Constitution itself, there are official views 
supporting the prosperity of the throne, Japan’s “…ancient form of government,” and the stability, 
prosperity and welfare of the country, through the promulgation of the Constitution, and the Imperial House 
Law. The Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of the Constitution expresses the conservative, patriotic 
desire that the nation’s subjects, descended from their “Imperial Ancestors,” will desire to “secure forever” 
the glory of Japan, “both at home and abroad,” and the “stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our 
Imperial Ancestors.”  The Preamble (Joyu) of the Constitution states the desire that Japan’s constitution 
and laws should promote the “welfare,” moral and intellectual development, and “security of the rights and 
of the property of Our people,” using quite emotive, patriotic language, even in English translation. Such 
expressions include “having, by virtue of Our Ancestors, ascended the throne of a lineal succession 
unbroken for ages eternal…” and “…Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favored with the 
benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors….” (Japanese Constitution; Ito and Ito, 
Commentaries on Constitution).  
896 Issues of public finance, including taxation, expenditures, revenue, and the national budget, were 
covered in Chapter VI of the Constitution.  The Diet had primary responsibility for approving the budget 
and major expenditures.  The Imperial Government and the Emperor had extraordinary power over the 
budget and other financial matters.  All the Diet’s decisions also required the Government’s concurrence.  
The former two actors could also enact imperial ordinances on financial matters when the Diet was not in 
session.  The Government also was to submit the annual accounting of the state’s expenditures and 
revenues. 
897 The thinking of most of Japan’s top-level national policymakers during this period could also be called 
conservative, so Ito was not abnormal in this quality. 
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groups to issue various economic decisions and to intervene in economic matters of the 
state.898      
 Kato Hiroyuki.  Kato’s views of economics were influenced by evolutionary 
ideologies, including German Social Darwinism, which greatly affected his mature 
thought on all aspects of science.899  His economic thought was slightly affected by racist 
overtones from evolution, common in this era.  Globally, Social Darwinism was strongly 
connected with certain forms of racist ideology, and had some effect on thinkers in Japan.  
One controversy was how soon Japan should allow “mixed residence” (foreigners of 
different races to live in its cities).  In 1893, Kato worried that implementing mixed 
residence too quickly in Japan might overwhelm the “inferior” Japanese by economic 
competition with “superior” Caucasians, and Chinese working for lower wages.900  We 
can likely surmise that Kato’s views of economics were generally conservative, like his 
                                                
898 The Constitution calls the Emperor the sovereign head of the Empire.  He exercised certain legislative 
powers in concert with the Imperial Diet and the Constitution, such as promoting laws (their passage and 
execution).  He could issue emergency ordinances when the Diet was not in session (subject to later Diet 
approval), and regular ordinances to aid the execution of existing laws, for “…the welfare of the subjects,” 
on economic and other matters.  The power to issue laws gave the Imperial government and the Emperor 
enormous power over policies governing the economy and other areas.  Additional political groups closely 
connected to the Emperor had a significant role in lawmaking on economic and other policies.  Ministers of 
State were constitutionally required to advise the Emperor, and one of them had to countersign all laws, 
imperial ordinances and rescripts.  The Emperor could also involve his Privy Council, or group of senior 
state advisors, whenever he wished (this happened frequently, at least during Hirohito’s reign before 1945).  
The close ties of both of these groups with the Emperor increased his influence over economic and other 
policy areas even more.  Other political actors could also play an economic role.  The emperor’s subjects 
were legally required to pay taxes, but protected from arbitrary, extra-legal household searches or entry.  
Their right to hold private property was inviolable.  The Diet had to approve all laws, including those on 
economic matters, submitted by the Imperial government or the Emperor, and could pass its own laws.  The 
Judiciary could also become involved in economic matters.  Among other possibilities, according to Article 
60, a special court dealing with economic or other issues might be convened, if needed.    
899 From my major sources on Kato, I did not obtain much data on his thought on economic matters, even 
though he served for a time in the Ministry of Finance. 
900 Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 244. 
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political views.901  He saw Japan’s economy as inferior to the West’s, and believed that 
Japan needed to learn from it.  There were racist overtones here also.  He saw Caucasians 
as economically superior to Japanese, and the Chinese as economic inferiors.  Due to 
Kato’s in-depth study of German language and thought, and his mature conservative 
politics, it is likely he supported strong state intervention in the economy.902  Given his 
evolutionary views, he supported the ideologies of fukoku kyôhei and shokusan kôgyô, 
which both argued that Japan must be rich and strong to survive.  Likely in Kato’s mind, 
Japanese society must support these goals too.       
Comparison of Worldviews on the Domestic Market (1850-1895)   
 
 I found varying amounts of data on the economic thought of the three leaders 
considered here.903  Both Fukuzawa and Ito were born in southwestern Japan, which 
increased their early exposure to Western ideas.  All three leaders had extensive exposure 
to, and influence from, Western knowledge.904  All seemingly believed that Japan could 
learn valuable economic lessons from the West, like lessons in politics. Different from 
Fukuzawa, the impact of Ito’s views on the domestic economy occurred early in his 
career (in the 1870s), mainly in the public sector.905  Given Ito’s lifelong involvement in 
the public sector, it seems his economic thought emphasized government policy’s role in 
                                                
901 Given the conservative nature of his political thought, we might assume that his economic beliefs were 
also conservative, but I am uncertain. 
902 This point is implied.  I found no data on Kato’s views of industry, the private sector, business, 
employment, labor or management issues.    
903 I found the most data on Fukuzawa.  Data on Ito is quite a bit less, as was the case with Kato. 
904 Kato also had exposure to Western knowledge through brief study at a Dutch studies school, but did not 
began studying the German language until early in his adult career.  
905 In Fukuzawa’s case, his involvement and reflection on economic matters occurred throughout his career, 
primarily concerning the private sector.  
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the economy, not the private sector’s role in it.906  Similarly, Kato’s lifelong career 
remained in the public sector.907  All three leaders believed that Japan must learn much 
from the technologically and economically superior West.  Their economic views saw 
Japan’s economic development as inferior to the West’s.  They believed that Japan must 
learn and grow from that superior model, somewhat as it had learned from its “more 
advanced” Chinese model throughout its earlier history.  The economic thought of all 
three was affected somewhat by evolutionary principles, Kato’s the most strongly.  
Above I noted the evolutionary, racist overtones that emerged in Kato’s brief comments 
on economics.  Ito and Kato drew many lessons from Germany, and were more 
politically conservative than Fukuzawa.908  Ito was also aware of more liberal political 
and economic systems in the United States and Great Britain.  Perhaps both his and 
Kato’s thought supported state economic intervention more than Fukuzawa’s.  
Fukuzawa’s views of economics and Japanese nationalism highly supported the 
ideologies of fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong army), and likely shokusan kôgyô 
(“increase production and encourage management”).  The Meiji government used the 
latter to encourage Japanese industries to pursue the former ideological goal.909  It seems 
both Ito’s and Kato’s thought also supported these ideologies.  The three leaders’ views 
of the role of economics in society varied slightly.  Fukuzawa emphasized the role of 
                                                
906 Given his views supportive of a strong state modeled on the Prussian system, it seems Ito would also 
have supported the state’s encouragement of public industries before the private sector was able to develop 
them.  This became actual Meiji government policy.  See my earlier comments on Ito’s likely views on 
government economic policy in the section on worldviews of the domestic market (1850-1895).   
907 I found no evidence that Kato’s economic views had any impact in either the public or private sectors. 
908 In Ito’s case, the main lessons emerged from Prussia’s authoritarian political system.  In Kato’s case, the 
lessons came from studying the thought of leading German intellectuals, the arguments of German Social 
Darwinism, and the generally conservative worldview of German leaders at the time.   
909 Japan, “Shokusan Kôgyô,” 1409. 
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economics in the private sector, while Ito and Kato focused more on the public sector.910  
While not acknowledged by most Japanese, the impact of Fukuzawa’s thought on the 
economy, especially the private sector, was large.911  
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on the Domestic Market (1850-1895) 
 
 Development Issues. To assess the development aspects of these domestic 
market worldviews, I will again use the analytical concepts of “modernization” and 
translative adaptation.  As with other domestic features of Japan (1850-1895), the concept 
of “modernization” is highly relevant to the domestic economy, since it assesses how a 
“peripheral” economy like Japan’s was absorbed by “core” Western economies into the 
global system, and how that process affected core Japanese cultural features and 
values.912  Did core features of the domestic economy remain intact during this period?913  
In their domestic market worldviews, Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato supported the ideas of 
“modernization.”  All three saw Japan’s economy as inferior, admitted Japan’s need to 
learn from the West in multiple areas, including economics, to prevent invasion,914 and 
                                                
910 Ito clearly believed that to survive, Japanese society must support economic reforms.  His patriotic 
language in the Constitution encouraged social and political support for these efforts.  Given Kato’s 
evolutionary views, it is likely that he thought that Japan must become strong and rich to survive, and that 
economics was key to make this happen. 
911 As I note elsewhere, most Japanese remember Fukuzawa for his extensive writings on Western 
civilization.  Yet he believed that economic development, growth and business had a vital role in the well-
being of the nation.  His efforts in his writings, private business and economic education helped strengthen 
the role of economics and business in Japan’s daily and national life. 
912 As noted elsewhere, the assumption in the “modernization” concept of Japanese scholars is that the 
“core” cultural features of the receiving society will remain intact, although its overall, outward form may 
become very Westernized. 
913 While the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato supported the ideas of “modernization,” they do not 
answer the question of whether core features of the economy remained intact at the end of this period.  The 
changes in Japan’s economy during this period and subsequent decades were enormous, and it was virtually 
totally destroyed at the end of World War II, but the question of what core features of the economy endured 
is not answered here.  
914 Ito’s conservative views in the Constitution of 1889 all advocated the building up of the Japanese polity, 
economy, and society to prevent invasion. 
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none of them wanted its cultural core destroyed. In Kato’s case as well,915 we see 
advocacy for empowering Japan on multiple levels, so it could evolve into a strong state 
that could not be invaded.916  While Japan might develop some of the outward trappings 
of the Western economies, clearly to Kato its cultural “core” and “indigenous 
‘traditions’” must not be destroyed.  While Japan might change greatly on the surface by 
importing Western business practices, a modern constitution, and conservative policies 
for public finance and government involvement in the economy, these leaders did not 
want to see their society destroyed.  All their work meant to assure its survival. 
 In their domestic market worldviews, all three of these leaders supported the 
ideals of translative adaptation, that in Japan’s economic development, there must be 
compatibility between its indigenous institutions and values, and the imported 
organizational structures and technologies.  In the process of economic development in 
Japan (1850-1895), was its base society destroyed, or did it continue intact, though 
altered?  While I cannot examine this issue in detail, as I argue earlier in this chapter, 
while many features of Japanese society underwent traumatic alterations in this era, many 
deep “traditions” and values were not destroyed, but proved essentially enduring.  Did the 
worldviews of Fukuzawa, Ito, or Kato on the domestic economy help destroy core 
elements of Japanese culture?  I do not believe that they did, but that of these three 
                                                
915 In addition to the evolutionary, racist overtones of Kato’s economic thought (noted above), in Chapter 3 
I also noted Kato’s support for nationalistic spiritual values, associated with Shinto, as patriotic and useful 
for strengthening Japan. 
916 This is most strongly expressed in Kato’s thought, but also in Fukuzawa’s and Ito’s, who both implicitly 
argued for evolutionary, progressive development for Japan.  I am tempted to assert that these evolutionary 
views hint at the economic development principles of W.W. Rostow in the early 1960s.  He wrote that there 
are necessary, specific, sequential steps in path of economic development for every developing society.  
The three Japanese leaders here did not specify what the steps are, but their thought supported the general 
idea of evolutionary progress in economic development, as did Rostow’s. 
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leaders, the deepest, broadest, and most direct impacts on Japan’s economy area occurred 
through the actions of Fukuzawa.917  They changed the attitudes of everyday Japanese 
about business and how it should be done.918  Fukuzawa’s powerful, positive portrayals 
of the West encouraged Japanese to engage the economic and technological challenges it 
presented with thrift, hard work, and eager learning, rather than fear and xenophobic 
defensiveness.919  These are the same basic values Japan positively engaged in its 
reaction to cultural input from the Asian mainland at many points in its earlier history. 
Fukuzawa’s contribution to modern Japan’s business culture has had a very positive, 
long-term impact on the development of Japanese business and economics, up to the 
present, consonant with many positive values long associated with business and hard 
work in Japan.920  In Meiji Japan, Fukuzawa also helped to weaken the widespread 
Confucian scorn for merchants and entrepreneurialism long influential in Tokugawa 
Japan. 
 Technology Issues. To analyze the technological aspects of the three leaders’ 
worldviews on the domestic market, I will use the concepts of industrial policy, 
technology as defined by Glick, and technonationalism as ideology.921  Thomas Glick’s 
                                                
917 These actions included Fukuzawa’s writings, his founding of Keio University, and his entrepreneurial 
activities. 
918 Fukuzawa’s ideas about Western business practices were not necessarily contrary to many of the 
previous ideas about business practice commonly used by merchants in Tokugawa Japan.  But the Western 
ideas included many practical insights about how to do business even more efficiently, and about how to do 
it in a modern world economy dominated by the West.  
919 These last two values were certainly strong in the reaction of the Tokugawa government to the outside 
world during the period of national isolation. 
920 An interesting question is to what degree these “positive” economic values may have also affected 
Japan’s later policies for ODA (Official Development Assistance) and technical aid for developing 
countries.   
921 Since industrial policy is chiefly policy-oriented issue, I include my comments on how these leaders’ 
domestic market worldviews reflect industrial policy later in Chapter 10, which treats the policy 
implications of the leaders’ worldviews on the various domestic and international issues. 
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definition of technology is relevant.922  How does his thinking relate to the worldviews of 
the leaders here? On his journeys to the West, Fukuzawa observed interaction with 
technology and Western knowledge in daily life in his hometown, in the United States, 
Britain and elsewhere.  In these contexts, he saw the power of modern economics to 
improve the lives of average citizens, and to empower entire societies.  These 
observations had a powerful impact on his worldviews.  He wrote about economics in 
many of his writings, and economics was one of his chief inspirations for founding Keio 
University.  Through his writings and professional efforts related to economics, 
Fukuzawa had a large influence on the business culture of Japan, and on the use of 
modern business practices in daily Japanese life.  Ito’s involvement with economics was 
at the national level, and mostly indirect, in his encouragement of popular support for 
public reform efforts in economics and politics, through language he used in the 
Constitution of 1889.  The economic thought of neither Ito nor Kato, the latter with 
evolutionary overtones, had much connection to economics or technology as systems 
operating in daily Japanese life.  But this was not the case with Fukuzawa.  
 Murakami’s concept of industrial policy means any form of government action 
or intervention in the economy, often involving technology. Fukuzawa is mainly 
concerned with how economics affects the private sector, while Ito and Kato’s concern is 
mainly for the public sector. Fukuzawa’s views are very nationalistic, supportive of 
enriching Japan, to help it resist the West. I am not sure if Fukuzawa would support much 
government action in the economy; he personally chose not to be so involved himself. Ito 
                                                
922 Glick notes how recent anthropologists study technology as a techno-economic or socio-technical 
system, through systems theory, looking at how human groups utilize tools to achieve social goals in daily 
living, often related to the organization of work (Glick, “Technology,” 466). 
269 
 
supported government intervention in the economy, in his brief involvement in national 
economic policy, and in what he wrote in the Constitution of 1889. Kato admired many 
things about Germany and Prussia. It is likely that he also supported their ideals of strong 
state economic intervention, but I am not positive. Of these three leaders, Ito’s support 
for some form of government economic intervention seems the most likely. 
 The concept of technonationalism as ideology is relevant if these domestic 
economy worldviews supported a strong role for technology in Japan’s national security, 
and the idea that technology had a key role in making Japan rich and strong.  Is this the 
case?  Fukuzawa strongly supported Japan’s successful mastery of modern economics as 
a chief tool, with technology, to make Japan rich and strong, to forestall Western 
invasion.  It seems Ito understood that both economics and technology had a key role to 
play in strengthening Japan against the West.  Given his support for a strong state role in 
the economy, he also seems supportive of technonationalism as ideology.923  There is no 
direct evidence that Kato supported technonationalism as ideology in his economic 
thought, although he clearly desired Japan’s survival, and was conservative in outlook.  
Of the three leaders here, Fukuzawa emerges as the leader most strongly supporting 
technonationalism as ideology.  
 Cognitive Issues. Image. To assess cognition aspects of these domestic market 
worldviews, I will again use aspects of the concepts of image, worldview, and cultural 
                                                
923 Earlier I noted Ito’s conviction that Japan could improve its international stature by absorbing the 
technologies of more advanced countries, and how he viewed Japan’s domestic development as taking 
precedence over foreign wars and adventures (Hamada, Prince Ito, 64-68).  In Ito’s thought, domestic well-
being must come first before international issues and entanglements.   
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logics.924 Regarding images of overall economics, Fukuzawa saw economic and 
entrepreneurial activities as helpful for the lives of local people.  He saw economics as 
the most preeminent science, the foundation of daily and national life, and beneficial for 
the whole nation.  To Ito, economics was one of the main pillars of Japan’s reform 
process, along with politics and law.  Kato’s mature views of economics were influenced 
by German Social Darwinism and evolution, had racist overtones, and were likely 
generally conservative.  The images of all three scholars of Japan’s economy saw it as 
inferior to the West’s.  Fukuzawa saw economic activity as important for Japan, and 
believed that without improved economic and technical knowledge, Japan would not 
survive.  This knowledge must be imported; both he and Ito believed Japan must learn 
appropriate economic lessons from the West.  In the racist overtones of Kato’s thought, 
Japanese emerged as economically and racially inferior to Westerners, and the Chinese as 
similarly inferior to Japanese.  To Fukuzawa and Ito, the Western economies were 
superior to Japan’s; the West was more economically dynamic.  Their early positive 
exposure to Western economic activities, in their hometowns, early educations, and 
through travel and study abroad, shaped their views of Western economies, making them 
willing to learn from the West in this area.  A hierarchical view of national economies 
suggests the influence of evolutionary thought on all three leaders, especially strong in 
Kato’s mature work.  Concerning their images of leading economic ideologies of that era, 
                                                
924 I will use the same basic aspects of these concepts that I use elsewhere in in Chapter 3 for worldviews of 
domestic society (1850-1895) and in Chapter 4 for worldviews of the domestic state (1850-1895).  The 
images of economics used include those of economic history, economics overall, of the Japanese economy, 
Western economies, government economic policy, private industry/the industrial sector; the private 
sector/business, of employment, labor, and management, of leading economic ideologies of the era, and the 
role of economics in society. For a discussion of the overall frameworks to which these images and 
worldviews belong, see my discussion below of the global phenomena connected with these worldviews, in 
the section on the cultural logics behind worldviews of the domestic market, 1850-1895. 
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all three leaders were politically conservative, and likely supported the ideals of fukoku 
kyôhei (rich nation, strong army) and shokusan kôgyô (“increase production and 
encourage management”).  Fukuzawa was especially strong in his support for economics 
and Japanese nationalism.   
 Concerning their images of the roles of economics in society, all three leaders 
saw economics as fundamental to Japan’s survival and flourishing.  Fukuzawa believed 
that economic development, growth and business activity had a vital role in the nation’s 
well-being.  His own efforts in his writings, private business and economic education 
contributed to strengthening the role of economics and business in Japan’s daily and 
national life.  Ito believed that Japanese society must support economic reforms needed 
for its survival.925  Kato believed that Japan must become strong and rich to survive; 
economics was one of the key ways for this to happen.926  
 On their images of the public and private sectors, on government economic 
policy, it seems all three leaders supported strong government intervention in the 
economy.  Fukuzawa supported appropriate government intervention in the economy, 
meaning positive encouragement, not over-involvement, in the private sector.  Sometimes 
the private sector could lead the public sector in encouraging economic development and 
growth.  Ito positively emphasized public sector involvement in the economy, not the 
private sector’s, and saw public economic intervention as important.  Ito and Kato were 
strongly influenced by German and Prussian thought, suggesting they likely supported 
                                                
925 His use of patriotic language in the Constitution of 1889 was meant to encourage social support for 
needed political and economic reforms. 
926 These conclusions about Kato’s views are implied. 
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strong state intervention in the economy.927  Fukuzawa had the strongest images of the 
private sector.   He saw private sector business and industry as the prime engine of 
national economic growth and development.  He believed, due to his personal experience, 
that through business, individuals could become successful, prosperous, and wealthy.  
This could promote the same for Japan.928  Fukuzawa was not afraid of monopolies 
(zaibatsu) or big business.  He believed both could contribute much to the growth of the 
nation.929 
 Fukuzawa offers the most extensive images on employment, management and 
labor.  He saw modern management principles as important for economic and business 
prosperity, and business education as paramount for creating and strengthening a modern 
business elite for Japan.  Efficient, hard-working, knowledgeable managers would be a 
key factor in the nation’s economic success.  Fukuzawa supported human rights, but was 
concerned that their rapid application could destabilize the nation.  His support for state 
rights and concern about emerging democratic movements likely made him wary of 
labor, that it might be disruptive to the nation’s economic health.  Ito likely took a dim 
view of labor rights, given his rather low view of democratic rights, which he supported 
granting only gradually, and his conservative political views.  Also given Kato’s 
conservative political views, it seems likely that all three of these leaders were 
conservative and not too supportive of labor rights in this era. 
                                                
927 In the Constitution of 1889, Ito allowed the Emperor and related political groups to have a high degree 
of involvement in many areas of public policy, including economic issues. 
928 This point, about national prosperity emerging from that of individual entrepreneurs, is implied. 
929 This last point is also implied from Fukuzawa’s actions. 
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 How did these images of the domestic economy (1850-1895) function as 
perceptual filters or organizing devices?  Economics is seen in these images as one of the 
most basic sciences and tools to enable Japan to survive in the modern world.930  If 
properly mastered, it can enrich Japan, and improve the daily lives of its subjects.  These 
economic images reinforce Meiji Japan’s sense of temporary inferiority to the West; 
economics is an additional arena of weakness.  Economic knowledge must be imported 
from the West, increasing Japan’s short-term dependency on the West.  In their views of 
economics’ role in society and in the public and private sectors, all three leaders support 
economics’ centrality for Japan’s survival and prosperity.  Their conservative political 
views led them to generally favor top-down solutions to economic issues.  While 
Fukuzawa argued for the importance of well-trained management and big conglomerates 
in the private sector, Ito and Kato seemingly favored strong public intervention in the 
marketplace.  This suggests that all three were wary of the potential of the labor 
movement to create political or economic instability.   
 These economic emphases also encouraged these leaders to reject “traditional” 
areas of knowledge not seen as crucial for Japan’s survival, including ethics, philosophy, 
religion, and Chinese studies.  Areas like culture, religion and education seemed very 
“uneconomic,” and were only valued insofar as they could be harnessed to enhance the 
nation’s survival.  These economic emphases also caused Japan to gravitate toward the 
Western world in its political and economic relations, and away from its “traditional” 
sources of such knowledge, namely China, Korea, and other “traditional” Eastern regions 
                                                
930 Additional tools of this sort, in the mind of these three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato) include 
modernized systems of politics, science and technology. 
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and societies.  Did the new focus of many of Japan’s leaders on Western-oriented 
politics, technology, economics, and military systems cause large-scale cultural upheaval 
or disorientation in Japanese society? I do not believe they did at this stage in modern 
Japan’s development.  In sum, I posit that the emphasis on economics in these images 
underlying these three leaders’ worldviews inevitably caused them to favor certain 
economic approaches to some degree in their thinking and policy actions, and to reject 
other possible approaches based more on “traditional” areas of knowledge. 
  Worldview. Based on the above images, what are primary elements of the 
worldviews of the domestic market for these three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato)?  
The nature of the world emerges as mainly economically driven—the international 
system, the national one, and daily life.  Without the proper goods, people cannot survive.  
With efficient economics, they can prosper greatly.  Economics are the lifeblood of any 
nation.  National economic systems compete, and must continually grow and evolve for 
their nations to survive.  Individual entrepreneurs compete within a nation’s economy. 
Whoever controls the world’s economic system controls the world.  Presently, that is the 
West, which sets the economic rules of the game.  If non-Western nations wish to 
survive, they must master economics and prosper. Many of these views seem highly 
influenced by evolutionism.   This econocentric worldview tended to deemphasize 
elements of the universe that are generally more non-material and non-economic, such as 
religion and spiritual values.931   
                                                
931 But I do not mean to deny the economic aspects of religious and spiritual practice, of which there are 
many.  Consider the sale of trinkets and amulets for the annual visits of millions of Japanese to local 
shrines and temples on New Year’s Eve, as they pray to welcome the new year.  Another example is the 
publication of religious books, literature and music in the United States. 
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  Western economic knowledge is crucial for Japan’s survival.932  Japan must 
strengthen economics on both the public and private levels; both are important for 
growth.  Japanese society must strongly support economic reforms.  As an autocratic, 
“traditional” society, to succeed economically, Japan must copy lessons from similar 
societies overseas (i.e. Germany).933  Economic lessons must be carefully applied for 
Japan to succeed.  If not, its stability may be destroyed.  Economics is central to most 
“productive” activity in Japan and the world, and to Japan’s reform efforts.  For Japan, 
economic inferiority also means national weakness and dishonor.  Japan must grow 
strong and rich to survive (Kato).  Economics has a crucial role in the nation’s health.  
For Japan to be strong, business and management must also be.  As individual 
entrepreneurs prosper, their success can be transferred to the national level.934  Japan 
must rise up and fight for itself economically, or it will be controlled or colonized by 
outsiders.  Both the public and private sectors in Japan have important roles in the 
economic growth process.  While the emerging business world will provide much of the 
energy for growth, government has a prime role in facilitating the process, in discerning 
the best lessons from abroad, focusing the nation’s attention on economic reforms, 
encouraging society’s support, and identifying the best policies to support major goals.  
Popular support throughout society is important.  Without it, public efforts may fail.  
Individuals must also prosper, for the benefit of the nation. 
                                                
932 Similar to this thought, Fukuzawa would argue that efficient Japanese managers must learn valuable 
lessons from efficient managers in the West (implied). 
933 This is the thought of Ito and Kato.   
934 These last two points are Fukuzawa’s thought. 
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  The West is superior to Japan in many areas, including economics and race.  
Germany has superior knowledge in various sectors; its model seems most suitable for 
Japan in politics and economics.935  Economies of “traditional” Asian powers, including 
China’s, are inferior to the West’s and to Japan’s, since Japan has a better capacity for 
reform.  The West’s superior economic knowledge must be imported for this purpose.  
Economics is central to explaining the West’s wealth, growth and superior evolution.936  
The Tokugawa and Meiji governments played a crucial role in the reform process and the 
importation of the West’s economic knowledge.  They were key mediators of how 
Japan’s domestic economy responded to foreign economies in this era, to a large degree, 
since they established overall policies for trade, currency exchange, and foreign 
investment overseas and domestically.  This is seen in the trade missions and the students 
sent abroad by several Japanese governments, both national and domainal, to learn 
business and economics, and in the foreign instructors imported to teach the same fields.  
Their policies favored economic knowledge from the West, not from Japan’s 
“traditional” Asian sources.  Earlier in this period, the government’s role was especially 
primary, as the private sector had not yet fully emerged in Japan. 
  The environments affecting these leaders’ (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato’s) domestic 
market worldviews included domestic and international elements.  Fukuzawa and Ito 
grew up in southwestern Japan, the region most open to trade with the West, and 
receiving the most direct Western economic influence in the late Tokugawa and early 
                                                
935 Both Ito and Kato support the points about Germany.  Kato also supports the idea of Western racial 
superiority.  In the late nineteenth century, Germany was perhaps Europe’s most advanced society, in terms 
of wealth, industrial development, level of literacy, education, cultural development and standard of living.  
These factors may have also strengthened its image as a powerful model for Japan.    
936 This point is implied from the thought of Fukuzawa. 
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Meiji eras.  It also received the most direct economic influence from Japan’s closest 
Asian neighbors, China and Korea.  Later in life, Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato moved to 
Tokyo, experiencing the growth and frenzy of entrepreneurialism there. The major focus 
of the last two was on the public arena, more on politics than economics.937  The 
international arena of these worldviews was also intense, including Japan’s need to 
improve its economy, compete with the West, and end unequal treaties imposed on Japan 
after reopening in 1859.  Another major issue was intellectual currents affecting global 
trade, such as economic liberalism and pressure for open markets.  Pressures for 
improved labor rights and factory conditions in major industrialized countries in this era 
soon hit Japan.938 
  How did these environments interact with and affect the actors’ worldviews on 
Japan’s domestic market?  The dynamism of Western economies, trade, and technology 
impressed all three leaders, making them feel that Japan must learn from the West, and 
that Japan was economically inferior.  Trade with other Asian nations was deemphasized.  
Economic growth was one of the main forces affecting Japan’s survival; so all sectors of 
society must focus on encouraging its success in this arena.  The “superior” nature of the 
West made Japan import its knowledge, not the East’s. 
  How did these worldviews and their environmental interactions influence these 
actors’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes?  
The overwhelming perception of the world as economically driven tended to make these 
                                                
937 For most of his career, Ito’s focus was on international and domestic politics and diplomacy, not 
economics.   
938 Marxism did not begin to emerge as an intellectual force in Japan or in the labor rights movement until 
the late 1890s, shortly after the end of this period (1850-1895). 
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leaders deemphasize non-material and non-economic knowledge, such as religion.939  It 
made them favor knowledge from the West, rather than knowledge from “traditional” 
Asian sources such as China.  “Practical” knowledge (Fukuzawa’s concept of jitsugaku) 
was the most preferred.  Societies that were judged the most successful economically 
became the most favored in the overall eyes of most Japanese leaders.  These three 
leaders tended to support Western knowledge and sources of information.  Western 
societies judged to be the most successful in particular sectors, such as economics, were 
also considered to be the best sources of knowledge in those areas.  Science, hard work, 
and material forces became major determinants for understanding events and their causes.  
  How did technological systems affect these worldviews?  Much of what 
impressed the leaders of Meiji and late Tokugawa Japan about the West and its power 
flowed from the West’s economic, technological and scientific achievements.  In these 
leaders’ eyes, the West’s wealth was a large part of what enabled it to prosper, exercise 
influence in international affairs, gain colonies, and maintain independence.  Japan’s 
leaders experienced the power of the West when Commodore Perry’s black ships 
appeared in Edo Bay.  When leaders like Fukuzawa and Ito traveled to the West, they 
                                                
939 We noted above how Fukuzawa argued that the “spirits” behind technology and advanced Western 
knowledge must be mastered, in addition to mastering the knowledge itself.  Yet he was not very religious.  
In the section on domestic society in Chapter 3, I noted how Kato favored the use of “traditional” Japanese 
spiritual values, especially from Shinto, believing that they would best strengthen Japanese nationalism.  
This meant Shinto as the new nationalistic spiritual ideology, as defined by the Meiji state. We will discuss 
the profound influence of Shinto on Emperor Hirohito’s worldviews and on Japan’s foreign policies during 
his reign through 1945 in Chapters 7 and 8. Westerners are sometimes amazed at how spiritual practices 
and beliefs like Shinto continue to influence major events and aspects of life in “secular,” non-religious 
Japan. Spiritual influence on modern life is seen in the ritual prayers offered by Shinto priests at the 
dedication ceremonies for new buildings, and in household worship and prayers offered at the Shinto and 
Buddhist family altars still kept in many Japanese homes.  Yet in most surveys about religion, most 
Japanese commonly define themselves as “non-religious.”  This may be because the Japanese word for 
religion, shukyo, has the sense of “sect teaching.”  Since many Japanese do not practice just one sect, they 
do not consider themselves to be “religious.” 
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directly observed its economic power, manifested in its technologies, military prowess, 
wealth, economic productivity and citizens’ daily lives, and in its colonies that they 
visited en-route.  All of this provided very concrete inspiration for Japan’s leaders that 
the path to “success” for the West was trod in economics, science, technology, and 
military power, and would be for Japan too. 
   Cultural Logics. Concerning the cultural logics under these worldviews of 
Japan’s domestic market (1850-1895), the global (international) phenomena and actors to 
which these leaders responded included the Western trading system, the global economic 
system dominated by the West, the unequal treaty system, commodities Japan traded with 
other countries,940 the global monetary (currency) system, foreign investments in Japan, 
Japanese investments overseas, foreign technologies,941 the economic and trade policies 
of foreign governments and the Japanese government, international companies and 
players from overseas and Japan, Western economic knowledge, modern (Western) 
                                                
940 The major commodities exported by Japan in the late Tokugawa period were copper, silver and dried 
marine products.  Trade in this period was dominated by Korea, China, and Holland (Japan’s only official 
trading partner from Europe).  Major imports in the late Tokugawa period included silks, gold, Chinese 
medicines and specialty products, and a few goods from Europe (William B. Hauser, “Economic History: 
Premodern Economy (to 1867)” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, Vol. 2 [Tokyo and New York:  
Kodansha, 1983], 150).  Major exports in the Meiji era were silk, tea, cotton and woolen textiles, and 
pottery, mainly to Europe and the United States.  Main exports to China and other Asian countries included 
primarily manufactured products, matches, soap and cotton yarn (Yamaguchi Kazuo, “Economic History: 
Early Modern Economy: (1868-1945)” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan,  Vol. 2 [Tokyo and New 
York:  Kodansha, 1983], 152); Leon Hollerman, “Foreign Trade” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan,  
Vol. 2 [Tokyo and New York: Kodansha, 1983], 319-320).  Meiji Japan exported more manufactured 
goods as its economy grew (William V. Rapp, “Foreign Trade, Government Policy on” in Kodansha 
Encyclopedia of Japan,  Vol. 2 [Tokyo and New York: Kodansha, 1983],  324).  Main imports in the Meiji 
era were equipment, ships, steel and additional products that Japan could not yet make.  This created a 
long-standing trend in Japanese trade, where Japan exports in order to import.  The nature of particular 
imports was generally driven by military and industrialization needs.  These made the government promote 
the importation of raw materials, and of capital and manufactured goods that Japan did not produce (Ibid.).        
941 Some of the main technologies that Japan imported included industrial, transportation, military, and 
scientific equipment.  
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business practice(s), international segments of the labor force,942 colonialism, and  
imperialism.  Some of the powerful ideas behind the Western and global economic 
systems included classical economics (represented by Adam Smith), theories of free 
trade, international trade, industrialization, evolutionism and Social Darwinism, 
imperialism, colonialism, governmental trade and economic policies, Western theories of 
business, Western and international business practices, theories of economic growth, 
wealth and prosperity, and values of wealth and individual entrepreneurialism.943  Some 
of the important thought underneath domestic market worldviews in Japan included 
Japanese thinking on economics and business in this period, concepts of importing 
needed knowledge that Japan lacked, theories of individual entrepreneurialism and hard 
work,944 ideological support for sending trade missions abroad, and concepts of political 
                                                
942 These international segments of the labor force included foreign instructors and businessmen, traders, 
and migrant workers in Japan who came from countries like China.  
943 Several streams of economic thought, important in the West (1850-1895), affected Japan’s economic 
system, directly and indirectly.  Two of these streams were the classical economics of Adam Smith, and the 
Malthusian principle of political economy and the doctrine of comparative advantage on international trade, 
developed and applied by David Ricardo.  Adam Smith’s thought, formerly called the “English classical 
school of political economy,” is developed in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations (1776).  In this work, Smith studies how a private enterprise-based economic system works.  He 
sees it as driven by the self-interest of individual consumers, which ultimately determines prices, in a 
framework of supportive laws and institutions.  His work offered simplistic theories of value, distribution, 
international trade and money, and enabled the development of classical and modern economics. In the 
early 1800s, David Ricardo developed the concepts of the economic model, the doctrine of comparative 
advantage, and applied the Malthusian principle to economics.  Essentially, he argued, based on the work 
of Thomas Malthus, that economic expansion would finally stop due to the rising expense of growing food 
on shrinking plots of available land.  To handle this, countries should import needed foodstuffs from other 
countries able to produce them more productively.  Countries should specialize in agricultural or 
manufactured goods that they are most advantaged to produce.  The benefits of international trade are 
shown by comparing the costs within each individual nation, rather than by comparing costs between 
nations.  This thought became the primary basis for nineteenth century arguments for free trade.  Ricardo’s 
thought was powerfully re-argued by John Stuart Mill in 1848 in Principles of Political Economy.  Also in 
the late 1800s, Western economists began to try to explain why goods trade at particular prices, and how 
resources are apportioned in situations of perfect competition (“Economics,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
2007. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-236756; accessed 21 June 
2007).   
944 One example of this is Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856), a Japanese agricultural reformer whose own 
hard work and common sense principles helped improve his own family’s welfare and that of the farming 
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authoritarianism allowing strong state economic involvement, protectionism, and import 
substitution.945 
  What were the cultural logics (unspoken, shared assumptions and patterns) 
underlying these leaders’ worldviews of the major global phenomena affecting Japan’s 
domestic market (1850-1895)?946  On theoretical issues connected with these global 
phenomena, the key beliefs and underlying logics concern Western social science 
theories and knowledge related to Japan’s domestic economy, including economics, 
evolutionism, colonialism and imperialism.947  Cultural logics beneath these theoretical 
beliefs (about economics) included the idea that money and material things drive the 
world.948  For global influence, independence and development, Japan needs those things.  
As a proud nation, Japan must survive by fighting hard and developing itself first, 
internally, economically and in other areas, before it can successfully face the West.  
Trade with nearby regions and perhaps gaining colonies can help Japan’s economy grow 
stronger.   Developing empires made Western countries rich, and will enrich Japan too. 
                                                                                                                                            
regions whose development he assisted (“Ninomiya Sontoku,” Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://0-
www.search.eb.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu:80/eb/article-9055889; accessed 27 June 2007. 
945 Some protectionist thoughts may have been based on concepts of economic nationalism (mercantilism), 
developed in Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries.  Mercantilism argued in support of trade 
protectionism (Ibid., “Economics”).  
946 The global phenomena related to Japan’s domestic market in this period are many and complex.  To 
make better sense of these phenomena and their related cultural logics, I have organized them into several 
categories:  theoretical issues, broader issues, and more focused issues.  Within the category of broader 
issues, related to Japan’s domestic market, I have also organized them as follows:  mainly domestic issues, 
public sector issues, and private sector issues.  Predominantly international issues are included later in my 
discussion of worldviews of Japan’s external economic relations, 1850-1895. 
947 Economic theories included classical economics, theories on free trade, international trade, 
industrialization, economic growth, wealth and prosperity. 
948 What were some of the major theoretically influenced beliefs to which I refer?  A major phenomenon 
strengthening the West is economics.  To be strong, Japan must also master economics, and fight hard for 
survival.  To compete with the West, Japan must develop its own house first.  Helping nearby regions and 
nations like Hokkaido and Korea can also strengthen Japan’s economy. While Hokkaido, now Japan’s 
northernmost island, had long been a major sphere of Japanese influence, it did not formally enter the 
nation until the late 1800s. 
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  Beliefs about broader market issues on the domestic level included those on 
economics and business.949  Cultural logics underneath these beliefs saw economics as a 
major controlling force of the world.  For Japan to become wealthy, it must become 
economically powerful, but first its people must prosper.  Internal prosperity precedes 
external prosperity.  In rich nations like the West, many people know business well, work 
hard, and are smart.  Japanese are also smart, so they can learn the business ways of the 
West.  Doing so, as Japan learned from China before, will make Japan strong.  
  Beliefs on broader domestic market issues included those about general 
business practice, entrepreneurialism and labor.950  The cultural logics supporting these 
beliefs included the conviction that business and hard work are honorable.  Through 
them, people and nations prosper.  Confucianism, in condemning commerce, has become 
a bankrupt philosophy that has failed Eastern nations.  While Confucianism long worked 
well for social relations, Eastern nations are now weaker than the West.  Successful 
business generates wealth that strengthens all of society.  For example, Ninomiya 
Sontoku showed much practical wisdom, courage and hard work that strengthened his 
own family, and the regions he helped to develop.  So thrift, hard work, and perseverance 
will make Japan and its people strong.   Strong business at the grassroots is really what 
                                                
949 Most of the beliefs and supporting cultural logics that concern Japan’s international economic relations I 
will discuss later in Chapter 5, and some in Chapter 8.  Beliefs about international economic phenomena 
that primarily affected Japan’s domestic market are included here.  Beliefs on basic economics and 
business related to Japan’s domestic market include the conviction that economics drives every nation and 
the world.  Japan too must be wealthy to survive, both its people and the nation.  Creative, aggressive ways 
of doing business have helped strengthen the West, so Japan must study those ways.  Japanese are clever, 
and their ingenuity can help Japan to grow as well. 
950 According to these beliefs, hard work is seen as especially honorable.  Business is not shameful, and the 
ethical norms of Confucianism that condemned commerce are wrong.  Business can strengthen individuals, 
their families, communities, and the whole nation.  Ninomiya Sontoku is a hero and model for all Japanese.  
Individual entrepreneurs and companies that succeed are necessary to help the nation become rich. 
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invigorates a nation.  The government’s role is important for setting the stage for what the 
market can do, but the market is central around the world, and will be in Japan. 
  Broader beliefs and their underlying logics on how the public sector affects 
Japan’s domestic market included those on relevant economic policies of the 
governments of foreign countries and Japan, and on public policies on Japan’s internal 
economic reforms.951  In the cultural logics behind these beliefs, Japan is a great country 
that must be saved.  It will learn best from economically successful countries with 
experiences most like its own.  If Japan copies from countries too different, it risks its 
social stability. Japan can learn valuable lessons from such countries (i.e. the United 
States), but must do so carefully.  The governments of economically successful Western 
countries should be emulated, as culturally appropriate.  The governments of economic 
failures should not be.  Japan will succeed and learn best through hard work, using the 
best information from the world’s economic successes.  The government, the people, and 
the private sector must learn these lessons, working together to help Japan grow.  
                                                
951 Government economic policy includes ideas about the state’s economic role, protectionism, and import 
substitution.  The broader beliefs on how governments and their economic policies affected Japan’s 
domestic market included the idea that for the soundest path to economic development, Japan must learn 
economic lessons fitting its own culture, history, and context from countries with similar experiences. Since 
Japan was seen as a highly traditional, authoritarian country, leaders such as Ito and Kato believed it would 
learn the best from countries with similar systems, such as Germany.  Some countries’ cultures were very 
different from Japan’s, including extremely successful economies (i.e. the United States).  Japan might 
learn and apply lessons from such countries, but must do so very carefully. The Japanese best understand 
their own society, so they can best apply these lessons.  Japanese, not foreigners, must control their 
country.  Japanese must reform their government to gain more qualities of the governments of 
economically successful Western countries, or Japan will not be able to apply their lessons well.  Both 
Japan’s government and people must work hard to learn the world’s best lessons in every sector, including 
economics, and wisely apply them in both the public and private spheres (Ito and Kato stressed the former, 
and Fukuzawa the latter).     
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Japanese know their country best, and can best define how it should develop.  Foreigners 
can assist, but they cannot have ultimate control.952 
  Beliefs on broader market issues affecting Japan’s domestic private sector 
included those about Western business, international firms (Japanese and foreign), and 
international segments of the labor force.953  According to the cultural logics under these 
beliefs, economics and wealth are the foundation of prosperity and well-being, seen in 
examples from the West, their economies and rich people.  If it works for the West, it can 
work for Japan.954  Through modern business and hard work, if Japanese prosper, then 
Japan (as a nation) will.955  For modern business to truly succeed in Japan, Japanese must 
master its techniques, technologies, social and ethical factors, and encourage them in 
society.  While Japan must change in this process, if it destroys its heart and soul, or it 
will not survive.  Western firms are the key practitioners of Western business.  Japan 
must study their practices and ideas, overseas and in Japan.  Foreign experts in Japan are 
vital for quicker mastery of Western economic knowledge.  But they must not stay too 
                                                
952 It is implied that this would be the case for any country seeking to develop. 
953 According to these beliefs, by learning Western business, Japan can become powerful and rich.  
Western-type business can make nations and individuals very rich.  Japan must master the techniques of 
Western business and economics, the “spirit” behind them, and create a society supportive of business and 
entrepreneurship (Fukuzawa).  But in doing so, it must not give up its own soul.  The purpose of mastering 
Western (economic) knowledge is so that Japan can survive.  Business is the new lifeblood of Japan, the 
foundation to increase its power, internally and externally.  Foreign firms have a key role to play in 
economic reform, bringing in vitally needed knowledge and technologies.  They must be carefully 
managed, and not allowed to get too much of a foothold in Japan.   Foreign experts can be a key source of 
modern economic knowledge; Japan must find the best experts to teach its brightest students.  This can 
enable Japan to leapfrog certain stages in the development process.  Foreigners must not stay long.  
Japanese must quickly master their knowledge and send them home.   
954 Through Western business and “scientific” economics the West became rich, and through them, Japan 
can too.  Wildly successful Westerners, such as Andrew Carnegie and the Rothschilds, became rich through 
business.   
955 There are also examples of hard work and prosperity in Japan, including Ninomiya Sontoku and the 
founders of Japan’s zaibats u. 
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long.  Japan must be for the Japanese, and “cultural contamination” from outsiders is a 
danger.956  Japan is not Western.  
  More focused issues affecting these three leaders’ worldviews on the domestic 
market and their related cultural logics include their views of foreign technologies and 
knowledge and their roles in the domestic economy.957  The cultural logics supporting 
these beliefs include the conviction that strong public involvement in major areas of the 
economy is needed to accomplish major goals, such as importing knowledge.  At this 
early stage, the weak private sector will do better if the government helps.  But the 
private sector also has key roles.  It will be the key engine of growth, and can often 
respond more quickly and flexibly than the government. 
  The basic response of these three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato) to the 
global phenomena identified above was to study and learn from the powerful economic 
example of the West, to seek to understand the principles and social contexts of the 
West’s economic achievements, and to reflect upon how to apply those lessons to Japan.  
This necessitated study and reflection on two levels, on the contexts, ideas and 
accomplishments of modern economics and business internationally, and on Japan’s 
                                                
956 For example, foreigners, their cultures and beliefs, such as Christianity, may pollute and corrupt Japan 
and its people.  So while Japanese absorbs their knowledge, foreigners should be kept at arms’ length, 
staying as briefly as possible.  Recall the “mixed residence” controversy over how soon to allow foreigners 
to reside in Japanese cities, and Kato’s comments on the issue (see Kato’s comments in this chapter in the 
section on domestic market worldviews). 
957 According to these beliefs, the government plays a key role in importing and setting policies for foreign 
knowledge and technologies, and mediating the process.  The major purpose for these policies is to 
strengthen Japan and its economy domestically so it will not be invaded.  The government must set major 
policies on training through foreign experts and choosing the best foreign models.  It helped set the tone for 
importing knowledge through trade missions.  The government must play these roles now since the private 
sector is still weak.  But that sector also has key roles.  It is more dynamic, can better generate wealth and 
real growth, and affects the daily lives of Japanese more directly.  Private business training, through 
schools like Keio, can help spread knowledge of modern economics and business.  Sometimes business can 
set the lead for the public sector. These points about the private sector are implied from Fukuzawa. 
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current economic capabilities, available resources, and social conditions.  Second, these 
leaders sought to apply these lessons in their own writings and policy recommendations 
for what Japan should do.958  Applications included developing economics education 
programs for the nation, and devising successful policies to encourage Japanese trade, 
industrialization, and business development, including development of the relevant public 
infrastructure.  Generally, on the domestic level, the response of Japan to the Western 
economic challenge in this era paralleled the response of these three leaders, along with 
supporting the application of modern economic and business principles to daily business 
practice, and the huge growth of private sector business and industry that began in the 
Meiji era.959 
  The cultural logics under these responses included assumptions that the West 
was more economically successful than Japan, that economic and business success was 
key to the West’s power (and power in general), that it would be for Japan, and that 
similar success for Japan was needed for it to remain free.  For Japan to achieve this, it 
must learn from the already “successful.”  The learning process involved absorbing 
relevant technical and social knowledge on economics and business from abroad, 
                                                
958 As noted before, on economic matters, Fukuzawa developed his main recommendations for the private 
sector, by writing widely for popular consumption and education in Japan, founding a university highly 
influential on Japanese business (Keio), and several successful businesses.  Ito and Kato’s main work 
concerned the public sector, and their involvement in economic issues was less than in political affairs.  
Kato also wrote extensively on social issues (morality and ethics).   
959 While modern accounting principles and others were widely applied throughout Japan, the application 
of these principles occurred within the overall context of Japanese business culture.  While modern 
Japanese corporate and business cultures adopted many modern business practices and techniques from the 
West, Japan’s business culture did not disappear.  Rather, it incorporated these techniques into the overall 
framework of relevant Japanese values, which have continued to evolve over time.  Evidence of this 
adaptation process includes the fierce loyalty to the company (their lifelong employer) required of 
“salarymen” in the corporate culture of late twentieth century Japan.  This was highly reminiscent of the 
loyalty expected of Tokugawa era samurai for their lords.  Today, the expectation of lifelong employment 
in major corporations has lessened, due to Japan’s economic slowdown of the 1990s and early 2000s.  This 
is also affecting the loyalty of contemporary young Japanese to their employers. 
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gathering data on Japan’s relevant conditions, and reflecting on how to best apply the 
foreign knowledge to Japan.  Japanese also assumed that Japan could learn from foreign 
cultures, apply their knowledge, improve it, and “catch up,” as it had done for centuries.  
In the cultural logics behind their response to foreign phenomena, Japanese reacted partly 
on the basis of their previous experience with and response to similar phenomena, 
knowledge and technology from China and other Asian regions.  There was pride that 
Japan, a great nation, should, could and must survive.  Foreign economic knowledge 
must be applied in culturally appropriate ways.  If not, it would not function well in 
Japan, whose society, culture and national identity would be threatened.  Japanese leaders 
assumed that it was appropriate and useful to have strong public intervention in the 
private sector that would enable and enhance the social environment the private sector 
needs to flourish.  Judging from the spread of modern business practices and Japan’s 
economic growth in the Meiji era, it seems they were correct. 
 Comparing the cultural logics under Japan’s response to the global phenomena 
affecting its domestic market, the new theory-related logics focus on assessing the 
meaning of economics for the West, and their application to Japan.  Modern economics 
made the West more powerful and wealthier than Eastern nations.  While economics 
were influential in late Tokugawa society, and the state of its economy was fairly 
advanced, due to the influence of Confucian ethics, economics and commerce did not 
enjoy the prestige they gained in the new Meiji world.960  Commerce was somewhat 
scorned in the Confucian and Buddhist worldviews, and merchants did not have a place 
                                                
960 I discuss the general state of the late Tokugawa economy in the domestic markets contexts section 
earlier in this chapter. 
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in the official social hierarchy of the late Tokugawa period.  There is also the more 
material focus of these new cultural logics, as opposed to the more ethical and spiritual 
focus of late Tokugawa Neo-Confucian logics.  In the Neo-Confucian logics, proper 
social hierarchy, harmony, honor, and duty drove society, but in the new Meiji world, 
entrepreneurialism, wealth and power did.  Earlier in Japan’s history, the overwhelming 
wealth, power, beauty and wisdom of China and its cultural universe impressed the 
ancient Japanese.  From the sixth century A.D., they began actively importing and 
absorbing these treasures from Korea and China.  Somewhat similarly, the wealth, power 
and technology of the West impressed modern Japanese, and led them to embark on a 
new but greatly accelerated learning program in the late 1800s.  The earlier experience 
with China influenced modern Japan’s response to the West, and somehow prepared it to 
embark on its new knowledge importation campaign.  Hard work, necessary for the 
survival of each generation, has always been valued in Japan.  Peasant farmers had 
always grown the rice that fed the nation, but were not given a position of honor in the 
social hierarchy of the late Tokugawa era.   
 In the Meiji era, business, commerce and the “science” behind them received 
unprecedented honor throughout society.  Belief in a strong state is one assumption of 
pre-Meiji worldviews that carried into the new cultural universe of the Meiji era.  The 
logic that Japan should learn from the “most successful” and powerful foreign models is 
another carry-over from Japan’s experience in the China-dominated universe to the 
Western one.  The cultural leap the Japanese had to make in adjusting to the Western-
dominated universe seems greater than that they made in adapting ancient Chinese 
influences.  The receipt of the latter was the active choice of Japanese, and happened over 
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centuries, as opposed to Japan’s accelerated learning from the West in the late 1800s.  
Japanese took pride that they had imported, saved and/or improved key cultural and 
political features from China, many of which had long died out in China.961 
Japanese had a deep confidence, from their China experience, that they could also 
indigenize and improve Western imports.  So prolonged involvement of foreigners was 
viewed as strange, obstructive, and unnecessary.  In its experiences with ancient China 
and the modern West, Japan valued what appeared most powerful at the time.  In the 
ancient world, it was the military and economic power and gigantic size of China, the 
depth and practicality of Confucianism and other Chinese philosophies, and the esoteric 
beauty and power of Buddhism and its artistic influences.  In the late 1800s, Japanese 
were impressed with the military power, economic and technological strength of the 
West, from which they had isolated, by choice, for so long.  The new Western-dominated 
cultural universe was largely “forced” on Japan, requiring a more accelerated, focused 
response from Japan’s leaders.  Japan had less luxury of choice and time in the modern 
case.  The new case placed almost exclusive emphasis on the material world, and 
comparatively little on the ethical or spiritual world.962  Foreign knowledge of the 
material realm, including technologies, science, and business techniques, gained an 
unprecedented place of honor in Japan.  The “private sector” did as well. 
 In comparing the cultural logics under these domestic market worldviews 
identified above, on theoretical economic issues, the new Meiji assumption that money 
                                                
961 One example of this is the national cultural treasures from ancient China and Japan stored and 
maintained at the Shôsô-in national treasure storehouse at Todaiji Temple in Nara, from the eighth century 
A.D. up to the modern age. 
962 In spite of this, I have noted above the belief of Fukuzawa and Mori that Japan must master the “spirits” 




and material things drive the world contrasts with the older Confucian view, prevalent in 
the Tokugawa period, that proper harmony, social order, attention to ritual, duty and 
ethical behavior would save the nation.  In the New Meiji view, Japan must work very 
hard and develop itself, but in the more traditional view, honor, order and proper ethical 
behavior were the primary characteristics of advanced societies.  The new Meiji world 
focused on trade and external engagement, where the Confucian world focused on 
attaining the highest level of proper harmony and order within each society, believing, 
from the powerful example of China, that societies which did so would honor the proper 
ritual order of the universe, and prosper greatly.  Societies that did not honor nature’s 
proper harmony and order, and those farthest from the greatest nation that did (China), 
were the most primitive and barbaric.  A new logic emerging in late Tokugawa Japan 
began to doubt the benefits of Confucianism, since it now failed China, which was 
becoming a colony of the West.  Though the Westerners were generally barbaric, they 
were very clever and powerful; therefore Japan must learn from them, so as not to suffer 
China’s fate. 
 Comparing the cultural logics on economics and business in Japan’s domestic 
market, we see in the new Meiji view, a nation’s power in the world is driven by material 
and economic productivity in society, based on the people’s hard work.  In the Confucian 
cultural universe, national well-being is based on proper order, ritual and harmony in a 
nation.963  Hard work is the basis of survival, but the life of a scholar or bureaucrat who 
uses his mind, not just his muscles, is more honored. 
                                                
963 In Japan’s case, this wisdom was absorbed from a much more powerful external force, China, though in 
China’s case, it was not. 
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 In the new Meiji cultural logics on business practice, entrepreneurialism and 
labor, business and hard work are highly honored.  Confucianism, which has failed East 
Asia, is seen as backward and corrupt.  Most fundamentally, hard work and solid 
business build a nation, not just ethics and philosophy.  The market drives the prosperity 
of the nation and its people.  In the Confucian universe of the late Tokugawa era, hard 
work is necessary for survival, but people of honor should be more than hard working, 
ignorant peasants.  The universe has overall laws governing its operation and balance, for 
which we need careful study by scholars, or we will not understand the lessons of history 
and ourselves.  To flourish, a society needs proper order, ethics, rituals and social 
relations on all levels, orderly government and wise rulers.  If not, it will perish.  
Commerce is necessary for the functioning of society, but is cruder than ethical 
reflection.  Japan is no exception.  It needs all these things, and the hard work of its 
people.  But they are unwise.  They need the guidance and protection of wise leaders, 
their father the Emperor, and a harmonious society.  Out of deep love, affection and 
thanks for their country and ancestors, Japanese must work hard, and maintain their 
families’ and nation’s honor.964  
 On the public sector, governments and their economic policies, the cultural 
logics of the Meiji period stress that Japan is a great country, currently weaker than the 
West, from which it faces a great threat. For successful development policy, Japan’s 
government must be strong and reform itself, learning best from governments of 
economic powerhouses most like Japan.  Hard work, outstanding knowledge and 
                                                
964 The new Meiji state emphasized new patriotic values of devotion to the emperor and nation.  They built 
on the Confucian-influenced bushido (samurai ethic) values of commitment and duty that were 
predominant in the Tokugawa period.  
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cooperation between sectors (public, private, and popular) will help Japan grow.  Much 
knowledge can be gained from foreign experts, but Japanese know Japan best, and can 
best help it grow.  In conservative Confucian views in the late Tokugawa era, those 
geographically furthest from the Confucian world are seen as most barbaric.  Yet many 
Westerners are very smart, have impressive technology, and are gaining increasing power 
that threatens the East.  Japan will soon have to face them, change, and grow.  The 
Tokugawa regime is increasingly weak and corrupt.  Japan must figure out how to open 
itself to Western knowledge, improve itself and grow, without being destroyed.  How can 
Japan receive foreign knowledge, improve it, and make it its own?  Does Japan need 
Western techniques yet Eastern spirit (wakon yosai),965 or both Western techniques and 
Western spirit? 
 In the Meiji era’s cultural logics of the international segments of business, 
firms, labor and their roles in the domestic market, economics and wealth are the basis of 
well-being of nations and their people, as seen in the West, and will be for Japan too.  
Japan must learn from the West’s economies, technologies, and societies.  Japan must 
change, but not destroy its soul.  Since foreign firms are the chief experts in business 
practice, Japan must learn from them.  Their knowledge is crucial to help Japan grow and 
survive.  The temporarily superior culture of the West has allowed its superior economic 
and scientific success.  To succeed economically and technologically, Japan must change 
and become more like the West, culturally, or master certain (Western) social features 
                                                
965 Wakon yosai (Japanese/Eastern ethics, Western techniques) is an important ideological slogan of the late 
Tokugawa period coined by Sakuma Shosan (1811-1864), a leading scholar of Western learning at the 
time. Sakuma used the phrase to signify that Japan urgently needed to learn Western science and 
technology, while maintaining its own Japanese spirit (“Sakuma Zosan,” in New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Vol. 10 [Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1993], 345). 
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that support such success.966  In the more “traditional” and Confucian-influenced cultural 
logics of the late Tokugawa period, while Japan desperately needs foreign knowledge to 
survive, it does not desire many cultural aspects.  Foreigners must not stay in Japan too 
long; their prolonged presence is a danger to Japan’s political, economic, and cultural 
survival.  In China, India, and other parts of Asia, foreigners dictate to local governments, 
control and exploit their economies, and trample their cultures and religions.  Westerners 
are culturally inferior to Japanese.  They are smelly, hairier, “stinking of butter,” much 
cruder, and their religion (Christianity) believes in an intolerant god who cannot respect 
or allow Japan’s gods to coexist.  Christianity is an imperialist tool that the Westerners 
tried to use before to invade, control and conquer Japan.  Westerners have often nearly 
destroyed societies they have invaded.  This must not be permitted in Japan.  They must 
not overly contaminate the culture of Japan.967 
 On the roles of foreign technologies and knowledge in the domestic economy, 
the Meiji era’s new cultural logics see Western technology and science as superior to 
Japan’s, as what made the West so powerful.  Japan needs them to survive.  It is the 
government’s duty to help Japan to import them.968  Business will become the most 
powerful tool to help Japan grow, the key factor behind economic growth and wealth, 
often more flexible and dynamic than government.  Now Japan’s business sector is 
weaker than the West’s, but will grow stronger.  The government must help business at 
                                                
966 The points about the West’s cultural superiority and mastering some of its social features are from 
Fukuzawa and Mori. 
967 Some of the points about the cultural logics behind “traditional” and Confucian logics here sound 
stereotypical and extreme.  To a degree, they may be, but many Japanese held such views during this 
period. 
968 This flows from the government’s most basic duties to effectively rule the nation and guarantee its 
survival in the face of extensive (foreign) threats and other national emergencies. 
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this stage of Japan’s development.  In more “traditional” and Confucian logics in the late 
Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, Japan needs the West’s powerful technologies and 
knowledge to survive.  Japan cannot stay isolated now.  It must learn from these “clever 
barbarians,” without importing many of their ways.  Hopefully Japan can keep them at 
arms’ length.  The state must be strong, to stand up against foreigners and internal 
divisions.  Without a strong state, Japan will not survive.  Business was seen as ignoble in 
traditional Confucianism, but Japan must now use it to compete with the West. 
 For a brief summary comparing selected findings generated from this discussion 
of likely cultural logics underlying these domestic worldviews, see Table 4.1 below, 
which compares cultural logics of the knowledge importation campaign from mainland 
Asia (starting about the sixth century A.D. onward) with logics in the early Meiji era, and 
Table 4.2, which compares important cultural logics on the domestic market from the late 
Tokugawa era with those from the early Meiji era. From Table 4.1, we see that the earlier 
campaign placed more emphasis on spiritual, ethical and artistic items than the Meiji 
campaign did. The former campaign also took much, much longer than the latter 
campaign. The latter campaign was considered a matter of national survival. In Table 4.2, 
we observe a higher emphasis on ethical, philosophical-based knowledge, legal 
prohibition on interaction with foreigners, and an official scorn for business during the 
late Tokugawa period. In contrast, in the early Meiji era, there is a much greater focus on 
material and economic knowledge, learning and importing foreign knowledge, and 




Table 4.1: Comparison of Cultural Logics, China/Korea Importation Campaigns (6th 
Century A.D. onward) and Meiji Knowledge Importation Campaign (late 1800s-early 
1900s). 
China, Korea Campaigns     Early Meiji Era Campaign 
Wealth, power, technology, religion, arts from 
Asia mainland greatly impresses Japan 
Wealth, power, technology, arts from the West 
greatly impresses Japan 
Importation campaign took centuries Importation campaign took decades 
Japan must learn from the most powerful, 
successful foreign model(s) 
Japan must learn from the most powerful, 
successful foreign model(s) 
“Moderate,” less drastic cultural leap to adjust 
to Asian sources 
“Drastic” cultural leap to adjust to Western 
sources 
Whatever is most powerful, beautiful, and/or 
philosophically appealing is worth copying 
Whatever is most powerful is worth copying 
Japan chose to learn and copy from Asian 
sources, models 
Japan forced to copy and learn Western 
sources, models 
Emphasis on importing many ideas and 
“spiritual” items, also many techniques  
Heavy emphasis on importing technological 
items, little interest in Western spiritual ones 
 
 
Table 4.2: Comparison of Important Cultural Logics on the Domestic Market: Late 
Tokugawa Era and Early Meiji Era  
Late Tokugawa (Neo-         Early Meiji Logics 
Confucian) Logics 
More ethical focus More materialist, economic focus 
Business scorned, merely tolerated by the 
Tokugawa state; ethics/morality preferred by 
state 
Business, economics, science behind them 
highly honored in Japan; needed for Japan’s 
survival 
Belief in a strong state Belief in a strong state 
Strong emphasis on ethical, moral issues of 
Japanese origin, lesser interest in material issues 
Heavy emphasis on material knowledge, 
items, little on spiritual items, issues 
Stronger emphasis on ethical, moral world Stronger emphasis on material world 
“Japanese,” indigenous knowledge of ethics, 
philosophy highly valued, Confucian, Buddhist 
knowledge less valued, Western knowledge least 
valued 
Western materialist, scientific, economic, 
other knowledge highly valued; Mainland 
Asian knowledge often devalued 
Business, commerce has low social status Private sector honored, nurtured 
Proper harmony, order, ritual, duty, ethics, 
behavior save a nation 
Money, material things, power, hard work 
empower a nation, drive the world 
Stability, political and social order are the basis 
of Japan’s prosperity; wealth: not unimportant 
Economics, wealth are the basis of a nation’s 
well-being, international status 
Foreign knowledge helpful for Japan, somewhat 
desired (especially military, medical knowledge) 
Foreign knowledge mandatory for Japan’s 
national survival 
Foreign cultural knowledge restricted by Japan’s 
state, highly desired in certain cases and by some 
individuals 
Foreign knowledge highly desired by the 
state, which embarks on aggressive 
importation campaigns 
Presence of foreigners is legally banned, except 
for limited trade in limited locations in Southwest 
Presence of foreign experts is highly 
encouraged, but only for short periods. 
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Japan Continuing fear of “cultural contamination” 
by the West 
Overseas travel by Japanese is banned; a small 
number slip abroad anyway 
Overseas travel and study by Japanese highly 
encouraged, though few can go 
The West’s science, technology: highly desired, 
imported as Japan is able. Yet protecting Japan’s 
national isolation cannot be compromised.  
West’s science, technology are highly 
desired, have made it strong; aggressive 





 Regarding the first main question of this research, the influence of Japan’s 
experience in technology, development and foreign relations (and key leaders’ views 
about them) from 1850 to 1945, here I will trace general connections, while I will attempt 
to identify more specific linkages in Chapters 9 and 10, the concluding chapters. On 
sociocultural issues, in this era, Japan was definitely willing to look abroad to absorb 
foreign knowledge (during the late Meiji and Taisho eras), but as it got closer to World 
War II, it was less willing and able. Today’s aid follows this lesson well. Japan’s aid 
encourages openness and foreign learning by LDCs. Another key issue, not considered in 
Japan in this era, was what the state of an LDC can do to try to relieve the social costs of 
development, if anything. 
 On domestic political economy issues, in facing political development and 
reforms, in this era, Japan resorted to repression somewhat, and sought to limit 
democracy and other possible forms of dissention. Unfortunately most leaders did not 
really worry about what kinds of economic development might be the most appropriate 
for Japanese society at the time. Japan did maintain its overall goals for independence 
and national unity. Despite the destruction brought by the nation’s authoritarian system 
by 1945, Japan’s national unity served it very well. 
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 On economic policy and development, from 1850 to 1895, Japan did not pursue 
a balanced approach to industrialization, but focused on heavy industrialization and 
encouraging large parts of the private sector, such as the zaibatsu. On the role of 
development ideologies, during this era, Japan was willing to aggressively borrow 
foreign ideas and ideologies to help with its economic growth.  Japan also used several 
indigenous ideologies to encourage growth and management, influenced by samurai and 
Confucian values.  
 Next, on the second key question of the dissertation, I will consider if the ideas 
of “modernization” and translative adaptation, as seen in the worldviews of the domestic 
state and market in Chapter 4, present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with 
technology and development from 1850 to 1895.969 All five leaders support the concepts 
of “modernization” and translative adaptation in their views of the state, and the three 
leaders studied on the domestic market also support the two concepts. Regarding 
“modernization” in worldviews of the domestic state, all five leaders studied (Fukuzawa, 
Mori, Ito, Kato, and Yamagata) supported it. All were nationalistic in their political goals, 
wanting Japan to strengthen its internal politics so that it could repel the West. While they 
varied in their views of the exact form political reforms should take, none wanted 
Japanese society destroyed. On “modernization” and the domestic market, Fukuzawa, Ito 
and Kato all supported the concept. All knew that Japan’s economy was weak, that Japan 
needed to learn from the West in economics to prevent invasion, and none wanted to lose 
Japan’s identity. On translative adaptation and the domestic state, all five leaders studied 
supported political change and development for Japan’s survival. So all five supported 
                                                
969 The concept of internationalization is not considered in Chapter 4. 
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translative adaptation in their goal to strengthen Japan through political reforms, and 
assure its survival as a people, a nation, and a culture. And the three leaders studied on 
the domestic market also supported translative adaptation, that imported Western 
economic practices and technologies must enhance, not destroy, deeper features of 
Japanese culture.  
  Regarding technology issues and the domestic state, rapid political reforms 
allowed Japan to quickly rebuild the Japanese government after the Meiji Restoration. 
The rapid development of an effective bureaucracy, and the strong emphasis on the 
military, meant that Japan marshaled its forces fairly rapidly to build up the nation’s 
capacities in military, economic, industrial, scientific and technological capacities. The 
Meiji state also used these capacities to limit movements and protests pressing for more 
political rights. Technology also played a very major role in the growth of Japan’s 
domestic market in this period. Faced with the possibility of intense competition from 
abroad, certain industries such as textiles and iron received key input from the state, and 
Japan’s industrial revolution started in the late 1880s. 
  Concerning development, in domestic political development, Japan adopted 
several political institutions that were mainly modeled on authoritarian, monarchical 
systems in late nineteenth century Europe, especially from Germany, including a 
constitution, a limited parliament, extensive bureaucracy, autocratic emperor, and a large, 
powerful military. Political development encouraged by the state included a set of 
nationalistic ideologies that were conservative in nature. More liberal ideologies were not 
yet allowed to take root. On economic development, by the mid-1800s, the late 
Tokugawa economy had developed to a very sophisticated pre-industrial level. After the 
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Meiji restoration (1868), the Meiji government aggressively targeted particular heavy 
industries for initial emphasis and growth, promoting development ideologies such as 
fukoku kyôhei for this purpose. The private sector slowly began to emerge. Government 
emphasis in this period especially targeted large-scale industries and businesses for 
development.  
 While international contexts of politics and economics (1850 to 1895) will 
mostly be discussed in Chapter 5, regarding Japan’s experiences in the domestic state, 
there are many examples of foreign models for Japan’s parliament, constitution, 
bureaucracy, the military, and of political ideas and ideologies. The most influential ideas 
and models in this period came from Europe, while some came from the United States. In 
the domestic market, influential economic forces included various industrial 
technologies, principles, theories, and practices of economics, finance, business and 
banking. Ideas regarding the labor movement and workers’ rights also entered Japan, 
though they were heavily suppressed by the state during this period. 
  All of the leaders studied in Chapter 4, five on domestic state issues, and three 
on domestic market issues, support the basic concepts of “modernization” and translative 
adaptation in the worldviews we have studied. In the domestic contexts surveyed here, do 
the ideas of “modernization” and translative adaptation in these worldviews well 
represent Japan’s experiences in technology, development and foreign relations? On 
“modernization, while all of the leaders studied in the chapter agree that Japan must 
import needed political and economic ideas and technologies, all want Japan’s essential 
cultural integrity in these areas to remain intact. From the items imported, what happened 
in practice? The military and industrial technologies inevitably began to greatly alter 
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Japan’s rural and urban landscapes. The creation of a new extensive, national 
bureaucracy did as well. The spread of various new values, including nationalism, 
patriotism, and market-oriented production norms could not help but change many 
aspects of Japanese life, since in Tokugawa Japan, culture, politics and much of daily life 
operated on a highly regionalized level, given the division of the nation into numerous, 
rather isolated feudal domains. Economics was more integrated on a national level than 
were politics or culture. There is little evidence that many aspects of Japan’s core culture 
were fundamentally changed, though. For example, most of the new corporate ideologies 
that emerged for Japan’s new private sector were based on neo-Confucian values of the ie 
system and the bushido code. In development, the imported political items were carefully 
designed to match Japan’s conservative culture of politics, and liberal political and 
economic ideologies were discouraged by the state. However, the state, in its major 
emphasis on promoting large-scale industries, did not seem very cognizant of the need to 
protect small-scale and localized agriculture, cottage industries or merchants. For the 
most part, practices seem sensitive to the issues of “modernization,” except on the need to 
protect local industries.  
 Though all of the leaders also supported the theory of translative adaptation, 
what happened in practice? As Japan imported various new political and economic 
technologies and items, did its culture adapt well? Though review of grounded, 
ethnographic data would be needed to authoritatively answer this question, from my 
study here, it appears that Japan’s basic culture adapted fairly well to the huge influx of 
foreign technologies, institutions and ideologies promoted for development. Though 
inevitably altered, I wish to argue that the deepest aspects of Japanese culture remained 
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mostly intact through this period of tumultuous change. This is also the conclusion of 
many Japanese scholars. The foreign items that were imported were particularly chosen 
on the basis of helping Japan to quickly modernize, but also to not clash too greatly with 
Japan’s conservative politics and culture. The latter, in particular, had been extremely 
isolated from foreign, especially Western, input for so long. In general, the economic 
imports seem less sensitive than the political ones on the need to protect Japan’s cultural 
core. The primary emphasis there is on quickly enriching the country so it can defend 
itself economically and militarily, to simply survive. 
 In the data in the historical worldviews of the domestic state and market 
presented here, is there evidence of how Japanese views of spirituality may have affected 
policies in general? On the issue of spirit and spirituality, in my discussion about 
domestic politics, I note Fukuzawa’s and Mori’s concern for mastery of the supportive 
“spirits” (values) surrounding technology, and how the cultural logics behind worldviews 
of the domestic state seem more materialistic than spiritual in tone.  In my treatment of 
spiritual values and domestic market worldviews, I noted how there seemed to be a 
general de-emphasis of spiritual values in the economic worldviews, and a more ethical 
focus in late Tokugawa cultural logics contrasted with a greater emphasis on the material 
world in Meiji logics. There was also a need for Japanese to master the spirit behind 
Western political, economic, business and cultural achievements. 
 Regarding the contrasting theme of the role of material phenomena in these 
worldviews, in the cultural logics on domestic politics (1850 to 1895), material values are 
emphasized more than spiritual ones, likely partly because of the strong images of the 
sheer power of the West’s technologies displayed in conflicts with China and other 
302 
 
countries, and Western technology’s power to conquer and control many of them as 
colonies and areas of influence. The domestic market worldview here de-emphasizes 
non-material phenomena, sees the world as primarily economically driven, and offers 
material causes as the major explanation for world events. Money and material things 
drive the world in the cultural logics under these domestic market worldviews. These 
cultural logics had a mostly material focus, while the domestic market cultural logics of 
the late Tokugawa era were mainly ethical and neo-Confucian in orientation. The foreign, 
Western items favored for importation in the Meiji era were generally more material in 
emphasis than items imported from Asia since the sixth century A.D. Foreign knowledge 
of material things was more valued in the Meiji era. In the new Meiji world and 
worldview, money and material things drove the world (and determine a nation’s power), 
but in the late Tokugawa era, harmony and proper ritual did. 
 In the brief comments on religion in this chapter, I note while a few of the Meiji 
leaders970 identified Western religious values and Christianity as having a major role 
associated with the “spirits” behind Western scientific and technological success, the 
economy-focused worldview of the domestic market tended to de-emphasize non-
material phenomena and knowledge, such as religion. The economic images in the 
domestic market data would also tend to encourage Japanese leaders to reject traditional 
fields not seen as crucial for practical Japanese knowledge acquisition, such as religion. 
These were only valued if they seemed to contribute to Japanese survival. In their 
observations of Westerners, Japanese saw that the former tended to trample the cultures 
and religions of those they invaded, and Christianity seemed highly intolerant. In spite of 
                                                
970 Here I am referring to Mori and Fukuzawa. 
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all these factors, I noted how in contemporary Japan [and actually in late Tokugawa and 
Meiji era Japan as well], the Japanese practice of spirituality, even if often not defined as 
“religion,” is quite pervasive.971 
 What possible impacts did these views have on policies from 1850 to 1895? 
There seemed to be pressure against spirituality in the worldviews and cultural logics in 
this period, in domestic state and market views. The material-oriented worldviews and 
logics on politics and economics of the early Meiji era seemed to dominate the more 
ethical/philosophical ones that were predominant in the late Tokugawa period. The 
general discouragement of spirituality seen in these worldviews would also tend to 
discourage religion. Religion was only valued where it was seen as practical, i.e. where it 
might contribute to the construction of the nation.  The policies likely to result from these 
views would focus on practical economic and political concerns centered on building 
Japan as a nation. Religion and spirituality would not be much of a concern unless they 
would contribute to that cause. Compared with the views of spirituality that I mentioned 
in Chapter 3, these views seem less encouraging of them. But in both cases in Chapters 3 
and 4, we see a willingness to use spirituality and religion if they will contribute to the 
supreme national goal of building the nation to avoid colonization by the West. This 
indeed happened when the state chose to create State Shinto as the national religion and 
patriotic practice. This is the most direct policy application in this period seen here. 
 The major conflicts identified here are between the emphasis material and 
economic concerns over spiritual and ethical ones, noted in the major worldviews and 
cultural logics on the domestic state and politics. There is also the conflict between the 
                                                
971 See my brief discussion earlier in this chapter on the general religiosity of contemporary Japanese. 
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more ethical/philosophical/spiritual orientation in late Tokugawa worldviews and logics 
here, and the more material concerns that were predominant in the early Meiji era. 
Japan’s urgent need for survival helped to generate this shift. But I also noted above that 
in actual practice, in everyday life, it is highly likely that the daily practice of religion and 
spirituality did not diminish. So while there was a much more overt emphasis on political 
and economic concerns in the policy actions of most Japanese leaders, the knowledge that 
Japan must not abandon its own heritage, culture or spiritual identity was assumed, 
though not overtly. 
  What were the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign aid, 
over the long run? What we see here is that pressures to separate consideration of 
spiritual factors from the nation’s daily activities in political and economic affairs may 
have entered along with the Western, materialist, scientific worldviews and assumptions 
behind Japan’s political and economic reform programs in this era. Although the political 
and economic policies that Japan attempted to copy from the West may have included 
some policies of Western, especially European, countries that assumed the integration of 
church and state (several authoritarian political models), the Flaw of the Excluded 
Middle972 was also present, the secularizing influence of the French Enlightenment. In the 
actual policies for politics and economics that Japan enacted, there is little overt 
consideration of religion and spirituality, especially in the economic areas.  
Where secularizing tendencies may have occurred, it is hard to say whether they resulted 
from the Western-generated “Flaw,” and Japan’s own secularizing political tendencies.  
                                                
972 See the definition of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle in the Glossary, and the brief discussion of the 
issues it entails in Chapter 1. 
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In contrast, though, in the early Meiji period, the state instituted State Shinto to help build 
and motivate the nation. If anything, this seems to have represented somewhat of a 
reversal, from whatever secularizing source. There is no indication that the integration of 
spirituality with everyday life, even in things that could be called “political” or 
“economic,” disappeared. Given the presence of such practices in Japan today (noted 
above), I would argue that such practices remained during this era.  
 All of this suggests that although the postwar Japanese state and bureaucracy 
have been required to de-link all formal connections between religion and the state, some 
subtle connections might still remain. There is the famous case of Yasukuni Shrine, 
where the spirits of Japan’s war dead are enshrined. Many other Asian countries have 
complained that the visit of many prime ministers to the shrine to pray to the spirits of the 
war dead amounts to glorification of war crimes, mixing of religion and state, and 
ignorance of the feelings of the peoples of many of Japan’s Asian neighbors. Does this 
mean that some subtle signs of spirituality might be present in Japanese aid, or shape how 
the contemporary aid policymaking process occurs? Or are there subtle hints about 
spirituality in the aid policies, programs, loans and grants that are offered, or the aid 
outcomes that are generated? Although I cannot this question fully in the present 
project,973 it is interesting to ponder. We will see what insights emerge in Chapters 5 and 
6, where I consider leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external politico-economic and 
cultural relations, 1850 to 1895.  
 
                                                









Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895) 
 






 This chapter, on Japan’s external relations (1850-1895), examines decision 
makers’ notions of how Japan interacts with influences from outside Japan in its political 
and economic relations, and in its emerging imperialism. As we begin our examination of 
influences and contexts that are specifically international, and of views about them, a 
major point is that most of the change that occurred in Japan came because of its 
increasing contact and interaction with foreign influences, cultures and technologies. The 
massive influx of these forces into Japan began in this era. What major changes occurred 
as a result of Japan’s interactions with these forces? In Chapter 5 we will study the 
influence of Japan’s external relations in politics and economics, and of Japanese 
imperialism, while Chapter 6 examines issues connected with Japan’s external cultural 
relations in this period. What connection might these changes have with Japan’s 
contemporary aid policies? Several possible significant lessons for development and aid 
policies emerge, which I offer in the conclusion. Below I also argue that although several 
of these leaders were strongly convinced that spiritual factors were potentially important 
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contributors to aiding Japan’s reform process in this era, several forces fought against 
these contributions. But those forces could not prevent the significant emergence of State 
Shinto during this period, nor did they limit the powerful influence spirituality exercised 
on various policies from 1895-1945. Exploring these issues for this period will help us 
further lay the foundation for their implications for current Japanese aid. 
 After briefly surveying the contexts of Japan’s external political and economic 
relations (1850-1895), we will examine the views of selected leaders. On worldviews of 
external political relations, I discuss the views of all five leaders studied for this era 
(Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ito Hirobumi, Mori Arinori, Yamagata Aritomo and Kato Hiroyuki). 
On external economic relations, we will briefly examine the views of Fukuzawa, Ito and 
Kato. Leaders’ views of imperialism emerge more fully in 1895-1945, so I will consider 
them in Chapter 8, which covers that period.  
 Here imperialism includes the general thought of Japanese thinkers and leaders 
about colonialism and imperialism, Japanese government policies for building 
colonialism and empire, important imperialist doctrines and ideologies, and the state of 
Japanese-controlled or heavily influenced colonies, territories and possessions.  In 
Chapter 5, I include two territories that were eventually incorporated into Japan proper:  
Hokkaido island and Okinawa/the Ryukyu Islands.974  Briefly, colonialism refers to 
“control by one power over a dependent area or people,” or “a policy advocating or based 
                                                
974 I consider the contexts of mainly domestic Japanese expansion in Chapter 4. Similarly, Richard Van 
Alstyne treats the domestic territorial expansion of the United States, within international contexts, in 




on such control.”975  Imperialism may be defined as “the policy, practice, or advocacy of 
extending the power and dominion of a nation [,] especially by direct territorial 
acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other 
areas; broadly:  the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence….”976 
Japanese overseas imperialism did not fully emerge until after the close of the period 
covered in the present chapter (1850-1895), after Japan’s victory over China in the Sino-
Japanese War in 1895, when Japan was awarded its first overseas colony in Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, relevant antecedents of overseas imperialism occurred when the Japanese 
government chose to colonize first Hokkaido, and then Okinawa/the Ryukyu Islands, 
both of which were soon fully incorporated into the main part of Japan. I will examine 
the issue of imperialism more fully in Chapter 8, which covers the period of major 
Japanese colonialism and imperialism (1895-1945), including analysis of the worldviews 
of relevant leaders. I did not gather much data on the views of the five leaders studied for 
this chapter on imperialism and colonialism for the period 1850-1895, so I will not 
discuss and analyze leaders’ views of imperialism until Chapter 8. However, contexts 
related to imperialism are included here in Chapter 5.   
 For consistency of analysis, when possible, I will use the same analytical 
concepts to assess leaders’ worldviews of international issues and contexts as I used for 
domestic ones. In Chapter 5, I use the same three concepts for analysis of cognitive 
issues: image, worldview (my definition), and cultural logics. But using the same 
analytical concepts for international issues is not always possible. To analyze 
                                                
975 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, 1983), 261. Also see the 
more detailed definitions of colonialism and imperialism in the Glossary section.  
976 Ibid., 604. 
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development-related aspects of the leaders’ worldviews of international issues, I will 
draw mainly on the concept of internationalization, and on “modernization,” where 
appropriate. The two concepts are very similar. Translative adaptation is not so relevant 
for external issues, so it will not be used. In this chapter, I will not really look at domestic 
issues, including those of the regions and countries that came under the influence of 
Japanese imperialism and colonialism. “Modernization” tends to focus more on global 
economic processes, on the global economic system dominated by Western countries, 
and their effect on the internal cultural evolution of non-Western countries, as they are 
absorbed into the economic system.977 “Modernization” stresses the cultural effects of 
global economic processes, of the West upon the non-West, integrates both global and 
local (external and internal, international and domestic) factors, and concepts from 
development economics and anthropology. 
 Internationalization focuses more on external, international processes, on what 
happens as the more powerful West in the “core” absorbs other peoples from the 
periphery into the global economic system. As this happens, the West, assumed to be 
more “active,” dominates the weaker, more passive “periphery” countries. This concept 
not only looks at economic factors, but also considers cultural issues, to a degree. What 
happens as the peripheral countries, from non-Western regions such as Asia, Africa, the 
South Pacific and Latin America, are absorbed into the “cultural universe” of the West? 
While “modernization” considers the cultural effects of the global economy on the 
                                                
977 The key question with “modernization” is what happens to the (internal) cultures of non-Western 
countries as they are absorbed into the Western-dominated global economic system. “Modernization” 
answers that the cultures of the non-Western countries will be “Western” on the surface, but not in their 




domestic cultures of peripheral nations, internationalization does not really consider the 
internal implications at all. It especially examines what has happened on the international 
level through historic processes of colonialism. “Modernization” does not really look at 
issues of colonialism. And internationalization’s focus is not exclusively on historical 
issues. It also looks at contemporary issues, of what happens on the international level as 
Western/international development ideologies978 such as free markets, democracy, good 
governance, sustainability, participatory development, human rights, and WID (women in 
development) impinge on non-Western countries. Internationalization is also relevant for 
examining imperialism, though on a historic level, not on a contemporary one. Can these 
contemporary processes (such as the imposition of Western/international development 
ideologies on peripheral countries) be called “imperialism”? That seems rather a strong 
charge. Perhaps the term global hegemony (or domination) might be more appropriate.979  
 After reflecting on technology concepts in several different disciplines,980 I 
came up with basic questions in six categories to consider the technological implications 
of these worldviews on the international level: 1) General concepts of technology: what 
are the most important technology-related ideas and phenomena associated with each 
international worldview studied here? 2) Technology in the international system: what 
                                                
978 See the definition of development ideology in the Glossary. I use the terms Western and international 
together here, because at present, Western countries from North America and Western Europe largely 
dominate the global enterprise of international development, in such organizations as the United Nations, 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and many of the multinational development banks. A 
non-Western power, Japan, is highly influential in the operations of the Asian Development Bank. But as 
we saw in the discussion of the place of Japanese aid in the global aid system in Chapter 2, Japan does not 
occupy a central place in the global aid system. It is likely that the system will become more diversified 
with the gradual rise of possible new economic powers in this century, such as China, Russia, India, Brazil, 
Indonesia, South Africa, and others.    
979 See the definitions of colonialism and ideology, and of hegemony in the Glossary. These concepts have 
hegemony and domination have been developed by anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff, and also by 
Antonio Gramsci. See Comaroff and Comaroff, Revelation and Revolution. 
980 For more details, see the various technology-related concepts in the Glossary. 
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are the most significant political (economic, social, other) factors present in the imported 
technologies and related ideas in the international worldview studied here?981 And did the 
international system affect these technologies/issues positively or negatively? Why? 3) 
Technology transfer: what were the important ideas/technologies transferred here, in the 
worldviews under consideration? Who were the main international actors in the external 
environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and what impacts did they 
have on the transfer outcomes? What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn? 4) 
Technology, culture, and the international system: what are the most significant cultural 
factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in these international 
worldviews?982 In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these 
technologies/ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) 
environments on the international level?983 How did these technological issues affect or 
enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment?984 5) Technology, 
cognition, and international relations: do the belief systems of any of these leaders (on 
technology issues on the international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, 
and how? Do the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing 
                                                
981 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
982 Ibid. 
983 This could be called the “international cultural ecology approach” to technology. This question is drawn 
from this anthropological definition of technology: “the means and agencies by which human societies 
cope with and transform their material environment” (Glick, “Technology,” 464). This definition is based 
on the theory of cultural ecology in anthropology, the study of how human societies adapt to surrounding 
environments, through technology and other means (Richard O. Clemmer, Daniel Myers, and Mary 
Elizabeth Rudden, Julian Steward and the Great Basin: The Making of an Anthropologist (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 1999); Yehudi A. Cohen, Man in Adaptation: The Cultural Present (Chicago: 
Aldine, 1974). Here I apply that idea to the study of international relations, how a particular nation-state or 
national actor uses technology and related phenomena to adapt to and transform its surrounding 
environment in the international system. 
984 Again, this is the cultural ecology approach to technology, applied to international relations. See 
Clemmer,  Myers, and Rudden, Julian Steward, and Cohen, Man in Adaptation for some explorations of 
the concept of cultural ecology. 
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conditions and reality? If so, how do these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes? 
And 6) Technonationalism as ideology: in these worldviews on external relations, is the 
concept of technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how?  
 Above I noted that I will use the same analytical concepts for cognition issues 
on the international level as I used on the domestic level. Also in this chapter I introduce 
an additional analytical framework related to globalization. Key aspects identified in my 
anthropological treatment of globalization include speeded up and intensified global 
connections, including economic, social, cultural, and political linkages.  Globalization 
can be ethnographically and comparatively assessed on the micro-level (how it is 
perceived by individual, human actors) or the macro-level (public, shared perceptions).  It 
does not spread from one center or cultural tradition, but from several.985 From this 
definition, we see that globalization applies to our contemporary age, but what about 
Japan in the period 1850-1895? The period of 1850 to 1895 represented unprecedented 
globalization for Japan, as evidenced by its return into the global system in 1868, and the 
spread of global communications (i.e. the telegraph) and transport (rail, ships) in this era, 
among other things. Here are the key questions I will explore to uncover the globalization 
aspects of international worldviews in this chapter, Chapter 6 and Chapter 8: 1) How do 
some of the most important worldviews here reflect and/or affect processes of 
globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or 
technology)? And how does globalization affect the worldviews?  2) If we consider these 
                                                
985 See the definition of Globalization in the Glossary. Primary parts of my definition are based on Arjun 
Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” in Global Culture: Nationalism, 
Globalization and Modernity, ed. M. Featherstone (Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage. 1990); Harumi Befu, “The 
Global Context of Japan Outside Japan,” in Befu and Guichard-Anguis, Globalizing Japan, 3-22; and Befu 
and Guichard-Anguis, Globalizing Japan.  
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global processes as people experienced them, on micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, 
public) levels, what do we learn? 3) Do these important global processes represent a form 
of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? 
  
Contexts of Japan’s Foreign Relations (1850-1895): Major Trends 
 
 
Contexts:  Japan’s External Political Relations 
 
 To enhance its authority in Japan and East Asia, the Tokugawa Shogunate 
adopted a policy of national seclusion (sakoku) from 1639 to 1854.  The policy banned 
Christianity and its missionaries from Japan, most Japanese travel overseas, and limited 
foreign trade to four countries (with China, Holland, Korea and the Ryukyus), through 
just a few ports.986 In 1853, “black ships” from the United States helped to force open 
Japan.  Japan officially opened in 1854, signing treaties of diplomatic relations with the 
United States, Russia, Great Britain, and others.  In 1858, Japan signed several unequal 
trade and friendship treaties that granted foreign powers extraterritorial rights, and limited 
Japan’s capacity to tax foreign trade.  Through these Japan was absorbed into an unequal 
system of foreign relations dominated by Western nations.  This led to an outflow of gold 
from Japan, raising commodity prices, internal unrest, and anti-foreign feelings.  The 
Shogunate was overthrown in 1867.987   
 After 1868, the new Meiji government began a program of aggressive internal 
westernization, to strengthen the nation and prevent its colonization by the West.  Soon 
Japan began negotiations to end the unequal treaties, not achieved until 1911.  Japan was 
                                                
986 Japan, “National Seclusion,” 1062. 
987 Ibid., “History of International Relations,” 616-617; Ibid., “Opening of Japan,” 1156-1157. 
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also involved in significant events on the Asian mainland.  In 1876, Japan forced Korea 
to sign a treaty granting the former unequal rights of trade, ahead of all other foreign 
powers.  Korea was a significant sphere of Chinese influence.  Various events led to war 
with China over Korea (1894-1895), which Japan finally won, gaining colonies in 
Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands.  Reparations from China contributed significantly to 
Japan’s industrialization, and gave greater access to the Chinese market for Japanese 
business.988  Japan also sent several significant official missions to tour the United States 
and Europe in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, including six Shogunate 
missions in the 1860s, and the famous Iwakura mission (1871-1873).  The missions 
provided the government the opportunity to attempt to renegotiate the unfair commercial 
treaties (to no avail), and to obtain technological knowledge.989  The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, founded in 1869, stood at the height of the bureaucratic pyramid in the early 
Meiji period, and was the only bureaucracy with the foreign expertise to translate and 
negotiate treaties and other external matters.990     
 Japan’s closest foreign relations in this period were with the United States.  The 
United States is the country that has perhaps most influenced Japan for the last one 
hundred fifty years.  The two societies were very different at their first contact in the 
1853, and their subsequent relations might be called, for the most part, “distant but 
harmonious.”  In the 1870s, both possessed modernizing militaries, industries, and 
political systems.  At first, Japan learned much more from the United States than the 
                                                
988 Ibid., “History of International Relations,” 616-617. 
989 Ibid., “Shogunate Missions to the West,” 1406; Ibid., “Iwakura Mission,” 640-641. 
990 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 317.  
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reverse; many American teachers and other foreign visitors helped Japanese to gain their 
first (direct) exposure to Western knowledge, science and culture.991   
 In Asia, until the late 1800s, Japan was continually influenced by Chinese 
traditions that it reshaped into a distinctive civilization.  With China’s loss of the Opium 
War (1840-1842), many Japanese saw China as increasingly backward.  Meiji Japan and 
Qing China signed a treaty of friendship in 1871, but tensions erupted over Japan’s 
interests and actions in the Ryukyus (Okinawa), Taiwan, and finally in Korea, significant 
areas of Chinese influence.  Events in Korea resulted in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895) that Japan won.  By 1895, Japan gained colonies in all three areas.992  Japan had 
had distant relations with Korea during the Tokugawa period, but after the Meiji 
Restoration, the latter maintained its seclusion policy.993  Japanese pressure for influence 
there led to conflict with China.994  Japan’s relations with Russia were also important.  
After 1868, both nations competed and occasionally cooperated regarding influence in 
Northeast Asia, especially in China, Manchuria and Korea.  After Japan’s victory in the 
Sino-Japanese War, the Russians became increasingly concerned.995 Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi, an important Japanese leader, attempted unsuccessfully to invade Taiwan in 
1593.  After 1868, Japanese interest in Taiwan increased as Japan contemplated resisting 
                                                
991 Japan, “The United States and Japan,” 1656.   
992 Ibid., “China and Japan,” 188-189. 
993 Before the Tokugawa period, in 1592 and 1597, Japan invaded Korea, but was repelled by the Koreans 
and the Chinese.  This inflicted great damage on Korea (Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827).  This signature 
case seems to have contributed greatly to tensions and ill feeling on both sides of the Korea Strait for a long 
period. 
994 Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827-828. 
995 Ibid., “Russia and Japan,” 1277-1278. 
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Western colonialism and acquiring its own colonies.996 Japan also began to restore trade 
and diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian regions.  These relations had ended with 
the national isolation period (1639-1854).997   
 Regarding Europe, Japan’s relations with Great Britain were the most 
important. Britain was an important model for Japanese industrialization.  Important 
Japanese scholars studied in Britain, and British teachers in Japan made significant 
contributions to Meiji Japan’s development.998  Germany and France both had a 
significant influence on early Meiji Japan, in the areas of medicine, law, politics, 
economics, education, and the military.999  
 Concerning intellectual trends in international relations from 1850 to 1895, the 
ideology of sonnô jôi (“revere the emperor, expel the barbarians,”) expressed the goal of 
national unity under imperial rule and shunning contact with foreigners.  This political 
doctrine was used to encourage the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate, to support the 
Meiji Restoration, and to contribute to the building of the modern Japanese state.1000  In 
1873, a major debate (Seikanron) broke out over whether Japan should punish Korea for 
refusing its overtures for improved relations.  Pro-attack supporters lost the debate.1001   
 After 1868, former samurai organized the imperial army and navy on Western 
principles into one of the world’s most formidable armed forces.  In line with fukoku 
kyôhei and the importation of advanced technologies to prevent Western invasion, the 
                                                
996 Ibid., “Taiwan,” 1504.  For more on Japan and Taiwan, see my discussion below (in Chapters 8 and 10) 
on Japan’s imperialistic interests in Taiwan from 1895 to 1945.  
997 Ibid., “Southeast Asia and Japan,” 1449. 
998 Ibid., “United Kingdom and Japan,” 1504. 
999 German advisors influenced the Meiji constitution, and the Japanese army was modeled after Prussia’s. 
Ibid., “Germany and Japan,” 452; Ibid., “France and Japan,” 407. 
1000 Ibid., “Sonnô Jôi,” 1445. 
1001 Ibid., “Seikanron,” 1336.   
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government founded a modern army drawing on all classes of society in 1869.1002  The 
army was modeled on Prussia’s, and the navy on Great Britain’s.  Before 1870, the 
military focused on internal security, but soon began preparing for foreign wars.  
National conscription began in 1873, and large-scale build-up in 1884.  “The 
independence of the supreme command” concept and active military leaders in the 
cabinet would have profound effects on Japan’s politics.1003  In the Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-1895), Japan totally defeated China, and became the Far East’s superior power.  
For Japan, the war meant the point when the military began decisive influence in politics, 
when power politics came to influence foreign policy, with empire building in China as a 
primary target, and intensified industrialization.  These trends greatly affected Japanese 
society and Asian international relations for the next half-century.1004             
Contexts: Japan’s External Economic Relations 
 
 During the Tokugawa period, the Dutch were the only Europeans allowed to 
trade with Japan.  During national seclusion, the Dutch became the main source of 
Western knowledge for Japan.1005  Japan opened to more extensive foreign trade in 1858, 
with the signing of the Harris Treaty with the United States.  At first, Japan’s largest 
exports were raw silk, raw material goods and foodstuffs, and semi-manufactures. Key 
imports included textiles, ironware, ships, and guns.  Major trading partners were Great 
                                                
1002 Fukoku kyôhei means “rich nation, strong army.”  See the discussion in Chapter 4 and in the Glossary 
section. 
1003 Ibid., “Imperial Japanese Armed Forces.”  
1004 Ibid., “Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895,” 1432. 
1005 Ibid., “Dutch Trade,” 299. 
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Britain (which received eighty percent of Japan’s trade), the United States and 
Holland.1006   
 After 1868, the first major goal of Meiji Japan’s trade policies was to achieve 
equality with the West.  Unequal treaties signed with major Western powers limited 
Japan’s negotiating power.  Japan did not attain tariff independence until 1911. After 
1868, Japan’s foreign trade, including exports and imports, grew every year.   The 
government’s first promotion of trade occurred in 1873.  The Meiji government 
supported Japan’s modernization with loans, subsidies and technical help.  Japan had to 
import commodities, equipment and other materials that it did possess, paid for through 
exports. From 1868 to 1912, there were only twelve years when Japan had a surplus 
balance of trade.1007  In the early Meiji era, both the Japanese government and private 
firms viewed foreign investment in Japan as a means for Japan to acquire access to 
foreign markets, technology, capital, and management experience, so they actively sought 
foreign technical assistance.  Many foreign instructors and engineers came to Japan, and 
brought a great deal of industrial expertise, but Japan was wary of foreign domination, so 
most foreign instructors did not stay long.1008  The first Japanese businesses to operate 
overseas were trading companies that opened branches in China, Europe and the United 
States, from 1876.  Early businesses also included those related to silk and textiles, 
banking and insurance.1009  
  
                                                
1006 Ibid., “Foreign Trade,” 399-400; Ibid., “Government Policy on Foreign Trade,” 403. 
1007 Ibid., “Foreign Trade,” 399-400; Ibid., “Government Policy on Foreign Trade,” 403. 
1008 Ibid., “Foreign Investment in Japan,” 398. 
1009 Ibid., “Japanese Businesses Overseas,” 664. 
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 In the Meiji era, Japan gained much of its knowledge of foreign technological 
and economic systems through American teachers visiting Japan, and young Japanese 
going abroad. Very soon this economic relationship would become important for Japan, 
the United States, and the security of the whole Asia-Pacific region.1010  Limited trade 
between Japan and Korea continued during the Tokugawa period.  After 1868, Japan 
pressured Korea to open itself to diplomatic and trade relations, which Korea resisted.  
Eventually the two countries signed an unequal treaty in 1876 that granted Japan 
dominant trading power.  Competition with China over Korea led to the Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-1894), and formal Japanese colonization in Korea from 1910.1011  Limited 
trade between Japan and Taiwan (via the Dutch) earlier in the Tokugawa period greatly 
decreased after 1683.  Taiwan became a Japanese colony after the Sino-Japanese War, so 
its economic importance for Japan would soon increase.  Britain dominated Japan’s 
foreign trade in the early Meiji period, and British instructors and engineers aided Japan’s 
industrialization and railroad development.1012  Instructors from Germany and France 
also had significant input in Japan’s technological and economic growth in this 
period.1013                  
 
                                                
1010 Economic factors such as immigration, trade, and pressures for resource-poor Japan to colonize Asia 
are among the issues that would soon emerge.  See my discussion of economic connections between the 
United States and Japan from 1895 to 1945 below in Chapter 8.  Ibid., “United States and Japan,” 1656-
1657. 
1011 Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827-828. 
1012 Ibid., “Foreign Trade,” 399; Ibid., “United Kingdom and Japan,” 1655. 
1013 Instructors from Germany advised Japan on such areas as chemistry, mining, agriculture, and French 
teachers helped with economics and industrialization, in particular.  Ibid., “Germany and Japan,” 452; Ibid., 
“France and Japan,” 407.  
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Contexts: Japan’s External Relations: Imperialism 
 Japan’s first attempts at colonialism began soon after the Meiji Restoration 
(1868).  The Meiji government realized the strategic importance of Hokkaido and other 
northern islands (including Sakhalin and the Kuriles), and established the Kaitakushi 
(Hokkaido Colonization Office) in 1869.1014  In a treaty signed with Russia in 1875, 
Russia gained control of Sakhalin, while the Kaitakushi controlled Hokkaido and the 
Kuriles.1015  The Kaitakushi hired many foreign advisors who helped to found the 
forerunner of Hokkaido University.  The Kaitakushi aggressively advocated the 
development of Hokkaido, but in doing so, systematically denied the indigenous Ainu 
population their hunting, fishing and land rights.  A political scandal erupted in 1881, and 
the Kaitakushi was disbanded in 1882.  By 1886, all of Hokkaido became a modern 
Japanese prefecture.1016 To help develop Hokkaido, in 1873 the national government 
established the Tondenhei (Colonist Militia), composed of former samurai from various 
northern prefectures, to settle in Hokkaido. By 1882, over 2,400 settlers had moved to 
Hokkaido under the program. By 1890, as Russia’s interests in the Far East became much 
more visible, Japan ramped up efforts to increase the number of settlers and its military 
presence in the region. Over 40,000 people, both former samurai and commoners, were 
                                                
1014 Hokkaido is the northernmost island of contemporary Japan.  Before the Meiji era, Japanese settlement 
primarily extended up through the northern end of Honshu Island and the southern tip of Hokkaido, around 
the region of the city of Hakodate.  Sakhalin is a long, narrow island located just north of Hokkaido, and 
separated from the Siberian mainland by a narrow strait. 
1015 According to an 1855 treaty, Sakhalin was to be jointly occupied by both Russia and Japan, but 
tensions increased in the 1860s and 1870s.  Japan’s presence formally ended with the treaty signed in 1875, 
but this was not the end of Russo-Japanese conflict over the island (Ibid., “Sakhalin,” 1301). 
1016 Ibid., “Kaitakushi,” 715. 
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recruited. By 1904, with an adequate increase in population and the presence of an army 
division in the territory, the Tondenhei system ended.1017  
 The Ryukyu Islands had paid regular tribute to China since the fourteenth 
century. Although Japan exercised much influence in the Ryukyu Islands since 1609, the 
year of an invasion by the Satsuma domain, it was not until 1872 that the Meiji 
government designated the islands as a daimyo domain and announced to Western 
governments that it would take responsibility for diplomatic affairs. In 1879, the 
government declared the Ryukyus to be Okinawa prefecture under the new prefectural 
system, and China’s Qing dynasty complained. It was not until the end of the Sino-
Japanese War (1895) that China agreed to Japan’s acquisition of the Ryukyus.1018   
 One of the doctrines guiding Japanese expansion starting about this time was 
the Nanshinron (“Southern Expansion”) school of thought.  It argued that Japan should 
extend its influence into Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands, “legitimate” spheres of 
Japanese influence.1019  The Nanshinron doctrine became influential in thought about 
Japan’s overseas influence from the Meiji era through 1945, and was eventually used to 
justify political and territorial influence into Southeast Asia and the Pacific, including 
concepts that free trade, immigration, and sea routes to the region were important for 
Japan.  Nanshinron was also used to justify the expansion of the Imperial Navy.1020  The 
                                                
1017 Ibid., “Tondenhei,” 1604. 
1018 Ibid., “Ryûkyû kizoku mondai,” 1285. 
1019 Originally the Nanshinron doctrine stressed the value of Japanese influence in the “Southern Seas” 
(islands of the Southwest Pacific above the equator), but was later expanded to include Southeast Asia as 
well (Ibid., “Southern Expansion Doctrine,” 1450).  
1020 Ibid., “Imperial Japanese Armed Forces,” 54; Ibid., “Southern Expansion Doctrine,” 1450. 
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Hokushinron (or Northern Expansion, Advance-to-The-North) doctrine advocated 
Japanese expansion into Korea and Manchuria.1021   
 
Views about Japan’s Foreign Relations, 1850-1895 
 
 
Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations 
 
 Fukuzawa Yukichi. Fukuzawa Yukichi believed that it was wrong for Japanese 
to think of foreigners as an inferior species, only intent on invasion and 
“exploitation.”1022  This thinking was supported by the Kaikoku school of thought, 
according to which Japan should peaceably open her doors to foreign contact and trade, 
and absorb Western knowledge, technology and science to defend itself.1023  In this view, 
China was defeated in the Opium War and in other confrontations with the West because 
it ignored Western techniques.1024 According to Fukuzawa, both duty and self-interest 
required Japan to renounce its isolation and to restart its international relations.1025  
Fukuzawa’s top priorities for Japan’s foreign relations were its interests and 
independence.1026  In the early Meiji period, some Japanese scholars argued that 
international relations was based on a universal moral principle, that countries never 
intentionally harmed other countries, and would not suffer harm unless they behaved 
dishonestly.  In 1876, Fukuzawa criticized this view, arguing it might apply to 
                                                
1021 Ibid. 
1022 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 122. 
1023 See my comments about the Kaikoku School in Chapter 3. 
1024 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 20. 
1025 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 122. 
1026 Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 161. 
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individuals, but not to nations.  Rather, strong ethnic sentiments (jôjitsu) and an 
“irrational bias” (hempashin) bound people together in clans and nations.1027       
 In his writings before 1876, Fukuzawa believed that as reason deemed that all 
men should have equal rights, so should all nations.  A “law of nations” governed the 
behavior among Western nations, in principle and practice.1028  The first school of 
Western international law introduced to Japan (in 1865) stressed that international 
relations are based on international law, derived from immutable human reason.1029  This 
idea was likened to the Confucian doctrine of human good nature, similar to the 
Confucian ethical path.1030  In order for Japan to attain adequate “country rights” 
(kokken), her people must have adequate minken (people’s rights).  Only then would 
Japan be strong enough to defend itself.1031  By 1876, Fukuzawa concluded that the 
rational law of nations had no correspondence with reality, and that international relations 
were entirely different from interpersonal relations.  Rather, the former were based on 
“quarrels over power and profit.”1032  International relations in practice have no relation 
                                                
1027 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 128. Fukuzawa’s views of the West, and Japan’s international 
relations, were also shaped by his personal experience.  At twenty-five, Fukuzawa joined the first official 
voyage of a Japanese ship, the Kanrin Maru, to a foreign port (San Francisco) (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 
37).  Fukuzawa also saw Europe.  Under internal and external pressure (the latter from the British and the 
Russians), in 1861 the Bakufu (Shogunate government) renegotiated the opening of four major ports.  From 
early 1862 to 1863, it sent an embassy to six European countries, including Britain, France, Prussia and 
Russia.  Fukuzawa was allowed to join, since he worked in the government’s translation office.  His 
accounts became two books, one of which was Diary of the West (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 45-47). 
1028 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 123-125. 
1029 This work was based on the thought of the Western scholars Grotius, Pufendorf and Wolf, from a 
Chinese translation of Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (Japanese: Bankoku Kôhô) (Blacker, 
Japanese Enlightenment, 126).   
1030 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 126-128. 
1031 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 133. 
1032 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 130. In his Jiji Shogen (Current Affairs) (1881), Fukuzawa reviews 
the history of Europe’s international conflicts, concluding that people’s rights have no weight in 
international conflict, and are not based on Christian values.  Power, money and Machiavellianism are 
important. “The way of power” drives international conflicts, and Japan must strengthen itself militarily 
and economically (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 151). 
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with theory.  If necessary, a nation must use violence or trickery to gain victory.1033  In 
1878, Fukuzawa argued that international relations were governed by jakuniku-kyôshoku 
(the strong devouring the weak).  Only by adopting Western civilization could Japan 
become strong enough to defend itself.1034   
 From 1882 until the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Fukuzawa’s 
writings changed, stressing the primary importance of strengthening Japan in 
international relations.  Internal government issues like people’s rights took on a 
secondary importance.1035  After 1895, Fukuzawa’s worries about Japan’s independence 
disappeared, since it had proved its strength.  Now it could concentrate on building an 
ideal civilization.1036     
 Fukuzawa’s generally pro-government Jiji Shinpo newspaper took an 
aggressive stance about Japanese foreign policy in Asia.1037  He claimed that Japan was 
“major and … civilized” while Korea was “minor and … uncivilized.”  Japan should 
“leave Asia” and join the West, treating China and Korea as the West treated them.  
Fukuzawa was angry at both countries.1038  He believed that Japan had taken off an “old 
coat” and put on a new one—Western civilization.  After the start of the Sino-Japanese 
War, he called the Japanese those who tried to “advance civilization,” and the Chinese 
                                                
1033 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 129-130. 
1034 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 132-133. 
1035 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 133-134. 
1036 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 137. 
1037 The Jiji Shinpo newspaper was notable for its anti-Chinese, anti-Korean tone (Tamaki, Yukichi 
Fukuzawa, 177). 
1038 This is also known as the “Datsua-nyûô” (leave Asia, enter the West) doctrine. See Datsua-nyûô in the 
Glossary. Fukuzawa was angry because the Chinese army had defeated an attempted Korean coup 
supported by the Japanese army (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 159).   
325 
 
those who tried to “hinder” it.  Here he seems to have lost the rationality seen in his 
writings on Western civilization.1039    
 Ito Hirobumi.  Shortly before the Meiji Restoration, Ito supported the 
Shogunate’s overthrow and strengthening foreign relations.1040  Early in the 1870s, there 
were two main competing viewpoints among Japan’s leaders about foreign policy.  Ito’s 
group wished to solve the problem of unequal treaties quickly.  The other group called for 
a punitive expedition to Korea, for perceived insults to Japan.1041  In 1884, China and 
Japan clashed over Korea, which the former saw as its “vassal state.”  Ito showed what 
Hamada calls a protective, paternal attitude toward “impotent” Korea, reserving Japan’s 
right to intervene.1042   
 Mori Arinori.  In 1871, the Japanese government sent Mori to the United States 
as its first resident diplomat in Washington, to help prepare for the arrival of the Iwakura 
Mission.1043  At twenty-three, Mori was fluent in English, already had experience with 
the United States, and was a high status samurai.  With no diplomatic experience, he had 
to rely on several older prominent Americans for advice about diplomatic issues.1044 
 Yamagata Aritomo.  To protect Japan externally, in Meiji Japan, it was quickly 
accepted that a national, modernized military must be developed.  Yamagata saw the 
abolition of feudalism and restored national unity as prerequisites.1045  Fear of external 
                                                
1039 Ibid., xxv, 158-160. Fukuzawa’s views of China are treated much more extensively in Narsimhan, 
Japanese Perceptions. 
1040 Hamada, Prince Ito, 47. 
1041 Ibid., 64-65. The latter group was part of the Seikanron debate, mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
1042 Ibid., 87-90, 110-111. 
1043 This embassy was in the United States for five months in 1872 (Van Sant, Mori Arinori, xx). 
1044 Ibid., xx. The people he relied on included Hamilton Fish, U.S. Secretary of State, Mori’s secretary 
Charles Lanman, and Joseph Henry, scientist and director of the Smithsonian Institution (Ibid.,  xx).  
1045 Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 250-251. 
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invasion drove his thought about the buildup of the national power infrastructure, 
reflecting his goal to strengthen the military.1046  Yamagata supported universal 
conscription, the model of European nations.  To defend the nation, Japan’s military must 
compare well with those of other nations.1047   
 On foreign affairs, in 1890 he argued that Japan must possess a line of 
sovereignty (territorial integrity—shukensen) and a line of advantage (riekiesen) beyond 
Japan, for the protection of its national interests.1048  By 1895 he viewed the growing 
power of Russia and other Western nations in East Asia with concern.  Therefore he 
supported large military budget increases, and throughout his career, the strengthening of 
the military due to the external threat by Western nations in general, later by Russia.1049  
For much of the Meiji period, Yamagata viewed Russia as a threat, and supported an 
alliance with Britain.1050   
 Kato Hiroyuki.  Kato’s mature thought on Japan’s international relations was 
based on German Social Darwinism.1051  His thought is steeped in political realism and 
power issues.1052  International law results from the international battle for survival, and 
is essentially unstable.  Kato’s understanding of international relations involves several 
levels of morality:  1) between civilized and uncivilized peoples, 2) among civilized 
nations (Volkermoral), and 3) that of one nation or people (Volksmoral).  About the first 
                                                
1046 Ibid., 270-271. 
1047 Ibid., 254-255. 
1048 Later Yamagata viewed Tsushima Island as the western line of sovereignty, and Korea as the line of 
advantage (Ibid., 248-249). 
1049 Ibid., 248-250. 
1050 Ibid., 250, 270-271. 
1051 German Social Darwinism focused on the competition between countries and between racial groups, 
different from Anglo-American Social Darwinism, which emphasized the struggle for existence between 
individuals in a capitalist society (Davis, Moral and Political, 60). 
1052 Ibid., 60, 74. 
327 
 
level, concerning race, although the exploitation of weaker peoples by the strong is good 
for progress, the strong should not totally dominate “savages.”  Since we are all the same 
species, eventually “natural sympathy” (shizenteki dôjô) will govern race relations.1053  
Relations between civilized states are characterized by immorality; there is no 
“superstate” to control them.  Their interactions are as “natural” as those in the physical 
environment.  Nations also operate in terms of self-interest, cooperating only when they 
wish.1054  Self-interest allows attacking others, yet a new spirit of international 
cosmopolitanism sometimes replaces it.1055  On the last level, citizens fulfill their highest 
duty by commitment to the welfare and happiness of their country.  Seeking a citizen’s 
highest dignity and rights also usually benefits the nation, since whatever benefits an 
individual without harming the nation or other individuals is good (Davis 1966: 73-74).  
In Japan, willingness to die for the Emperor is the highest form of evolved devotion to 
the state.  Kato combines this interpretation of Social Darwinism with the samurai ethical 
code of bushido, and applies it to international affairs.1056  
 Non-Western Social Darwinists like Kato often saw Europeans as the most 
advanced peoples.  Kato argued that Asia was more submissive, “feminine,” and 
backward than Europe.  China achieved a high level of civilization in the past, but had 
stagnated.  Only Japan had an assertive, sufficiently “masculine” culture to break from 
                                                
1053 Ibid., 73, 76. 
1054 Because of the inequality of power relations, nations are often motivated to pursue their own self-
interest, and only cooperate or seek peace when their powers are nearly equal (Ibid., 75). 
1055 Ibid., 74-76. 
1056 Bushido stressed Confucian virtues of propriety, sincerity, benevolence, wisdom, righteousness, and the 
honor of death as the highest expression of loyalty. At the time of the wars with China and Russia (1894-
1895 and 1904-1905), the Japanese government reinvigorated bushido to encourage the sacrifice of citizens 
for the nation.  According to Kato, the state could engage in aggressive wars to enhance its survival in the 
international “jungle.”  Social Darwinism and bushido justified gross militarism (Unoura, “Samurai 
Darwinism,” 246-247).  
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the bonds of tradition, modernize, escape Asia, meld with the West, and join the modern 
world.1057  This was “proven” in the transformation of Japan since the Meiji Restoration, 
and victories in wars against China and Russia (1895 and 1905).1058  Eventually Japan 
and China will join the coming world-state (Weltreich), dominated by Europe.  Due to 
enhanced economic relations and international development, by the late 1800s, the 
nations of Europe showed the first signs of the world-state, seen in increasing 
international ties in many fields.  Eventually each state in the international system will 
become the cells or organs of the “single great organism” (ichi daiyûkibutsu),1059 
international rights will progress, and morality will experience a tremendous change.1060  
Comparison of Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations (1850-1895) 
 
 In their views of international relations, all five leaders wish to strengthen Japan 
so it can survive and flourish in the international system. To do so, all five realize that 
Japan must borrow needed political ideas, institutions, and military technologies. 
Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, and Kato are political realists, Yamagata the most 
conservative. Fukuzawa and Yamagata view the international system as driven primarily 
by the hunger of various state actors for power. Yamagata is the most overtly supportive 
of a strong military. He sees military reform as Japan’s top priority, international or 
domestic, to be preceded by ending feudalism and uniting the country. In their language 
                                                
1057 The idea of Japan “escaping” from Asia to join the West was captured in the slogan of Datsua-ron (the 
“discourse of leaving Asia” (also called “Datsua-nyûô;” see “Datsua-nyûô” in the Glossary). According to 
this slogan, Japan could fully modernize only by exiting Asia and becoming a part of the West.  This 
happened when Japan became the strongest Asian ally of the United States during the Cold War.  The 
dispute over whether Japan should remain an integral part of Asia or “leave” has continued through modern 
Japanese history.  Today Japan struggles on various levels to reintegrate into the rest of Asia.     
1058 Davis, Moral and Political, 78-82. 
1059 The views of Weltreich and ichi daiyûkibutsu are examples of globalization. Globalization issues are 
discussed toward the end of this chapter. 
1060 Ibid., 76-77, 82. 
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and images here, Fukuzawa and Kato in particular show evolutionistic influence. 
Regarding Japan’s reforming itself to better function in the international system, 
Fukuzawa, Mori and Ito were highly supportive of borrowing Western political ideas, 
institutions, and innovations. The first two were highly influenced by Western, liberal-
leaning political values. Early in his career, American influence on Mori’s diplomatic 
thought and practice was strong. Fukuzawa and especially Ito show more caution 
regarding reforms than Mori.1061 Kato is the leader with the most complex views of 
international relations. While his views were often racist and sexist, current trends of 
globalization seem to be somewhat imitating his estimation of how the international 
system would evolve into a world “super-state” controlled by the West. Fukuzawa, Ito 
and Kato were also realists in how they viewed international law. Ito had the most 
practical view. He knew that the West dominated the current system of international law, 
and believed that for Japan to survive, it must become strong, fit in, and earn a high place 
of honor in that system.1062 
 On the philosophical and cultural foundations of their views of international 
relations, all five leaders except Mori show a high degree of political realism.1063 The 
influence of Western political thought is great upon each leader, except Yamagata. In his 
case, Western military thought was more influential. Fukuzawa and Mori show more 
liberal political influence, Mori from the United States. German thought especially 
influenced Ito and Kato. Fukuzawa and Mori were more liberal leaning, while the other 
                                                
1061 Later in his career, Mori’s policy efforts were more focused on the domestic front (education), to 
strengthen Japan internally, so it might become a robust player in the international system. At this point, his 
thought seems less liberal, but more nationalistic and pragmatic. 
1062 These points on Ito’s views of international law are implied. 
1063 Mori shows more political realism toward the end of his career. 
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three leaders were more conservative. Mori, Fukuzawa, and Kato were influenced by 
evolutionary thought in their views of international relations, Kato the most profoundly 
and directly. Of the five leaders, Kato combined Western political ideologies with Asian 
ones to the highest degree.1064  
 Regarding their views of the Japanese nation, Japanese nationalism, and of 
Japan in the international system, all five leaders desire to support and build up the 
Japanese nation and assure its survival, yet vary in how much they are willing to borrow 
Western ideologies or institutions to do so. To strengthen Japan as a nation, Fukuzawa, 
Mori and Ito are more willing to borrow Western ideas, while Ito, Yamagata, and Kato 
are willing to borrow Western institutions and some ideas, more cautiously. Fukuzawa’s 
definition of Japanese nationalism as driven by strong ethnic and “irrational” emotional 
ties seems conventional. Earlier, Mori showed a more liberal view of the nation, and later 
became more conservative.1065 Concerning Japan’s place in the international system, all 
five leaders wish to build up Japan as a nation so that it can successfully compete and 
survive. For its survival, both Fukuzawa and Yamagata stressed Japan’s international 
relations and external defense as more primary than domestic issues.1066 To survive in the 
international system, Japan must open itself to foreign knowledge, and study the West’s 
appropriate political systems and constitutions, applying them carefully (Fukuzawa and 
Ito). Without adequate reform and modernization, Japan cannot defend itself or survive. 
                                                
1064 As noted above, Kato combined evolutionary views of international relations with the Confucian ethics 
of the bushido code, and supported the patriotic practices of State Shinto, essentially as developed by the 
Meiji state. 
1065 In his earlier views, Mori argued that Japan should take the radical steps of adopting English and 
Christianity as the national language and religion, while later in his career, there was a strong connection 
between nationalism and his mature view of education policy. He wished to use education as a tool to 
promote Japanese nationalism. 
1066 This was Fukuzawa’s view from 1882-1895. 
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Earlier in his career, Mori suggests the most radical degrees of reform for Japan, but later, 
his approach moderates. Kato’s extensive arguments, marrying evolutionary ideas, 
biological terminology and Confucian ideology, seem the most creative here.1067  
 All five leaders vary in how they view the West, and acknowledge that it 
dominates the international system (1850-1895). Fukuzawa and Mori are the most 
positive of the five. Yamagata is the most wary, viewing Russia and the West as Japan’s 
greatest security threat. For international relations, all five are willing to enthusiastically 
borrow from the West: general knowledge and technology (Fukuzawa), diplomatic 
thought and practice (Mori), political theory, ideas and institutions (Ito), military strategy 
and technologies for defense (Yamagata), and evolutionary theory to explain Japan’s 
place in the international system (Kato).1068 
 Four of the five leaders see Japan’s neighbors as inferior to Japan, even China 
(Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata and Kato). Kato again applies his evolutionary, gendered ideas 
of international relations in his image of Asia as the passive, feminine East. Yamagata 
and Ito suggest that Japan has a right (or duty) to intervene in the affairs of other Asian 
states.1069 
 Four of the five leaders draw heavily on modern science and technology at 
various points in their thought on international relations. Fukuzawa sees the West’s 
                                                
1067 To explain Japan and international relations, Kato takes evolutionary ideas and combines them with the 
samurai bushido code of Confucian ethics. His use of biological terminology in referring to nation-states as 
“cells” or “organs” in the “single great organism” (the coming “world-state”) that dominates the 
international system is also very interesting. Ideas like these would later be used by the Japanese state to 
encourage patriotism, war, militarism, and Japanese nationalism.  
1068 Kato also uses concepts of gender to explain the behavior of various actors, including that of the 
aggressive, masculine West. He sees Europeans are the most advanced, the ones who will control the 
international system and the coming “world-state.” 
1069 This is seen in Yamagata’s argument for Japan’s need for nearby spheres of influence in Asia, and in 
Ito’s support for Japanese intervention in Korea, even before 1895. 
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currently superior knowledge and technology as crucial for Japan’s survival in the 
international system. Mori greatly admires the West’s/America’s superior science and 
technology, cataloguing it in Life and Resources in America. While Yamagata 
acknowledges the superiority of Western military and scientific technologies and wants 
Japan to master them for survival, Kato draws concepts from Western “scientific” 
thought to explain the international system, Japan’s place in it, and the system’s future. 
 Concepts of morality and religion somewhat affect three of the leaders’ views of 
international relations. Fukuzawa has no specific ideas relating spirituality or religion to 
international relations, though he feels Japan must develop proper “spirits” of freedom 
and individual initiative to master technology, key to guarantee Japan’s independence. 
Mori admires Christianity and what he perceives to be its role in making the West great, 
so earlier, he urged Japan to adopt it as the national religion. Kato has a complex, 
multilevel concept of morality underlying his explanation of international relations, 
incorporating ideas about race, civilization, survival, nature, and instinct. He also wants 
to use State Shinto to build up Japan, for it to gain a stronger place internationally. 
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations (1850-
1895)  
 
 Development Issues. To analyze the development-related issues of these 
leaders’ views of Japan’s external political relations, as noted above, I will use the 
concept of internationalization here, supplemented by “modernization,” if relevant. What 
do we uncover in the views of these five leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Yamagata and 
Kato) on Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895), in light of internationalization? 
In their view, is it true that the West was attempting to subjugate Japan into its own 
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cultural universe as it drew Japan into the global trading system, to put Japan in an 
inferior position, dominate and exploit it? In this process, would Japan be colonized?  
 It is obvious that these five leaders accept the premises of internationalization: 
the West wishes to dominate and control Japan, economically and politically. This belief 
motivated these leaders to work and study hard, and take many urgent actions. They are 
generally pragmatic in their political realism, and in their assessments of how Japan 
should respond to the challenge. Since Western nations were the most successful and 
powerful in international politics, these leaders were eager to borrow from Western 
political thought and institutions, presumed to be part of the West’s success in 
international relations. Some of the leaders (Fukuzawa and Mori) are attracted to liberal-
leaning “Anglo-American” thought, given the huge success of the United States 
economically and technologically, and of Britain in technology and empire building. 
Others (Kato, Ito, and Yamagata) are attracted to German political thought and military 
technologies, due to Germany’s military and technological successes, and the greater 
“suitability” of its systems for Japanese culture. None of the five leaders wanted the 
pressure of the Western-dominated global economic system or cultural universe to crush 
Japan and its culture. Their reflection on cultural issues focused more on protecting 
Japan’s domestic culture, not really on international aspects. The exceptions were their 
view that Western culture must not destroy Japan’s culture, and the earlier view of pro-
Westernizers in the bunmei kaika movement, that Western culture was vastly superior, 
and must be rapidly acquired to make Japan modern. In the tension of whether internal 
development or external defense should take precedence, several of the leaders wavered 
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in priority at various stages (Fukuzawa, Mori), while Ito and Yamagata put more 
emphasis on the external throughout their careers.  
 In his complex views of the global system, including its moral underpinnings 
and future development, Kato accepts that in the long run, the process of 
internationalization, of the West absorbing and dominating the passive, peripheral East, 
will continue until the West totally dominates the future world-state.1070 The five leaders 
admit the present superiority of the West over Japan and the rest of Asia in various 
international arenas and issues, including the international system (economically and 
politically), colonialism, science and technology, and the presumed religious and moral 
underpinnings of international strength.1071 In their hierarchical views of the international 
system, several of the leaders held racist views about the West’s superiority over Japan, 
and Japan’s superiority over the rest of Asia.1072 It is ironic that as these leaders were 
wary of the threats that internationalization and possible Western colonialism presented 
to Japan and the rest of Asia, Japan in some ways repeated a similar pattern with many of 
its neighboring regions and states, some before 1895, and some after.1073 
 Is it relevant to use the concept of “modernization” to examine what happened 
in the worldviews of Japan’s external political relations, 1850-1895? The key question 
would be: in the international relations processes connected with the absorption of Japan 
                                                
1070 With the rise of China and other non-Western powers, this belief should not go unquestioned. 
1071 Fukuzawa and Mori viewed many of the strengths of the West as partly stemming from “spiritual” 
factors: strength of spirit, independence, morality and initiative. They also attributed some of the 
international strengths of the West as flowing from these internal factors. Other leaders here (Yamagata and 
Kato) admired the strengths of Japanese morality and spirit, and believed them to be superior to the West’s. 
They likely also hoped that these qualities would be a source of international strength for Japan.  
1072 Regarding Asia, the views of Fukuzawa and Kato in particular were racist. For Fukuzawa’s views, see 
Narsimhan, Japanese Perceptions.  
1073 Is this true, that Japan repeated the pattern of Western colonialism in East Asia and the Pacific? This is 
an interesting question, but one that seems beyond the scope of the present study, though I reflect on it 
briefly in Part 4 of the dissertation. 
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into the global economic system, what happened to Japan culturally, especially in the 
international arena? Did it become more “Western” on the surface? Did the core of these 
cultural features stay Japanese? It seems hard to apply very much “modernization” here. 
On external political relations, I cannot really examine domestic political or cultural 
features, the main feature that “modernization” covers. In their views of international 
relations, these leaders wanted to enthusiastically adopt Western political ideas and 
military technologies. Japan quickly learned to function effectively in Western diplomacy 
and especially in the use of Western military technologies (consider its victory in the 
Sino-Japanese war and other wars soon to follow). There are several cultural elements 
and angles connected with other aspects of the leaders’ views of Japan’s external political 
relations that we have examined here (such as the philosophical foundations of their 
views of Western diplomacy, and their views of nationalism), but the connections to 
“modernization” seem rather indirect. 
 In their thought about science, technology, and international relations, all of the 
leaders drew on modern scientific and technological principles from the West in various 
ways. In this area, it is implicit in their thought that Japan will be able to master and draw 
on these principles and technologies without culturally disintegrating and losing its soul. 
In these external political issues, what happens to Japan’s internal culture does not seem 
to really seem to be an issue of concern. Rather, in science and technology used for 
Japan’s international relations, the focus is more on using them to strengthen Japan’s 
external defense capabilities. This does not mean that these leaders did not have concerns 
about how Japan’s interaction with the West could affect the identity, integrity, and 
culture of Japan. As we noted in Chapter 3, they were highly concerned about these 
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issues, but when considering Japan’s culture, their focus seems to have been more on 
internal issues rather than external ones.  
 What about applying “modernization” to the spiritual and moral underpinnings 
of Japan’s international relations? Three of the leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato) wish 
to use elements of religion or “spirit” to motivate the Japanese people for the ardors of 
the development task. Fukuzawa and Mori are more willing to draw on “Western” 
sources, and Kato on “Japanese” ones. With a properly strengthened cultural core, Japan 
would have the fortitude to develop economically, compete successfully in international 
trade, and maintain its political independence. It seems the priority of these three leaders 
is to strengthen Japan’s internal cultural fortitude first, to withstand the onslaught of 
Western culture. Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato imply that the internal cultural side is 
important. But placing priority on first strengthening Japan externally, in its diplomatic 
and trade capabilities, rather than internally, might go further in protecting its identity and 
cultural core. Yamagata and Ito placed priority on addressing the external factors first, 
since foreign political or economic invasion and control threatened Japan’s very 
existence as a nation. A balance of external and internal processes may have been 
optimum. It seems that none of these leaders explicitly contemplated these issues, 
because they were in the “thick” of the battle, and many of these concepts had not yet 
been well formulated. 
Technology Issues. To analyze the technology-related aspects of these leaders’ 
worldviews of Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895), I will ask several 
questions in six major categories: 1) general concepts of technology, 2) technology in the 
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international system, 1074 3) technology transfer, 4) technology, culture, and the 
international system, 5) technology, cognition, and international relations,1075 and 6) 
technonationalism as ideology.   
 On general concepts of technology, what are the most important technology-
related ideas and phenomena associated with the worldviews of external political 
relations studied here? In general, each of these leaders recognized the importance of 
Japan becoming a modern, scientifically and technologically advanced nation in order to 
win a position of respect in the international system, especially Fukuzawa, Kato, 
Yamagata, and Mori. Above we noted how four of the five leaders draw quite a bit on 
modern science and technology in their ideas on foreign affairs. In most of their minds, 
especially Yamagata’s, military ideas and technologies were one of the key forces that 
Japan must master and use to strengthen its position in the international system. 
Fukuzawa, Kato, and Mori show the influence of “scientific” thinking in their 
evolutionistic ideas about political development and international relations. In his 
arguments about the Japanese nation, Kato again draws on evolutionary theory. 
Fukuzawa also greatly values the mastery of modern technology as key in helping Japan 
to defend itself and grow in the international system. Three of the leaders stress 
“spiritual” values (from the West, Fukuzawa, Mori, or the East, Kato), to help Japan 
                                                
1074 According to Szyliowicz, technology inherently operates as a part of various systems. It is also a 
system of inputs, throughputs, and outputs.  Inputs include raw materials, parts, and knowledge, 
throughputs the organization and control of the manufacturing process, and outputs the completed product 
(Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology,  Development, 8). 
1075 The main emphasis here, in the concept of technology and cognitive factors articulated by Szyliowicz, 
is that the viewpoints and beliefs of policy and decision-makers constrain and greatly affect the outcome of 
technology transfer cases and projects, positively or negatively. Belief systems can blind decision-makers 
to reality, and failure to adjust their viewpoints and decisions to changing conditions can greatly affect 
outcomes (Ibid., 8, 212, 223). 
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strengthen itself for development and the mastery of technology, so that it can survive in 
the international system.  
 Second, concerning technology in the international system, what are the most 
significant political factors present in the imported technologies and related ideas in the 
international worldview studied here?1076 In the five leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s 
external political relations, there are many connections between political and 
technological issues. To survive and strengthen its position in the international system, 
Japan needs both advanced political knowledge and development relevant for its society, 
and strong technological advancement. The pragmatism of most of these leaders makes 
them political realists, and exceedingly practical in their approach to technological 
decisions and importation. They also show much influence from scientific and 
evolutionary thought as they formulated their political convictions, and their views of the 
West. They saw technology as a major source of the West’s political power, and believed 
that it would be for Japan as well. I noted earlier in this chapter how heavily several of 
the leaders draw on scientific and technological principles in their thought on 
international relations. Two of them, Fukuzawa and Mori, also attributed superior  
spiritual values or beliefs as partial sources for the West’s scientific and technological  
capabilities.  
 Also regarding technology in the international system, how did the international 
system affect the technology-related issues in the worldviews of external political 
                                                
1076 Ibid., 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
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relations studied here?1077 The effect of technology in the international system affected 
these worldviews in two primary ways.  The first way concerns the sheer physical power 
of technology in the international system. The capability of the United States to send a 
small fleet of ships to Japan and “force” it open in 1853 did not depend on the power of 
technology alone. Internal corruption in the Tokugawa regime, the dynamism of 
Tokugawa society, and pressure from restless feudal domains such as Satsuma and 
Choshu also played huge roles. But the 1853 event was a powerful, ominous warning of 
future dangers that forward-thinking Japanese had long anticipated—Japan must open up 
and engage the world. Isolation could only last for so long. They knew that eventually 
Japan must end sakoku. Foreign knowledge and technology, and the ability to import, 
learn, and apply them, would also be key in defending Japan and maintaining its 
independence. If Japan did not modernize many aspects of its society quickly, 
maintaining independence would be impossible in the face of the West’s superior military 
and economic power. Events in China, India, the Philippines and Southeast Asia made 
that very clear. Technology was one of the key tools Japan must quickly master to stay 
free. To develop the modern economy and military defenses required, technology was 
also required. Indeed, Japan quickly mastered the technical and physical aspects of this 
science and technology very well. 
                                                
1077 In my answer to the question above on the general concepts of technology in these worldviews on 
external political relations, I identified several significant themes: 1) the importance of Japan becoming a 
modern, scientifically and technologically-advanced nation, to win a position of respect in the international 
system; 2) the importance of modern military technologies and principles; 3) the importance of technology 
in Japan’s defense systems; 4) the influence of evolutionistic thought on leaders’ ideas about political 
development and international relations; and 5) a belief in the role of strong “spiritual” and moral values to 
strengthen Japan in its scientific and technological growth, which would in turn enhance and maintain its 
position in the international system.  
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 A second major way that technology in the international system affected these 
worldviews was in the mental or attitudinal arena. The physical power of technology 
encouraged Japanese scholars and leaders to presume that the scientific laws and 
principles behind modern science and technology, as developed in the West, made them 
superior to the “ethical” and “philosophical” emphases of Asian philosophies.1078 This 
encouraged Kato, Mori, Fukuzawa and others to investigate Western knowledge and 
scholarship, to discover just what drove the West, and what had allowed it to leap so far 
ahead of the East in many areas. We explored a few details about their exploration of 
Western thought in earlier chapters. Top Japanese leaders and thinkers eagerly embraced 
many elements of Western culture and “scientific” thought, including, at times, 
Christianity, Western dress, diet and mannerisms, and evolutionary theory.1079 Early in 
the Meiji period, some leaders, such as those in the bunmei kaika movement, tended 
toward extreme Westernization. Soon, in the battle to confront modernity, many of these 
thinkers and others would turn back toward a search for Japanese and Asian sources of 
scientific and philosophical greatness.    
 Were these “physical” and “mental” effects of the international system on the 
technological aspects of these external political worldviews positive or negative? 
They were both. Positively, on physical effects, these events forced Japan’s leaders to 
face the reality of the West’s power, and the international conditions that Japan faced and 
encouraged political realism. They also encouraged the commencement of vitally needed 
political, social and economic changes in Japanese society, necessary for Japan to 
                                                
1078 Recall my reflections in Chapter 3 on how Fukuzawa in particular rejected Confucian thought as 
backward.  
1079 We explore many of the details of these cultural phenomena in Chapter 6 and elsewhere.   
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maintain its independence. And they laid the foundations for contemporary Japan and its 
many strengths, but they came only after many trials, costly losses, and the near 
destruction of the nation in World War II. The physical effects of the international system 
on the technology-related features of these worldviews on Japan’s international politics 
also included negative effects. The process of realistically confronting the West caused 
massive social and political changes in Japanese society that were extremely costly and 
traumatic. The human costs were huge. This also forced the West to further engage Japan 
and Asia as they “awoke,” and the rest of Asia to further confront the West, Japan, and 
modernity. Again, the costs were gigantic. And the growth in Japan’s power seemed huge 
confirmation of the wisdom of the nation’s chosen political and reform paths, which led 
to aggressive actions on the part of Japan’s military and government (similar to actions of 
the West) in nearby Asia. The positive mental effects of the international system on the 
technology-related issues of these external political worldviews included the need to 
confront the West. This caused many more Japanese to become knowledgeable about the 
West and global conditions. Also, many more Japanese became aware of modern science 
and technology, so industrial, scientific and health standards in Japan were raised. 
Negatively, the sheer power of the West and its technology caused nearly idolatrous 
“West-worshipping” by some of Japan’s leaders, at first, and caused some to briefly 
reject their Asian and Confucian heritages. These attitudes, coupled with evolutionary 
thought, brought increased feelings of nationalistic ethnocentrism, which eventually led 
to colonial and imperial actions in nearby regions. In the coming decades and World War 
II, the costs of these actions would be huge. 
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 How did these technological issues affect Japan’s external political 
relations?1080 The conviction (Yamagata’s, in particular) that military ideas and 
technologies were key for Japan to master for its survival, and to strengthen its position in 
the international system, caused Japan to place priority on its military build-up in the 
domestic economy. The build-up was effective. Japan grew enough in military 
technology and prowess that it was able to defeat China in the Sino-Japanese War. This 
victory hugely increased respect for Japan among the Western powers and in the 
international system, though of course it angered and perplexed China. The influence of 
scientific and evolutionistic ideas in the thinking of Japanese leaders caused some of 
them like Fukuzawa and Kato to artificially, racially elevate Westerners to a higher 
position of honor and power than they deserved, and to downgrade the honor of Chinese 
and other Asians. In the early Meiji period, Japan gave much more preference to 
interaction with the West than with China and other Asian nations. This type of thinking 
helped pave the way for Japanese imperialism and colonialism. The stress on the 
importance of science and technology in the nation’s defense led to the modernization of 
Japan’s military, and contributed to Japan’s military victories over China (1894-1895) 
and later over Russia (1904-1905). These victories also helped further validate the 
militaristic policy preferences of the state, and contributed to respect for Japan in the 
international system and in the West, though they did not improve Japan’s position in the 
                                                
1080 Recall that the four main effects of technology-related issues identified above (associated with 
worldviews of external political relations) are that: 1) military ideas and technologies are one of the key 
forces that Japan must master survive, and to strengthen its position in the international system; 2) the 
influence of scientific and evolutionistic thought in several of these leaders about political development, 
international relations, and the nation/Japanese nationalism; 3) the importance of modern science and 
technology in Japan’s defense; and 4) spiritual and moral values are needed to help Japan strengthen itself 
for development and mastery of technology, for its survival in the international system. 
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eyes of its Asian neighbors. The idea that spiritual and moral strength could enhance 
Japan’s development and position in the international system on some levels seemed to 
suggest to some Japanese that in battle, Japanese soldiers had more discipline and 
fortitude than the less well-organized, lumbering forces of its larger neighbors (China and 
Russia).1081    
 On technology transfer, what were the important ideas/technologies transferred 
here, in these worldviews of external political relations? There were many technologies 
transferred from the West and the international system to Japan, more than from Japan to 
the international system or its colonies in this period.1082 Major political and military 
technologies and ideas related to external politics transferred into Japan in this period 
included military technologies (ships and armaments), military theory, strategy, training 
and organizational principles, industrial technologies supporting militarism, Western 
political ideas, institutions, innovations, and philosophy,1083 evolutionistic theory/Social 
Darwinism, racist views of international relations, and modern concepts of diplomacy. 
The major technology-related items and ideas on international relations transferred from 
Japan to other nearby regions and the international system (1850 to 1895) were fewer. 
                                                
1081 One also thinks of Japan’s surprise attack on and victory over Russian forces at Port Arthur (Lüshun) in 
southern Manchuria, China (February 1904) that later served as a model for the Japanese attack on 
Americans at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in 1941. Japanese, including Hirohito, were also tempted to believe in 
their own moral and spiritual superiority over Americans, though those qualities did not lead to final 
victory in World War II. 
1082 Remember that this period (of pre-colonialism) goes through the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, 
just before Japan acquired Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands, its first two major foreign colonies.  
1083 These Western political ideas and concepts included democracy, political liberalism, political 
authoritarianism, authoritarian rule by royalty, the concepts of European-style aristocracy, a constitution, 
national parliament, principles of local governance, German political theory and philosophy and 
institutions, British and American political and diplomatic thought, and modern concepts of nationalism), 
the study of contemporary diplomacy and international law, and the building of diplomatic bodies and 
institutions for Japan’s foreign relations. For more on the nature of the Western political ideas and 
institutions that were imported into Japan, see Chapter 4. 
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Specifically, Japan used many modern military technologies and areas of knowledge in 
the Sino-Japanese War in Korea, China, Manchuria and Taiwan.1084  
 Who were the main international or domestic actors in the external environment 
involved in these transfer cases? For military technologies, theories, strategies, and 
training, on the international level, the main individual actors were foreign engineering 
instructors, military experts, and teachers who taught briefly in Japan, Japanese military 
officials who briefly studied or traveled abroad, and government officials who arranged 
to import these technologies. On the domestic level, the main individual actors included 
Japanese engineers and scientists who taught in colleges or did research in public and 
military institutions, and Japanese military officials and thinkers in Japan who studied 
foreign military writings. On the industrial technologies supporting militarism, the key 
individual actors on the international level included foreign scientists and teachers in 
Japan, and Japanese students, experts, and government officials who studied abroad and 
returned to Japan. On the domestic level, the key individual actors connected with these 
industrial transfers were Japanese teachers, engineers, scientists, and public/military 
officials in Japan.  
 Regarding Western political ideas, institutions, innovations, and philosophy, 
evolutionary and diplomatic theory, the primary individual actors on the international 
level were foreign teachers in Japan, and Japanese teachers/scholars who studied abroad. 
                                                
1084 There are additional significant items of knowledge and technologies that Japan transferred to its new 
overseas colonies and the international system after the period of overseas colonialism started. For more on 
that period, see Chapters 8 and 10. I am not really aware of very significant political ideas or military 
technologies exported out of Japan until about 1895, though Japan did send some political ideas to Korea 
after its influence there began in the 1870s. 
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On the domestic level, the primary actors included Japanese teachers and scholars who 
studied foreign writings in Japan.  
 State or institutional actors involved with military technologies, strategy, theory 
and training and their industrial applications at the international level chiefly involved 
Japanese government ministries related to the military and defense, foreign governments 
and armament sellers. On the domestic level, state and institutional actors involved with 
military technologies and issues again included the Japanese military and defense 
ministries, imperial colleges and government military research institutions. State and 
institutional actors promoting military industrial technologies on the domestic level were 
the Japanese government, several of its ministries, and largely public-related industries.  
 The institutional actors supporting the transfer of Western political ideas, 
evolutionary thought, and diplomacy at the international level included foreign 
educational institutions sending foreign instructors to Japan, the Japanese government 
and relevant ministries (education, foreign affairs, and others), and foreign governments 
and entities supporting Japanese scholars studying abroad. The state/institutional actors 
connected with the transfer of these areas of knowledge at the domestic level were mainly 
the Japanese government, colleges and schools, the Ministry of Education, and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 What impacts did the actors involved in these transfer cases have on the transfer 
outcomes? Based on the worldviews of the five leaders studied here, concerning the 
transfer of military technologies and theories by individual actors on the international 
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level, all of the actors1085 had a profound impact on the Japanese importation of military 
technology and knowledge. Judged by what Japan did in the Sino-Japanese War, it 
mastered them extremely well. On the transfer of industrial military technologies by 
individual actors on the international and domestic levels, by the time of the war, Japan 
imported significant military technologies, and developed the capacities to build them, 
seen in the impressive fleet sent to attack China. The efforts of individual actors on the 
international and domestic levels1086 were very successful. And on the transfer of 
Western political ideas and innovations at the international level by individual actors, 
both the foreign scholars in Japan and Japanese scholar returnees were highly successful, 
given the many innovative political institutions that Japan adopted, such as the 
Constitution and the Diet. Japan soon developed the capacity to function 
diplomatically.1087 The ideological nature of all these developments was conservative. 
 What were the impacts of individual actors on these transfers at the domestic 
level? For military technologies and theories, Japan-based scientists, engineers, teachers 
and military officials also worked extremely hard, and again judged by what Japan 
accomplished in the Sino-Japanese War, did an amazing job in mastering and applying 
these areas of knowledge.1088 In the transfer of Western political ideas and innovations, at 
the domestic level, individual actors helped Japan to absorb these ideas. Some of them, 
                                                
1085 These actors included foreign instructors, Japanese military officials and scholars who studied abroad. 
1086 As a reminder, the actors on the international level were mainly foreign instructors and Japanese 
scholars returned from abroad, and on the domestic level, Japanese teachers and engineers.   
1087 While Japan developed these diplomatic capacities, it is interesting to remember how young Mori 
Arinori, the first Japanese diplomat posted to reside in the United States, relied upon leading Americans for 
guidance in learning the nuts and bolts of diplomacy.  
1088 Regarding the transfer of Industrial military technologies at the domestic level by individual actors, see 
the comments in the immediately preceding paragraph. 
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like Mori and Kato, developed fairly sophisticated applications. The conservative nature 
of Japanese society in this period limited the application of more liberal ideas.     
 Concerning the impacts of actors on the transfers by state or institutional actors 
at the international level, regarding military technologies, theories, and their industrial 
applications, in general, the Japanese government actors did an outstanding job in 
acquiring and transferring the technologies they judged needed for Japan’s military. The 
foreign suppliers of this knowledge were usually willing to supply them. On Western 
political ideas, evolutionary thought, and diplomacy, the foreign entities sending foreign 
instructors to Japan, the relevant Japanese government ministries, and foreign entities 
supporting Japanese scholars abroad also did a generally effective job in transferring 
these political and social ideologies. Some officials, like Kato, were very creative in how 
they applied them to the Japanese context, which was not easy. 
 On the impacts of state and institutional actors on the transfers at the domestic 
level, regarding military industrial applications, the main actors (Japanese government 
ministries, educational and military research institutions) were again generally successful 
in transferring these technologies. The Japanese government agencies and education-
related institutions transferring concepts of Western political ideas, evolutionary thought, 
and diplomacy to the Japanese context also did fairly well, though the task was certainly 
not simple.   
  What major lessons or improvements can we learn from these transfer cases? 
These political and military “transfers” went mainly to, not from, Japan. Items imported 
were of a highly pragmatic and utilitarian, not esoteric nature, to strengthen Japan’s 
internal political system and military defenses for survival and respect in the international 
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system. The military skills were used well in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895. 
Foreign teachers and engineers also contributed greatly to Japan’s transfer of political and 
military knowledge for its international relations, and yet Japanese scholars, teachers, and 
scientists also made crucial contributions. The Meiji state was the key driver in the 
process. Japan’s success in the war, and its rapid adoption of innovative political 
institutions, point to its overall success in this endeavor to import technologies to allow 
Japan’s survival in the international system. Both state and individual actors were highly 
successful in transferring these areas of knowledge. 
 Fourth, on technology, culture, and the international system, what are the most 
significant cultural factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in 
these international worldviews?1089 The primary cultural factors affecting these 
worldviews fall into several main areas. Views of politics include Japanese ideas and 
concepts of Western politics,1090 the cultures of international law and diplomacy, the 
Japanese culture of politics in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras,1091 and linguistic 
and cultural contexts and their influences on the translation of these political concepts 
from other languages into Japanese. Another important cultural factor was views of 
                                                
1089 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology,  Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
1090 These include views of democracy, political liberalism, and authoritarianism. 
1091 The Japanese culture of politics in this era included new notions of national identity drawing on new 
and ancient sources, including State Shinto, the new emperor ideology of the unbroken imperial line and of 
the emperor descended from the gods, ancient chronicles of Japan’s creation, and notions of Japanese 
ethnicity (such as Japan’s divine creation by the gods, and Japan as a family-state descended from the 
imperial family). Japan’s culture of politics also included the concept held by Japanese of Japan compared 
with other nations, and their self-concept of Japan as a nation. In that view, Japan was currently weak, 
technologically poor, and must build itself up quickly to compete with the West. Many of these aspects of 
Japan’s culture of politics are noted in the domestic political contexts section of Chapter 4. See Culture of 
politics in the Glossary section. 
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militarism, including the Japanese cultures of militarism,1092 and the influence of the 
military cultures of various countries, such as Britain, the United States, and Germany. 
Views of science, technology, and politics and international relations were another 
notable cultural feature here: the cultures of modern science and technology, Japanese 
views of evolutionism and Social Darwinism, and their influence on Japan’s views of 
politics, race, international relations, and the “hierarchy” of peoples and nations in the 
international system. A final area of relevant cultural factors is general views of other 
countries and regions.1093 
 In these worldviews, how did these leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Yamagata, 
Kato) concerned use these technologies/ideas1094 as means or agencies to cope with and 
transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level?1095 Fukuzawa 
contributed most to spreading Western, liberal political ideas in his popular writings. This 
in turn had a meaningful impact had what Japanese needed to do to build their country 
                                                
1092 The Japanese cultures of militarism in this era included post-samurai culture, the bushido ethical code, 
and neo-Confucian thought. 
1093 Views of other countries included Japanese views of the West and specific Western countries, of 
Western religion and its role in Western political and scientific development, of Asia, China, and Korea, of 
Confucian thought and political philosophy, and Western countries’ views of Japan and of Asia. 
1094 The major transferred ideas and technologies were 1) military technologies (ships and armaments); 2) 
military theory, strategy, training, and organizational principles; 3) industrial technologies supporting 
Japan’s militarism; 4) Western political ideas and philosophy (democracy, political liberalism, political 
authoritarianism, German political theory and philosophy, British and American political thought, 
evolutionistic theory/Social Darwinism); 5) Western political institutions, innovations, systems (such 
authoritarian rule by royalty, European-style aristocracy, a constitution, national parliament, principles of 
local governance, German political institutions); and 6) Western diplomacy and international relations (i.e. 
British and American diplomatic thought, modern concepts of nationalism, the study of contemporary 
diplomacy, international law, building diplomatic bodies and institutions for Japan’s foreign relations, 
racist views of international relations, and modern concepts of diplomacy). 
1095 Asnoted earlier, this can be called the “international cultural ecology approach” to technology. This 
question is drawn from this anthropological definition of technology: “the means and agencies by which 
human societies cope with and transform their material environment” (Glick, “Technology,” 464). This 
definition is based on the theory of cultural ecology in anthropology, which I apply that idea to the study of 
international relations, how a particular nation-state or national actor uses technology and related 
phenomena to adapt to and transform its surrounding environment in the international system. 
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internally so it could face external challenges on the international level. In this period, Ito 
contributed to Japan’s external political relations in his service as a foreign minister and 
diplomat, and his work on strengthening Japan’s internal political system through his 
work on the Meiji (1889) constitution. Mori did not have a large impact on strengthening 
Japan’s capacity to function in its external political relations, beyond functioning as a 
diplomat in Washington, DC in the early 1870s, and helping the Iwakura Mission when it 
arrived in the United States.1096 Yamagata had a huge impact on Japan’s external political 
relations, in his efforts to lead Japan’s military build-up, and its massive importation of 
military technologies in the early Meiji era. I did not find any direct evidence that Kato’s 
complex thought on international relations had any direct influence on Japan’s 
diplomacy. So of the five leaders, Yamagata contributed the most strongly, in the 
technological arena, to strengthening Japan’s external political relations. 
 How did the technological issues or features in these worldviews of external 
political relations affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or 
environment?1097 Military technologies, theories, training, and military-related industrial 
technologies enabled Japan to attack and intervene in the affairs of neighboring countries 
and regions including Korea, China and Taiwan near the end of 1850-1895. This 
enhanced Japan’s relations with Western countries (won their respect, to some degree), 
but it greatly increased hostility with Japan’s Asian neighbors, including China and 
Korea, who were both highly wary of Japan. Western political ideas, institutions, and 
                                                
1096 Although Mori prepared his Life and Resources in America to educate Japanese about the advanced 
conditions in the United States, it was written in English, and was never translated into Japanese (Van Sant, 
Mori Arinori). 
1097 Again, this is the cultural ecology approach to technology, applied to international relations. See 
Clemmer, Myers, and Rudden, Julian Steward, and Cohen, Man in Adaptation, for some explorations of 
the concept of cultural ecology. 
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diplomatic innovations helped to modernize Japan’s own domestic political system 
somewhat, brought greater recognition from the West, and enabled Japan to basically 
function in the system of Western-dominated international diplomacy. In sum, these 
technologies paved the way for greatly increased warfare and imperialism by Japan in 
Asia and the Pacific in the next period examined in this project (1895-1945), improved 
Japan’s capacity to relate diplomatically to the West, and increased Japan’s presence in 
the international system, especially in the East Asian region. 
 On the issue of technology, cognition, and international relations, 1098 do the 
belief systems1099 of any of these leaders (on technology issues on the international level) 
blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Do the leaders fail to adjust their 
decisions or viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? If so, how do these factors 
affect transfer or policy outcomes? While Fukuzawa had a fairly balanced view of the 
West, his negative views of Asia blinded him to the dignity of those cultures. In his era, 
China and Korea went through periods of relative stagnation or decline. Both struggled, 
as Japan did, to adjust to the onslaught of the West. This bias toward mainland Asia, seen 
in several of the other leaders’ writings, affected Japan’s actions toward mainland Asia in 
very powerful ways, most specifically in this era, in the Sino-Japanese War. The 
politically conservative attitudes of Ito, Yamagata, and Kato predisposed them to copying 
a more authoritarian model like Germany or Prussia, not toward a more liberal model, 
such as Britain. Somewhat similarly, Mori’s extensive experience traveling to and living 
                                                
1098 For a discussion of technology, cognition, and international relations, see Chapter 5. 
1099 Belief systems include a decision-maker’s beliefs about another actor’s strategies, tactics, motivations, 
and goals (Keith Shimko, Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan 
Administration [Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1991], 45). They are a part of an actor’s 




in the United States and Britain, and Kato’s long-term study of German language and 
thought, predisposed them to the models each chose to copy, and inevitably influenced, to 
some degree, the policy outcomes each finally encouraged. I do not see any overt 
evidence that these leaders’ blind spots caused them to fail to adjust to rapidly changing 
international conditions. Rather, I would argue that while their backgrounds and beliefs 
caused them to move in certain directions in their policy decisions, they did not lack a 
capacity to move fairly rapidly, when conditions warranted it.1100 
 Finally, in these worldviews on external relations, is the concept of 
technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how?1101 Implicit in the concept of 
technonationalism as ideology is the idea that a nation must strengthen itself internally, in 
terms of its economy and technologies, so that it can be strong and secure in the 
international system. How much did the external politics worldviews of these five leaders 
reflect the international aspect of technonationalism as ideology, and how much did they 
reflect domestic factors? For Japan to strengthen itself in the international system in this 
era, it must first import needed areas of technology and knowledge from the international 
system (from the West, in particular). Second, it must learn, master and apply the 
technologies in its own context. Finally, it must use the relevant technologies to improve 
                                                
1100 For example, while Mori’s exposure to the liberal the United States and Britain caused him to propose 
radical social policies when he was young (i.e. that Japan should adopt English as its national language), he 
moderated his proposals later in his career (for example, his conservative educational policies in favor of 
Japanese nationalism). The general rapidity of Meiji Japan’s response to the onslaught of the West, 
reflected in the actions of all five leaders studied here, is impressive, compared to the slower responses of 
China and Korea. 
1101 Technonationalism as ideology is the idea that technology is an important, basic part of protecting a 




its own position and interaction in the international system.1102 While Yamagata and Ito 
emphasize this last point the most, all five of the leaders strongly acknowledged Japan’s 
vital need to import needed technologies to strengthen itself internally, for national 
survival in the international system.1103 Similarly, in their views on nationalism, all five 
of the leaders support building up the Japanese nation so it can be strong in the 
international system. For that process, they all recognize that Japan must import the 
world’s best knowledge, science and technology, now possessed by the West, no longer 
by Asia. In sum, in examining the leaders’ external political worldviews through the lens 
of technonationalism as ideology, the possibility of Japan gaining strength and surviving 
in the international system is strongly connected with its own internal strength and 
reforms. Most of these five leaders care most about the domestic aspects, for the basic 
reason that if internal reforms are insufficient, external strength will never follow.   
 Cognition Issues. Images. The primary images about general international 
relations that emerge here reflect strong political realism and instrumentalism (Fukuzawa, 
Ito, Yamagata, Kato). International relations are seen as driven by the powerful 
(Fukuzawa, Kato), by economics (Ito), with nations fighting for their own interests and 
their own survival (Fukuzawa, Kato), cooperating only when they wish (Kato). The 
international system is chaotic (Kato; Yamagata (implied)). Japan’s capacity to conduct 
international relations and diplomacy must be strengthened (Ito, Mori). Regarding nations 
and nationalism, Japan must modernize and restore its national unity in order to survive 
                                                
1102 This could include using the technologies to project into the international arena, as the West did. 
Yamagata in particular agreed with this point. 
1103 See also my discussion (earlier in this chapter) of the five leaders’ views of international relations, at 
the beginning of the section, Comparison of worldviews on Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895). 
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(Yamagata). Fukuzawa believes that strong feelings and emotions, even irrational ones, 
connect people with nations, while Kato argues that the bonds of the Japanese people are 
both emotional and due to blood.1104 The nation is more important than individuals; 
people have a duty to sacrifice their lives for the state (Kato, Mori (implied), and 
Yamagata). Similarly, the rights of the nation are more important than those of 
individuals (Fukuzawa). Images of international relations also reflect, to a large degree, 
the influence of scientific, technological, and evolutionary thinking. Biological imagery 
permeates Kato’s arguments about international relations. He sees the international 
system as a “jungle” where civilized and uncivilized peoples, nations and races compete 
for survival. International relations represents a competition between stronger and weaker 
nations, and like nature, only the strong will survive (Fukuzawa, Yamagata). There are 
also a few images of morality and international relations. To Kato, international relations 
often involve moral components which, though complex, are mostly driven by the 
survival instinct. Fukuzawa sees idealistic, moralistic or Confucian images of 
international relations, presuming human goodness, as unrealistic and flawed.  
   Another group of images relates to military and defense issues. In the early 
Meiji era, Japan’s military is seen as backward, in need of modernizing, while Europe’s 
military is strong and superior to Japan’s (Yamagata). Modernizing and strengthening the 
military for the nation’s survival is the government’s supreme task (Yamagata, 
Fukuzawa: 1882-1895). Japan must also adopt and develop modern military technologies 
from the West to survive (Yamagata, implied). Fukuzawa also argues that only through 
                                                
1104 Recall Kato’s argument that all Japanese are descended from the emperor, and connected with each 
other in a “family-state.” 
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acquiring Western civilization can Japan defend itself. Yamagata implies that Japan must 
exercise influence in nearby countries to defend itself against the West. There are 
generally no negative images of war here, especially regarding Japan and Asia, only the 
certainty that Japan does not want the West to invade it or Asia. To Kato, aggressive wars 
and attacking other nations, to enhance survival in the international “jungle,” are 
acceptable.  
 A final category of images on Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895) 
concerns foreigners, foreign countries and regions. One gets the impression that Japanese 
in the late Tokugawa period were highly wary of foreigners, especially Westerners, and 
interaction with them. Contrary to many others, Fukuzawa concludes that foreigners are 
not inferior to Japanese, and not solely bent on invading other countries. Images of the 
West are both positive and negative. In some images, the West is seen as admirable, and 
these Japanese leaders admit that Japan can learn much from it (Mori, Fukuzawa, 
Yamagata). Fukuzawa calls the West a desirable “new coat,” from which Japan can learn. 
On the other hand, the West is a huge threat that may invade Japan (Yamagata). In the 
future, the world will become a world-state, dominated by Europe (Kato). Images of Asia 
are also somewhat conflicting, though mostly negative. Asian civilization is now an “old 
coat” (Fukuzawa). Asia and China are uncivilized and backwards, though China used to 
be civilized (Fukuzawa, Kato). Japan is now superior to both Asia and China (Fukuzawa, 
Ito, Yamagata, Kato). It is now acceptable for Japan to intervene in and influence 
mainland Asia (Yamagata, Ito).    
 How do these images function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? These 
images of international relations show a preference for pragmatic, power-oriented images 
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that would tend to provoke materialist, realist, power-oriented policy responses: massive 
study of Western knowledge and importation of useful technologies, and the rapid 
buildup of Japan’s military. This happened. In line with this realism, the leaders here 
mostly prefer “scientific” and “technological” explanations for everything, including 
social and political phenomena. As we observed earlier, this helped encourage a rejection 
of Japan’s philosophical, ethical Asian/Confucian heritage by these leaders. These types 
of images would make state leaders prefer more strong state, autocratic solutions to 
diplomatic dilemmas, rather than diplomatic, carefully negotiated ones, and make them 
have less preference for individual human rights. All of the images regarding the military 
and war support a rapid increase in Japan’s military and defense capabilities, and 
aggressive actions regarding both the West and Asia. They do not suggest a pacifist 
response. The images on the West suggest the ambivalent response that Meiji Japan gave: 
great admiration for much of Western technology and culture, but a fierce determination 
to protect Japan’s political integrity and cultural autonomy, at all cost. There is also near 
anger or disgust expressed toward Asia and China (Fukuzawa), and paternalistic 
sympathy for its “inferior” state (Ito). These attitudes suggest Japanese intervention, 
which soon occurred. The concept of non-interference in other state’s affairs does not 
apply here. 
 Worldview. What do these images of Japan’s external political relations suggest 
about the nature of the world, and how it is driven? The world is chaotic, driven by 
power, and only the strong survive. It resembles a biological system, a “wild jungle.” 
Only through unity as a nation can people survive. To be strong, a nation must have 
power: money, resources, military, and so forth. The West controls the world. The world 
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outside Japan is strange and dangerous. The lifeways of the strongest, the West, are best; 
the lifeways of the weak (Asians) are inferior. Japan needs to fight hard to grow strong 
and make its way in this world. How does this world work? Wealthy, militarily strong 
countries drive the world. The weak are devoured by the strong. Unified nations are 
strong, and can fight. Through success in war, victors become stronger. The temporarily 
weak, such as the Japanese, must study the strong (the West) to get stronger. In this view, 
it is allowable for the strong to invade the weak, though Japan does not want to be, or 
intend, to stay weak.  The world is politically controlled by the politically, economically 
and militarily strong: the West. In these worldviews in the early Meiji era, the self  
(Japan) is weak in international and military affairs. Japan must become strong, is 
capable of doing so, and by 1895, has done so. Japan can learn, has a noble culture, and 
can teach the rest of Asia. Regarding non-self (other countries and regions), the West is 
strong in all these areas, threatens Japan, Asia, and other weak nations. It wants to invade 
and control Japan like the rest of Asia and many other countries. 
 What are the relevant environments surrounding the leaders who hold these 
worldviews? How have these environments interacted with or affected the their 
worldviews? The surrounding environment includes Western countries (such as the 
United States, Britain, France, Russia), East Asian countries and regions (China, Korea, 
the Ryukyus, Southeast Asia), Western views of international relations, and international 
relations and political theories that seep into Japan at the time. Those theories were 
highly influential on the views of Japan’s leaders working in politics and diplomacy. 
These outside philosophies interacted with existing Japanese views inherited from the 
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Tokugawa era1105 and Dutch studies for over two hundred years. The power and threat of 
the West made these leaders know they must learn and master Western diplomatic and 
military knowledge, or Japan could become colony like India or China. 
 How these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions influence 
the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their 
causes? Regarding perceptions, the power of the West made Japanese leaders favor 
Western views of politics, international relations, diplomacy, military technology, 
science, and related areas. They tended to reject the Confucian and Asian foundations of 
previous Japanese knowledge. They highly favored knowledge from the West. 
Concerning information, most of these leaders and the Japanese government drew on the 
best, latest Western knowledge that could be obtained abroad or brought to Japan. They 
often ignored Asian sources. They used power-, scientific, biological, evolution-leaning 
and economic-oriented explanations of international events. 
 How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? The power of 
Western military technology greatly influenced the Japanese military, and both its and the 
Japanese government’s actions in international relations in mainland Asia in this era. 
Western political knowledge transformed Japanese domestic politics to encourage the 
rapid industrial and military buildup that supported military actions against Asia, 
indirectly against the West. 
 Cultural Logics: The global phenomena to which these leaders responded 
included foreign governments (Western and Asian), Western political ideas (including 
those on international relations) and institutions, Western military technologies and 
                                                
1105 The Tokugawa era worldviews included neo-Confucianism, and on the official level, supported sakoku. 
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forces, Asian military forces (China and Korea), Western diplomatic institutions and 
structures, Western writings on politics, diplomacy and military affairs, and Confucian 
ideas about politics and political relations that had influenced Tokugawa Japan and still 
influenced Qing China and Korea. 
 The cultural logics under the worldviews of these global phenomena suggest 
that governments that have more military power are superior. Those that lose battles or 
do not have such power are weaker and thus inferior; those with power are superior. 
Asian governments are weak, passive, and therefore inferior. Western political ideas 
support these Western victories and power, and therefore are superior. Western political 
ideas are based on logic and science, and therefore better. The West and the strong rule 
the world and “call the tune.” Thus Japanese must adopt their systems of international 
politics and diplomacy to fit into that system. The West’s main culture of politics and 
ideas mostly conflicts with Japanese culture, so Japan must only very carefully adapt 
Western political ideas and institutions, or its culture may be damaged. The West is 
stronger. Therefore if Japan wants to survive politically as a nation and in the 
international system, it must have the West’s military technologies and Western-type 
military forces to survive. Hard work brings rewards. Those who are weak, passive (ie. 
Asia countries and their militaries) are inferior. Political ideas based on science are better 
than ones that are not. Therefore Western political ideas are better than Asian or 
Confucian ones. Western cultural and political ideas conflict with Japanese politics and 
culture. Only ideas closest to Japanese culture can work at this time, despite their 
intellectual appeal. This reflects an attitude of cultural relativism. Political ideas and 
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philosophies that do not stress action, power, bring more power, or wealth are passive, 
weak, and inferior. Confucian ideas and societies are therefore weak and inferior.  
 What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? As quickly as 
possible, Japan must learn these new political and military ideas, institutions, and 
systems, quickly industrialize, and build up its own military, political and diplomatic 
systems. Japan must quickly use these to its own advantage, for its own interests in the 
international system. That is what these leaders believed, and what they did. Japan then 
imitated the West, and used these new ideas and technologies it had mastered to attack 
China, Korea and Taiwan before the end of this period (1895).   
 In the cultural logics under these responses, if Japan is not strong and does not 
modernize quickly, those who are stronger, the West, will conquer it. It may become an 
inferior colony or vassal state, such as India or China. Japan must learn the best 
knowledge and technologies to survive. Only the powerful, learned, and technologically 
strong survive and flourish. To survive, it is permitted for Japan to import knowledge that 
it needs. Japan can take these imported ideas and technologies, and improve them, based 
on its past experience with Chinese and Korean knowledge. To survive, Japan must 
become a strong, aggressive power like the West. A strong country is allowed to be 
involved in the internal political and economic affairs of inferior powers. Japan knows it 
does not want this itself. But it is the right of a strong country. The strong can exploit the 
weak and do. Japan will be great and strong. It also has this right.   
 What do we learn by comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the 
global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to 
them? The cultural logics under the worldviews stress evolutionary ideas, power and 
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strength, especially military ones. Science and technology are preferred. We should 
assume that science, materialism and technological strength bring tangible, true benefits. 
Japan must have these to survive. There is also the assumption that though Japan is also 
technologically weak, it is more assertive than other Asian countries. It can learn, work 
hard, and improve. Additional assumptions include those of Western superiority over 
Japan, Japan’s superiority over other Asian countries, and that imported technologies and 
ideas must be compatible with the receiving society’s culture, or they will not work. The 
cultural logics under the responses are very similar to the cultural logics under the 
worldviews themselves. Many of the same assumptions about the superiority of power, 
strength, materialism, and knowledge are also here, and that Japan is superior to other 
Asian countries, that it can import these technologies and ideas, learn, master, and 
improve them. The former cultural logics under the worldviews seem of a more general 
nature, while the cultural logics under the responses are more specific to Japan’s actual 
current conditions.   
 Globalization Issues.  How do these important worldviews on external political 
relations reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows 
of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? The intensified speed of global 
communication and transportation in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period meant that 
Japan and its leaders now could have knowledge of the world’s greatest political and 
military ideas and technologies, and possibly learn them, if it wished. This had never 
before been possible for a nation as geographically isolated as Japan, on such a scale, and 
so quickly. While Japan had very interesting, intense encounters with the West in the 
period just preceding the Tokugawa period, this period was much more intense and 
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urgent compared with the former.1106 Decisions had to be made quickly, or the nation 
could be invaded. Absorbing the political theories and ideas was not as urgent as building 
up the country’s military defenses, in the thought of Yamagata. The leaders’ attitudes on 
nationalism do not reflect the input of these global processes at such an intense rate. Both 
the intense threat that Japan now faced in its international relations, and its ability to 
respond so rapidly, were a result of these global processes. In the minds of these leaders, 
the power of the West, and the speed at which it and its forces now threatened Japan, 
helped to emphasize the threat of the West, and de-emphasize threats from Asia. Science 
and technology were a primary reason for this intensified globalization. Morality and 
religion did not really affect these globalization factors. And how did globalization affect 
the worldviews? The unprecedented speed of communication and transport links in this 
age intensified the speed at which Japan must respond to the Western threat of invasion, 
and even the speed at which Japan’s worldviews were hit. Like China and Britain during 
the Opium War, Japan now faced war with global powers like Britain on an 
unprecedented scale, in just a matter of months, where not long before, encounters with 
such a distant power at such a scale were unknown. 
 If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro- 
(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? The global processes 
I refer to here are the intensified speed at which Japan and other non-Western nations like 
China, India and Korea had to respond to political and military ideas, forces, and 
technologies. Individually, all of these five leaders responded with hard work and study, 
                                                
1106 I refer to the period from about 1550 to 1650, when Japan encountered Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and 
British traders, and the entry of Christianity into the country. 
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to try to understand aspects of the Western threat, and to determine how Japan should 
best respond. Fukuzawa focused on understanding the meaning of international relations 
on a general level, and international law. Kato attempted to understand these issues on a 
“scientific” level, and some of his writings were used by the Meiji state to support its 
own policies. His own estimation that the world would eventually evolve into a single 
world-state dominated by Europe actually predicts the process of political 
globalization.1107 Several of the leaders took personal action on Japan’s diplomatic and 
military policies. Ito concentrated on learning European political and legal systems, so 
they might be applied effectively in Japan, and participated in direct negotiation in 
foreign diplomacy with other nations in several occasions. Mori also briefly served as a 
diplomat. Yamagata took aggressive action on building up Japan’s military. Several 
traveled overseas to observe the West directly (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Mori). On a public 
level, the actions of these leaders represent an urgent, collective response in the face of a 
huge threat almost unprecedented for Japan. The Japanese people at large did not seem to 
have the capacity to picture the complexity and exact nature of this threat, but their wise 
leaders did so rapidly, and very well.    
 Do these important global processes of external political relations represent a 
form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? These 
Japanese responses only represented a Japanese form of globalization at the end of this 
period, with the start of the Sino-Japanese War, when Japan battled Chinese and Korean 
forces in Korea, China, and Taiwan. At this point, the Japanese response to the forces of 
Western globalization boiled over, resulting in Japanese invasion of several neighboring 
                                                
1107 Davis, Moral and Political, 76-77, 82. 
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regions. The significance of these events was the start of unprecedented Japanese 
involvement in the world, strongly manifested from 1895 on, up to our present age. 
Negative aspects of this Japanese globalization were first felt by its Asian neighbors, not 
really by the United States or Britain until World War II, and not much by Europe until 
the postwar period. 
Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations 
 
Fukuzawa Yukichi.  The foreign books that Fukuzawa collected on his overseas 
trips provided many of his ideas for Japan’s domestic and international economic 
activities, as did the trips themselves.  From his trip to Europe (1862), Fukuzawa 
developed a deeper knowledge of Western business practices.  Seeing the results of post-
Civil War hyperinflation on his second trip to the United States (1867), Fukuzawa 
understood the causes of inflation. This helped motivate him to later start the Yokohama 
Specie Bank, which became Japan’s first international bank.1108  
 Ito Hirobumi.  Ito understood the importance of foreign economic institutions.  
In 1870, he studied American financial institutions in the United States, later applying 
similar knowledge to Japan’s Far Eastern empire.  In the mid-1870s, he helped negotiate 
a commercial treaty between Japan and Korea, a first for modern Korea.1109  After Japan 
gleaned political and economic lessons from the West, in the early 1900s, and after he 
became Japan’s resident- (governor-) general in Korea, Ito supported the importation of 
Japan’s political and economic lessons into Korea, which he saw as inferior to Japan in 
                                                
1108 Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 108, 110. The roles of the Yokohama Specie Bank were to balance the 
amount of gold and silver in Japan, and to provide funds to Japanese international traders (Ibid.).  The U.S. 
occupation forces closed the bank in 1946, since it had become the bank of Japan’s military forces and 
overseas colonies (Ibid.,119). 
1109 Hamada, Prince Ito, 62, 75. 
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its development.  This is a clear, early example of Japan projecting itself and its own 
development experience on another country, soon to be a colony. 
 Kato Hiroyuki.  In late nineteenth century Social Darwinism, and to Kato, 
Caucasians were seen as racially superior to non-Caucasians.  Kato would have been 
shocked to see the global economic successes of Japan in the late twentieth century, when 
some experts declared, “Japan is number one.”1110 Kato also had a somewhat racist view 
of economic competition between nations. It seems he attributed the superior economic 
performance of the West and Europeans, in part, to their “superior” race and civilization. 
As noted above in Chapter 4, he worried that the superior economic abilities of 
Caucasians might overwhelm Japanese in economic competition within Japan, and that 
the racially inferior Chinese might do the same, through their presumed willingness to 
work for lower wages.1111 If this was true for Japan’s domestic marketplace, it seems 
Kato would apply the same thought to competition in global markets.  
Comparison of Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations (1850-1895) 
 
 Both Fukuzawa and Ito traveled to the West to observe Western economics in 
action, and had early exposure to the power and presence of Western trade in their 
childhoods in southwest Japan. Both observed the practical operation of Western 
economics in childhood, and overseas, especially Fukuzawa. Fukuzawa was highly 
effected by what he observed long-term, both by the impressive knowledge of Western 
trading and Dutch studies when he was young, and then by the powerful effects of 
Western economics when he traveled overseas (he was especially impressed by the 
                                                
1110 Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 249. 
1111 Ibid., 244. 
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latter). He was moved to write about these in his many popular books, several devoted to 
economics and business. Fukuzawa applied what he wrote in his private life and career, 
and in the many financial and business institutions he helped found. Ito also very 
impressed by what he observed in Western economics when he traveled overseas. He also 
applied these lessons to another country: Korea.1112 Fukuzawa founded the highly 
influential Yokohama Specie Bank, Japan’s first international bank. Thus he also had a 
large influence on Japan’s international financial dealings with the world. Ito was directly 
involved in international economic negotiations, though his greatest impacts were on 
international politics, not international economics. This was not the case for Fukuzawa 
and Kato. Ito studied economic issues in his travels to the West, and later applied them to 
one of Japan’s greatest colonies, Korea. This is a clear example of Japan “learning” from 
the West, and then projecting that onto its own empire. It is an example of Japan 
projecting the West’s mistakes onto others, of repeating the West’s “mistakes.” It is also 
an example of Japan projecting itself, its own development experience, on another 
country. In general, we see suggestions of evolutionistic thought in the thought of 
Fukuzawa, regarding intense economic competition between nations, but it is strongest in 
Kato.1113 In Kato’s racist views and explanations of economic competition, of winners 
and losers, among the races and nations, it is assumed Westerners/Caucasians are 
economically superior, next Japan, and last, other Asians. 
 
                                                
1112 I refer to the commercial treaty between Japan and Korea that Ito negotiated. 
1113 This is a straightforward observation of Kato’s views, but it is based on only a small amount of data. I 




Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations (1850-
1895) 
 
 Development Issues. Is it more relevant to use internationalization, 
“modernization,” or both concepts here? Internationalization seems more relevant, since 
it considers external, international processes involving the global economic system, 
including colonialism and imperialism, of how peripheral, non-Western countries are 
absorbed into the global economy, and the cultural effects of that process on the 
international level, not the domestic one. This chapter does not really consider domestic 
issues, so internationalization is more relevant here than “modernization,” which 
considers the global economy and its effects on the internal cultural features of peripheral 
countries, as they are absorbed into the world market.  
 In terms of internationalization, as we examine these worldviews of Japan’s 
external economic relations (1850-1895), the key question is what do we learn about 
Japan’s economy and its culture on the international level as it began to be absorbed into 
the global economic system? As Japan was about to be drawn, or “forced,” into the world 
economy, by both external and internal pressures, of necessity its cultural interaction with 
the outside world increased. With pressures to trade came the signing of the unequal trade 
treaties with several Western nations in the late 1850s, which in turn brought pressures 
for more negotiations from the Japanese side, in order to replace the treaties and their 
unfair requirements. Increased economic interaction brought foreign teachers of 
economics and business to Japan, as well as some foreign businessmen and migrant 
workers from China. Japanese government officials and young scholars were also sent 
abroad to master the fields of economics, business, accounting, and related fields. These 
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interactions greatly updated and transformed the technical practice of business in early 
Meiji Japan, even if many of the ideologies guiding Japanese management continued to 
be influenced by neo-Confucian values that prevailed in the late Tokugawa period.1114 
Additional social changes hit Japan that were brought through increased economic 
interaction with the outside world, including rapid industrialization, increased 
urbanization, women entering the workforce, and so forth. These economic changes also 
enabled Japan to begin to build its huge export businesses, build up its military, and to 
“export” its own culture to neighboring regions, in a manner of speaking, with the Sino-
Japanese War.1115 In coming decades, Japan’s economic relations with the world would 
have increasingly large economic and social effects on Japan, its Asian neighbors 
(especially its colonies), and other nations. 
 Technology Issues.  What are the most important technology-related ideas and 
phenomena associated with these worldviews of external economic relations? Among the 
major technological issues connected with these worldviews of external economic 
relations are that these actors received direct exposure to the power and “wonder” of 
Western technological and economic “marvels.” As youths in southwestern Japan, even 
under national isolation (sakoku), Fukuzawa and Ito were exposed to the influence and 
powerful presence of Western trade and economies. Ito stole away on a steamship to 
learn how to pilot one. Both Fukuzawa and Ito were greatly impressed with these marvels 
when they traveled overseas to the West, and were also exposed to Western economic 
                                                
1114 See the discussion of the influence of Confucian values from the late Tokugawa period on Japanese 
management culture in early Meiji Japan in the section on domestic market contexts in Chapter 4. 
1115 The “export” of Japanese culture that started in the next period (1895-1945) was probably greatest in 




ideas. While Fukuzawa’s knowledge tended toward the basic functions of modern 
economies, banking, and daily business practices in the West, Ito’s knowledge focused 
more on international economic diplomacy and treaties. Technology is also closely 
connected with industrialization, which would further promote Japanese economic 
growth. In Kato, we see an evolutionistic emphasis on economic competition between 
nations, another key determinant to which nations become strong, influential, and 
survive. Economically successful nations develop great technologies, are strong, more 
admirable and receive the spoils of the international system. 
 What are the most significant economic factors present in the imported 
technologies and related ideas in these worldviews of Japan’s external economic 
relations?1116 And did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively 
or negatively? Why? Many of these technologies were physically powerful. Their most 
significant economic factors included the power of military technologies to conquer and 
control foreign markets by force. Technologies of global transport and communication 
enabled Western traders to trade globally, spread their economic influence, gain more 
wealth, control more colonies, and more spheres of influence. They would do the same 
for Japan. Managerial technologies of business, economics and economics education 
would strengthen Japan’s economy domestically, build it up, and prepare Japan to better 
function in the global economy. Mastering the know-how of international economic 
diplomacy would enable Japan to function in the world economy. The technologies 
connected with industrialization would greatly enlarge Japan’s production capacity, 
contribute to domestic growth, and permit Japan to produce various products 
                                                
1116 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
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domestically, export to foreign markets, and increase its wealth. An “evolutionary” 
mentality that stressed that Japan must work hard or it would not survive encouraged hard 
efforts to ensure Japanese survival. The international system affected many of these 
technologies very powerfully and positively. It is the international system that brought 
Japan many of these technologies in the first place. While the international economic 
system threatened to impoverish or control peripheral nations like Japan, Japan is one of 
the very few cases that showed that if nations worked hard, smartly and in a disciplined 
manner, independence from foreign economic and political control might be achieved.   
 What were the important ideas and technologies transferred in these worldviews 
of external economics? Technologies transferred included transportation and 
communication equipment (ships, trains, the telegraph), industrial technologies 
(manufacturing, steel, textiles, shipbuilding), managerial and business technologies 
(modern management, accounting, training), agricultural imports/exports, and military 
technologies (ships, armaments, battle strategies). Among the ideas that were transferred 
were Western economic theories of trade, finance, commerce, business, evolutionary 
theory, management, business and accounting principles and theories, late Tokugawa 
Dutch studies (which inevitably included some economic ideas), ideas, and theories of 
imperialism.1117   
 Who were the main actors involved, whether international or domestic, 
individual or state, and what impacts did they have on the transfer outcomes? Main 
individual actors on the international level included Western international leaders, 
traders, military officials, foreign economists, and business leaders. Japanese actors in the 
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international level included many of the same. There were also migrant laborers present, 
especially from China, in this era. State and institutional actors on the international level 
from the West included foreign governments, economic ministries, international shipping 
and commercial firms, and from Japan, the Japanese government, economic and 
industrial ministries, commercial and shipping firms. On the domestic level, individual 
actors from Japan were mainly government leaders, economic thinkers, businessmen, and 
traders. Western actors present in Japan included foreign businessmen, traders, and 
teachers doing business with or living in Japan. State and institutional actors on the 
domestic level included the Japanese government, ministries and agencies connected with 
the economy, industry, trade or business, small or large business firms, and the zaibatsu.  
 What were the impacts of the transfers? They were both positive and negative. 
Western government actors forced negative treaties on Japan. Western businessmen and 
teachers brought a great deal of know-how and shared this with the Japanese. The 
Japanese government had huge impacts on the progress of business in Japan. The 
government’s hand in the market was heavy in this era, mostly leaning toward large 
business. The public sector mostly took the lead in deciding trends and policy directions. 
While the influence of individuals like Fukuzawa, Shibusawa Eiichi1118 and others was 
very significant in Japan’s business and private sector, the lead of the public sector in this 
era was stronger.  
 What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn in these transfer cases 
related to Japan’s external economic relations? These technologies and economic systems 
indeed were powerful. Hard efforts to study and master them paid off in many ways. 
                                                
1118 Shibusawa (1840-1931) was one of the greatest and most influential businessmen in Meiji era Japan. 
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Japan grew, and its efforts to grow and industrialize were highly effective. This is not to 
say that there were not many difficulties or pain; there were. Japan grew to the point that 
not long after this period it was able to negotiate an end to the unequal treaties with the 
West, and become involved economically in the affairs of its neighbors such as Korea 
and Taiwan, and beat huge countries such as China and Russia in military confrontations. 
Yet even though Japan developed the capacity to do all of these actions did not mean all 
of them were justified or right; many were not. The damage inflicted on neighboring 
countries, especially through the wars, was huge. Yet economic infrastructure eventually 
resulted in some places where there had been almost none (i.e., Taiwan).   
 What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported 
technologies and ideas in these economic worldviews?1119 The most important cultural 
factors included greatly enhanced, speeded up connections in transportation and 
communications with the outside world, a greatly improved ability to communicate, 
travel to, and connect with it, and an enhanced capability to receive economic ideas from 
overseas and discuss them. There were huge impacts from industrial technologies: the 
ability to vastly increase the productivity and output of the Japanese economy and then 
the huge accompanying social impacts. This inserted a greater Japanese presence into the 
world marketplace. The impacts of this presence were likely the most significant in Asia 
in this period. Managerial and business technologies brought new and enhanced 
principles of scale, efficiency, finance, time-keeping, speed, exporting, importing, and 
trading. Interacting with the outside world had huge cultural impacts on how Japanese 
worked and conducted business in the early Meiji era, compared with the late Tokugawa 
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era. Agricultural production of silk and textiles enhanced employment in rural areas. 
Increasing employment of rural men and women in new factories and industries affected 
their lives, farms, village, and families in many ways. Military technologies brought 
increasing discipline throughout society, and increased the economic scale of production 
and industry. Western ideas of business greatly increased the scale of production of 
Japanese business, connected it with world markets, greatly changed daily life in Japan, 
and vastly increased the nation’s wealth. The culture of science and technology 
associated with industrial and military technologies gradually spread throughout the 
nation through the education system, improving research, health, and military 
applications. The most important cultural values included the value of efficiency in time 
and work, increased values of communication, travel, freedom, Western cultural values 
of freedom, independence, freedom of communication, expression, values of free trade, 
entrepreneurialism, experimentation, hard work, wealth, European ideas of class, wealth, 
desires to increase efficiency in agriculture and industry, values associated with 
mechanization in many areas, values of speed, evolutionism, survival of the 
strongest/fittest, and the right of strong nations to invest in and influence other regions, to 
gain wealth and help developing regions improve as well. 
 In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies/ideas 
as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the 
international level? Fukuzawa observed, studied, and read about these economic and 
business technologies, wrote popular books to educate other Japanese in economic 
principles, founded several businesses and educational institutes, and became very 
wealthy and successful. In other words, he practiced what he preached. He believed that 
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through his writings and efforts, Japan would improve economically on the grassroots 
level, and that this would strengthen the nation internally, and enable it to flourish on the 
international level. Fukuzawa had some direct influence through the founding of the 
Yokohama Specie Bank. Ito used ideas of international economic diplomacy to negotiate 
several international treaties, including Japan’s commercial treaty with Korea in the mid-
1870s. This helped to begin to project Japan’s influence overseas, which eventually had 
huge impacts on Japan’s Asian neighbors, and on Japan as well. Economic efforts that 
supported Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War also enhanced Japan’s position in the 
international system through the increased prestige Japan gained in the eyes of the 
Western powers after its victory over China. Subtle, evolutionistic ideas of racism and the 
hierarchy of nations, peoples, and countries, like Kato’s, also helped to support Japan’s 
military and economic interventions on the mainland. 
 How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the 
international system or environment? The rapid influx of various technologies 
(transportation, communication, industry, management, and agriculture) greatly increased 
Japan’s wealth, and its capacity to communicate with, interact with, and influence the 
international environment. This interaction and influences most greatly affected Japan 
itself, and its Asian neighbors. Influences on the West were more gradual and subtle, i.e. 
the export of porcelains, teas, silk, and Japanese art from Japan, increasing Western 
knowledge of and interest in Japan. For Japan, its increasing involvement in Asia and the 
buildup of its military greatly increased the nation’s wealth, industrialization, and 
economic power, and brought it out of near total isolation. It also increased its respect in 
the international system and to the West. To other Asian countries (China, Korea), this 
375 
 
would soon bring much pain, anger, and hatred of the Japanese that continues to manifest 
itself to some degree in Japan’s contemporary international relations today. 
 Do the belief systems1120 of any of these leaders (on technology issues in these 
economic worldviews, on the international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, 
which, and how? Do the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing 
conditions and reality? If so, how do these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes?  
The belief systems of the leaders here do blind them to certain realities, and likely bias 
their actions and (where relevant) policy decisions in certain directs. The pro-materialist-
leaning, pro-scientific bent of these leaders, plus the great wealth and impressive 
technologies of the West they have observed, makes them favor big-scale “scientific” 
technologies and knowledge systems on economics from the West, then the world’s 
dominant center of power. These leaders tend to favor heavy industrialization, rapid 
adoption of modern business and accounting practices, large-scale development of 
military armaments, assertive economic diplomacy and trade to end Japan’s unequal trade 
treaties with the West, and aggressive Japanese involvement in the economic and 
political affairs of nearby regions, wherever possible. Their economic belief systems 
therefore make them favor economic practices or assertions of the West, and generally 
blind them to non-material conditions in mainland Asia and nearby regions, such as 
China, Korea, and Taiwan. Evolutionary thought also influences their focus on the 
“strong” West, as opposed to Japan’s “weak” neighbors. Ironically, the economic and 
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technological strength of the West, and the weakness of Japan’s Asian neighbors, seems 
to motivate Japan to “copy” the West so Japan can grow strong, and then “share” its 
knowledge and fruits with its weaker Asian brothers. Hopefully Japan would also gain 
more wealth in the process too.    
 In these worldviews on external economic relations, is the concept of 
technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how? The ideas of technonationalism as 
ideology are implicit in these views, especially in Fukuzawa’s. Most of his writing on 
economics stresses helping Japanese to understand modern economics and business 
practice, so that they will be adopted, to strengthen Japan internally, so that it will grow 
wealthy and strong, to defend itself against the West. The views of Ito and Kato also 
suggest that a stronger Japan also has the right to help its weaker Asian neighbors grow 
stronger, which theoretically also increases Japan’s wealth, and therefore its own 
security. 
 Cognition Issues. Image.  The primary images of Japan’s external economic 
relations here can be organized into three main groups. In the first, images of foreign 
economic relations, economic treaties are seen as both good and bad. They should be fair 
to Japan, and in Japan’s national interests, but when they are not, they are bad (Ito, 
implied). Yet economic treaties and stable economic relations between countries are 
good, when they are fair (Ito). The superior economic performance of Westerners over 
Japanese and other Asians is sometimes attributed to their “superior” race and civilization 
(Kato).1121 Other Asian countries are seen as economically inferior to Japan and the West, 
and less developed than Japan, so exporting Western or Japanese economic lessons to 
                                                
1121 Kato is also worried that premature competition with Westerners in Japan could ruin Japan’s economy. 
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them is good, and helpful for those countries (Ito). In the main images of Western 
economies, Western economics and business are seen as superior to Japan’s (Fukuzawa 
and Kato), and it is assumed that Japan can learn much from Western economies 
(Fukuzawa). They are both seen as good models for the Japanese economy and business 
world (Fukuzawa). Learning about Western business is good, whether in the West or in 
Japan, but the former is even better (Fukuzawa). Western economic knowledge is useful 
and can be applied in Japan (Fukuzawa), or soon, in Japan’s new empire (Ito). The third 
group of images here are of Western economic institutions. They are seen as important, 
and worthwhile for Japanese to study (Ito).  
 How do these images function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? The 
economic images here reflect pragmatism and realism, similar to the images above on 
external political relations. These images would encourage Japanese policymakers to 
favor close economic relations with the West, and not as much with other Asian nations. 
These images favor the West, its economic systems and knowledge. These images also 
encourage Japan to intervene economically in the affairs of other Asian countries, if it is 
strong enough and able to do so. These images do not encourage Japan to learn about 
business or economics from other Asian countries. 
 Worldview.  Based on the above image, in the cognitive framework that 
emerges, the world is controlled by the strong, including the economically strong (the 
West). Because the West is economically stronger than Japan and other Asian countries, 
it is superior to them. Any country that does not want to be weak and inferior must learn 
from the strong, the West. For the weak to become strong, they must learn and change. 
Japan can learn and change by adopting Western economics. The world is also driven by 
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the strong, especially the econ strong. That is now the West. That strength gives the 
strong the right to control and exploit the economically weak. Japan does not want to 
remain that way, so it must learn and grow economically, and become strong like the 
West as soon as it can. The strong, even Japan, have the right to control the weak, i.e. rest 
of Asia. Regarding the world’s order, an existing system of international trade and 
economic treaties controls trade and financial relations between countries. Japan is shut 
out of this system due to sakoku (national isolation) and because the powerful West has 
both developed and now controls the global economic system. The economically 
powerful West now controls this system. If Japan can gain military or economic power, it 
can change the unequal treaties foisted on it by the West. In Japan’s views of the self, 
Japan is rather poor and weak, but enterprising, well-disciplined and hard-working. It can 
work hard, learn, and overcome its present weaknesses. Japan is in the best posit of the 
Asian countries to do this. Japan can then help the other weak Asian countries fight the 
West. In Japan’s views of the non-self (others), the West is economically strong, 
aggressive, greedy, individualistic, selfish, ready to conquer others and the weak, and to 
control them. The rest of Asia appears superstitious, weak, slow, lumbering, primitive, 
isolated,1122 and incapable of defending itself without Japan’s “help.” 
 What are the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who hold 
these worldviews? The relevant environments contain Western powers and other Asian 
countries/regions nearby. There are also Western governments, Asian governments, trade 
treaties, the diplomatic world influencing and controlling the treaties, and emerging 
Japanese trading companies and entrepreneurs. How have these environments interacted 
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with or affected the leaders’ worldviews? Western treaties have put a “vice” around 
Japan, an unfair burden that Japan seeks to overcome as rapidly as possible. Weak Asian 
countries, their “offensive” behaviors, potential resources, and potential invasion by the 
West tempt Japan’s business leaders and entrepreneurs. 
 How may these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions 
have influenced the leaders’ perceptions? The unequal treaties angered and worried 
Japan’s leaders. They made them more determined to modernize Japan, and help it grow 
as quickly as possible, to overcome these unfair conditions. Actions of Asian countries 
such as China and Korea angered some leaders (Fukuzawa, Yamagata), made them feel 
pity for them (Ito), and desire to punish, discipline, guide them like children, and so forth. 
Regarding their uses of information, Japan’s leaders favored Western economic 
knowledge, not from Asia. Concerning the leaders’ understanding of events and their 
causes, they encouraged them to explain economic events through Western scientific and 
economic theories and explanations. They also applied Japanese entrepreneurial common 
sense to many of these issues, and used very worldly, material points-of-view, pragmatic 
explanations, according to which, the economically powerful control and drive the world. 
It was the West. 
 How may have technological systems affected these worldviews?  If so, which 
aspects may have been affected? The huge evidence of power of economics was evident 
in the power of industrial technology to build up the West, in its enormous wealth, and in 
the amazing lifestyles in the United States and Europe that these leaders observed. These 
systems also gave Japanese the power to travel the world, the British the power to 
conquer the greatest known power (China), and so forth. 
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Cultural Logics:  The global phenomena to which these leaders responded 
included the Western trading system, the global economic system dominated by the West, 
the unequal treaty system, commodities traded with other countries, the global monetary 
system, foreign investments in Japan, Japanese investments overseas, foreign 
technologies (including industrial and manufacturing technologies), foreign governments 
and the Japanese government, their economic and trade policies and economic-related 
ministries, international companies and players from overseas and Japan, Western 
economic knowledge, modern (Western) business practice(s), international segments of 
the labor force, colonialism, and  imperialism.  Some of the powerful ideas behind the 
Western and global economic systems included classical economics, theories of free 
trade, international trade, industrialization, evolutionism and Social Darwinism, 
imperialism, colonialism, governmental trade and economic policies, thought about 
business, industry, production, factories, management, labor, Western theories of 
economics and business, Western and international business practices, theories of 
economic growth, wealth and prosperity, and values of wealth and individual 
entrepreneurialism.1123 
 What are the leaders’ worldviews/basic beliefs about these phenomena? In their 
view, the West controls the global economic system, and has forced treaties favor to itself 
on Japan. All that the West wants to do in and with Japan is designed to be in its interest, 
not Japan’s. Foreign technologies must be imported and mastered by Japan, and can be. 
Foreign governments favor their own economic interests, are greedy, and do not care 
                                                
1123 Much of this list is similar to the global phenomena I listed for the cultural logics of the domestic 
market worldviews in Chapter 4. 
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about Japan. Japan’s government must act in Japan’s natural interests. All governments 
should fight for their national interests, as should their economic ministries. Strong state 
involvement in international economic diplomacy is necessary for Japan’s economic 
interests to be protected in the world market. Japanese international business should 
definitely be encouraged, but in this period, the state must take the biggest lead. Strong 
government in the marketplace for a country like Japan at this stage of econ development 
is good, internationally or domestically. Western economic knowledge works, is 
practical, has brought the West’s great wealth and power. Western business practices are 
efficient; they work too. Western colonialism and imperialism are dangers for Japan, and 
must be resisted. The international labor force must be carefully controlled, or it could 
overwhelm Japan’s economy (Kato). All Western economic thoughts are “scientific.” 
They prove that they are better because they work. The economically strong will control 
and dominate those who are weak. Modern Western theories about business and 
economics must be learned and well applied by Japan, because they work. If Japan does 
this successfully, it will survive and flourish in the international system. Domestic wealth 
in Japan will be affected by what happens internationally. Values of entrepreneurialism, 
industrialization, and business in the private sector have been the true engine of growth in 
such countries as the United States, Britain, and will be for Japan, as soon as its private 
sector can be strengthened enough to emerge. Until then, a strong state role is okay and 
necessary. Learning these international economic and business practices will make Japan 
wealthy.1124  
                                                
1124 This last point is from Fukuzawa. 
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 What are the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global 
phenomena?  The strong control all forms of power, even economic, in the world. Brute 
force and power controls and determines that happens in the world. Greed drives the 
world. Economic actors, even states and their governments, act in their own, national 
interests. Each country and government cares most for itself. Each country and 
government, including Japan, must act in its own interests, including economic ones, and 
defense. This is also true in international economic diplomacy, and in the world market. 
Japan’s government must act on behalf of, and defend, Japan. Private business, including 
Japan’s, cannot compete in the global market until it reaches a certain maturity or level of 
quality and competitiveness. Until that time, strong state action in international economic 
diplomacy to protect its own national markets and businesses is allowed. Strong state 
economic action and intervention is necessary at this stage. Western and modern 
economic and business knowledge work, are practical and scientific. Japan must learn 
them. It will not be good for Japan to econ controlled or dominated by the West, so Japan 
must build itself up so it will not be. The economically strong will survive and flourish in 
the world, and control the economically weak. Learning Western economics and business 
practices will make Japan successful, wealthy. Countries that are wealthy and successful 
will survive. What happens internationally affects what happens domestically. The 
private sector is what really brings growth, but if it is too weak, or just emerging, it must 
have the help of the state. The public and private sectors must cooperate; they are not 
natural enemies. 
 What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? They studied 
hard, learned about Western economic and business theories and theories of international 
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trade, to answer these questions: why is the West so wealthy and strong? What made it 
so? What are the basic principles behind these phenomena? What must Japan do to learn 
these principles, and grow? What can Japan do to grow strong and wealthy so the West 
will not control it? Japan’s leaders studied all of the economic areas listed. The specific 
leaders studied here focused on the overall economy,1125 modern business and accounting 
practices,1126 the meaning of modern finance,1127 Western business culture,1128 
international economic diplomacy,1129 basic theories of economics,1130 understanding 
entrepreneurial values and culture, and how they might be encouraged in Japan.1131  
 And what were the cultural logics under these responses? Japan has the capacity 
to learn from other countries, and then grow. Japan has often done it before in its history. 
Through hard work, a people and country will be rewarded. Japan must work hard in its 
present situation. It must survive. It has no choice. If Japanese apply themselves to 
learning these economic and business ideas, they can master them, and improve Japan’s 
situation. Japan’s leaders need a basic understanding of overall economic and business 
knowledge; certain leaders need specialized knowledge of particular areas. Economic 
knowledge is the most fundamental for Japan’s national survival.1132 Japan’s leaders have 
the responsibility for setting the pace for the rest of Japanese society concerning the 
adoption of these modern economic business practices and culture, in helping set goals, 
providing overall guidance, and encouraging everyday people throughout Japan to learn 





1129 Hirobumi Ito and Miyoji Ito, Commentaries on the Constitution. 





about them. The state especially has the responsibility to take the lead concerning Japan’s 
international economic and business dealings, since it is beyond the realm of almost all 
Japanese. But the effects of the international econ system and competition can determine 
the fate of the whole nation, so the state must definitely be involved. 
 If we compare the cultural logics under the worldviews about the global 
phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the 
phenomena, we see that the former logics stress very realist, materialist forces and issues: 
power, wealth, greed, and economic and political actors acting in their own, national 
interests. If actors do not act in their own interest, they will lose in international economic 
competition. Strong state action is assumed to be necessary until Japan’s private sector 
has reached enough maturity to face international competition. Western business and 
economic knowledge is admired and desired because of practicality: what it has done for 
the West, and because it is “scientific.” These views are highly materialist and pragmatic. 
Cooperation between the public and private sectors is presumed to be positive and 
necessary. Though the private sector will ultimately determine most of Japan’s growth, it 
is currently too small, and needs the protection and nurturance of the state. The cultural 
logics under the leaders’ responses to the global economic phenomena stress action on 
the part of Japan’s leaders, and the Japanese people themselves: hard work, study, and 
more hard work. Hard work, cooperation and learning have built Japan in the past, from 
the village level up. This time, the national government must take the lead in determining 
the best courses of action for Japan’s overall economy. Cooperation of various domestic 
and private sector actors will be strongly encouraged, and if necessary, coerced, since this 
cooperation is a matter of national survival.   
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Globalization Issues.  How do these important worldviews on external economic 
relations reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows 
of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? Even in the late Tokugawa period, 
under the national isolation policy, in remote Japan,1133 these leaders experienced the 
impacts of Japan’s limited economic relations with the West in southwestern Japan. Of 
Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato, Fukuzawa in particular sensed the power of economics to 
greatly uplift Japan, from what he saw in the West. On a global level, Ito knew that Japan 
must quickly undo the damage of the unequal trade treaties with the West, or it would be 
colonized and econ-dominated by the latter.  
 If we consider these global economic processes as people experienced them, on 
micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Impressions 
from Fukuzawa’s childhood of the power of Western economics, and what he later 
observed as he traveled in the West, affected his lifelong work, in which he stressed the 
import of economics as the foundation for Japan’s modern life. It is also seen in the 
various economy-related institutions he helped found. Ito was the individual here who 
was most directly involved in the processes of international economic diplomacy, helping 
to negotiate treaties with several other countries, such as Korea.  
 Do these important global processes of external economic relations represent a 
form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? 
Western economic globalization and pressures on Japan to open for trade helped force 
Japan to open and begin modernizing. Eventually Japan was determined to begin its own 
                                                
1133 Japan was geographically remote from the Western world, and in ancient/medieval times, fairly isolated 
even from the rest of East Asia. 
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involvement in Asia, largely for economic reasons, partly in response to what the West 
was already attempting to do there. Besides the economic damages resulting from the 
Sino-Japanese War, the economic effects of this Japanese “globalization” did not really 
start to emerge until slightly later, when Japanese colonization began in Taiwan in 1895, 






 From our study of leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external political and 
economic relations (1850 to 1895), what can we conclude about how those views, and 
Japan’s experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations at this time, 
may have contributed to Japan’s current foreign aid policies? In this conclusion, I will 
note general trends, but will explore more concrete linkages in the final chapters (9 and 
10). On learning from foreign societies, we see that a developing nation needs strong 
relations with more advanced countries so it can import practical, high level knowledge, 
from many sources, to help it develop the nation. Nation-building, for the nation’s 
survival, must be a top priority. Japan needed such knowledge in politics, economics, 
science, technology, military affairs, and so forth. For this purpose, Japan sent bright 
scholars overseas, and brought foreign experts into the country. Japan did all these things 
in this period, and set a good example for LDCs today. These should also be priorities in 
today’s aid programs, but I am not sure how much they currently are in Japanese ODA. 
On cultural issues and development, Japan’s leaders (1850-1895) did not do very much to 
protect the nation’s culture. On religion and development, coercion and mixing of 
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religion and state were highly destructive in Japan. On the role of development and 
security ideologies in domestic Japanese affairs, toward the end of the era 1850 to 1895, 
Japan used several ideologies to encourage imperialistic control of nearby regions and 
extremist nationalistic ideologies to cement its control of Japan’s domestic politics, 
economy and society. In ODA and development policy, aggressive or extremist 
ideologies should be discouraged. 
 On external political relations, from 1850 to 1895, there were many negative 
events that can provide fruitful guidelines for ODA and development policies. For 
example, in this period, Japan generally had hostile relations with its neighbors in Asia. 
Though Japan was uncomfortable with being forced to open itself to foreign relations 
with the West, a few years later, it forced Korea to do the same. Though Japan did not 
like the unequal treaties that were forced on it, it forced similar treaties on Korea and 
others. Though Japan did not want to be attacked or invaded by the West, it attacked 
China over the issue of Korea, partly on Korean soil. Japan built up its military without 
adequate controls on its power, which would have disastrous consequences for the nation 
in a few decades. Sadly, in this situation, we have a developing country quickly repeating 
the mistakes of the West in its relations with other developing countries. It seems that 
Japan recognizes these mistakes on some levels. Its present ODA policy seeks friendly 
relations with LDCs, not to attack or coerce them. Japan also limits its ODA for countries 
that have excessive arms trade or build-up. 
 On external economic issues, Japan took various wise, pragmatic steps in its 
international economic relations in this era (1850-1895). It sought to trade with a broad 
range of nations on an equal basis, including bilateral trade, though unequal treaties 
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hindered these goals, somewhat. The government encouraged Japan to seek independence 
and strength in trade, and to identify the nation’s areas of economic strength, as quickly 
as possible. Japan also sought positive economic and cultural relations to help it rapidly 
gain needed technical knowledge. Since positive trade has been a key part of Japan’s 
development and growth, Japan’s ODA policies have always sought to encourage LDCs 
to develop strong economic infrastructure so that they can engage in their own positive 
economic development and growth. 
  The second key question of the dissertation asks whether the ideas of 
“modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation an accurate picture of 
Japan’s experience with technology and development, and how much are they seen in 
Japan’s current aid policies. The concept of translative adaptation does not really apply 
here, since the main focus of this chapter is on international, not domestic issues. In their 
worldviews of Japan’s external political relations (1850 to 1895), all five leaders studied 
accept the basic assumptions of internationalization, that the West should not dominate 
Japan as it is absorbed into the global economy, politically or economically. While it is 
also implied that they do not want Japan to be culturally invaded, their cultural emphasis 
is more on the domestic level. In their views of external economic relations (1850 to 
1895), all three leaders studied (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato) support internationalization. 
None wants Japan to be economically dominated by the West, nor its internal culture 
destroyed. There are few comments about cultural issues on the international level here. I 
found it challenging to apply “modernization” to the worldviews of external political 
relations, but in the end, concluded that in the case of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato, they 
suggest that while maintaining Japan’s internal cultural fortitude is important, placing 
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priority on external defense first is more important (a matter of national survival). 
External defense is also more important to Yamagata and Ito. I also concluded that the 
concept of “modernization” does not apply to the worldviews of Japan’s external 
economic relations (1850-1895). 
 What are some chief insights from Japan’s experience with technology, 
development, and foreign relations during this period? Regarding technology, during the 
Tokugawa period, Japan imported most of its Western technology through its trade with 
the Dutch, the only Western country with which it was allowed to trade.1134 A significant 
technology, a fleet of American navy ships, helped force open Japan in 1853. Japan 
significantly built up its military technology and industrialization, contributing to its 
victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). This led to further 
industrialization in Japan after the war. Japan gained significant exposure to and training 
in technology through several different sources in this period: through the various 
government missions sent to the West in the 1860s and 1870s, foreign direct investment, 
and from trade with and foreign instructors from the United States, Britain, Germany and 
France.  
 Concerning development, national isolation (sakoku) from 1639 to 1854 turned 
much of Japan’s development inward, though not totally. It limited, but did not totally 
extinguish, foreign input entering Japan. During sakoku, the Dutch were the main source 
of Western knowledge for Japan. Even though Japan was cut off from most sources of 
foreign knowledge in the Tokugawa period, it had a remarkably dynamic, economically 
                                                
1134 These comments are based on comments in the context sections on Japan’s external political and 
economic relations, earlier in this chapter, and draw on various sources footnoted there. 
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and culturally active society, based on its own internal dynamics, trade, hard work, high 
educational levels, and large population. Though the signing of unequal trade treaties 
with various Western nations in 1858 initially created various pressures for Japan, such as 
higher commodity prices and internal unrest, ultimately the opening of the country 
provided a huge stimulus for the nation’s development in all areas. Though Japan’s 
development had historically been profoundly influenced by China and also Korea, with 
China’s defeat by Britain in the Opium War (1840-1842), Western models became much 
more appealing. After 1868, the Meiji government’s aggressive Westernization program 
had large effects on Japan’s development. Examples of foreign stimulation of Japan’s 
development included the large input by foreign scientists and instructors from leading 
Western nations, especially the United States and Britain, and aggressive negotiations by 
Japan with Russia in 1875, which enabled Japan to actively colonize the northern island 
of Hokkaido, while Russia gained Sakhalin. Though the Meiji government supported 
development efforts with loans and other subsidies, there was also heavy reliance upon 
foreign investments, markets, technical assistance, and instructors. 
 What do we learn about Japan’s experience with foreign relations from our 
survey of the contexts above? The national seclusion policy cut off almost all political 
and economic relations between Japan and other countries in the Tokugawa era. Though 
Japan reopened its political and economic relations starting in 1854, it was burdened with 
the system of unequal treaties with major Western powers that did not end until 1911. 
Early in the Meiji era, Japan quickly began assertively engaging China and Korea, 
politically and economically. Through war and other actions, Japan gained several 
colonies and significant economic footholds on the mainland, but the consequences for 
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the other Asian powers were largely painful. Relations with the United States and Britain 
were the most significant for Japan, politically, economically, and culturally. Military 
knowledge imported from Prussia, in particular, would have important effects on Japan 
and other Asian nations, through the Sino-Japanese War (1904-1905) and later conflicts. 
Economically, Japan had relatively limited exchange with foreign powers during the 
Tokugawa era, especially with Western powers. Despite the burden of the unequal 
treaties from 1858-1911, Japan was able to export mainly agricultural and semi-finished 
and manufactured goods in the Meiji period, though it usually had a negative trade 
balance. Foreign trade, interchange, and knowledge were especially key in the Meiji era 
for enhancing Japan’s economic and technical knowledge in this period.  
 What evidence emerges by comparing both the leaders’ worldviews and Japan’s 
experiences with technology, development and foreign relations in this era? Regarding 
“modernization” and internationalization, while these five leaders are not unconcerned 
about the cultural impacts of Western influence, they are most concerned about Japan’s 
external defense and security, since that was the most obvious, overt threat. In reviewing 
the nation’s primary experiences with technology, development and foreign relations 
from 1850 to 1895, what emerges is the great contrast between the late Tokugawa and the 
Meiji eras. In the former, Japan had extremely limited access to Western technologies 
and stimulation. It was greatly isolated, economically, politically, and culturally. After 
the opening of the country, however, enormous growth in the nation’s technological 
capabilities, development, industrial capacity, and foreign relations/connections occurred.  
 Another key difference is that in the older era, Japan gladly received influence 
from other Asian nations, while now, those sources were nearly totally rejected, and 
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Western sources overwhelmingly favored. The contrast between such intense isolation 
followed by feverish importation of everything Western could not be starker. After 
emerging from the late Tokugawa period, young Meiji leaders realized how much Japan 
had missed, and wasted no time beginning to educate themselves and Japan in what they 
believed they country needed to know, since its very freedom and independence 
depended on it.  
 The intense nature of what Japan faced, and its need to progress as rapidly as 
possible, tended to make these leaders neglect “softer” issues like culture, in the face of 
more pressing political, economic and strategic issues. Internationalization’s emphasis on 
comprehending the political and economic threats Japan faced as it was increasingly 
absorbed into the world market is well reflected in both the worldviews and development 
experiences seen in this chapter, and the urgent nature of reforms makes the leaders’ 
“neglect” of culture make sense. It has been argued by some aid critics that today’s 
Japanese aid policy also tends to focus more on economic and technical issues, rather 
than softer human issues such as those mentioned here.   
 What evidence do we have here of how views of spirituality and religion 
associated with these worldviews of external political and economic relations (1850-
1895) may have affected policies in Japan in this era? On spirituality, above I note how 
three leaders in particular (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) support the use of spiritual values 
to strengthen Japan and its cultural core so that Japan can better succeed in technological 
and economic development, and enhance its chances for survival in the international 
system. Several of the leaders also argue that positive values and spirituality, whether 
Western or Eastern, can contribute to a society’s positive economic growth and 
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development.1135 Above I also noted a significant theme that emerges on in the views of 
several of the leaders on the role of technology in Japan’s external political relations: the 
importance of strong spiritual values to strengthen Japan’s scientific and technological 
growth, to help enhance its position in the international system.       
 In my above discussion of the worldviews and cultural logics of Japan’s 
external political relations, I note that there is a heavy emphasis on material power, 
values, and the presumed strength and benefits that science and technology may bring. 
The superiority of material values and science is assumed. In my examination of leaders’ 
views of external economic relations in this era, I observe how their pro-materialist bent 
makes them favor large-scale technologies and industrial development for Japan, and 
encourages them to discount the ethical and philosophical values of Japan’s East Asian 
and Confucian heritage. The cultural logics under these worldviews are highly 
materialist, pragmatic, and stress the power of science, technology and economics to 
control and change the world.     
 In my brief comments on religion in this chapter, I note how concepts of 
religion and morality affect three of the leaders’ views of international relations to a 
degree.1136 These three feel that morality and religion have a role in strengthening Japan. 
In their worldviews of Japan’s external political relations, all five leaders studied admit 
the West’s current superiority over Japan and Asia in most international issues, including 
the presumed religious and moral underpinnings of international strength. In the lessons 
                                                
1135 These leaders are Fukuzawa, Mori, Yamagata, and Kato. The first two are highly positive about the 
potential role of Western values in the West’s.  
1136 Here I am referring to Fukuzawa, Kato and Mori.  
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offered for other developing countries here, a positive role for religion in contributing to 
a nation’s economic development is acknowledged.1137   
  What impacts might these views on spirituality, religion, and materialism have 
had on policies in this era? Views that strong, positive spiritual values can help build 
Japan and its stature in its external political and economic relations would encourage 
more humility in Japan’s approach toward its Asian neighbors, and more confidence and 
less anxious perplexity at rash, insensitive actions of Western powers. These did not 
occur. The heavy material emphasis in views of technology would tend to cause Japan to 
support large-scale industrialization, and to largely reject its Confucian heritage, and 
indeed occurred.   It is possible that religion could contribute positively to Japan’s own 
development and international stature, though the leaders had mixed feelings on whether 
Western spirituality could. Finally State Shinto emerged as the Meiji government’s 
response, especially for the purpose of offering the nation moral strength for 
development. I found no intentional applications of State Shinto for international 
relations in this era.1138 
 From the evidence presented here, what are the implications of possible 
conflicts between views of spirituality and science and similar issues for policy in this 
period? What are the possible value conflicts between spirituality and science revealed in 
the views discussed in this chapter? While several of the leaders wisely observed that 
positive spiritual values could likely enhance Japan’s technological and economic 
                                                
1137 For example, religious values can contribute positively to the building of a society, so a society should 
not neglect its religious heritage in order to develop. If it does, it may suffer.  
1138 This was not the case in the next period (1895 to 1945), when Japan imposed the practice and 
ideologies of State Shinto and emperor worship on its long-term colonies in Taiwan and Korea. Part of the 




development, and therefore also its international stature, the question was which values. 
While some of these leaders leaned toward Western values or Christianity, others and the 
Meiji state preferred Japanese values. While the state officially chose to build a new 
national spiritual infrastructure in State Shinto, other individuals such as Fukuzawa did 
their best to promote Western type values in their own personal spheres of influence. We 
noted earlier, especially in Chapter 4, the profound though indirect influence felt through 
Fukuzawa’s writings, his work at Keio College, and his other economic activities.  
 However, these efforts did not negate the general pressure against spiritual 
values and ethical knowledge that pervaded the period, in the face of the overwhelming 
power of technology, science, economics, and other material forces in this era that Japan 
especially encountered from the outside world as it opened itself to increasing foreign 
intercourse. Part of the pressure was caused by the “power” of science and materialism, 
part of it came from the cultural conflicts that most Japanese felt as they considered 
Christianity, and some came from rejecting Japan’s Confucian ethical and philosophical 
heritage. So there was strong pressure against much consideration of spiritual factors as 
various development and security policies were implemented by the Meiji state. Was any 
of the pressure against the use of spiritual perspectives in policies due to the Flaw of the 
Excluded Middle that was perhaps inherent in the scientific and technological 
worldviews and ideologies that Japan absorbed from the West? Perhaps there was some 
influence, though not in the case of several of the leaders we studied here.1139 The fact 
that State Shinto could even emerge in the face of such pressures likely resulted from 
                                                
1139 This was not the case for Kato, Fukuzawa, or Mori.  
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Japan studying the presumed positive role of state churches and religion in the economic 
development of Europe. 
 Where are possible future implications of these issues for Japanese foreign aid, 
over the long run?1140 The theme of pressure against considering spiritual issues and 
values as one approaches “real world,” materialist policies in politics, economics, and 
diplomacy emerged in this chapter. In postwar Japan, Article 20 of the Japanese 
Constitution of 1947, imposed on Japan by the American Occupation, prohibits the 
influence of religion in the political affairs of the state, and state interference in the 
religious life of the people.1141 What has been the effect of this stance on Japanese 
diplomacy or foreign aid? It likely created additional pressure against any insertion or 
consideration of these issues as aid is offered to developing countries. Has that likelihood 
created “blindness” on the part of Japanese policymakers of this significant cultural area, 
and how it might affect the acceptance, appropriateness, or delivery of aid programs, 
loans and packages for countries with different religious and spiritual conditions? If such 
a form of “blindness” exists, could it be attributed to some form of the Flaw of the 
Excluded Middle? In contrast, from 1895 to 1945, spiritual issues had profound effects 
on the course of Japan’s future, both domestic and international, as we will see in 
                                                
1140 I must wait until the firt part of the conclusion, Chapter 9, to include definitive comments about my 
working hypothesis, how Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations, and 
leaders’ views of those areas, may have affected Japan’s current aid policies. Right now, I can say that 
Japan’s experience in this period offers many potentially highly valuable lessons for other LDCs in the 
areas of technology, development and foreign relations. Another key point here is that in this era, various 
material, secularizing forces attempted to divorce the input of values and “spiritual” forces from Japanese 
reforms and policies in multiple areas. Similar secularizing tendencies also seem to be present in 
contemporary aid policy. What is the cause of these forces, and what are their current effects? I cannot yet 
say.  
1141 The Constitution of Japan (1947), “Hanover Historical Texts Project,” available from 
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/1947con.html. Internet; accessed 9 August 2008. 
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Chapters 7 and 8. But first we will consider the issues connected with Japan’s external 













Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895) 





This chapter, a continuation of the discussion of Japan’s external relations (1850-
1895), examines decision makers’ notions of how Japan interacts with international 
influences on its cultural relations with the outside world. In this chapter, I primarily 
consider the views of Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori and Kato. In Chapter 6, like Chapter 5, I again 
use the concept of internationalization to analyze development issues in the worldviews 
of Japan’s external cultural relations, six major issues to assess worldviews in the area of 
technology, and the same concepts for analysis of cognitive issues: image, worldview 
(my definition), and cultural logics. For globalization issues in Chapter 6, I use the same 
questions that were used in Chapter 5: how some of the most important worldviews here 
reflect or affect processes of globalization, how globalization affects worldviews, how 
global processes affected people and these leaders on micro- (personal) and/or macro- 
(shared, public) levels, and whether these global processes represent a form of Japanese 
or non-Western globalization. In the conclusion of this chapter, I argue that it was very 
hard for the Japanese government to balance the material aspects of foreign learning and 
knowledge importation with the ethical/spiritual/philosophical aspects. Why was this so, 
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and what implications might this have for later Japanese aid? In this chapter, I explore 
partly how this issue and others related to Japan’s external cultural relations unfolded. 
 
Contexts of Japan’s External Cultural Relations, 1850-1895:  Major Trends 
 
 
 In the late Tokugawa period, until the 1860s, foreigners were generally viewed by 
Japan according to China’s Ka-I (“Flower-Barbarian”) view.  All foreigners outside the 
middle kingdom were barbarians; the further away they were, the greater their barbarity 
(Blacker 1964:125). Japanese study of and exposure to foreign cultures from 1850 to 
1895 consisted mainly of academic study and cultural exchanges of several types.  
During the Tokugawa era, Western learning in Japan included study of Western 
languages, medicine, the physical sciences, the arts, and late in the period, military 
science and foreign affairs. Japan’s sustained effort to acquire advanced Western 
knowledge during the Tokugawa and Meiji eras was a decisive factor in its rise to great 
power status in the late 1800s and early 1900s.1142  The Shogunate established the Bansho 
Shirabesho (the Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books), a forerunner of Tokyo 
University, in 1855, as Japan’s first centralized educational facility for the study, 
translation, and teaching of Western languages, science and technology.1143  In the early 
Meiji period, English replaced the Dutch language as the most important Western 
language studied in Japan, and was considered essential for the mastery of Western 
technologies important for modernization.  Study of English stressed reading skills to 
                                                
1142 For most of the Tokugawa period, Western learning was called Dutch learning, since Japan acquired 
most of its knowledge from the Dutch during this period, because the Dutch were the only Europeans with 
whom they were allowed to trade (Japan, “Western Learning,” 1697-1698). 
1143 Ibid., “Bansho Shirabesho,” 100. 
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master such knowledge, not oral skills.1144  Another area of western learning important 
for Japan’s modernization was the study of foreign law, the concepts of which required 
careful adaptation for the Japanese context.1145  Foreign law would have important 
impacts on Japan’s constitutions (1889 and 1947), its politics, and the lives of all 
Japanese persons.      
Japan is famous for its important cultural exchanges and embassies sent abroad to 
acquire foreign knowledge, some of which occurred in ancient times.1146  In the late 
Tokugawa and early Meiji eras, the Shogunate missions to the West (1860s) and the 
Iwakura mission (1871-1873) provided unexpected perspectives on Western societies for 
embassy members and a systematic way for the government to learn about the West, 
helping to motivate some of the travelers to question the traditional social and political 
systems in Japan.1147  After Japan opened to foreign exchange in the late 1800s, its 
                                                
1144 Ibid., “English Language Training,” 342-343.  Such an approach to English instruction was highly 
pragmatic and utilitarian, geared toward training all Japanese to master English for the building of the 
nation.  The stress on reading skills made sense, since in Meiji Japan, very few Japanese would ever meet 
foreigners or travel abroad.  But this choice affected generations of Japanese and their ability to relate well 
to foreigners in intercultural interaction.  Today Japan’s huge, national JET (Japan English Teaching) 
program, where several thousand young foreigners are brought to Japan to teach English and other foreign 
languages every year, is an attempt to overcome these difficulties. Anthropological explorations of the JET 
program are found in David L. McConnell, Importing Diversity: Inside Japan's JET Program (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000) and David L. McConnell, “JET Lag: Studying a Multilevel Program 
Over Time,” in Doing Fieldwork in Japan, ed. T.C. Bestor et al. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 
2003), 124-38. 
1145 Ibid., “Study of Foreign Law,” 399.   
1146 From the seventh through the tenth centuries A.D., during China’s Sui and Tang dynasties, Japan sent 
(or scheduled) twenty-four different diplomatic missions to China, in order to promote diplomatic relations, 
trade and cultural exchanges.  Several embassies from China also visited Japan, and a few of the Japanese 
missions stopped in Korea on the way.  Embassies often included scholars and Buddhist monks.  In 
addition to enhancing economic, political, and cultural relations, some of these exchanges promoted great 
changes in Japanese culture and politics, based on Chinese models, such as the administrative reforms of 
Japan’s Taika Reform of 645 A.D. (Ibid., “Embassies to Sui and Tang China,” 1467).    
1147 Fukuzawa Yukichi accompanied the 1862 mission.  His bestselling book Conditions in the West was 
very influential in the bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment) movement in the Meiji era.  Several 
important national leaders in the Meiji government accompanied the Iwakura mission.  Through their 
observation of life in the West, some of them better understood the social conditions necessary to support a 
modern economy (Ibid., “Shogunate Missions to the West,” 1406 and “Iwakura Mission,” 641). 
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international cultural exchange policy stressed the importation of foreign knowledge from 
abroad into Japan, rather than the promotion of Japanese culture abroad, in order that 
Japan might quickly be built into a strong, modern nation based on Western models.1148 
 Japan was affected by its contact with ideologies and movements gleaned from 
foreign cultures.  Underlying this has been the Japanese concept of the West, which is 
rather problematic in its imprecision, but tends to emphasize geographic aspects and 
racial identity.1149  Among the important ideologies and intellectual trends in this period 
was the bunmei kaika (“civilization and enlightenment”) movement, initiated by the Meiji 
government to instill Western thought and cultural practices in the populace at large.1150  
In the private sector, intellectuals like Fukuzawa Yukichi, Mori Arinori, Kato Hiroyuki 
and their Meirokusha society attempted to introduce Western culture, social institutions, 
and “enlightenment thought” across the fields of culture, economics and politics through 
their writings and debates.  These intellectuals greatly influenced the bunmei kaika 
movement, and served as its leaders. Increased exposure to the West led to greater 
acceptance of Western ideas such as political liberty, seen in the rise of democratic 
                                                
1148 Ibid., “International Cultural Exchange,” 615.  While this is basically true, as soon as Japan began the 
process of colonizing outlying regions such as Hokkaido, Okinawa, and Taiwan, the attempt to 
systematically transfer Japanese culture to those areas, and develop them economically, also began.  For 
Taiwan, the process began in 1895.   
1149 The Japanese have used the word Seiyô for the West since the mid-1800s.  It literally means “the 
western seas” as related to China, historically viewed as the center of Japan’s known universe.  The concept 
of the West has changed greatly over the years, even recently (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “The West,” 
563-564).   
1150 The government encouraged people to adopt Western diets, hairstyles, and clothing.  It also initiated 
cultural and technological innovations such as the telegraph, postal services, railroads, a national public 
education system, and the West’s Gregorian calendar (Japan, “Meiji Enlightenment,” 946).   
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movements.1151  Two other important Western-related intellectual influences beginning in 
this period were Social Darwinism and feminism.1152  
 Concerning Japan’s interaction with foreign cultures in overseas locales from 
1850 to 1895, the impact of many Japanese who studied abroad in the United States and 
Europe and then returned home was great.1153  Japan has been aware of its cultural debt to 
China throughout history, but from the late Tokugawa period, Japanese began to doubt 
the Chinese tradition’s relevance for modernity for various reasons.1154  Japan’s cultural 
debt to Korea is also deep, since it received many elements of its pre-modern culture 
from Korea, or from China via Korea.1155  But problems from two attempted Japanese 
invasions since the late 1500s, and Japanese pressures for influence in Korea in the late 
1800s and early 1900s, contributed greatly to tensions between Japan and Korea from the 
late 1800s to the present.1156  Japan’s cultural interaction with Southeast Asia, renewed in 
                                                
1151 The Freedom and People’s Rights Movement was one such democratic movement.  By 1880 the broad 
acceptance of things Western led the Meiji government to counter the influence of Western culture by 
attempting a revival of conservative Confucian thought (Ibid.; Encyclopedia of Contemporary, 
“Enlightenment Intellectuals,” 124-125).      
1152 For more on Social Darwinism in Japan, see my discussion of Mori Arinori and Kato Hiroyuki in 
Chapter 3.  For a brief overview of feminism in Japan, see Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Feminism,” 
141-142. 
1153 Japan, “United States and Japan,” 1656. 
1154 These reasons included the weak response of China to both the West and to Japan throughout the 
nineteenth century, revealed in China’s defeat in several conflicts, including the Opium War with Britain 
(1840-1842), and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).  To intellectuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
contemporary China seemed technologically and scientifically weak and philosophically stagnant, 
compared with the West (Ibid., “China and Japan,” 188-189). See also Narsimhan, Japanese Perceptions. 
1155 For example, many aspects of Japanese culture in the Jômon and Yayoi periods (10,000 B.C.-300 B.C. 
and 300 B.C. -300 A.D.) are very similar to Korean culture of the same periods.  Japan received Buddhism, 
Confucianism and Chinese characters directly from the Korean kingdom of Paekche in the sixth century 
A.D. (Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827). 
1156 The tensions between China and Japan for influence in Korea led to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895), discussed above in this chapter.  The Japanese victory in that war and the war with Russia (1904-
1905) led to Japan’s formal colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945 (Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827-828). 
During the early 1900s, Japan had many inaccurate cultural images of China and Korea, reflected in 
discrimination inflicted on Chinese and Korean residents in Japan. Japan devoted more cultural attention 
toward learning from the West from 1868 to the 1920s. Though Japan’s cultural gaze again shifted to Asia 
from the 1930s to 1945, at that time its imagery of China and Korea was clouded by militaristic and 
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1868, included Japanese female prostitutes who worked chiefly on the Malay 
Peninsula.1157 Immigration was never a major social trend in Japan.1158 While the 
eventual impact of Japanese emigrants on the lands where they went is certainly 
significant, the impact of emigration on Japan itself has been comparatively much 
smaller.1159 
 Regarding Japanese interaction with foreign cultures within Japan (1850-1895), 
relations with the United States had profound cultural influences on Japan.  Foreign 
teachers and visitors from the United States introduced many scientific, social, and 
humanistic philosophies, as well as arts and religion, to young Japanese through schools 
and universities.1160  Through foreign experts and teachers in Japan, German influence on 
Japanese medicine and law and French influence on its economic thought and other areas 
of culture were deep.1161  Several thousand foreign teachers and experts came to Japan to 
both public and private sector education, helping Japan modernize in areas such as 
engineering, agriculture, medicine, foreign affairs, and military science, where foreign 
                                                                                                                                            
colonial ideologies. It is likely that accurate images of China and Korea have only recently emerged, in the 
case of China, since the 1980s. 
1157 These women were referred to as Karayuki-san (Ibid., “Southeast Asia and Japan,” 1449; Encyclopedia 
of Contemporary, “Japayuki-san,” 233).      
1158 Much larger percentages of the populations in nations such as Ireland, England and Italy have 
emigrated overseas than from Japan.  The major overseas destinations of Japanese emigrants in the early 
Meiji period were Hawaii and the United States.  Even if we consider the percentage of Japanese who 
emigrated to Japan’s overseas colonies during Japan’s period of active overseas colonization, it still seems 
small compared to Japan’s total population. (Japan, “Emigration,” 334). 
1159 Ibid., 334-335. A significant example of the impact of Japanese emigrants on foreign lands is their huge 
impact on agriculture in Hawaii, California, and Brazil, lands where they emigrated in fairly large numbers.  
In California, the most productive agricultural state in the United States, Japanese emigrants in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries helped to pioneer the state’s enormously productive fruit and 
vegetable growing industries. For more, see Ronald Takaki, A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural 
America (Boston: Little Brown Co, 1993). 
1160 Japan, “United States and Japan,” 1656. 
1161 Ibid., “Germany and Japan,” 452; Ibid., “France and Japan,” 407. 
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knowledge was deemed useful.1162  Their impact on helping transform Japan from a 
feudal society into a modern, great power in slightly more than a generation was huge.1163  
Chinese immigrated to Japan after the nation opened to Western trade in 1853.  Many 
Westerners also brought Chinese employees, and by 1875, half of the foreign residents in 
Japan (5,000) were Chinese.  Most were merchants and professionals who settled in port 
cities like Yokohama and Kobe.1164   
 





Fukuzawa Yukichi.  A key factor in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s view of foreign culture 
is that he grew up in Kyushu near Nagasaki.1165  In the late 1850s, the thought of 
traveling to a distant “barbarian” country was frightening to most Japanese.  After two 
hundred years of seclusion, they were “nervous,” “unadventurous,” and easily frightened 
by Western things.  Yet they felt (morally) “superior” to Western barbarians.1166  But 
Fukuzawa was somewhat different.  In San Francisco, he was impressed by various 
                                                
1162 Most of the foreign instructors came from four countries:  the United States, Great Britain, Germany, 
and France (Ibid., “Foreign Employees of the Meiji Period,” 396-397). 
1163 It is true that foreign instructors had a huge impact.  They taught subjects requested by Japanese 
authorities, and implemented policy decisions already made by Japan itself.  In most cases, their salaries 
were totally paid by Japan (at least for the public sector foreign employees) (Ibid.).       
1164 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Chinese in Japan,” 65-66. 
1165 This exposed Fukuzawa to Western ideas flowing in via the Dutch at Deshima, an island outpost in 
Nagasaki harbor.  During the Tokugawa period, all trade with the Netherlands was relegated there, and the 
Netherlands was the only Western nation allowed to trade with Japan.  There was a tradition of Dutch 
learning at Nakatsu, Fukuzawa’s home feudal domain, from the late 1700s.  His love of Western 
knowledge began when he was made curator of a large collection of Western books in Nagasaki at age 
nineteen.  A year later (1855), he was invited to attend a school of Dutch studies in Osaka.  In 1858, 
Fukuzawa transferred to teach Dutch studies in Edo.  Soon he began to study English.  By 1863 Japan’s 
major diplomatic language had switched to English from Dutch, reflecting the increasing importance of 
Britain in Japan’s diplomatic relations (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 4, 14-16, 20, 22-27, 30, 33, 67). 
1166 Ibid., 39. As an example of Japanese discomfort, some ignorant samurai attacked foreigners for 
perceived insults.  These could have caused foreign intervention.  Fukuzawa believed that Chinese 
ignorance of the West caused foreign intervention there (Ibid., 53-54).   
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technologies, yet found Western male-female relationships shocking.1167  In Europe and 
the United States, Fukuzawa treasured seeing things with his own eyes, but spent much 
money on books, many for use in his school in Edo, to establish a foundation for modern 
education in Japan.  He believed that education through Western books was necessary for 
Japan to achieve fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong army).  He saw that in numerous 
areas, Japan was weaker than the West, so fukoku kyôhei made sense.1168   
Fukuzawa was very successful as a translator, but anxious to address a wider 
Japanese audience.1169  Soon he began Conditions in the West (Seiyô Jijô) (first part 
published in 1867).  The first volume includes accounts of common western institutions, 
technology, and essays on the history, politics, military, and public finance in the United 
States, Britain, and Holland.1170     
According to Fukuzawa, only through a spirit of freedom and independence could 
people and nations improve themselves, and can Japan defend itself against the 
“aggressive” West.1171  Individual duties are the foundation of Western civilized society 
and the “well-being of states.”1172  Yet the key factor in whether societies succeed is 
education.  In the beginning, all people are created equal, but education makes the long-
                                                
1167 Ibid., 41. Among the technologies he found interesting were gaslights, tall stone buildings, factories and 
steamships (Ibid., 41). 
1168 Ibid., 49-50, 54, 56, 58. Japan’s areas of weakness included science, industry, politics, commerce, and 
military strength (Ibid., 54). 
1169 For this purpose, Fukuzawa privately distributed the unpublished Tojin Orai (How to Deal with 
Foreigners) (1865) in simple Japanese, where he contended that the presence of foreigners in Japan and 
interaction with them were unavoidable (Ibid., 70).   
1170 Ibid., 69-71. The institutions treated include politics, taxes, currency, trading companies, schools, the 
military, newspapers, and libraries.  Areas of technology discussed include steam engines, steamships, 
steam locomotives, and the telegraph.  Fukuzawa argues that he has focused on the most pragmatic areas, 
to help Japan decide whether each country is to be treated as friend or enemy, and the appropriate strategy, 
military or other (Ibid.). 
1171 Ibid., 90. 
1172 Ibid., 72. 
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term difference.1173  Fukuzawa founded Keio Gijuku (College), the first Japanese 
institution that he opened, based on a Western model.1174  Building such institutions was 
his way of helping to modernize Japan.1175  Fukuzawa also pioneered public debate in 
Japan.1176     
 From 1866-1875, Fukuzawa published seventeen books on current global issues 
such as western science, military affairs, British politics and diplomacy.  During this 
period, his greatest books were An Encouragement of Learning (1872/1876) and An 
Outline of a Theory of Civilization (1875).1177  Both were bestsellers, and the former 
became a national textbook for children.1178  By the mid-1870s, Fukuzawa no longer 
viewed the West so positively.  He lost patience with the pressures, “violence,” arrogance 
and scandals of the Westerners in their interpersonal and international behavior, calling 
them “inhumane white devils” and “aggressive foreigners.”1179  Fukuzawa’s role as a key 
interpreter of Western civilization waned after this time.1180 
Ito Hirobumi.  Ito had mixed feelings about Western culture.  As a young man, 
prior to his first journey abroad, Ito harbored anger against foreign residents in Japan.1181  
                                                
1173 Ibid., 89-90. 
1174 For the school, he adapted various Western customs, including standards of cleanliness, student 
behavior, and time-keeping (Ibid., 82).         
1175 Ibid., 80-82. 
1176 Ibid., 139-140, 144-146. Fukuzawa built two famous debating halls in Tokyo in the 1870s and early 
1880s, and started Japan’s first elite debating society, Kojunsha (Ibid., 139-141). 
1177 Ibid., 87. In the second book, Fukuzawa claims he means to write an outline of western civilization for 
the public, especially for older “Confucianist” readers.  He begins by implying that all things, even the 
West, must be seen and learned in relative terms (Ibid., 90-91).   
1178 Ibid., 91. 
1179 Ibid., 150-151. The terms in quotation marks here are direct quotes from Fukuzawa and from Tamaki, 
Yukichi Fukuzawa. 
1180 Ibid., 92-93. Fukuzawa’s role waned because he lost interest in translation work.  Also the huge, 
government-sponsored Iwakura mission returned to Japan in late 1873, and the large account of the mission 
by Kume Kunitake (Tokumei zenkan-taishi Beiou Kairan jikki) was published in 1878 (Ibid., 92-93). 
1181 Hamada, Prince Ito. Ito helped several others burn down the British legation house in Edo.  
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In 1863, to learn how to operate a steamship, Ito and five others snuck aboard a foreign 
freighter bound for Shanghai.  Ito made it to London four months later, and was totally 
enthralled by its technologies, wealth and power.  To learn western culture, he lived in 
the home of a London college professor for six months.1182  He grew to respect much of 
the strength and wisdom of Western civilization.  To strengthen Japan, he traveled abroad 
several times throughout his life for extended research about Western societies. 
Mori Arinori.  After Mori’s first trip to Europe, he and five other Japanese 
students traveled with an American to a Christian utopian religious colony in upstate 
New York.  This was Mori’s ticket to explore the United States.1183  Similar to Japan in 
the late 1800s, the United States was a new kind of society that borrowed technology, 
politics and culture from older societies, but was remaking itself and expanding in a 
utilitarian fashion.  Mori hoped that Japan would learn and borrow from the United States 
as well.1184  
One of the main purposes of Mori’s Life and Resources in America (1871), the 
first comprehensive account of the United States written by a Japanese, was to inform the 
members of the government’s Iwakura Mission about conditions in the United States.1185  
Mori assumes that events in the U.S. are a foretaste of what will come to other 
                                                
1182 Ibid., 33-34, 36-37. 
1183 Van Sant, Mori Arinori’s Life, xviii-xix. The colony was called the Brotherhood of the New Life.  Mori 
was impressionable, and clearly affected by the utopian view of Christianity he experienced in New York 
(Ibid., xix). 
1184 Ibid., xxv. 
1185 Van Sant, Mori Arinori. The book is also meant to appeal to the interests of his Japanese audience.  It is 
one of the few works available in English on a nineteenth or twentieth century non-Westerner’s view of the 
United States (Ibid., xxiii).  Mori wrote the book with the assistance of others, including Charles Lanman, 
his secretary.  Curiously, the book was never translated into Japanese, perhaps because of sensitive political 
conditions in Japan, or Mori’s own busyness (Akira Iriye in Mori Arinori’s Life and Resources in America, 
ed. John E. Van Sant [Lanham, MD:  Lexington Books, 2004], x-xi. x, xxii-xxiv). 
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nations.1186  The range of subjects covered in the book is quite comprehensive, covering 
many areas of American life, politics, economics, infrastructure, society, and culture.1187  
Mori is also struck by the difference between American ideals and actual reality, and by 
the importance of religious, philanthropic and educational organizations in American 
life.1188   
Kato Hiroyuki.  A key area of Kato Hiroyuki’s thought about intercultural 
interaction concerns religion.1189  He attacks it as “the enemy of all learning,” and 
mistakenly believed that all religions and related ethical systems are based upon theistic 
supernaturalism.1190  He views religion through the lens of evolution.  Religion has had 
powerful impacts on progress, more the result of social evolution.1191  Ethical systems 
evolve over time, and the struggle for power provides the basis for moral evolution.  
Religious ethics provide great “motivating power,” but hinder civilization.1192  Kato asks 
important questions about religion, and yet Winston Davis concludes that his attack on 
                                                
1186 Van Sant, Mori Arinori, xxiii. This assumption is also found in similar books, such as Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America (Ibid., xxiii)   
1187 Areas covered include America’s government and politics, agriculture, amusements, transportation, 
commerce and trade, banking and finance, manufacturing, industries, religion, education, culture and 
science, natural resources, the military, cities, and frontier life.   
1188 Akira Iriye in Van Sant, Mori Arinori, x-xi. Examples of these ironic aspects of American society for 
Mori include racial prejudice, political corruption, and failure of American Christians to always follow 
their faith (Ibid., x-xi).  Mori strongly suggests that Christianity is a “leading element” in the search for 
civilization, and later argued that it should be adopted by Japan as the national religion.  He seems to accept 
the prevalent nineteenth century Western notion that there was a “connection to Christianity, ‘progress’ and 
‘civilization’” (Ibid., xxvii).    
1189 Here I consider Kato’s thought on Japan’s religious systems that originated outside Japan in this 
section—namely Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity.  Kato’s views of Japan’s primary indigenous 
religion, Shinto, are considered in Chapter 3 in the section on leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s domestic 
society. 
1190 An exception is Buddhism in its original form, which included no belief in a god or gods. 
1191 Davis, Moral and Political, 83-85. 
1192 Ibid.,  122. 
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religion was rather dogmatic and primitive.1193  Concerning major world religions,1194 
Kato’s childhood was steeped in neo-Confucianism, the main support for the Shogunate, 
and he based his personal philosophy of utilitarianism on conventional Confucian 
virtues.1195  He admired the Confucian model of relationships, and condemned the ethics 
of more universal religions.1196  Yet Confucianism provided an inadequate foundation for 
modern ethics.1197  He was generally critical of Buddhism, an “otherworldly”1198 religion 
that he charged hypnotizes people against their natural mental capacities.  It adapted well 
to the Japanese context, and seemed harmless, but was unscientific.1199  Kato was most 
critical of Christianity, what he called a great “insult” to Japan’s national essence 
(kokutai).1200   
A second area of intercultural interaction in Kato’s time was the issue of Japan’s 
unequal treaties with the West.  Japan had to prove it was modern and civilized.  The 
Western nations pressured it to allow their traders, diplomats and missionaries to dwell 
there.  Various conservative scholars in Japan, including Kato, argued that allowing 
                                                
1193 His questions include the relationship of the “is” of science and the “oughts” of religion and ethics, the 
claims of faith versus the state, and whether gods are real (Ibid.).   
1194 The various assertations here about the nature of non-Japanese religions here are Kato’s, not my own. 
1195 These include filial piety, loyalty, righteousness, and benevolence (Ibid., 85). 
1196 According to Kato, these religions failed to recognize the particularism in all moral relationships (how 
moral obligations determine the particular relationship one has with another person) (Ibid., 86). 
1197 Ibid., 85-88. For example, in China, some Confucian rituals were still observed, but often altered, and 
included many lapses.  Confucianism in China failed to protest against many social evils, such as the 
criminal code (Ibid., 87). 
1198 This is a direct quote. 
1199 Ibid., 95-96. 
1200 Ibid., 90-94. Kato published a series of three books attacking Christianity from 1907-1909.  These were 
republished in 1911 as The Perniciousness of Christianity.  Like many Japanese nationalists, he resented 
the criticisms of Christians of Japan’s emperor-worship, and its treatment of women.  While modern 
science rose in the Christian West, he condemned Christianity as unscientific.  And while it claimed to be 
the great faith of love, Christian nations were nationalistic and imperialistic.  Yet early Christianity made 
great contributions to human progress (Ibid., 90-94). 
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“mixed residence” too soon would threaten the Japanese with extinction.1201 Meiji 
Japanese thinkers saw Japanese as racially inferior to Caucasians.1202  Kato also saw the 
West as superior in science.  The main area where the Japanese could show their 
superiority was in moral superiority and evolution.1203 
Comparison of Worldviews on Japan’s External Cultural Relations (1850-1895)  
To compare the worldviews of these leaders on Japan’s external cultural relations 
(1850-1895), we can organize their views into several primary categories: views of and 
attitudes toward culture, views of (foreign) religions, attitudes toward foreigners and 
interactions with them, views of foreign learning and books, of foreign technology, and 
of overseas travel and study. Regarding culture, Fukuzawa believes that while all peoples 
are created equal, education is the key factor in determining how far different societies 
progress. Books are also a key way to learn about foreign cultures. Individual duty and 
responsibility are also fundamental bases for any “civilized” or highly developed country. 
Yet cultures, even the West, must be judged in relative terms. On Japanese culture, only 
by a spirit of independence and freedom in various cultural realms can help Japan or any 
society grow. Education and educational institutions are a key way of accomplishing this. 
Adopting some Western customs and styles of communication and thought may also help 
                                                
1201 Also see the discussion on the issue of mixed residence in Chapter 3, in the section on Japan’s domestic 
society. 
1202 Unoura, “Samaurai Darwinism,” 243-244. Unlike the Germans, however, Unoura argues that the 
Japanese did not overtly apply Social Darwinism to developing a sense of racial superiority to their Asian 
neighbors, including the Chinese and the Koreans (Ibid., 248). But they did apply an evolutionistic-
influenced concept of hierarchy to their images of nations and peoples, to determine which were stronger or 
weaker, more superior or inferior.  
1203 Ibid., 247-248. This moral superiority was seen in bushido and the devotion of Japanese to the emperor 
and the state.   
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Japan to modernize.1204 Yet Japan must defend itself, culturally and otherwise, against the 
West.1205 Compared with the West, Japan presently has many weaknesses,1206 and yet 
Japan has moral superiority.1207 These leaders recognize many positive aspects of 
Western culture. According to Ito, Western civilization has much wisdom, power, and 
Western technology and wealth are amazing. Westerners are racially and scientifically 
superior to Japanese,1208 and show much individual responsibility.1209 The general 
progress in the United States, despite its many struggles, offers a foretaste of coming 
global trends.1210 But there are negative aspects of Western culture. Westerners are 
perceived as “aggressive,” violent, arrogant, and “inhumane” on multiple levels.1211 Japan 
must overcome inequalities in its relations with the West.1212  
 Among these leaders, most of their attitudes about foreign religions, especially 
Western religions, are negative.1213 While foreign religions provide great inspiration, they 
limit civilization’s development. Foreign religion has affected progress only indirectly, as 
                                                
1204 Here I am referring to Fukuzawa’s advocacy of Western-style public debate. 
1205 All of these points are Fukuzawa’s opinions. 
1206 This is Fukuzawa’s point. 
1207 This is Kato’s argument. 
1208 Kato. 
1209 Fukuzawa. 
1210 Mori. He also finds that there are conflicts between American ideals and actual practice (Van Sant, 
Mori Arinori). 
1211 Fukuzawa. The terms in quotes are direct quotations from Fukuzawa. 
1212 Kato. According to him, Japan’s unequal economic treaties with the West are one example of what 
must be overcome. 
1213 The strong exception to this is Mori, who takes a very positive view of Christianity (noted above, 
especially in Chapter 3). Positively, Mori finds that religion and charity make many positive contributions 
to American life (Van Sant, Mori Arinori). For the most part, these leaders do not consider Shinto to be a 
“religion,” but more a deep, heartfelt, indigenous spiritual practice that at times is highly connected with 
patriotism and a love for Japan. The term “religion” in Japanese, shukyo, literally translates into English as 
“sect-teaching.” Before the Meiji era, before Buddhism and Shinto were formally and legally organized 
into strict sects, in informal practice, they often intermixed, even at the same temples and shrines. This may 
help explain why even today, many Japanese do not view Shinto (“the way of the gods”) as a “sect-
teaching,” or religion, while they more easily see Buddhism (Bukkyo, “Buddha’s teaching”) or Christianity 
(Kirisutokyo, “Christ’s teaching”) as such. 
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a product of social evolution. To Kato, foreign religions seem superstitious.1214 Kato 
finds foreign religions contrary to learning, unscientific in general and in their ethics, as 
opposed to science, which stresses actual reality.1215 Kato also faults universal ethical 
systems, which fail to consider relational differences.1216  Kato reserves the most scathing 
criticisms for Christianity, which he finds totally contrary to Japanese culture.1217  
 Regarding foreigners and interacting with them, these leaders, besides Mori, are 
mostly negative. Above I noted the ethnocentric attitude held by most Japanese in the late 
Tokugawa period that Japanese were morally superior to foreigners and Westerners, and 
their fear about interacting with foreigners or traveling abroad. Yet interaction with the 
West and with foreigners was unavoidable for Japan; Japanese must learn how.1218 Japan 
must prove to the West that it was civilized and modern.1219 Despite these wise 
conclusions, even these leaders struggled with these interactions, practically and 
intellectually.1220 
                                                
1214Kato implies this. As noted above, he falsely believes that all non-Japanese religions are based on 
theistic supernaturalism. 
1215Recall above where I noted that Kato argues that foreign religion focuses on “oughts” and “shoulds” 
(i.e. ethical issues) while science focuses on the “is’s” or actual facts of reality. Recall the discussion in 
Chapter 6, where I noted that Kato essentially argues that Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity all fail 
in their handling of ethics, in their unscientific approaches. In Chapter 5, I noted Kato’s argument that a 
new scientific morality will eventually guide international relations. This new morality is largely based on 
evolutionistic thinking. There are flaws in this thought. What then becomes of issues of justice involving 
the weak, minorities, and the poor?  
1216 Thus Kato prefers Confucian social ethics and its values such as filial piety and loyalty, although he 
also finds that they fail to handle modernity adequately. 
1217 Recall Kato’s arguments mentioned above, that Christianity is imperialistic, nationalistic, and intolerant 
of Japanese spirituality and the kokutai. All of the negative points about foreign religions in this paragraph 
are Kato’s.  
1218 This is Fukuzawa’s essential argument, and partly why he devoted so much effort to writing many 
books about the West for popular Japanese audiences, even though after the mid-1870s, his attitude toward 
interacting with Westerners turned sour, when he called them aggressive and violent. 
1219 Kato. 
1220 Recall how when young, Ito was angry about the presence of foreigners in Japan, and helped to burn 
down the British legation house, how Fukuzawa felt overwhelmed when he saw male-female interactions in 
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While interacting with foreigners seemed a huge challenge, these leaders show a 
much more eager attitude about Japan’s need to master the “superior” fruits and 
knowledge of Western civilization. Japan should learn and borrow from the West, 
especially from the United States, according to Mori. Japanese must also understand 
global affairs and Western civilization.1221 These leaders also supported foreign learning 
in their own lives, seen in their study of foreign languages and numerous trips abroad for 
observation and research.1222 If possible, it is worthwhile to travel overseas to research 
the West, and to obtain foreign knowledge.1223 Observing things firsthand is valuable.1224 
Yet not all can travel or go abroad. It is important for Japanese to learn about Western 
culture and institutions through books or any other means possible.1225 These attitudes 
about absorbing foreign knowledge through books or overseas learning are also seen in 
the leaders’ attitudes about learning Western technologies.1226 
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Japan’s External Cultural Relations (1850-
1895) 
 
Development Issues. In terms of the concept of internationalization, if we 
examine these worldviews on Japan’s external cultural relations, how did the absorption 
of Japan into the Western-dominated global economy affect the various cultural features 
identified in these worldviews? The positive attitude toward education seen in 
                                                                                                                                            
San Francisco, and Kato worried that premature “mixed residence” of Westerners and Chinese in Japan 
might damage Japan’s survival. 
1221 Fukuzawa. 
1222 Fukuzawa especially focused on English (after Dutch), Mori on English, and Kato on German. 
Fukuzawa, Mori, and Ito often traveled and studied abroad. 
1223 Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori. 
1224 Fukuzawa. 
1225 Fukuzawa, Ito. 
1226 Ito believed that Western technology was great, and should be learned by Japanese. That is why he 
stole aboard a ship (to learn to pilot it), and first traveled to London. Fukuzawa found Western technologies 
in daily life in the West highly impressive. 
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Fukuzawa’s view of culture was nothing new, but a reflection of the Confucian respect 
for learning that was several millennia old. But his emphasis, and Mori’s, on the 
importance of “individual” duty and responsibility does seem a reflection of Western 
cultural influence. As leaders such as Fukuzawa and Mori reflected on the West’s 
technological and economic successes, and Western culture, they could not help but 
notice the strong emphasis on individual duty and morality common to Western cultures. 
Education would expedite the technical transference of knowledge and expertise, but 
independence, freedom, and creativity were more “spiritual,” and could not be so easily 
copied. Fukuzawa thought that actually adopting Western customs to some degree would 
help, but the process seems rather tricky. To what degree did Japan master the 
transference of not only the technical aspects of various areas of knowledge and 
technology, but also the value- and “spirit”-related components? Technically, it seems 
that Japan mastered many of these technologies very impeccably, evidenced most clearly 
in its rapid industrialization, economic growth, and the victory in the Sino-Japanese War.  
But mastering the spirits of individual freedom, independence and creativity seemed 
more much more elusive, given the conservative, authoritarian tendencies of Japanese 
culture and politics in this era and after. What was the effect of the generally negative 
view of Western religion and Christianity that prevailed in late Tokugawa and Meiji 
Japan on Japan’s mastery of individualism and freedom? Though creativity in the arts 
and literature has never been lacking in Japan, and a brief era of increased liberalism 
occurred in the Taisho era (1912-1926), this influence seems rather small.1227 So while 
                                                
1227 I say this because, although Christianity has exercised a relatively large cultural influence in Japan, in 
the establishment of social institutions, hospitals, and universities, the number of Christians in the society 
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Japan’s full entry into the world economy greatly increased its economic and even 
cultural interactions with the outside world, I wish to argue that key elements of Japan’s 
core cultural identity did not really change as a result of this interaction. 
But what did these processes mean for Japan’s external cultural relations? 
Perceptive leaders and thinkers such as Fukuzawa and Mori identified important cultural 
factors behind Western science and technology that they hoped Japan could absorb. It 
seems that although Japan was superb at mastering the technical aspects of many 
techniques, it did not master the accompanying “spirits” and values of freedom and 
individualism nearly as well. Did Japan project these cultural “spirits” of freedom, 
individualism and creativity abroad, in its foreign relations and interactions? This is the 
key question relevant to Chapter 6 that internationalization asks. Theoretically, if these 
spirits and values are key to technological success, and Japan wished to help its Asian 
neighbors, it should have also desired to share these values. I must respond that no, Japan 
did not project these spirits of creativity, individualism and freedom abroad in this era. If 
it did not master them internally, how could they have been projected externally? Rather, 
in the Sino-Japanese War and pressures projected in its relations with places such as 
Korea and Taiwan, I would argue that Japan basically projected a negative “Western” 
(and Eastern) value: aggression.    
Technology issues. What were the most important technology-related ideas and 
phenomena associated with these worldviews of external cultural relations? They 
included education, education-related knowledge, methods of communication and 
                                                                                                                                            
has never been large, never more than one percent of the total population. It does not seem that Christianity 
has changed the fundamental core of Japanese culture, which tends to be highly oriented toward conformity 
and harmony within groups.   
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education that brought foreign cultures and technologies to Japan, including ships, the 
telegraph, the modern postal system, universities, schools, Western education, educators 
and styles of teaching, foreign language pedagogy and pedagogies (Western or Japanese) 
for teaching of these areas of foreign cultural knowledge. Scientific and technological 
areas of knowledge included science education and pedagogy, experimentation, the 
culture of Western science and education transferred into the Japanese environment, 
scientific and evolutionary theories.1228 Western cultural products included music, 
literature, religion, and art. How did foreign religions relate to the transference of this 
knowledge? Some foreign teachers who came to Japan were religious, often Christian. A 
good example is William S. Clark, a professor from Massachusetts who taught 
agriculture and Christianity as ethics at the forerunner of Hokkaido University. He 
converted many of his students to Christ and famously urged them, “Boys, be 
ambitious!” Many foreign instructors, some of whom were foreign language and English 
teachers, and others who were Christian missionaries, helped establish universities, 
schools and hospitals. Their general teaching had a great impact on the transference of 
Western cultural knowledge into Japan, especially in the teaching of English, a primary 
gateway for learning many other forms of Western knowledge. They collectively had a 
huge impact, sometimes intangible, on Japan’s quest for foreign knowledge and culture, 
in providing the first and only interaction of many Japanese with foreigners. 
                                                
1228 Some of these “scientific” and evolutionary theories also offered support for a reemerging Japanese 




What are the most significant cultural factors present in the imported technologies 
and related ideas in these worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations?1229 While 
Western education models exposed Japanese to more rhetorical styles of teaching and 
examples of creativity, Japanese education tended to stress more rote learning styles. 
Some universities may have been organized on Western lines, but functionally and 
socially, remained very Japanese. Japanese easily mastered experimentation and 
observation in Western-inspired science education. They were excellent learners of 
English reading and writing, but due to differences in language study and emphasis, their 
mastery of spoken English was often of a lower level.1230 The geographic isolation of 
Japan did not affect their mastery of the technical aspects of this cultural knowledge, but 
language challenges and cultural differences did hamper the general mastery by Japanese 
of English and other languages for face-to-face interactions with foreigners. This latter 
struggle reflects the general awkwardness of interaction with foreigners with which many 
Japanese in this era struggled.  
Did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively or 
negatively? Japan was able to import virtually all the areas of foreign knowledge it 
desired, and master them. The system of knowledge importation and learning mainly 
emphasized technical mastery of information for contribution to the growth of Japan, 
technologically and economically, not the gaining of intercultural skills for interaction 
with foreigners and foreign cultures. This difference was not an effect of the international 
system, but likely an after-effect of the extreme cultural isolation of Japan during the 
                                                
1229 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, 11; Hayashi, The Japanese Experience, 52. 
1230 The English language education system of Meiji Japan focused on the mastery of books and written 
knowledge, not on oral English for communication. 
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Tokugawa period, and continuing geographic isolation in the Meiji era. And the practical 
purpose of this knowledge was to contribute to the building of the nation, usually not to 
prepare Japanese for study or travel abroad.  
  Who were the main international actors in the external environment, or domestic 
actors, individual or state, involved? On the international level, the main individual actors 
who were Westerners included foreign teachers, scientists, researchers, and engineers 
working in Japan. International individual actors who were Japanese included teachers, 
scholars, government officials and business people who had traveled or studied abroad. 
On the domestic level, individual actors who were Japanese included teachers, scholars, 
scientists, and engineers who remained in Japan. State and institutional actors on the 
international level included foreign governments and ministries (both of which had rather 
limited influence), Western religious institutions (churches and missionary societies), 
educational institutions and universities. State and institutional actors who were Japanese 
on the international level included the Japanese government, the Ministry of Education, 
other ministries (such as Foreign Affairs) which sent Japanese scholars abroad or brought 
foreign teachers to Japan, and private educational institutions (such as Keio and Waseda 
Universities) which brought foreign teachers to Japan. State or institutional actors on the 
domestic level included the Japanese government, the Ministry of Education, private 
educational institutions and universities, public and private schools, museums, and 
religious institutions.   
What was the impact of these actors on transfers of knowledge and ideas related 
to external cultural relations? Western teachers, scientists, and Japanese teachers and 
scholars who traveled abroad had huge impacts, in what they taught and transferred to 
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Japanese students. Of the latter, one example is Fukuzawa, although most Japanese 
instructors did not travel abroad. Western religious institutions, schools and universities 
also had a fairly large influence on spreading knowledge of Western culture and English 
language. Foreign governments had limited impact, though foreign educational 
organizations also had some influence. The Japanese government, private educational 
institutions, and public and private schools and universities also had a large influence in 
spreading knowledge of Western culture, language, and technologies to the Japanese 
mainstream population at large, and on whether they were favored or rejected by the 
public.   
From these cases of cultural and technological transfers, what lessons do we learn, 
and how could these transfers have been improved? It seems easier to transfer the actual 
technical hardware of a technology or cultural item, rather than the culture, context or 
“spirit” that surrounds it, uses it, or causes it to flourish. Various individual and 
institutional actors here made huge contributions to the spread of Western culture and 
related technologies and ideas in this period. It is not possible to say here which actors 
had the most influence.1231 The encounter with Western ideas, creativity and influence 
had a huge, stimulating influence on Japanese arts, literature, and many other areas of 
culture. To repeat, various surface features of Japan’s culture changed, but most of its 
core cultural features did not change that much.  
  What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported 
technologies and ideas in these worldviews?1232 The most important cultural factors that 
                                                
1231 More in-depth case studies would be necessary to answer that. 
1232 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, 11; Hayashi, The Japanese Experience, 52. 
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were present included targeted learning, debate, argument, Western logic, scientific 
experimentation and rationality, foreign knowledge, diversity of opinion, new political 
and cultural ideas, knowledge of the world, foreign conditions, their cultures, and 
creativity. The most important cultural values included freedom, individuality, 
independence, choice, and values connected with Western art, diversity, democracy, 
liberalism, and several philosophies that mainstream Japanese considered highly radical, 
such as anarchy and feminism.  
In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies/ideas 
as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the 
international level? Of the individual actors we have considered, Ito negotiated with 
foreign governments to improve Japan’s economic and political standing on the 
international stage and helped import some important Western political concepts and 
institutions into Japan, including the Diet and the Constitution. Fukuzawa had more 
domestic than international cultural impact. Mori guided Japanese overseas (in 
Washington DC, on the Iwakura Mission) to learn more about the West.  
How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the 
international system or environment? Western nations were more impressed with Japan 
after observing its political development (i.e. the Diet and the Constitution), and seeing 
its victory in Sino-Japanese War, so they granted Japan more autonomy and diplomatic 
recognition. Though their attitudes toward Japan were still highly racist, and they did not 
necessarily agree with Japan’s conduct in the Sino-Japanese War, soon Western powers 




were more willing to sign treaties with Japan, for example, the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
of 1902. 
Did the belief systems of any of these leaders (on technology-related issues in 
these cultural worldviews, on the international level) blind them to certain realities? All 
these leaders prefer to absorb cultural knowledge from foreign cultures that they believe 
have superior knowledge (from the West). They favor knowledge from cultures that 
appear scientific, modern, more powerful, wealthy and advanced. This bias makes most 
of the leaders here (except Yamagata, not considering in this chapter) favor Western 
sources of knowledge over Asian and Confucian ones. But while these leaders desire 
advanced Western knowledge and cultural products to help modernize Japan and defend 
it against the West, they struggle with what will happen to Japanese identity and culture 
as this occurs. They know that there are many positive aspects of Japanese culture that 
must be preserved. While the West has superior technology, they do not believe that its 
culture is superior (except perhaps Mori). Their general rejection of Western religion and 
Christianity, except for Mori, suggests that they realize deep down that while Japan may 
be very successful in acquiring Western technology and knowledge, it cannot and must 
not jettison its core identity, its soul. The eagerness to learn and accept Western 
knowledge and technology was great, but willingness to accept Western culture only 
went as far as necessary to facilitate acceptance of the first two. They also expressed 
extreme awkwardness expressed at having to learn to interact with Westerners. This also 
reflects the great ambivalence present in Japan: a desire to accept foreign technologies 
and knowledge without having to accept the presence of foreigners, or to keep their 
presence as minimal as possible.  
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 To which realities are the leaders blinded, and how? The leaders here are biased 
toward the West and against Asia. This blinds them to the fact that mainland Asian 
countries and peoples did not feel the need or want much of any foreign presence in their 
midst, including a Japanese one. It also temporarily blinded several of these leaders to the 
wisdom of many aspects of Asian and Japanese heritage (especially Fukuzawa and Mori, 
on Confucian and Chinese influences).  
Do the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing conditions 
and reality? These leaders adjusted their viewpoints to changing conditions very rapidly, 
especially regarding both the West and events in nearby Asia. Yet I would argue that 
their general pro-Western, anti-Asian bias tended to blind them toward realistic 
conditions in Asia outside Japan, and the true desires of those regions’ peoples. 
 How do these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes? The general blindness 
and bias seen in these regarding the rest of Asia definitely affected policy outcomes in 
this era and shortly after. Fukuzawa, as we noted earlier in this chapter, was angry against 
China, and his Jiji Shinpo newspaper reflected this. Ito took a paternalistic attitude 
toward Korea, and Kato saw other Asians as racially inferior to Japanese. Did these 
attitudes reflect those of more Japanese leaders? While we cannot be certain, given the 
actions of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War, this seems a strong possibility.     
In these worldviews on external cultural relations, is the concept of 
technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how? Technonationalism as ideology is 
manifested in a very basic way here, in the goal of several of these leaders (Fukuzawa, 
Mori, Ito, and Kato) to strengthen Japan for its own security and survival, through its 
mastery of Western technology and appropriate cultural products that are helpful for 
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those ends. While they admire many of the advanced features of Western culture, they are 
not blind to Western aggression. Their primary goal in helping Japan attain knowledge of 
various areas of Western culture is not sheer intellectual fascination, but rather Japan’s 
national survival. Their generally negative attitude toward Western religion reflects their 
concern with protecting Japan’s cultural identity and core. Even Mori only wished to use 
Christianity because he believed that it could help Japan become great. Interacting with 
foreigners, Westerners or Asians, was very challenging for most Japanese, seen in the 
attitudes of the leaders here. Yet despite these challenges, the great efforts of these 
leaders in various cultural areas to strengthen Japan’s interactions with the outside world, 
in their writings, research, work in various areas of policy advocacy, their travel abroad, 
and study of Western culture, economics, politics, and science, all reflect one supreme 
goal: to strengthen Japan so its own security is assured.   
Cognition Issues. Image. The main images about Japan’s external cultural 
relations include issues of culture, the West, social relations and intercultural interaction, 
social development, and religion. Fukuzawa suggests that while all humans are created 
equal, not all cultures are equal. A key factor in the different levels of cultural 
development of different societies is varying levels of educational achievement. He also 
suggests that all cultures, even the West’s, must be judged in relative, not absolute, terms. 
On Western culture, early exposure to it created favorable impressions and lessened the 
fear of it in Fukuzawa and Mori.1233 These leaders call Western culture impressive 
                                                
1233 Remember that Fukuzawa and Mori both grew up in southwestern Japan (Kyushu), the region that had 
the most contact with Western culture during national isolation in the Tokugawa period. 
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(Fukuzawa, Mori), possessing much strength and wisdom (Ito), and Westerners racially 
superior to Japanese (Kato).  
Western books, and the knowledge that comes from them, are highly valuable for 
Japanese, a potential foundation for Japanese cultural reformation, so they should be used 
in education. They will help make Japan strong and wealthy.1234 Fukuzawa observes that 
individual duties are the foundation of Western civilized society and the “well-being of 
states.” It is worthwhile to study and learn Western culture, abroad if possible.1235 
Regarding Western technology and culture, the West’s technology, wealth and power are 
all impressive (Fukuzawa and Ito), and the West is superior to Japan in science (Kato), so 
Japanese should learn Western technology and culture (Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori). And yet 
the West is “aggressive” (Fukuzawa). There is sometimes a dissonance between Western 
values and actual sociocultural conditions (Mori). So there is some ambivalence in these 
images of Western culture and society. 
 There are extensive images on “foreign” religions, especially from Kato.1236 Kato 
calls religion evil.1237 Religious ethics give great “motivating power,” but hinder 
civilization (Kato). His images and thought on religion are colored by evolutionism. 
Religion has strongly affected human progress, but because of social evolution, not 
because of religion’s intrinsic nature. According to Kato, morality and ethics evolve over 
time, and are based on the struggle for power. Kato sees conflicts between foreign 
                                                
1234 All of these points about Western books and knowledge are images of Fukuzawa’s. 
1235 This is seen in the life examples of Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori, who all studied and traveled abroad at 
many points in their lives. 
1236 Remember that Kato does not see Shinto as a “religion.” He sees all religious and ethical systems that 
did not originate in Japan as foreign, even if they have adapted to Japan and flourished there for centuries, 
as in the case of Buddhism and Confucianism. All Kato’s comments here, on religion, morality, and ethics, 
are generally directed at religious and ethical systems he considered foreign. 
1237 Kato called religion the “enemy of all learning.” 
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religions and reality, foreign religions and science, for example, between the “is” of 
science and the “oughts” of religion and ethics, faith versus the state, and whether the 
gods are real.1238 To Kato, neo-Confucian values and the Confucian model of social 
relations are more admirable than the ethics of more universal religions. But 
Confucianism provides an inadequate basis for modern ethics, since it fails to handle 
many modern social evils.1239 Buddhism is negative since it hypnotizes people against 
their “natural mental capacities,” and Christianity is ethnocentric, anti-Japanese, 
unscientific, hypocritical, and imperialistic, although it has made many contributions to 
human progress. Kato’s images of Christianity greatly contrast with Mori’s, who sees it 
as very positive, and believes that it has made many contributions to America and the 
West. Its spirit of independence and individualism are very important, and likely part of 
the reason for the West’s success in science. So Japan needs Christianity or least 
Christian-inspired scientific values. 
These leaders offer extensive images about the challenge for Japanese to relate to 
Westerners. While Fukuzawa soon argued, after traveling abroad, that Japanese must 
learn how to interact with foreigners, and that doing so in Japan would be unavoidable, 
Kato and Ito worried about the presence of Westerners in Japan and the effect it could 
                                                
1238 It is interesting to realize that though Kato saw conflicts between “foreign” religions and 
science/reality, he drew on ideologies based on Japanese spirituality, Shinto, to support Japanese 
nationalism, patriotism, and evolutionary arguments for descent of the Japanese people from the divine 
emperor, into one “family-state.”  
1239 Neo-Confucian values reflect such qualities as filial piety, benevolence, and loyalty. In the Confucian 
model of social relations, morality exercised is based on relational particulars. In Kato’s mind, universal 
religions ignore these relational aspects of morality. But Confucianism, in its stress on proper ritual, fails to 
address many modern social evils. 
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have on Japan’s culture.1240 Fukuzawa himself struggled with these interactions.1241 
Despite this, Fukuzawa argues that for Japan to improve, it desperately needs knowledge 
of Western culture and the adoption of certain Western cultural practices.1242 
A final type of images regarding Japan’s external cultural relations concerns how 
social change and development are affected by international factors. Fukuzawa argues 
that building social institutions based on Western models and incorporating Western 
customs is a key way to help Japan modernize.1243 Several further factors are identified as 
key: education, “spirits” of freedom and independence, and vitality in religion.1244 
How do these images function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? These 
images stress cultural relativism and a hierarchical view of different cultures. The culture 
and knowledge of the West is seen as positive, though its behavior is not. These images 
would cause policymakers to fear the West yet admire it, and to reject Asian models for 
cultural change. The negative bias of Kato’s images of “foreign” religions is notable. He 
finds nothing positive about Christianity, though he quietly acknowledges that science 
                                                
1240 Ito worried about the presence of Westerners in Japan, and remember that Kato worried about the threat 
of “mixed residence” if Westerners were allowed to live in Japan too soon. These fears reflect the 
inexperience and fears of most Japanese in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods concerning 
interaction with Westerners. 
1241 Recall how Fukuzawa was shocked at male-female interactions when he visited San Francisco, and 
how in the mid-1870s he called Westerners arrogant, scandalous, and violent in their interpersonal (and 
international) behavior.   
1242 Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori all contend that learning about the West will strengthen Japan. Mori believes 
that Japan can learn much from America, and that it should study its conditions in depth to do so (Van Sant, 
Mori Arinori). According to Fukuzawa, practical knowledge of Western culture is important for Japan to 
understand how to respond to each foreign society. He further argues that Japan needs “spirits” of freedom 
and independence to defend itself against the West, and that adopting Western cultural customs and habits 
such as cleanliness, time-keeping, public debate, and schooling practices will help Japan to modernize.  
1243 Here modernize is not given in quotes, so I mean the conventional sense of modernization, not the 
specialized Japanese definition (“modernization”) that is used as an analytical concept in the development 
issue sections throughout this dissertation. 
1244 Fukuzawa concludes that the key factor in whether societies succeed is education. Mori notices that 
religious, philanthropic and educational organizations are important contributors to American life (Van 
Sant, Mori Arinori), and believes that they can be for Japan too. Also recall the stress of Fukuzawa and 
Mori about the importance of freedom, independence and individual initiative.  
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emerged within Christendom. This crucial point, the power of Christianity and its 
“spirits” of freedom and scientific investigation,1245 is what Mori seizes upon as key to 
help Japan become scientific. The ill feelings of Kato toward Christianity reminds one of 
anti-Christian bias prevalent in the Tokugawa period,1246 also present in the early Meiji 
period, though the government made the religion legal, due to pressure from Western 
countries. Pro-Christian leaders like Mori were influential, but small in number. Japan 
eventually acquired science, despite anti-Christian feelings. National survival encouraged 
Japanese to study English and Western knowledge, even if most in this era would never 
interact directly with foreigners. The insight that Japan needed education and positive 
values for growth and change certainly took hold, and has influenced Japan up to the 
present.  
 Worldview. Based on those images, in the worldview/cognitive framework that 
emerges, the world is divided into many cultures, many of which are unequal. Cultures 
with more knowledge and education are better. In the view of these leaders, those 
cultures, such as the West, have more power and control the world.1247 Countries with 
poor cultural development are weak. To Kato, many peoples are “religious.” Religion is 
simply a feature of social evolution, not important by itself. Western religion is negative, 
greedy, nationalistic, and does not fit Japan. Foreign religion conflicts with science and 
reality. To Mori, Western religion (Christianity) made the West great, partly through its 
values, and also encourages science. Japan needs science, so perhaps it needs Christianity 
                                                
1245 Remember that many of the great early European scientists, such as Newton, Galileo and Copernicus, 
were Christians. 
1246 Under the Tokugawa period’s Sakoku (national isolation) policy, the practice of Christianity was 
banned in Japan.  
1247 Note that the views listed here are the views of the leaders under study. 
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as well. The West drives the world. Japanese must interact with both. Mori also believes 
that through education, a people can improve their culture and their condition. 
  In this worldview/cognitive framework, countries with superior culture are 
powerful and strong in other areas too, such as politics and economics. To Kato, science 
drives the world; religion does not. Religion is a lie, unreal, and cannot handle modernity. 
Mori believes that positive religion (i.e. Christianity) and its values can make a people 
great (for example, the United States). Not just greed drives the world, also charity, 
philanthropy, science, and inventions (inspired by religion and creative, inspired values). 
Education enables a people to grow, improve. In this worldview, the West now culturally 
dominates the world, as China once dominated Japan’s known world. Japan must 
therefore learn from the West, not just from China and Asia.  
 In this cognitive framework, Japan is seen as presently weak, but having a great 
culture, morality, and a capacity to learn, grow, work hard, and change. Views of the 
non-self see the West as strong, “superior” in culture and technology to Japan, but not 
necessarily in morality. To Mori, the West has superior morality, and its religion (mainly 
Christianity) is superior to Japan’s.  It has made the West stronger in science and 
technology to Japan and Asia. Japanese must unavoidably interact with Westerners to 
learn from them. Westerners are greedy. Asia is weak, culturally inferior, and stagnant. 
While it was once great, it is now isolated (China, Korea), and now has trouble learning 
modern knowledge, such as from the West. 
The relevant environment(s) surrounding those who hold these worldviews 
include Western ideas, arts, books, education, and from Asia, Confucian culture, Chinese 
ideas, studies, arts, literature, and philosophy. How have these environments interacted 
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with/affected these leaders’ worldviews? The effects include a view of Western learnings 
as fascinating, amazing, cutting-edge, superior, and more “scientific” than Japanese and 
Asian learnings. This causes most Japanese thinkers in this period to highly favor 
Western knowledge and culture. Others struggle with how to merge Western culture with 
Japanese culture and Asian heritage.   
How have these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions 
influenced the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understandings of events 
and their causes? In these perceptions, in the most extreme version, Western culture is far 
superior to Japan’s. Japan needs it, must learn, master, and support it. Eastern culture is 
stagnant, slow, and backward. Japanese feel very awkward in interacting with 
Westerners. Regarding information, there is a new preference for Western art, culture, 
dress, and customs. Asian and Japanese arts are briefly ignored, and deemphasized by 
certain leaders. A high value is placed on Western culture and knowledge as key for 
Japan’s survival. On understandings of events and their causes, Western arts, 
architecture, science, and culture are great and more “modern.” Science dominates and 
drives the world. Now the West and its culture are conquering the world. Therefore the 
West can conquer Japan and Asia. Japan needs this culture, or at least knowledge of it, to 
be more strong and modern. Change happens through learning. Through education, a 
people can better themselves and their country. 
How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? The West’s 
superior technology makes Japanese assume that the culture and science of the former are 
better. This makes most Japanese leaders in this period temporarily prefer Western 
culture and learning from the West, rather than Asian culture and learning. Yet most 
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Japanese know there is much honorable in Asian and Japanese cultures. Japanese and 
Asian cultures cannot be totally abandoned, and certain things about the West seem 
funny, strange, bizarre, and/or incomprehensible. 
 Cultural Logics. What are the global phenomena relevant to external cultural 
relations about which these leaders hold a worldview, and to which they are reacting? 
These include Western cultural influences entering Japan: ideas from politics, science, 
literature, the arts, medicine, technology, food, new products, materials, clothing, books, 
English, German and other foreign languages, and people (Western teachers, scholars, 
traders, diplomats, missionaries, and religion coming to Japan). This includes knowledge 
brought back to Japan from Japanese who have studied and traveled abroad. Asian 
students, traders, and migrants who come to Japan, especially from China, also brought 
their cultural artifacts and knowledge.  
What are the leaders’ worldviews/basic beliefs about these phenomena? Western 
culture, knowledge, and science are powerful, great, and superior to Eastern and Japanese 
knowledge in a material, technical sense, but not necessarily in a moral sense (Kato, 
Yamagata, and Ito). Perhaps in a moral sense, Western culture is superior to Japanese 
culture.1248 The superiority of Western culture is proven in the power it manifests in 
economics, politics, the military and technology.  
In the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global phenomena, the 
powerful and the strong are great and superior. The West is superior to Japan and Asia. 
The strong are better than the weak, who are inferior. Japan and Asia are both weak and 
inferior. Weak countries should copy and learn from the cultures of strong countries. 
                                                
1248 This was the view of Fukuzawa earlier, not later, and of Mori. 
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What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? At first, there was a 
mad craze to learn and copy anything Western (opera, beef, and dress) and strongly 
manifested in the bunmei kaika movement. Soon after, there was anger and fear at the 
West, its greed, and concern about how to protect Japanese culture and identity against 
the Western onslaught. There was also a strong desire to strengthen Japan, its culture, 
nationhood, and identity, and to earn a strong place for Japan on the international scene. 
This would include respect for Japan’s military, and Japan’s place in international 
relations. Japan should become a strong power in Asia. Japan should earn a position of 
respect, while still being Japanese. 
What were the cultural logics under these responses? At first there was almost 
idolatrous worship of the West and its power, and then realistic appraisal and concern 
over the West, its power and intentions. This was followed by much pondering and effort 
to discern how to keep Japan great, protect, and maintain its culture. Some of these 
leaders showed anger toward the West and/or toward Asia. Later came the desire of some 
to aggressively counter the West and “help” Asia, even if war must be waged.  
If we compare the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena with the 
cultural logics under the responses to the phenomena, the former logics seem logical, but 
also more philosophical/mental than the latter ones. The latter logics are more pragmatic 
and realistic, and yet more reactive to actual conditions.  
   Globalization Issues. How do these important worldviews on external cultural 
relations reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows 
of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? These worldviews reflect the processes 
of greatly intensified cultural globalization for Japan that especially occurred in the early 
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Meiji era. The increased cultural flows especially involved ideas and new technologies, 
but also a relatively small number of influential people, both foreigners who came to 
Japan, and Japanese who went overseas. In the arena of external cultural relations, the 
influence on Japan of these leaders who went overseas, Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori, was 
huge, especially from the first two. The impact of Fukuzawa on overall Japanese society, 
through his translation of Western cultural ideas in ways that were comprehensible for 
millions of Japanese in his popular writings, and his less acknowledged work in 
economics, looms large. Ito also had indirect, but great, effects on daily Japanese life 
through his translation of Western political concepts in the Constitution of 1889.    
If we consider these global cultural processes as people experienced them, on 
micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Fukuzawa, Ito 
and Mori experienced the effects of cultural interchange with the West in their personal 
lives from their youth, due to growing up in Kyushu, the region with the most connection 
with the West in the late Tokugawa period. These three also experienced these effects as 
they traveled overseas on various occasions for study or work. All of these men, 
including Kato, were highly impressed with the quality of knowledge they learned from 
the West. But each struggled with relating to Westerners in person. Only Mori did not 
seem to struggle as intensely. In spite of his intensive study of foreigners, later Fukuzawa 
became bitter after the mid-1870s. Mori also noted that there were conflicts in the United 
States, between its high ideals and its actual accomplishments.1249 And Kato struggled 
                                                
1249 The specific conflict to which I refer is that between the high moral ideals of Christianity, the 
predominant religion in the United States, and the nation’s struggle with slavery, which helped provoke the 
Civil War. Mori arrived in the United States in the early 1870s, when he wrote his Life and Resources in 
America (see Van Sant, Mori Arinori). Given this environment, shortly after the end of the Civil War, this 
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with what he viewed as elements of Western culture, like religion, that seemed highly 
incongruent with Japanese culture. Did everyday Japanese struggle in these ways as they 
encountered Western culture and ideas? It does not seem that they did, as these deep-
thinking leaders especially struggled on a philosophical level. This “clash” of Japanese 
and Western values was not fully manifested until the anti-Western backlash of the pro-
military governments of the 1930s, when Japan’s government came under intensified 
military influence. On a public level, over time, the impacts of Western cultural artifacts 
and technologies would greatly transform the daily lives of most Japanese, especially 
during the twentieth century.     
Do these important global processes of external cultural relations represent a form 
of Japanese or non-Western globalization? These relations do not represent a very strong 
case of Japanese globalization in this period, since other countries did not begin to come 
under much Japanese cultural influence until shortly later in the early twentieth 
century.1250 This process was especially intense in Korea, which became a Japanese 
colony in 1910. The cases of cultural influence were greatest in those regions that became 





 From our study in Chapter 6 of leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external cultural 
relations (1850 to 1895), what can we conclude about how those views, and Japan’s 
                                                                                                                                            
conflict could not have been more vivid for Mori. Yet despite America’s struggles, Mori was still hugely 
impressed with what he observed.   
1250 The chief exception to this time line was Taiwan, which became a colony of Japan’s in 1895, shortly 
after the Sino-Japanese War. 
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experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations at this time, may have 
contributed to Japan’s current foreign aid policies? Here I will list general trends, while 
more concrete linkages with the actual ideas of current Japanese ODA will be explored in 
Chapters 9 and 10. First, gaining key areas of foreign knowledge is a key priority for any 
developing country, and must be in ODA policies. These areas include science, foreign 
languages, politics, economics, foreign law, and so forth. The government should take a 
key role in encouraging policies in this area, including sponsoring study abroad, 
scientific/cultural exchanges, importing foreign teachers and books, and society-wide 
discussion of what values and institutions should be imported and/or rejected. Japan 
excelled in much of this in the period 1850 to 1895. On cultural issues and development, 
ODA policies should encourage an LDC’s government to initiate policies to protect the 
nation’s positive cultural values and institutions, but the policies should not be coercive, 
and must allow for freedom and opposition. Japan’s policies on culture were often 
coercive and repressive.  
 Regarding external cultural relations, to learn from foreign countries, an LDC 
must have accurate views of those cultures, and the capability of interacting effectively 
with foreigners. In ODA, this issue relates to the effective transfer of technology and 
knowledge, and how culture affects the process. Japan had numerous cultural barriers to 
cross: the need to overcome great geographic and cultural isolation that had lasted 
hundreds of years, linguistic difficulties, inaccurate views of foreigners influenced by 
ancient Chinese and Confucian stereotypes, and broad inexperience in interacting with 
any foreigners at all. All of these factors suggested that it would be quite challenging for 
Japanese to interact with foreigners and their cultures. Indeed it was, even for bright 
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young leaders who eagerly desired to do so. But Japan benefited from its long tradition of 
importing, learning and improving knowledge from foreign countries, and its historic 
eagerness over many centuries to do so. Perseverance and hard work in this area also paid 
off, despite setbacks such as World War II. The historical legacies of Japan’s geographic 
and linguistic isolation have created significant barriers that continue to somewhat 
“isolate” its people from the outside world, even today. At the very least, while Japan 
does an amazing job of importing and translating foreign knowledge from abroad, 
knowledge from Japan is much less accessible to foreigners, because of the difficulties of 
the Japanese language.  
 These cultural difficulties have affected Japan’s ODA and its overall 
effectiveness. Japanese aid agencies have been hampered in their ability to adequately 
assess ground level issues and interact with local populations because of language 
challenges. Cultural barriers, to some degree, also affect the international image of 
Japanese ODA, and the success of Japan’s government in communicating about it to the 
world at large.  Whatever cultural barriers other LDCs face in development and aid, no 
doubt Japan has faced many of similar gravity.    
 Regarding the second key research question of the dissertation, is the idea of 
internationalization an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and 
development?1251 In my discussion above of how internationalization meshes with the 
worldviews of external cultural relations in this chapter, I argued that a chief factor in the 
views of Fukuzawa and Mori, the West’s values of individual duty and responsibility, 
                                                
1251 Note that the concepts of “modernization” and translative adaptation, mainly domestic focused 
concepts, while featured in the second key research question, do not appear in Chapter 6, which focuses on 
issues on the international level related to culture.  
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seemed important for Japan to adequately master science and technology. I also noted 
that while Japan was very successful in importing much hardware of Western science and 
technology during this era, importing the accompanying cultural values was more 
challenging. Despite the great cultural impacts and changes in Japan that resulted from 
this interchange, I argued that most of the deepest parts of Japan’s culture did not change. 
Also, Japan’s overseas actions in this era, primarily the Sino-Japanese War, did not 
project these spirits of freedom and individualism, but rather aggression.  
 From the contexts examined in this chapter, what do we learn about Japan’s 
experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations? Regarding technology, 
various cultural institutions and policy actions were important in encouraging Japan’s 
mastery of foreign technology. Three identified above included the public Bansho 
Shirabesho for the study of Western languages, science and technology, the study of 
English to facilitate the mastery of foreign knowledge and technology for the building of 
the country, and government missions and embassies sent abroad so that leading Japanese 
could learn about Western culture and technology, among other purposes. And 
concerning development, above we learned that Japan’s policy on international cultural 
exchange in the Meiji period emphasized the massive importation of Western knowledge 
to contribute to the building of the nation, in huge contrast to the strict national isolation 
policy of a few years before, under the Tokugawa Shogunate. Various intellectual trends 
and ideologies, some publicly sanctioned, attempted to favorably introduce Western 
culture and thought to the nation.1252 Foreign instructors from various nations, especially 
                                                
1252 Two of these movements were the bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment) movement, and the 
Meirokusha debating society. 
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from the United States, had a huge impact on Japan through the foreign knowledge they 
helped to share, greatly facilitating the rise of Japan from feudalism to a modern power in 
only a few decades. 
 Regarding foreign (cultural) relations, before the end of the Tokugawa period, 
most Japanese subscribed to the Chinese view that Westerners were highly barbaric, 
given their great distance from China, though they possessed great technical knowledge. 
Yet Japanese also began to doubt the modern greatness of China, after its defeats before 
Western powers. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan’s massive national campaign 
to absorb international knowledge contributed greatly to building of the nation. Despite 
Japanese tensions with China and Korea, Japan’s intellectual debts to those nations, and 
to the United States (in the Meiji era) were huge. 
 What evidence emerges by comparing both the leaders’ worldviews of external 
cultural relations and Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign 
relations in this era, from the evidence presented in this chapter? From 
internationalization, I concluded that while Japan did an amazing job in importing the 
technical hardware of many technologies into Japan during this period (1850 to 1895), it 
had a more challenging time importing some of the associated “spiritual” factors, such as 
values of freedom, individualism, and creativity, believed by leaders such as Fukuzawa 
and Mori to be important for Japan’s mastery of Western science and technology. In our 
examination of Japan’s experience with technology, development and foreign relations, 
seen in the contexts of Japan’s external cultural relations, I concluded that several social 
institutions and policy efforts, such as the Bansho Shirabesho and encouragement of 
English study, were important in encouraging Japan’s mastery of foreign technology. The 
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Meiji government’s policy that was extremely supportive of importing Western 
knowledge contrasted sharply with that of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which sharply 
limited it. The Meiji government efforts, and the contributions of many foreign 
instructors, were especially key in Japan’s successful mastery of technological hardware. 
A few foreign instructors also shared religion. While influential on a few individuals, it 
did not take hold widely. Despite Japan’s great cultural debt to the Chinese and Korean 
civilizations, they fell into some disfavor in contrast to Western civilization and 
technologies as sources for Japanese learning. What again seems clear is that while Japan 
was impeccable at mastering the technical aspects of these technologies, the 
accompanying cultural values were much harder to absorb. In this era, in practice, 
technological hardware (items of a more material nature) was more favored than the 
esoteric, ethical, and spiritual values behind them. 
 I give a more definitive answer in Part 4 (the concluding section), but what is the 
likely pattern seen in Japan’s aid policies of today, regarding the issue of 
internationalization? They do not seem overtly or politically “aggressive,” as just noted. I 
cannot say whether values of freedom and individualism are also transferred. Somewhat 
of a degree of “dependence” on Japan may be encouraged, in that historically, much 
Japanese aid has been “tied.” But its aid cannot be called aggressive, as the Sino-Japanese 
War was. 
 Concerning the third key research question of the dissertation, to what extent has 
Japanese spirituality perhaps affected Japan’s foreign aid policies? What evidence do we 
see in the historical data in this chapter? In my discussion of “spirit” and spirituality in 
this and several other chapters, I note how Fukuzawa and other leaders, especially Mori, 
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argue that any nation wishing to develop, including Japan, must master “spirits” and 
values of freedom, independence, individual duty, and creativity. In Chapter 6, I 
comment that transferring intangible values like these is more challenging than 
transferring technical hardware, in general and also for Japan. Hence I argue that in this 
era (1850-1895), Japan did not substantively transfer “soft” spirits such as independence 
and creativity in its cultural interactions with other nearby regions, but rather an 
aggressive use of technology, as seen in the Sino-Japanese War. Mori also argued that 
since Western Christianity seemed to encourage values of individual duty and inspired 
values that encouraged science and freedom, perhaps Japan also needed Christianity. I 
further identify several key lessons on spirituality and development from Japan’s 
experience, including the importance of balancing material and ethical/contextual 
elements of knowledge as a nation develops, the valuable contributions that religious 
input from other countries can offer (though not without some cultural risk), and how 
many of the leaders considered here identified both helpful values and contributions that 
religion provided for the development of Western nations. 
 On the conflict between the material and spiritual worlds identified in previous 
chapters, there are few overt references in Chapter 6. Earlier in this chapter, I commented 
on how Ito is the strongest case here of a leader who took several technologies and ideas 
on the international level and used them the most profoundly to transform Japan on the 
domestic level.1253 I also noted how several of the leaders (Kato, Yamagata, and Ito) 
found Western culture and technology superior to East Asian knowledge, though not the 
                                                
1253 I am referring to his support for ideas on political issues such as a parliament/Diet, and for a 
constitution. Fukuzawa also had a huge impact, though his impacts were more centered on the private 
sector, not on public policy.  
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West’s morality and spirituality. The only exception was Mori, who saw both Western 
technology and spirituality as superior. Finally, there is the lesson here that for wise 
development, a nation should seek to pursue a balance between material/scientific and 
cultural/spiritual development. Perhaps this last comment is the most notable, that in 
approaching development, and the technical and ethical/cultural dilemmas it presents, 
Japan (and any LDC) must seek a balance. However, the overpowering “superiority” of 
Western technology and culture, manifested in its military and economic strengths, 
Japan’s consequent rejection of “ethical” East Asian models in this era, and perhaps an 
“‘in-built’ Flaw of the Excluded Middle” weakness inherent in the Western technologies 
Japan imported, may have challenged Japan’s ability to do this. 
 Regarding religion, the main insights that stand out in this chapter are that, 
through interaction with foreign instructors, reading Western literature, and travel 
overseas, several of these leaders (Fukuzawa and Mori) gained positive impressions of 
what Western religion, Christianity in particular, had accomplished in the West. They 
valued both its moral strengthening of individuals and the contemporary scientific and 
technological advances they observed which were pioneered in the West, not in East Asia 
or other regions. On the other hand, many Japanese leaders, here especially Kato, disliked 
Christianity for various reasons, and felt it was highly incongruent with Japanese culture, 
though it had contributed positive things to the development of the West. What 
contributed to Kato’s extremely negative view of Western religion? Perhaps it was the 
fact that he did not observe its accomplishments in the West firsthand,1254 and likely he 
                                                




was also exposed to the Protestant theological school of German rationalism in the late 
nineteenth century, which caused many to question the historicity of Christianity. Perhaps 
the negative attitude of these leaders reflected residue of prejudice against Christianity 
left from the Tokugawa period, and their concern with protecting the identity of Japan. I 
also noted above in this chapter that Western religion (thus Christianity) was one of the 
most important global cultural products to be transferred to Japan at this time. Both 
foreign instructors and Western religious institutions were among the main actors 
facilitating this transfer. There are also very valuable lessons that Western spirituality and 
religion offered for Japanese development, and for any LDC, so developing countries 
should carefully reflect on what degree of openness to foreign religion they wish to 
allow, and why.        
 What impacts may these views on spirituality have had on policies in this period?  
The reflections of several of these leaders were very wise, especially their insight about 
how values and “spirits” accompanying the technologies to be mastered must also be 
studied and perhaps adopted to some degree. Fukuzawa and Mori both attempted to 
encourage this as much as they could, Fukuzawa in the private sector, and Mori largely in 
his work on education policy. Despite this wisdom, there was enormous pressure against 
allowing many Western cultural values, including religion, into Japan. Part of the 
pressure was based on the sakoku policy of the Tokugawa period, and part of it was 
based on the prejudice against Christianity that prevailed even before the Tokugawa 
period. It is also harder to transfer intangible values than technical hardware. Achieving 
appropriate balance between material and ethical/spiritual/philosophical factors in 
Japan’s development was thus extremely challenging. Did Japan find an appropriate 
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balance in this area, or between hyper-Westernization and pro-Japanese nationalism, the 
latter that especially took hold in the 1930s? Shifts between these various extremes 
occurred at various times, and it seems that the ideal balance was never found in the pre-
1945 period.1255 
 The major conflicts between spirituality and science that were present in this era 
include the conflict between leaders who were pro-Western religion (because they felt it 
had contributed much to Western science) and leaders who were pro-Shinto (because 
they thought Japan must have its own indigenous source to inspire development 
efforts).1256 Could Christianity or Shinto contribute more to Japan’s development efforts? 
Whatever the answer might have been, Shinto was chosen as the national spiritual 
ideology to support Japanese nation-building. There was also the potential conflict 
between material and spiritual values that, though mentioned infrequently in Chapter 6, 
continued nevertheless. 
 Where are the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign and 
development? As discussed above, in this era, there were great pressures against 
considering the contributions of religious and other spiritual values to development, what 
they might be, and pressures against Japan adopting Christianity as its official ideology 
for this purpose. To achieve a balance between the extremes of considering material 
issues in development, or only examining spiritual ones, I argued that in this period (1850 
to 1895), Japan mainly leaned toward the material side, though it did adopt State Shinto 
                                                
1255 I do not necessarily believe that the appropriate balance for post-1945 Japan has been found either, 
though it is not pertinent to reflect on this issue here. 
1256 There was also consideration of what Buddhism might contribute to Japanese development by various 
thinkers, notably by philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870 to 1945). 
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as its official spiritual ideology for development. In subsequent periods of Japanese 
history, it appears that Japan has alternately leaned toward either the material extreme or 
the spiritual one on the issue of whether to acknowledge the influence of spirituality in its 
development efforts (both on the domestic and international levels). In my opinion, from 
1895 to 1945, Japan leaned more toward the spiritual side in its development efforts.1257 
In the postwar period, I would argue that Japan has again returned to overtly pro-material 
extremes in its policies for development and aid, though the Western/global aid agenda is 
currently pressuring Japan to consider social and cultural issues to a greater extent.1258 
This is seen in Japan’s long-running preference for economic infrastructure in both its 










                                                
1257 For more on this, see the arguments I present in Chapters 7 and 8. 
1258 Though we are not able to explore these issues in this dissertation, I surmise that partly due to the strict 
legal pressures in Japan’s 1947 Constitution for the separation of religion and state, there is little or no 
consideration of religion in the development ideologies currently supported by the Japanese government, 
and in its aid policies. However, recent arguments about the clash of civilizations, Islamic politics, and 
religious terrorism may be increasing pressure on Japan to reconsider how religion and spirituality affect its 
diplomatic and aid policies. I suspect that any attention that religion is given likely fails to consider 










































 This chapter focuses on the pre-aid period of 1895 to 1945, the age of major 
overseas Japanese colonialism. Colonies included Taiwan (from 1895), Korea (from 
1910) and parts of mainland China (from 1931). On domestic issues, worldviews 
discussed here include views of technological development, the domestic state, market, 
and society. In each case, I consider the views of Yanagita Kunio and Emperor 
Hirohito.1259 What is the significance of Yanagita Kunio and Emperor Hirohito for this 
project, and why did I choose each of them? 
 Yanagita Kunio was the founder of Japanese folklore studies, a scholar, poet, 
government bureaucrat, a pioneer of ethnography in Japan, and one of the first Japanese 
leaders to critically assess Japan’s mass importation of Western culture and technology, 
examining this process in grassroots Japanese society.1260  The unifying theme of his 
work was the search for elements of tradition that explain Japan’s distinctive national 
                                                
1259 I will discuss the choice of these two leaders momentarily. 
1260 Yanagita served as a national bureaucrat, in the Diet (1914-1919), as a journalist, and at the League of 
Nations (the early 1920s).  After 1930, he devoted himself to ethnography across Japan (Kawada 1993). 
Our consideration here is primarily of Yanagita’s thought from about 1900 to 1930.  We are not able to 
consider his other writings during the World War II or postwar periods, which space and time do not allow.  
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character.  Many of these he identified in rural society.  He worried that the uncritical, 
wholesale adaptation and invasion of Western technology and culture was rapidly 
destroying Japan’s heart and soul.  His career lasted from the early to mid- 1900s.  
Japanese scholars view his work as relevant to Japan from the Meiji era onward.  Some 
argue that he attempted to offer Japan models for “alternative modernization.”1261   
 Emperor Hirohito (posthumous name, the Emperor Showa) was a pivotal figure 
in the life of the nation, as a symbol and more.  His thought, as an individual, was of 
questionable impact.  But through the symbolism of his position as emperor, the images 
he projected, and his policy actions and inactions, his influence on the nation was 
profound.  Although the historical “height” of his reign was from the early 1920s to 1945, 
his influence continued until the late 1980s.  Even after his death, he continues to be 
incredibly controversial, both in Japan and abroad.  In his study of Hirohito, Herbert Bix 
examines the contexts of his life, his interaction with politics, and how the emperor 
transformed Japan’s monarchy.1262  Hirohito is the one Japanese figure, more than any 
other, who reveals the nature of “…Japanese politics and government-military relations,” 
and the political views of the Japanese in the twentieth century.1263  Hirohito was a 
“fallible” person with common human weaknesses and desires, but at the center of 
                                                
1261 Minoru Kawada, The Origin of Ethnography in Japan: Yanagita Kunio and His Times (London: Kegan 
Paul International, 1993), 1-3, 81, 110-111. Kawada argues that while Japanese scholars acknowledge the 
importance of Yanagita’s work, their overall conclusions about his work are highly varied (Ibid., 2). 
1262 Hebert P. Bix’s seminal study of Hirohito’s life, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, is 
groundbreaking in its analysis of Hirohito’s life, political actions, and the broader implications of these for 
Japanese society and its place in the twentieth century world (Bix, Hirohito).  In Japan, the book has 
received both positive and negative critical response from scholarly and popular critics.  For details on the 
Japanese critiques of Bix’s book and his response to them, see Herbert P. Bix, “Emperor Hirohito in 20th 
Century History: The Debate Rekindles,” JPRI working paper, no. 92 (Cardiff, Calif: Japan Policy 
Research Institute, 2003), http://www.jpri.org, accessed 9 August 2008. 
1263 Ibid., 5-7. 
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power, politics, and political conflict in Japan longer than anyone else.1264 In Hirohito, we 
have a strong case where images greatly affected policy outcomes.  Below and in the 
concluding chapter, I examine Hirohito’s worldviews and his personal and projected 
images, each of which highly influenced his policies and political engagements. 
Especially with Hirohito, connections between worldviews and policy actions should 
become clearer. 
 In this chapter, for consistency and ease of analysis, where possible, I will use 
the same analytic concepts that I used for domestic issues in Chapters 3 and 4. In the case 
of technology issues, for worldview of technological development, I use Glick’s 
anthropological definition of technology. For domestic state and domestic market 
worldviews, I will again use the concepts of Glick’s definition of technology, 
technonationalism as ideology, and Murakami’s concept of industrial policy. For the 
domestic society worldviews, I will use the first two concepts, and not the third, in 
addition to several questions about the relationship of technology and society, where 
relevant.1265 
 An item of particular interest in this chapter is the importance that views of 
spirituality exercised on policy, and the impact these policies eventually had on Japan and 
its empire. A major tension arises between the views of spirituality of Yanagita, who 
stressed strengthening local manifestations of spirituality to build Japan, and Hirohito, 
                                                
1264 Ibid., 17-18. 
1265 The questions (from Chapter 3) to be asked here about the technology aspects of domestic society, if 
relevant, are: 1) what was the effect of societal attitudes about technology upon Japan’s reception of it? 2) 
What was the effect of general societal attitudes (and these leaders’ attitudes) about society, social change, 
morality and religion on Japan’s views of technology and technological change? 3) Through these leaders’ 
views of domestic society, do we learn anything about how technology fit into Japan’s social system, daily 
life and work of the era? 4) Do the worldviews of these leaders suggest that technology was a socially-
constructed phenomenon in Japan at this time? 
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who exercised great influence as the supreme spiritual and political leader of Japan, but 
who focused more on the national and international levels. During this era (1895 to 
1945), as time went on, spirituality exercised an increasing influence on Japanese politics 
and national life. It clouded, to some degree, Hirohito’s policy actions and decisions. 
Sadly, before 1945, the Japanese government largely ignored the wise observations of 
Yanagita on preserving Japan’s local cultures and spirituality. The heavy mixing of 
religion and politics in this era ultimately had disastrous consequences for the nation. 
Based on my own reflections on these issues, later in this chapter I offer several 
significant policy lessons on how religion and spirituality can positively affect a 
developing country’s development processes. I also ask important questions about the 
consideration of religion in Japan’s current foreign policymaking and aid policy 
processes. As Japan remains the second largest economic power in the world, one of the 
most significant players in the Asia and Pacific region, and one of the world’s largest 
donors of foreign aid, these questions are potentially of great significance for global 
development and security.      
 
Contexts of Domestic Issues (1895-1945): Major Trends 
 
 
Contexts of Technological Development  
 
For Meiji policymakers, Western science became one of the chief means for 
making Japan into a modern nation, to prevent its colonization.  From the era of World 
War I through World War II, while three main sectors did scientific research (the public 
sector, universities, and the private sector), only the research of the national laboratories 
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had much prestige.1266  During World War II, Japanese research suffered from isolation 
from most foreign sources of data.  The public sector, both the military and the 
government at large, had used many foreign sources, but now they had to rely on 
Japanese ones.  Funding increased, and for the first time, Japan’s science and technology 
researchers cohered their own unique identity.  But as World War II worsened for Japan, 
scientific research almost halted.1267         
 Throughout the pre-World War II era, Japan’s government played a key role in 
the promotion of technological development.1268  Most engineers entered government 
service, serving in public agencies, schools, laboratories, and as advisors to private 
industry.  The need to build both Japan’s military and industrial strengths was deemed 
proper motivation for the government’s involvement in pre-war R&D. Globally, the 
degree of public involvement in technological development seen in Japan’s pre-World 
War II scientific research community was rare in that era. Much of Japan’s basic and 
applied research in the 1930s and 1940s was done at the prestigious Institute of Physical 
and Chemical Research (Rikagaku Kenkyûjo, or Riken).1269 
 After 1895, Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and 
Japan’s economic boom during World War I were a further boon for Japan’s industrial 
and technological development.  Before World War II, Japan’s military escalation was 
                                                
1266 All three of these sectors cooperated in funding pre-World War II research and development (Japan, 
“Research and Development,” 1255). 
1267 Ibid., “Natural Science,” 1069. 
1268 Perhaps the most important public research-related effort before 1945 was the establishment of the 
Gakujutsu Shinkôkai (or Gakushin), the prewar predecessor of today’s Japan Society for the Promotion of 
Science.  Gakushin was mainly a research funding organization, and its work provided an important 
foundation for much of Japan’s postwar industrial base, including the fields of chemicals, electronics, and 
medicine (Ibid., “Research and Development,” 1255).  
1269 Ibid.  
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the motivation for much of the nation’s industrial and technological growth, especially in 
the heavy and chemical industries.  Although most of Japan’s technologies in this era 
were imported, Japanese researchers developed several new important technological 
innovations in the pre-World War II era.1270    
Domestic State Contexts 
 
 In the late 1890s, the aftermath of the war with China (1894-1895) greatly 
affected Japanese politics, and the throne as a tool for authoritarian control and rule.  
Ironically, the strength of political parties in the Diet also increased. Economic 
development picked up speed, and Japan’s politics became increasingly competitive, as 
the interests of Japan’s elites in big business, the Diet, the military and the bureaucracy 
often clashed. After the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), political party activities grew, 
as well as increased military spending to support Japan’s new colonies on the 
continent.1271 Intense political factionalism continued until the end of the Meiji period 
(1912), and slightly beyond.1272 From then until the early 1930s, political liberalism and 
participation, a trend called Taisho democracy, spread as men over twenty-five received 
                                                
1270 Ibid, “Modern Technology,” 1540.  Among the notable innovations by Japanese researchers before 
World War II were the development of monosodium glutamate (MSG, an important food additive) (1908), 
a high performance steel alloy, KS Magnetic Steel (1917), and the Yagi Antenna, the most common 
television and radio antenna configuration (1926) (Ibid.).  One sector in which Japan is a pioneer is the area 
of environmental technologies.  Japan’s development of advanced environmental technologies has run in 
tandem with its industrial development.  From 1868 to 1945, mining pollution in particular stimulated 
technological innovation in this sector (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Environmental Technologies,” 
129).  
1271 Bix, Hirohito, 33-34. 
1272 Genro (elder statesmen) from the hambastu (pre-1868 domain clique) factions, especially from the 
former domains of Satsuma and Choshu, served as prime minister, influenced important government posts, 




voting rights in 1925. Yet the authoritarian tendencies of the government continued.1273 
Gradually the power of the military in politics increased in the 1930s.1274 Government 
and bureaucracy were very closely connected, and most bureaucrats served long-term.1275  
Through 1945, the emperor had supreme authority over his ministers and the military, 
creating two bureaucracies, one civil, and one military. The military exercised 
extraordinary power over the political system.  Laws were drafted by bureaucrats, and 
approved in the Diet; the emperor also issued imperial decrees.1276 The state manipulated 
both religion and images of the emperor for political purposes.1277 The power of political 
parties grew after World War I, but they declined due to political pressure from the 
military in the 1930s, and were absorbed into a new national body by 1940.1278   
 Nationalism continued as an even more powerful ideology from 1895 to 1945.  
Through about 1912, Meiji leaders skillfully used the concept of kuni in the education 
system to translate the people’s allegiance from their feudal domains into devotion to 
                                                
1273 Many of these authoritarian tendencies resulted from the Meiji constitution, in force through 1945.  The 
constitution was a compromise between the two principles of imperial sovereignty and parliamentary 
government, and left unclear exactly how policy was to be made.  Much of Japanese political history 
through 1945 was driven by the conflict between these two issues (Ibid., “Political System,” 1216; 
“Constitution of the Empire of Japan,” 232).  
1274 Ibid., “Political System,” 1216.  Competing factions from the army and navy competed over the 
government’s domestic and foreign policymaking in the 1920s and 1930s.  Their power was strongest from 
1937-1945, when the military dominated the entire national government (Ibid., “Gumbatsu,” 479).  
1275 Most bureaucrats served long-term since they were chosen mainly by competitive examination, rather 
through political appointment (Ibid., “Bureaucracy,” 147). 
1276 Ibid. 
1277 I explore the issue of the emperor’s image in Chapter 9. Regarding religion and politics, after Hirohito 
ascended the throne in 1926, two ideological movements influenced by religion emerged.  One took off 
again in the late 1920s, a debate about the true nature of the national polity (kokutai), Japan’s state and 
society, and how it might be renewed. It was argued that this could best be accomplished through the 
emperor’s authority. The second ideology, kôdô (“the imperial way”) argued that the emperor provided the 
morally superior model for all Japanese. Kôdô was influential in Japanese politics in the late 1920s and 
1930s. Only morally superior Japan and its kôdô could purify Asia from corrupting Western influences, 
such as liberalism, communism, and individualism. While the kokutai debate was particularly associated 
with Shinto, the kôdô ideology was associated both with Shinto and several Buddhist sects, especially the 
Nichiren sect (Bix, Hirohito, 10-11). 
1278 Japan, “Political Parties,” 1212. 
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Japan and the emperor.1279  During the period of Taisho democracy (about 1905-1932), 
the nationalistic ideology of Nihonshugi (Japanism) receded, but resurfaced in the 
1930s.1280  Forms of statist nationalism took hold through the education system, Shinto 
festivals and rituals for the emperor, and new doctrines stressing harmony and Japanese 
uniqueness.1281  In the 1930s, these forces solidified into powerful political influences.  
Popular nationalists attacked the government for its “weakness” against the West, often 
stressing the spiritual role of the emperor as Japan’s high priest and intercessor, and 
seeking to connect all Japanese in ethno-psychic bonds.  From the debate on Japan’s 
national polity (kokutai),1282 the kazoku kokka (“Japan-as-a-family-state”) concept was 
official dogma in Japan’s schools through 1945, with persecution of dissenters.1283 
                                                
1279 Kuni is the basic Japanese word for “country,” in the sense of a national state or land.  This feeling was 
an example of “patriotism” (aikokushin) (Ibid., “Patriotism,” 1189). 
1280 Ibid., “Nihon Shugi,” 1087.  An example of a theory supportive of liberal Taisho era values, opposed to 
the official interpretation of the kokutai was tennô kikan setsu (“emperor-as-organ-of-the-state” theory), 
influential from 1920-1935.  It argued that the emperor as mainly an organ of the state, in which primary 
sovereignty was vested (Ibid., “Tennô Kikan Setsu,” 1552).  Another political theory supportive of liberal 
Taisho values was mimponshugi (“people-as the-basism”), developed by political scientist Yoshino Sakuzo, 
which argued for government by and for the people, in the name of the emperor.  The movement used 
mimponshugi as the translation for democracy, since the more common term for democracy, minshushugi, 
suggested popular sovereignty against the emperor, and would have drawn condemnation from the 
government in the 1920s (Ibid., “Mimpon shugi,” 962).    
1281 The state did not consider State Shinto to be a religion, but a government institution that fostered moral 
instruction.  State Shinto influenced Japan’s education system to encourage popular support for the state, by 
stressing the Emperor as divine and Japan as sacred (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “State Shinto,” 478-
479; Japan, “Nationalism,” 1059).  The use of symbols to promote nationalism also intensified.  For 
example, the rising-sun flag, while a modern invention, was increasingly used in public places and schools, 
although it did not legally become Japan’s national flag until 1999 (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, 
“Rising-Sun Flag,” 422-423). 
1282 The debate over the meaning of the kokutai goes back to the nineteenth century, and was, at its start, 
heavily influenced by different schools of Shinto.  Central to the concept of kokutai is the idea that the 
Japanese polity is unique, since the Japanese imperial line is descended in an unbroken line from the gods, 
and the concept of the family state, that all Japanese are related to the emperor as their “father.”  The debate 
reemerged in 1935, and the concept was important through the end of World War II as nationalist ideology 
promoted by Japan’s government (Japan, “Kokutai,” “Kokutai debate,” and “Kokutai no hongi,” 819-820). 
1283 Ibid., “Kokutai,” 819; Ibid., “Nationalism,” 1059.  An example of official dogma related to the kokutai 
issue was a two volume political tract, Kokutai no Hongi (Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of 
Japan), in use from 1937 to 1945.  It was intended as mass propaganda for all Japanese and school 
children.  It stressed the unique, divine mission of Japan, and used arguments drawn from nationalistic 
treatments of Japanese culture (Ibid., “Kokutai no Hongi,” 820).   
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Democratic ideals reached their zenith in the Taisho democracy movement through the 
early 1930s.  In 1918, the victories of democracy after the world war and Marxism in 
Russia led to similar demands from students, intellectuals and workers in Japan.  The 
government responded by granting some demands, and repressing others.  In the 1930s 
and the 1940s, as the military gained more power over Japan’s politics, liberal influence 
waned.1284 
 Political movements, acts, and incidents in Japan from 1895 to 1945 had a range 
of ideological leanings.  On the conservative side, notable political movements included 
the Peace Preservation Law1285 and the February 26th Incident.1286  Liberal movements 
included the Taisho democracy movement,1287 the Universal Manhood Suffrage 
Movement,1288 the movement for women’s suffrage,1289 and the student movement.1290 A 
major political scandal of this period was the Siemens affair of 1914.1291 
                                                
1284 Ibid., “Democracy,” 278.  The values of liberalism had a hard time taking hold before 1945.  The Meiji 
constitution gave top power and position to the emperor, assuming that the state was always more 
important than the individual. Important players on both the right and the left resisted liberalism.  A few 
activists resisted the rise of militarism from the 1920s to the 1940s, but with little effect (Ibid., 
“Liberalism,” 889).    
1285 This law (in use 1925-1945) was used to control communists, anarchists, and other political radicals, 
and was the main foundation of ideological control in Japan (Ibid., “Peace Preservation Law of 1925,” 
1192-1193). 
1286 Ibid., “February 26th Incident,” 359-360. 
1287 This movement (1905-1932) encouraged liberal values in Japanese politics, culture, education and the 
media (Ibid., “Taisho Democracy,” 1500-1501).    
1288 This was a movement to grant the vote to all Japanese males over the age of 25 in elections to choose 
members of the House of Representatives in the Diet.  It was passed in 1925 (Ibid., “Universal Suffrage 
Manhood Movement,” 1662). 
1289 The women’s suffrage movement in Japan began not long after 1868, as some activists in the Freedom 
and People’s Rights Movement pressed for women’s rights.  The women’s suffrage movement became 
active in the 1920s, but was disbanded in 1940 (Ibid., “Women’s Suffrage,” 1709).    
1290 The student movement in Japan was at its height from the 1920 to the 1970s.  While there are student 
groups of every political leaning, Marxist-leaning groups have been the most influential.  In the 1920s, the 
leading student group was the Marxist Gakuren, but in the 1930s, nationalistic student groups were the 
most active (Ibid., “Student Movement,” 1460-1461).  
1291 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Scandals,” 439.  In the Siemens affair, a German company paid 




Domestic Market Contexts  
 
 Concerning Japan’s economic history, through 1919, several major industries 
grew greatly, but rapid industrial growth caused problems in several sectors, including 
textiles, iron and steel, shipbuilding, and banking. Agricultural growth was slow.  
Alongside industrial growth, small scale and cottage industries continued, resulting in a 
dual structure economy, with most people’s incomes staying low.  The government and 
the police largely suppressed the socialist and labor movements at this time.  During the 
1920s, several economic crises struck Japan, and the worldwide economic depression 
(from the 1929 U.S. stock market crash) hit the nation in 1930-1931, causing the Showa 
Depression (1930-1935).1292  Many small- and medium-sized firms went bankrupt.  The 
agricultural sector suffered, increasing poverty for tenant farmers, and exacerbating rural 
social unrest.  Yet in the 1920s, Japan’s productivity increased in technological growth 
and industrial rationalization.  Pressure for the concentration of capital enabled the 
growth of older financial and industrial conglomerates (zaibatsu), and the birth of new 
ones.  By 1931, after the Manchurian Incident in China,1293 the government increased 
military spending, prompting growth in key industries, employment, and agriculture.  
This also began Japan’s ultimately disastrous march into World War II.  The government 
slowly increased military spending, public control over labor, the economy, and key 
industries.  Toward the war’s end, by 1944 and 1945, manufacturing halted with allied 
                                                                                                                                            
modern Japan’s political landscape since the 1880s, when the government sold public-related industries to 
Meiji officials’ friends at bargain prices. 
1292 The financial crises that hit Japan in the 1920s included the post-World War I slump (1920), short 
recovery followed by the economic crisis from the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923, and bank failures 
causing the financial crisis of 1927 (Japan, “Industrial History,” 307; Ibid., “Showa Depression,” 1414). 
1293 For more details on the Manchurian Incident, see the section on the contexts of Japan’s external 
political relations, 1895-1945 in Chapter 8.    
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bombing.1294  The wartime economy totally crumbled with Japan’s surrender in August 
1945.1295    
In government economic policy, from 1868 to 1945 there was no antimonopoly 
policy in Japan, and little support for individual entrepreneurs.  The chief economic goal 
was to strengthen the national economy rapidly, to prevent Japan’s colonization.  The rise 
of large zaibatsu was encouraged, and seen as supportive of the economy’s nationalistic 
goals.  Many new industries and their related corporations emerged in the interwar years.  
Government policies promoted the growth of specific industries.1296  Japan’s industrial 
revolution continued until about 1910, with the government taking the lead in developing 
certain heavy industries.1297                   
 The private industrial sector in Japan was stimulated by Japan’s victories in the 
wars with China (1895) and Russia (1905), and the opening of new colonies.  Japan’s 
industrial capital increased greatly during World War I, with the Far East left to mainly 
Japan’s input.1298  Through 1931, the private sector endured several waves of 
unemployment, bankruptcies, and increasing capital concentration by the zaibatsu.  After 
1931, the economy “re-inflated” through war preparations, more exports, and achieved 
greater employment.  A weakness of Japanese banks was the large number of small banks 
                                                
1294 Production in late 1945 was one-sixth of prewar (1935-1937) amounts (Ibid., “Industrial History 307; 
and “Showa Depression,” 1414).  
1295 Ibid., “Industrial History,” 307; and “Showa Depression,” 1414. 
1296 Emerging industries included aircraft, consumer electronics, and automobiles (Ibid., “Industrial 
History,” 601). 
1297 One of the heavy industries getting public promotion was iron and steel, from the late 1880s (Ibid., 
“Industrial Revolution,” 603). Until 1900, light industry dominated up to 85 percent of industrial 
production in Japan.  The textile industry was the most important light industry in Japan through World 
War II, and the greatest energizing factor in Japan’s industrialization (Ibid., “Industrial Structure,” 603). 
1298 During World War I, the Far East was left mainly to Japan’s input since the other major powers, 
including Russia, the United States, Britain, Germany, and others in Europe, were all occupied with 
hostilities in Europe. 
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connected to particular firms.1299  The government strongly supported the formation of 
joint-stock companies (kabushiki kaisha) from 1901, and the zaibatsu networks of 
interrelated industrial and financial holding companies, which grew greatly.1300  Families 
maintained intense control of the top zaibatsu until just before World War II.1301  In the 
1930s, Japan’s economic activity on the Asian mainland expanded, and several new 
zaibatsu emerged.1302  Through tight control, zaibatsu limited imported technology to 
their related firms.1303                 
 The first continuous labor unions began in the late 1890s, but disbanded by 
1901.1304  Through the 1920s, awareness of worker’s rights increased, and labor linked up 
with democracy movements.  More lasting labor federations started in 1912 and 1919.1305  
The productivity of industry grew in the 1920s, partly due to partial suppression of trade 
unions, and the growth of managerial principles that encouraged loyal workers.1306  By 
the 1930s, ideological differences split the labor movement into moderate and more 
radical branches.  The latter was basically eliminated by government repression before 
World War II.  In the late 1930s government militarists suppressed labor by starting 
Sampô (Sangyô Hôkoku Kai, the Industrial Patriotic Association), which stressed loyalty 
                                                
1299 Following numerous bank failures from 1926-1929. By 1935, the five largest private banks held 40 
percent of deposits (Ibid., “Corporate History,” 250).  
1300 Reasons for the growth of the zaibatsu included their large capital bases upon founding, their ready 
access to funding, raw materials and lines of foreign trade through their networks, their excellent 
entrepreneurial leaders, and their application of the Confucian ie (household) concept to the business 
environment, which inspired consensus decision-making and intense corporate loyalty (Ibid.).  
1301 From the start of World War II, outside ownership grew (Ibid., “Zaibatsu,” 1768). 
1302 One of the newer zaibatsu was automobile manufacturer Nissan (Ibid.).  Important, older zaibatsu in 
this period included Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo (Ibid., “Mitsubishi,” 980; “Mitsui,” 982; and 
“Sumitomo,” 1471). 
1303 Ibid., “Zaibatsu,” 1768. 
1304 Their disbanding was due to financial and police problems (Ibid., “Labor,” 869).  
1305 Ibid. 
1306 Ibid., “Industrial History,” 601. 
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and ultranationalist values.  All unions disbanded or went underground.  Both Sampô and 
managers’ encouragement of family-like loyalty (1890s-1930s) provided the basis for 
Japan’s postwar enterprise unions.1307  Working conditions for women in industry were 
poor and wages low, and first received notice in the late 1890s.1308  Women remained 
concentrated in the textile industry, but with militarization in the 1930s, moved into other 
sectors as men joined the military.1309         
 Important ideological currents about domestic economic development from 
1895-1945 included the concept of fukoku kyôhei.1310  From the early 1900s, management 
ideologies were affected by principles about paternalism and the uniqueness of Japanese 
culture.  Business faced public intervention in labor issues, so managers argued that 
foreign-type labor laws would drive up costs, and that they, unlike Westerners, cared for 
employees.1311  Among intellectuals, the pre-World War II Nihon shihonshugi ronsô 
(debate on Japanese capitalism) was important.1312 
 
                                                
1307 Ibid., “Labor,” 870; and “Labor Unions,” 873.  
1308 The first law to improve women’s working conditions passed in 1911 (Ibid., “Women in the Labor 
Force,” 1707). 
1309 Women outnumbered males in the total labor force through about 1930.  In the 1930s, the other areas 
women moved into included the chemical industry, manufacturing and skilled jobs (Ibid., “Women in the 
Labor Force,” 1707). 
1310 Through about 1912, fukoku kyôhei continued its influence in building up strategic, publicly supported 
industries (Ibid., “Fukoku Kyôhei,” 425). 
1311  Ibid., “Managerial Ideology,” 915.  The argument about managers’ concern for workers’ welfare was 
based on the Confucian ideal of ie (household) family-like relationships in the workplace.  It could be 
argued that this ideal had only limited effect in the prewar system, since working conditions for many 
lower level laborers in the prewar system were perhaps as bad as those in any Western country undergoing 
industrialization. 
1312 This debate of Marxist economists, at its height from about 1927-1937, considered whether the most 
important factors of Japanese capitalism were its residual “feudal” or “semi-feudal” aspects from the Meiji 
area (argued by the Kôzoha “Lectures” faction, connected with the Japan Communist Party) or the aspects 
it shared with other advanced capitalist countries (the position of the Rônôha “Labor-Farmer” faction).  
Members of the latter faction argued that Japan’s coming revolution would be socialist (Ibid., “Nihon 
shihon shugi ronsô,” 1086; “Rônôha,” 1275; “Nihon shihon shugi hattatsu shi kôza,” 1086).  See also 
Japan, “Kôzoha,” 836.  
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Domestic Society Contexts  
 
  Regarding social and national identity (1895 to 1945), we noted in Chapter 3 
how a government commonly instills a sense of national identity through symbols, 
rituals, education, and ideas. Popular culture also contributes. The Meiji state also 
encouraged nationalist images based partly on the Kokugaku School of learning,1313 
stressing such sources as Shinto and its creation myths, and Confucian values of loyalty, 
duty, and patrimonial descent. The Emperor ideology related closely to the concept that 
all Japanese were divinely descended from the imperial family in a “family-state,”1314 
with the emperor as father and head of the nation. The state also drew on non-Japanese 
sources, including Western concepts of royalty,1315 ethics education, and heroic figures 
like Benjamin Franklin. Leading public intellectuals and mass media also contributed to a 
sense of national identity. In Japan, intellectuals like Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960), 
Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962, already mentioned) 
investigated elements of Japanese identity, including connections with nature, cultural 
practices, and Buddhist philosophy.1316  
 In this period intense debates over the racial origins of the Japanese also 
emerged. While some scholars, including Kato Hiroyuki, stressed the racial purity and 
homogeneity of the Japanese, descended from the imperial family, others, such as 
anthropologists Torii Ryuzo (1870-1953) and Kita Sadakichi (1871-1939), emphasized 
                                                
1313 See the brief discussions of Kokugaku in Chapter 3. 
1314 See the brief discussion of kazoku kokka (“family-state”) in Chapter 4. 
1315 This was to help support the new Emperor ideology, which also drew on Shinto images of imperial 
divinity. Previously the emperor had long been a mysterious, largely hidden figure of ritual (Encyclopedia 
of Contemporary, “National Identities and Minorities,” 344). 




the descent of the Japanese minzoku (ethnic group) from peoples who entered Japan from 
Northeast and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, prior to the Japanese state’s 
formation in the seventh or eighth century A.D.1317 As the nation entered World War II in 
the 1930s and 1940s, issues of identity and race were increasingly affected by politics. 
From 1937-1940, the Kokumin Seishin Sôdôin Undô (National Spiritual Mobilization 
Movement) encouraged pride in Japanese culture and values of patriotism and thrift 
through radio and celebrity lecture tours.1318     
 Despite legal restrictions against women in the 1898 Meiji Civil Code, women 
made huge contributions to the nation and its economy. In addition to their participation 
in agricultural labor and cottage industries in rural areas, women contributed greatly to 
the industrialization of Japan in the textile industry. Gradually women entered new jobs 
in such places as telephone exchanges, department stores, and entertainment venues. 
Some even entered the new occupations of journalism, secretarial work, teaching, and 
medicine. At the turn of the nineteenth century, a few women became leaders in the labor 
movement, and in political movements in nationalism, socialism and anarchism.1319 The 
feminist group Seitôsha (Bluestocking Society) emerged in 1911, followed by politically 
active groups in the 1920s and 1930s, some of which pressed for female suffrage. In the 
1930s, conservative militarist forces impelled Japanese women to quiet these demands. 
During World War II, women worked in government-sponsored neighborhood and 
                                                
1317 This is still the most commonly accepted view of the racial origins of the majority of the Yamato 
(majority) Japanese racial group (Ibid.). This does not include the origins of the Ainu people of Hokkaido.  
1318 Ibid., “National Identities Minorities,” 345-346.  
1319 An early pioneer in the field of women’s history was the former anarchist Takamura Itsue 
(Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Women’s History,” 567). 
460 
 
patriotic associations, but work in industry was limited to single women during most of 
the war.1320      
 From 1895 to 1945, important social movements, ideologies and events 
included the social effects of several wars, Nihonshugi (Japanism),1321 feminism,1322 
pacificism,1323 Taisho democracy,1324 the Tokyo Earthquake of 1923,1325 Yamato-
damashii,1326 and the cultural effects of the Kokutai (national polity) movement from the 
late 1930s through 1945. During World War I, the war, centered in Europe, meant that 
Western and other foreign suppliers could not meet demand for various products in Asian 
markets. This, plus the demand of Japan’s Western allies for munitions, increased the 
value of Japanese exports three fold from 1913 to 1918. Japan had an industrial boom and 
a rapid entry of capital, causing steep inflation for Japan’s quickly urbanizing regions, 
leading to widespread rice riots in 1918. But overall, the large growth of Japanese society 
during World War I, including industry, the economy, military, and empire, brought an 
                                                
1320 Japan, “Women of Japan, History,” 1706. 
1321 This conservative reaction to the rapid Westernization of Japanese society in the Meiji era, seeking to 
preserve “traditional” elements of Japanese institutions and values, reemerged during the increase of 
ultranationalism in the 1930s (Ibid., “Nihon shugi,” 1087). 
1322 For more brief details on Japanese feminism in this period, already mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, see Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Feminism,” 141. 
1323 Japanese pacifism was strongly influenced by Christianity. Christian pacifists denounced various 
military events, including the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905, Kinoshita Naoe), World War II (Kagawa 
Toyohiko) and colonialism and war in China (1931-1945, Yanaihara Tadao). Additional important pacifists 
in this era, often influenced by Christian thought, included Kotoku Shusui, Uchimura Kanzo, and Abe Iso 
(Japan, “Pacifism,” 1180).   
1324 See my discussion of Taisho democracy in other sections of the dissertation. 
1325 The Tokyo Eatthquake of 1923, one of the most devastating natural disasters in history, struck on 
September 1, devastating a large area surrounding Tokyo and Yokohama. It affected an area populated by 
nearly 12 million people. The earthquake and the resulting fires killed an estimated 142,000 and injured 
over 103,000. It caused massive destruction of the capitol metropolitan region, and widespread social chaos 
(Japan, “Tokyo Earthquake of 1923,” 1596).  
1326 Yamato-damashii was a slogan used tthrough the end of World War II regarding spiritual qualities 
allegedly uniquely possessed by the Japanese people, including moral and physical strength, endurance, 
devotion, sincerity, and bravery. The meaning of the phrase, used since the Heian period (794-1185), has 
changed over time. By the early 1930s to 1945, it signified unwavering devotion to the nation and emperor 
(Japan, “Yamato-damashii,” 1735-1736).  
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increased sense of pride for most Japanese.1327 For Japan, World War II, occurring at the 
end of this period, represented a total national effort on the part of all citizens. The war, 
commencing with Japanese military intervention in China in 1937, profoundly affected 
the lives of all Japanese persons. Yet many Japanese experts have claimed that even utter 
defeat in August 1945 failed to rock the basic stability supporting the Japanese social 
system.1328 
 In this period, both local and national newspapers became very popular. By the 
1920s, expanding democracy, urbanization, education, industrialization and capitalism 
allowed the rise of mass magazines, including many for women. Magazines attracted an 
increasingly diversified readership, and often included selections of fiction to attract 
readers. In the 1920s, as radio broadcasting began to emerge, newspaper and magazine 
publishers attempted to open radio stations, but the government chose to establish NHK 
(Japan Broadcasting Corporation) as the national broadcasting service. Radio 
broadcasting commenced in 1925.1329   
 Advertisements in magazines and newspapers took off by the early twentieth 
century, with the rise of national mass media. As the country moved more toward 
imperialism and World War II, the volume of advertising decreased, and people working 
in advertising leaned more toward the national propaganda machine.1330  
                                                
1327 Ibid., “World War I,” 1711. 
1328 Ibid., “World War II, Japanese Society during,” 1716. I will briefly outline additional aspects of 
Japanese society during World War II in the rest of my discussion of the contexts of Japanese domestic 
society in this era (1895-1945).  
1329 Ibid., “Mass Communications,” 931; Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Newspapers and Magazines,” 
353. 
1330 Ibid., “Advertising,” 3.  
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 Another influential force in Japanese mass culture in this period was the 
Iwanami Publishing House (Iwanami Shoten), founded in 1913, which dominated prewar 
Japanese academic publishing through the 1970s. Iwanami first established its reputation 
by publishing the works of the famous Japanese novelist Natsume Soseki, and gained 
particular strength in philosophical works. Iwanami is one example of the rise of the 
Taisho democracy movement, and has contributed many influential trends to the Japanese 
publishing industry.1331  
 In Japanese education, ideological factors were increasingly influential during 
this era (1895-1945). The push for education to encourage nationalism and modernization 
were powerful forces in the late nineteenth century. Nationalism reemerged as an 
important influence under state militarism in the 1930s. Part of the purpose of the 
comprehensive national system of schooling was to contribute to the nation’s 
modernization, and to encourage the people’s “spiritual unification.” In the early 
twentieth century, new, complex forces influenced Japanese education, including the 
Russo-Japanese War, World I, the Russian Revolution, and global demands for 
democracy. New or renewed ideologies such as democracy, liberalism, socialism and 
communism entered Japan, spawning such movements in Japanese education as the New 
Education Movement, child-centered teaching, student movements, and the first teacher’s 
union, all in opposition to nationalistic education. By the mid-1930s, the government 
reacted with repression and promotion of the Japanese spirit (Yamato-damashii), to try to 
counter the effects of leftist ideologies. Schools began to emphasize ultranationalism after 
the Manchurian Incident in 1931, and outright militarism with the start of the war in 
                                                
1331 Ibid., “Iwanami Publishing House,” 222-223. 
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China in 1937. After war with the United States began in late 1941, military education 
and indoctrination in the schools increased, using such textbooks as the Kokutai no Hongi 
(Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan).1332 After the Russo-Japanese War 
(1904-1905), military training courses (gunji kyôren) were required for all students, male 
and female, at the primary and secondary levels. The height of gunji kyôren was during 
World War II, when it was required even for university students. After the war, it was 
banned from education.1333 Moral training and education (shûshin) was instituted in 
Japan’s public schools from 1872, and increasingly incorporated principles of 
Confucianism, nationalism, and militarism, until it was ended after World War II.1334 
 Regarding more general trends in education, additional imperial universities 
besides Tokyo Imperial University, the first, were established starting in 1897.1335 During 
the two world wars, three main actors in Japan, including universities, did scientific 
research.1336 During the Meiji period, although universal education was the goal, 
opportunities for females after primary school were few. Therefore a large private sector 
of educational providers for girls and women began opening schools for them. Christian 
missionaries were prominent in helping to provide these opportunities, and several 
private colleges for women were also established.1337  
                                                
1332 Japan, “Education, History,” 323, 325.  
1333 Ibid., “Military Education in the Schools,” 962. 
1334 Ibid., “Shûshin,” 1427. 
1335 Ibid., “Education, History,” 325. 
1336 The other two major sponsors of research were companies and the government (Ibid., “Natural 
Sciences,” 1069). 
1337 Ibid., “Women’s Education,” 1708. 
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 In the arts in this era,1338 Western literature continued to exercise a heavy 
influence on Japan, another arena where the struggle to come to terms with modernity 
and Westernization occurred.1339 Novelist Shimazaki Toson published Wakanashû (1897, 
a volume of free verse poetry), initiating a new style of free verse in Japanese poetry. 
Additional significant influences from the West included romanticism (introduced in the 
1890s), symbolism (introduced in 1905), and naturalism (highly influential from 1905 to 
1910, the source of the “confessional” novel, also known as the I-novel or watakushi 
shôsetsu). An additional significant trend in the early twentieth century was the 
publication of coterie magazines by writers of similar mind, and the serial publication of 
novels by famous writers in newspapers.1340 Many novelists such as Natsume Soseki, 
Mori Ogai, Nagai Kafu and Tanizaki Junichiro struggled with integrating elements of 
Western culture with Japanese literature. In the late 1920s and 1930s, Nagai and Tanizaki 
managed to draw on a vague sense of Japanese “tradition,” quickly obliterated after the 
war.1341 Drawing on Western concepts of literary criticism, modern Japanese literary 
critics attempted to apply Western critical standards to a variety of Japanese works, with 
varying success. They struggled to find a common position from which both Western and 
Japanese literature could be critiqued.1342 In spite of the venerable tradition of classical 
literature by Japanese women,1343 the category of “women’s literature” (joryû bungaku) 
arose as a distinct genre in the early 1900s, when collections and histories of women’s 
                                                
1338 Remember that our consideration of the arts must be mainly limited to just literature. 
1339 Ibid., “Literary Criticism, Modern,” 893. 
1340 Ibid., “Literature,” 896. 
1341 Ibid., “Fiction, Modern,” 367-368. 
1342 Ibid., “Literary Criticism, Modern,” 893. 
1343 This tradition includes outstanding works of fiction, novels, diaries, and journals such as The Tale of 
Genji (by Murasaki Shikibu), and The Pillow Book (by Sei Shonagon), starting as early as the Heian period 
(794 to 1185 A.D.). 
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writings began to be published. This categorization has been criticized as isolating 
women’s writing from the Japanese literary mainstream of “pure literature” 
(junbungaku), despite saving it from being classed with popular literature (taishû 
bungaku).1344 
 Regarding mass popular culture, in the Meiji period, younger writers attempted 
to create a new form of popular literature (called taishû bungaku) that fused elements of 
both Western and Japanese literature.1345 Western literary influence can also be seen in 
the emergence of genuine science fiction in Japan starting in the Meiji era from 1890-
1900, based on translations of works by Jules Verne and H.G. Wells, and reappearing in 
the 1920s.1346 The state was also involved in attempting to shape national popular culture 
through the imperial museums. New imperial museums in Kyoto and Nara, started in the 
1890s, used displays, archives and archaeology to help inculcate the state’s concepts of 
“nation” and “empire” to visitors. It was no accident that these museums were called 
“imperial,” not national, museums, since even in the 1890s, the state used the imperial 
throne as a symbol of nationalism. Displays also connected with Japan’s colonial 
ambitions.1347 A movement of aesthetic modernism that influenced mass culture in the 
1920s and 1930s was ero guro, an abbreviation of the Japanese term for “erotic-grotesque 
nonsense” (ero-guro-nansensu). This movement touched such areas as magazines, horror 
and detective novels, commercial design, soft-core pornography, and academic fields like 
urban anthropology and psychology.1348 
                                                
1344 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Women’s Literature,” 569. 
1345 Japan, “Popular Fiction,” and “Literary Criticism, Modern,” 1218. 
1346 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Science Fiction,” 443.  
1347 Ibid., “Museums,” 336.  
1348 Ibid., “Ero Guro,” 131. 
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 Concerning philosophy, in the 1890s, the Japanese government attempted to 
encourage emperor-centered nationalism through the national education system. At the 
same time, certain Japanese intellectuals such as Nishimura Shigeki introduced the use of 
Western philosophy to reinterpret Confucian and Buddhist thinking. In public 
universities, study of British and French enlightenment thought was gradually replaced 
by German-influenced idealism (i.e. Hegel) through the work of Inoue Tetsujiro. Another 
scholar, Onishi Hajime, used the work of Kant to counter Inoue’s anti-Enlightenment, 
pro-statist positions, combining Eastern and Western thought in the process. In the early 
1900s, researchers in Japan’s state universities used German philosophy to deepen 
Japan’s understanding of modern philosophy, generating a new understanding of the self 
and awareness of the search for the meaning of human existence. From the late Meiji 
period to the end of the Taisho era (1926), Japanese scholars focused on Neo-Kantianism, 
producing work of increasing technical focus. In 1911 Nishida Kitaro published Zen no 
Kenkyûjo (A Study of the Good), which was the first study by a Japanese philosopher to 
try to develop a universal philosophical system by applying Western philosophy in a 
logical, rational fashion to “traditional” Japanese thought. Under the influence of the 
Taisho democracy movement, philosophers such as Kuwaki Gen’yoku and Watsuji 
Tetsuro attempted to use intellectual rationalism, traditional Japanese and East Asian 
ethics, and new liberal, democratic ideals influential in the Taisho period, to encourage a 
move beyond strict state nationalism to a spirit of individualism and values supportive of 
the new middle class.1349  
                                                
1349 Japan, “Modern Philosophy,” 994-995. 
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 Marxism, first in the form of socialism, did not become influential until after the 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and its ensuing social and political problems in Japan. 
Early socialists such as Abe Iso and Katayama Sen were inspired by Christian humanism. 
Another socialist, Kotoku Shusui, shifted from anarchism to support for socialism and 
workers’ rights after a visit to the United States, but was executed by the Japanese 
government in 1910. Though the Marxist movement revived slightly following World 
War I, it did not receive much philosophical consideration until after about 1926, 
encouraged by scholars such as Kawakami Hajime, Fukumoto Kazuo, and Miki Kiyoshi. 
Japan became increasingly fascist and militaristic after war with China started in 1937, 
and many Japanese intellectuals were increasingly influenced by nationalistic 
philosophies such as Japanism. Thinkers such as Tosaka Jun and Saigusa Hirota tried to 
encourage consideration by intellectuals of the accomplishments of Marxism in the 
Soviet Union, but their movement was disbanded by state repression. Along with the rise 
of interest in Marxism, there was growing Japanese philosophical concern with historical 
and social issues, especially through the lenses of Hegelian philosophy and dialectical 
thought.  
 The rise of militaristic nationalism in Japan in the late 1920s and 1930s 
encouraged work on nationalistic ideologies such as Nihonshugi (Japanism) and 
kôdôshugi (imperial supremacy) by scholars like Kihira Tadayoshi.1350 Confucian ideals 
were preserved in the Imperial Rescript on Education of the late 1800s, and by the early 
1930s, increasing international and domestic pressures on Japan created an atmosphere 
where the fusing of Confucian values with nationalism was encouraged. Through tools 
                                                
1350 Nihonshugi is discussed in Chapter 4, while kôdôshugi (kôdô) is briefly considered in Chapters 8 and 9. 
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such as the nationalistic document Kokutai no Hongi, Confucian ideals became a 
powerful tool for the promotion of Japanese nationalism within Japan and throughout the 
empire.1351 In the years shortly before World War II, conservative Japanese scholars also 
attempted to use the ideology of Kokugaku to provide ideological backing for the 
imperial state of Japan.1352 The historical tool of kôkoku shikan was also used in the late 
1930s and 1940s as a primary ideological tool to encourage Japan’s wartime 
activities.1353 
 Regarding religion, by the end of the nineteenth century, Shinto and Buddhism 
had become more institutionalized and formalized, and Japanese folk religions highly 
popularized.1354 State Shinto, founded in the Meiji period, exercised an even higher 
degree of influence on Japanese spirituality and politics from 1895-1945. It was formed 
partly to provide a clear cultural and national sense of identity for Japanese in the face of 
Western religions, ideologies and influences that were rapidly entering Japan. In the 
twentieth century, State Shinto exercised influence on Japanese education, encouraging 
ideas of the divinity of the emperor and sacred nature of Japan. The government claimed 
that State Shinto was not a religion, and organized separate branches of Shinto that were 
considered religious (called Kyôha Shinto). Thus the government could attempt to coerce 
all Japanese to participate in worship at State Shinto shrines without breaking the 
Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of religion. Another controversial part of State 
Shinto was the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, dedicated to enshrining Japan’s war dead. The 
                                                
1351 Ibid., “Confucianism,” 224.  
1352 Ibid., “Kokugaku,” 817. See also the discussion of Kokugaku in Chapter 3, 4, 7, and 9. 
1353 Ibid., “Kôkoku shikan,” 815. Kôkoku shikan (emperor-centered historiography) refers to a nationalistic 
type of historiography in the late 1930s and 1940s that emphasized the permanence and importance of the 
imperial throne in Japan’s national polity and in influencing Japanese history. 
1354  Ibid., “Religion,” 1252. 
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emperor performed ceremonies at the shrine that turned the war dead into kami; over one 
million were so deified during World War II. The formal state functions of Yasukuni 
Shrine as a primary center of State Shinto were legally prohibited in late 1945. 
Nevertheless, it continues to be a source of controversy within Japan and between Japan 
and its Asian neighbors, even up to the present.1355      
 Some folk religious groups organized around charismatic leaders or pilgrimage 
groups, eventually becoming “new religions.”1356 Many new religions were founded in 
the nineteenth century.1357 Many have been characterized by offering close camaraderie 
and warm fellowship in small groups,1358 also true before 1945. Government control of 
religion was especially intense during the years shortly before 1945.1359 Despite this, 
membership in many new religions grew greatly in the twentieth century. Perhaps the 
most famous new religion founded in the twentieth century is Sôka Gakkai, currently the 
largest new religion in Japan. Sôka Gakkai bases its doctrines on the teachings of the 
Nichiren Shôshû sect of Buddhism that focus on the Lotus Sutra. Before 1945, Sôka 
Gakkai members experienced some persecution from the government for refusing to 







                                                
1355 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “State Shinto,” 478-479. 
1356 For a brief discussion on new religions, see the section on religion under domestic social contexts 
(1850-1895), Chapter 3.  
1357 Japan, “New Religions,” 1078. 
1358 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Japanese New Religions,” 351. 
1359 Japan, “Religion,” 1252. 
1360 Ibid., “New Religions,” 1078. 
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Views of Domestic Issues (1895-1945) 
 
 
Worldviews on Japan’s Technological Development 
 
 Yanagita Kunio.  In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Yanagita Kunio believed 
that two forces threatened Japan’s indigenous stability—family changes, and lifestyle 
alterations through the rapid influx of Western culture and technology.1361  Uncritically 
received through urban gateways, they especially affected rural people’s daily lives, 
worldviews, lifestyles and finances.1362  Yanagita believed that farmers must evolve 
standards of acceptability for Western products and their imitations, which spread to the 
remotest areas by 1912.1363  Their response to foreign technology also affected the 
agricultural economy, since the class system of rural life sometimes stifled creativity, 
talent, and innovation.  Failure to conform to expectations could result in banishment or 
ostracism.1364  Rural Japan needed a new balance of “traditional solidarity” and 
individual will.1365   
 Hirohito, Emperor. Concerning science, from 1914, Hirohito developed a love 
for marine biology.  In school he learned natural history, physics, marine biology, and 
Darwin’s theory of evolution. In his worldview, he reconciled modern science and 
                                                
1361 For a brief discussion on changes in family life, see my discussion on Yanagita’s views of Japan’s 
domestic society in that section in this chapter.  The types of Western products affecting rural Japan 
included “… new kinds of art, religion, manufactured goods, and an entirely new kind of knowledge….” 
(Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 147).  
1362 Since Japan’s prewar population was predominantly rural, these issues affected the lives of the majority 
of Japanese in profound ways. 
1363 Increasing materialism and consumption undermined the budgets of many rural families (Ibid., 147-
148). 
1364 These included expectations in the areas of behavior, tradition, and communal labor. The system of 
social ostracism was called (mura) hachibu—village ostracism (Ibid., 154). 
1365 Ibid., 145, 147-149, 154-155. 
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accounts of Japan’s national polity (kokutai).1366  Science strengthened the rational side 
of Hirohito’s character, making him capable of weighing arguments, reason, and 
evidence.  He also felt a great duty to his imperial, divine ancestry.1367   
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on Technological Development (1895-1945)  
 
 How do Yanagita and Hirohito’s views of Japanese technological development 
and culture compare?1368  Both Yanagita and Hirohito highly valued Japanese culture and 
society, desiring to preserve it.  Yanagita wanted to protect the “soul” of Japan and its 
cultural core from the uncritical importation of Western culture and technology.  
Preserving certain elements of Japan’s true identity, seen in the religious practices of 
many of Japan’s rural villages, seemed necessary.  Hirohito was especially concerned 
with protecting and continuing the imperial throne and his position on it, no matter the 
cost.  It seems that no matter the perils and destruction that Japan faced during World 
War II, this was his strong desire.1369  Perhaps he believed that if the imperial throne 
ceased to exist, so would Japan.  While Hirohito strongly supported the official emperor 
religious ideology that was imposed on Japan during his reign and before, Yanagita 
rejected it as the core of Japan’s cultural identity.  Rather, Yanagita argued that the 
                                                
1366 Bix, Hirohito,199-200. 
1367 Ibid., 60-62. 
1368 I am not certain how Yanagita or Hirohito viewed Japanese-derived technology; my data does not touch 
on that subject. 
1369 If Hirohito had ordered Japan to surrender earlier in World War II, hundreds of thousands of Japanese 
lives could have been saved.  Bix argues that he waited until he was reasonably sure that the throne would 
be preserved before he was willing to press for surrender.  This suggests that he may have valued the safety 
of the throne more than that of his own people (Bix, Hirohito). 
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“heartfelt” expressions of grassroots folk worship found in rural Japanese villages were 
closer to the true heart of Japanese culture.1370   
 What about Yanagita and Hirohito’s general views of Western science, 
technology and culture, and their relation to Japan?  Yanagita viewed Western 
technology and culture in a negative manner.  He believed that Japan’s massive 
importation of Western technology and culture was a threat to Japan’s survival, and its 
cultural soul.  To forestall this destruction, new critical standards of what to reject and 
what to accept must be developed.  Hirohito viewed Western science and technology 
positively, with great fascination and respect.  Beyond his personal avocation with 
Western-derived scientific study of marine life, he supported the positive Meiji view of 
Western science and technology, that it was superior to Japan’s, and a powerful tool to 
help strengthen Japan militarily, economically, and politically.  Through modern science 
and technology and its applications, Japan could lead and protect itself, and perhaps the 
rest of Asia, from Western invasion and colonialism.  
 What about Yanagita and Hirohito’s willingness to be exposed to Western 
technology and culture, through the training they received in Japan or abroad? Both 
Yanagita and Hirohito were trained in some of the most advanced Western knowledge in 
their respective areas of study in their era, Yanagita at Tokyo Imperial University, and 
Hirohito at the imperial schools expressly created for his training.1371 But while both men 
received such exposure to Western knowledge in Japan, neither one studied or lived 
                                                
1370 For more details, see my discussion below of Yanagita’s and Hirohito’s views of domestic Japanese 
society, 1895-1945.  
1371 Yanagita’s field of academic study was “agricultural politics,” while Hirohito’s training exposed him to 
many areas of knowledge, including military science, politics, the natural sciences, history, religion and 




abroad for very long.1372 Like the leaders of 1850 to 1895 discussed above, both desired 
to use Western science and culture to strengthen Japan.1373     
Conceptual analysis of leaders’ worldviews of technological development (1895-
1945) 
  
 Seen through the lenses of internationalization, translative adaptation, and 
Glick’s anthropological definition of   technology, Yanagita’s thought about technology 
was mostly concerned with its effects on domestic Japanese culture and society, the 
effects of the aggressive internationalization of Japan by the West that he observed.  To 
him, the internationalization was underway; the question was how to mitigate its impacts.  
Hirohito’s worldview emphasized basic scientific principles of rationality and empirical 
investigation more than technology.  During World War II, his scientific worldview also 
influenced his policy actions concerning the military’s use of technology, chiefly for 
what he and the Japanese government saw as the defense of Japan and its Asian 
neighbors against the “iron ring” of “ABCD” encirclement by other powers, especially by 
the aggressive West.1374  So inspired by the West’s aggressive internationalization, 
Yanagita’s technological concerns focused more on the issues of Japan’s effective, 
domestically focused translative adaptation.  Before 1945, Hirohito, was more externally 
focused in his view of technology.  At this time, he was profoundly influenced on a 
                                                
1372 Both Yanagita and Hirohito traveled abroad, Yanagita as a representative to the League of Nations in 
the early 1920s, and Hirohito on goodwill tours to Europe and the United States in the 1920s and 1970s.  
Yanagita lived abroad during his service in Europe, and later established contact with several leading 
Western scholars of ethnography and anthropology. 
1373 Yanagita, while wary of Western influence, used a western-derived social science research method, 
ethnography, for this purpose.  Hirohito utilized training in Western politics and military principles and 
technologies to try to strengthen Japan in Asia against the West.  Scientific rationality also influenced his 
policy decisions and actions.  
1374 In the 1930s, “ABCD” signified American, British, Chinese and Dutch influence around Japan in East, 
Northeast, and Southeast Asia and the North and South Pacific regions.  The Soviet Union was also viewed 
as a very significant threat.  In the overall Japanese worldview, it appears that the Soviet Union was seen 
more as a “Western,” not “Eastern” power.  
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personal level by Western science, seen in his usually rational policies using technology 
to “defend” Japan and Asia against the West.  His view of technology mostly emphasized 
the external threat of Japan’s internationalization by the West.  Through an 
anthropological lens, Yanagita’s view of technology seems fundamentally 
anthropological, especially in an applied sense, regarding his concern about the impacts 
of Western technology on the daily lives of Japanese, rural society, and the cultural core 
of Japan as a whole.  Hirohito, however, did not seem to have any real comprehension or 
concern about the impacts of science or technology on the daily lives of his subjects.1375        
Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic State Contexts 
 
 Yanagita Kunio. Domestically, Yanagita Kunio supported universal male 
suffrage in the 1920s, the parliamentary system, and political parties (the last two if they 
truly reflected “the people’s will”). Though espousing no ideology, he supported 
proletarian parties, but it was hard for them to unite against the two most powerful 
conservative parties of the dominant elites, the Seiyûkai and the Minseitô. The nation’s 
diverse interests were more important than those of any class or group, but even with 
universal male suffrage, all of them were not represented. Yanagita’s concept of 
nationalism stressed the nation’s long-term interests. Representative government should 
control all aspects of national policy and the military.1376 The emperor should be the 
nation’s supreme spiritual symbol, without much political power. Yanagita also cared 
about regional political development, but saw little interest in it. The weakening of 
                                                
1375 Perhaps this was related to Hirohito’s overall isolation from and lack of understanding of his subjects, a 
point explored by Bix (Bix, Hirohito). 
1376 Elements of the political system that Yanagita criticized included the House of Peers, the Privy 
Council, the political power of the military, and the power of the genrô (elder statesmen) to influence 
national policy.  All of these forces tended to limit the “people’s will” in various ways (Kawada, Origin 
Ethnography, 88-91).   
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“communal consciousness” seemed a source of political problems, and national 
administrative consolidation in rural Japan damaged “traditional” solidarity. Perhaps the 
enduring sense of communality limited this, yet it also might stifle political freedom.1377 
Yanagita gave unique importance to the role of agriculture in Japanese politics, culture, 
and national life.1378  As the basis of national solidarity, it contributes to the people’s 
sense of communal belonging.1379  He also emphasized Japan’s ie (extended family) 
system, which connected individuals to extended family, ancestors, descendants, and the 
nation.1380 Yanagita criticized many national trends in pre- World War I politics since 
they ignored citizens’ everyday concerns, and long-term implications. By the late 1920s, 
he took an independent stance toward many political questions.1381 
 Hirohito, Emperor.  Hirohito’s education affected his worldviews about the 
Japanese state and domestic politics.  The goals of his lifelong education were to enable 
him to judge policy viewpoints and options, yet stay above the process, and effectively 
serve through the Meiji system of checks, balances, factions, and bureaucracies.1382 Until 
nineteen, Hirohito attended his own schools, learning military and non-military affairs, 
important for his future work on domestic and international affairs.1383  From 1914-1921, 
Hirohito received formal military training, the daily routine of which greatly influenced 
                                                
1377 Ibid., 86-107, 151. 
1378 Yanagita’s academic background was in the field of “agro-politics” (Ibid., 2-3). 
1379 Yanagita saw agriculture as the key link between “… the land and its people,” the nation’s “anchor” 
(Ibid., 38-39). 
1380 Ibid., 39-40. 
1381 Ibid., 107. 
1382 Bix, Hirohito, 81. 
1383 Ibid., 36-41, 43-47, 51, 57-59. These non-military subjects were called teiôgaku (“instruction for the 
emperor”).  They included mathematics, science, economics, foreign languages, calligraphy, ethics, and 
law (Bix, Hirohito, 58-59).  His instructors included top military leaders and university professors.  Many 
of his instructors were conservative.  Because top instructors were usually chosen as his teachers, they were 




his whole life.1384  Hirohito’s education affected his worldview of the military and 
politics in important ways.1385 A conflict emerged in Hirohito’s training, due to the image 
of his autocratic grandfather, the Emperor Meiji, whom he was to emulate.  The 
Confucian ideal of gentle, benevolent monarch contrasted with the autocratic ruler image 
imported from Europe.  The last image conflicted with Hirohito’s natural personality.1386  
On Japanese history, he learned the same ideology of divine descent, racial homogeneity 
and superiority that all Japanese children did.  These became essential elements in his 
worldview.1387  Hirohito also received instruction on current Japanese theories of 
constitutional law.1388  He believed in the sacred nature of his authority, and was taught to 
perform Shinto rituals for the imperial ancestors, representing the ideology of kôso kôsô 
                                                
1384 His military training was also affected by the military culture of the time.  Japan’s military culture in 
the 1910s and 1920s was influenced by the values of bushido (the samurai ethic), Yamato damashii (“Japan 
spirit,” which stressed feelings of “racial superiority” and “invincibility”), and strengthening Japan’s 
national polity (kokutai).  The military also had the conflicting roles of protecting Japan’s colonies, 
defending the nation, and maintaining internal stability in the midst of the most intense strikes and labor 
unrest in Japan’s history.  There were also conflicts in the military concerning general morale and support 
for the monarchy (Ibid., 51-52, 152-156).         
1385 There were conflicts in his roles and interests in this area.  From an early age, he believed that as 
emperor, he would exercise leadership in political and military matters.  As he entered adulthood, his 
interests tended toward politics, but also history and the natural sciences.  How would Hirohito balance his 
conflicting roles of supreme military commander and constitutional monarch?  His education failed to teach 
him how to handle these conflicts, but his tendencies unfolded in the crucible of policy making in the late 
1920s and 1930s (Ibid., 51-56, 89-91).  For example, Hirohito and his aides continued to allow the superior 
power of the military over civilian forces in the “mixed” cabinets that ruled Japan from 1888-1945.  And 
against the opposition of educators, from 1925, Hirohito allowed the military to send officers to middle 
schools and universities to provide military training for students (Ibid., 150, 156-157). 
1386 Ibid., 133. Hirohito’s character affected him throughout his life—his reticence, high-pitched voice, 
weak demeanor, and “unmartial” appearance.  Hirohito came to often mask his emotions during public 
appearances.  The theme of masks and hiding one’s emotions is important in Japanese culture.  Hidden 
meanings have been highly valued.  Despite appearances, Hirohito was fairly intelligent, strong-willed, 
frugal, and knowledgeable about the military, though not very creative.  Top experts were brought in to 
help him through daily lectures, and they often succeeded (Ibid., 84, 87-91, 129-130). 
1387 Bix, Hirohito, 70-74. His instruction also stressed that activist emperors were important throughout 
Japanese history, even during periods of military domination of politics (i.e. the Kamakura period, 1193-
1336) (Ibid., 73-74). 
1388 One theory, advocated by Hozumi Yatsuka and Uesugi Shinkichi, advocated imperial absolutism.  The 
other major theory, of Minobe Tatsukichi, argued that the emperor was an organ of the state, and that his 
power was therefore constrained at times.  In his exposure to constitutional law, Hirohito learned that the 
center of sovereignty (tôchiken) is located in both the emperor and the state, but that the emperor is the 
brain (central force) of the state (Ibid., 77, 79).   
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that connected the imperial family to the myth of Japan’s divine creation, forming part of 
his worldview about morals and the state.1389 In the mid-late 1920s, Hirohito supported 
nationalism and traditional political values over the liberalism and openness connected 
with the Taisho democratic movement.1390 
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on the Domestic State (1895-1945) 
 
 Yanagita and Hirohito’s views of the domestic state can be broken into three 
broad categories, views of politics and policymaking, of political institutions, and of 
political ideologies. On politics, Yanagita worried that Japan’s political system ignored 
the people’s daily concerns, that the loss of “communal consciousness” would cause 
political problems. This consciousness was deeply rooted in rural agriculture. The latter 
he saw of central importance in Japan’s culture of politics, and worried that national 
political consolidation occurring in Japan would damage “traditional” solidarity. Hirohito 
had very different concerns. In general politics, in the competition between military and 
oligarchic political involvement and civilian political involvement, he definitely preferred 
the former. So on politics, Yanagita manifests more concern for popular political 
involvement, while Hirohito preferred elite control with limited, carefully regulated 
democracy. 
 On political institutions, Yanagita worried that elite controlled institutions such 
as the Genro1391 and the Privy Council limited popular democratic involvement. He 
supported such institutions as the Diet, broadly populist political parties, universal male 
                                                
1389 Ibid., 77-80, 38-39. Kôso kôsô means “the imperial founders of our house and our other imperial 
ancestors” (Bix, Hirohito, 38). 
1390 Ibid., 146. See the brief discussion of the Taisho democracy movement in Chapter 7.   




suffrage, and representative and civilian control of the national government and the 
military. In contrast, Hirohito disliked democracy, and believed that Japan needed a 
supreme leader, the emperor. Yanagita believed that the nation’s emperor should be the 
nation’s supreme spiritual leader, but not have much political power. Hirohito saw the 
emperor’s authority as sacred, that the emperor must perform sacred rituals for the 
imperial ancestors. In the conflict between the images of the emperor as benevolent, 
Confucian ruler or as autocratic, European-style emperor, Hirohito personally preferred 
the former. Yet he also desired that the emperor should have much power, as he indeed 
had in the prewar political system.1392 In his actions, he shows that he desired to be able 
to judge policy options, and yet stay above the complexities of national political 
entanglements. In Hirohito’s prewar view, the emperor should exercise influence in the 
nation’s political and military affairs. In his own training, military knowledge and 
discipline were heavily stressed, so he could not help but be strongly influenced by them. 
To Hirohito, the military was vital in the political life of the nation.          
 Regarding political ideologies, according to Kawada, Yanagita had no particular 
ideology, although he leaned toward proletarian, populist political parties, against the 
conservative parties of Japan’s ruling elites. As of the late 1920s, Yanagita usually took 
an independent political stance. In contrast, Hirohito’s basic political ideology was very 
conservative, as seen in the ideology of kôso kôsô, that Japan was divinely created and 
closely related to the imperial family. Elements of this ideology included the views that 
                                                
1392 This view was stressed in his education, which stressed the “activism” of many emperors in Japanese 
history. His training also emphasized the conservative values of Japan’s military culture, including bushido, 
Yamato damashii (“Japan-spirit”), and strengthening the kokutai (national polity or essence). 
Understanding military issues and affairs was highly important to Hirohito in the prewar political system.  
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Japanese are divinely descended from the gods, racially homogeneous, and superior to 
others. On nationalism, Yanagita saw the nation’s long-term interests as more important 
than short-term ones, but also believed that representing the diversity of those interests 
was more important than those of any single group.1393 Regarding views of the nation and 
Japanese history, Yanagita believed that the Confucian ie system connected all Japanese 
to each other and the state. To him, “communal consciousness” and communality were 
important in Japan’s culture of politics. Agriculture played a central role in both Japan’s 
national solidarity and the sense of “communal belonging” of all Japanese. The 
weakening of Japan’s communality in the 1920s seemed to be a source of political 
problems, but he worried that excessive communality might stifle political freedom.  
Hirohito, as just noted, viewed Japanese as divinely descended and racially superior, and 
saw national sovereignty as centered in both the emperor and the state. On religion and 
the state, Yanagita was not opposed to some mixing of religion and public life, in that he 
believed that the emperor should be the nation’s supreme spiritual symbol. And yet, he 
wanted the political power of the emperor to be limited. Though we have already noted 
Hirohito’s mixing of religious and political authority (his zealous participation in Shinto 
rituals), later in life, he was uncomfortable with “fanatical” emperor worshippers. So on 
political ideologies, while both Yanagita and Hirohito have conservative elements, 
Yanagita is much more populist in his outlook. 
Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews of the Domestic State (1895-1945) 
 
 Development Issues. Regarding “modernization,” the basic question, from 
1895-1945, is, as Japan was increasingly absorbed into the world economy, and 
                                                
1393 In the 1920s, Yanagita believed that not all national interests were yet represented. 
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interacted with it, from the evidence in the domestic state worldviews here, what 
happened to Japan’s domestic culture of politics? Did its “core” become more “Western,” 
or did it stay basically “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On general politics, Yanagita was 
more concerned for grassroots, populist political involvement and genuine democracy 
(similar to the consensus, village-level politics of traditional Japan): a focus more on the 
domestic level. Hirohito was more concerned with oligarchic control of the political 
process, with limited democratic input, and a focus more on national level. On the local 
level, despite the heavy input and huge changes brought by Japan’s heavy involvement in 
the international economy in this period, the basics of Japanese political culture in rural 
areas, especially decision-making by consensus and local communalism, did not change. 
At the national level, the oligarchic, authoritarian tendencies of Japanese politics, seen 
since ancient and Tokugawa times, also did not change.  
 On political institutions, Yanagita favors strong, democratic, populist input and 
institutions. Hirohito favors supreme power exercised by an all-powerful emperor, and 
oligarchic- and militarily-controlled political institutions with limited popular input. He 
seemed “afraid” of the people, somewhat unsure of how to personally relate to them. In 
national political institutions, Hirohito’s view prevailed in the pre-war system; its core 
seemed more similar to “traditional Japanese political culture. “Modernization” basically 
prevailed in Japan’s general politics and political institutions in this period. 
 Concerning political ideologies, Yanagita supported a populist, independent 
form of Japanese nationalism, but was rather conservative in his support for “traditional” 
elements of Confucian social connection and rural, agriculturally based solidarity. 
Hirohito was highly conservative ideologically, supporting the political aspects of 
481 
 
emperor ideology, State Shinto and nationalist thought. He also had a highly conservative 
view of the state and of Japanese ethnicity. Both Yanagita and Hirohito were fairly 
conservative, but Yanagita, more populist. In their political ideologies, both seem 
reflective of “modernization”—Yanagita in his support for Japanese communality and 
Confucian values, and Hirohito, less so. Though Hirohito supported Shinto values, they 
were the redefined, nationalized values of State Shinto, not necessarily those of 
“traditional,” local Shinto across different regions. 
 On translative adaptation, the main question here is, in the evidence in the 
political worldviews here, as Japan attempted to adapt to the global market, in spite of its 
importation of Western political and cultural items, did the “core” of its domestic culture 
of politics stay mostly “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On general politics, Yanagita was 
concerned that national politics were destroying “traditional” Japanese communality. He 
was also concerned for local and regional political life. Hirohito cared about oligarchic 
and military control of politics, with limited democrat input. In both of these worldviews, 
on general politics, translative adaptation seems validated; Japan’s basic politics stayed 
mostly non-Western and Japanese. On political institutions, Yanagita favored democratic, 
popular input in political institutions, and was wary of too much elite input. Hirohito 
supported a strong emperor, and elite/military-controlled institutions. In these 
worldviews, did the core of its domestic culture of politics stay mostly “non-Western” 
and “Japanese”? Again, translative adaptation generally prevailed.  
 On political ideology, Yanagita was populist and proletarian leaning, without 
espousing a specific ideology, but supported communality and Japan’s local culture of 
politics. Hirohito was ultraconservative, supported the state’s main ideologies, including 
482 
 
State Shinto, the emperor ideology, and nationalism, and had conservative views of the 
nation. In these worldviews, did the core of Japan’s domestic culture of politics stay 
mostly “non-Western” and “Japanese”? Yanagita’s support for communality prevailed, 
but his democratic populism did not. Hirohito’s conservative political ideologies also 
prevailed, although the highly state-manipulated ideologies of emperor worship and 
ultranationalism were not very characteristic of the historic Japanese culture of politics. 
Here, Yanagita basically supported the ideals of translative adaptation.1394 Hirohito’s 
“new” ultranationalistic political values seem more like Western ideologies of 
ultranationalism than “traditional” Japanese ones, and do not seem supportive of 
translative adaptation. 
 Technology Issues. Examining these leaders’ views on general politics through 
the lens of Glick’s concept of technology, Yanagita was more supportive of popular 
political involvement in national politics, while Hirohito favored elite control. Yanagita 
was more concerned about how politics affected peoples’ daily lives. Yanagita disliked 
elite institutions that limited people’s opportunities for democratic involvement. Hirohito 
was concerned about maintaining elite control of institutions. Yanagita manifested a 
concern for how politics affected peoples’ daily lives much more than Hirohito did.  
 There was not much concern in either Yanagita or Hirohito for the issues of 
technonationalism as ideology, to make Japan wealthier. Yanagita’s main concern for 
economics is that the state should focus more on agriculture and the regional economy, 
not heavy industrialization and exports. He believes that this is the major way to make 
                                                
1394 Yanagita’s views here reflect the basic continuance of communality that continued in rural Japanese 
politics, but here we cannot judge what happened in urban politics. 
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Japan stronger and therefore wealthier. His main concern was protecting Japan’s culture 
and identity, enabling Japan to survive. Making Japan abundantly wealthy was not his 
major concern. Hirohito’s main concern, however, was effectively ruling Japan, and 
maintaining the viability of the imperial throne, not economic, industrial or wealth issues. 
 Concerning Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, in their views of politics, 
neither Yanagita nor Hirohito shows much concern for Japanese government intervention 
in Japan’s economy. Yanagita is a strong supporter of government intervention, but not in 
support of heavy industrialization. He desires that intervention be positive, especially 
focused on rural, regional, and agricultural issues. His main motivation is the protection 
of Japanese culture, not the promotion of (heavy) industrial growth. Hirohito shows 
absolutely no concern for this issue. So while Yanagita is a mixed, perhaps moderate 
example of Murakami’s concept, Hirohito shows no connection to it at all. 
 Cognition Issues. Image. The main images of Japan’s domestic state here 
concern politics, political institutions, political ideologies, the nation and politics, 
Japanese society and politics, and religion and politics. There is a large dichotomy in 
many of the images because of huge differences in many of the basic views of the two 
leaders studied here, Yanagita and Emperor Hirohito. Regarding basic politics, Yanagita 
paints positive images of regional and local politics and takes an independent stance on 
many issues. Hirohito, however, supports the conservative authoritarian apparatus of 
prewar Japanese politics. On Japan’s culture of politics, Yanagita’s images stress the 
importance of agriculture and local culture in Japan, while Hirohito’s stress the roles of 
the nation’s elite-dominated political institutions and the military in politics, and the need 
to create stability. 
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 Main images on political institutions from Yanagita question elite domination as 
negative, while those from Hirohito imply that elite control of politics is both good and 
necessary, since the people are not able to govern themselves. While Yanagita’s images 
of the emperor’s role in politics stress that it should be limited, those of Hirohito 
emphasize that the emperor, the “brain” of the state,1395 has a primary role in providing 
leadership and guidance for the state and the military, without getting mixed up in 
political complexities and factional disputes. On the role of the military in national 
politics, while Yanagita’s images stress that representative government should limit the 
military, Hirohito’s suggest the importance of the military in national life and politics. On 
democracy, Yanagita’s images stress that all of the interests in Japan must achieve some 
level of representation,1396 and that representative government should reign in political 
actors such as the military. Hirohito’s images hint that democracy is dangerous, and 
therefore it should be limited. Yanagita supports political parties if they support workers’ 
rights and broad national interests; he distrusts the elite-dominated parties in control in 
the 1920s.1397         
  On ideologies of politics and the nation, Yanagita’s images are progressive and 
liberal leaning, while Hirohito’s support imperial and nationalistic ideologies of divine 
descent and Japanese heritage such as kôso kôsô. On Japanese history and national 
                                                
1395 “Brain” of the state was Kato Hiroyuki’s biology-influenced term for the leadership role of the emperor 
in relation to the Japanese nation. I use the term here again to signify the central, guiding role the emperor 
had in Japanese national politics in the prewar era. 
1396 For example, Yanagita strongly supports universal male suffrage. Female suffrage was perhaps too 
radical even for a progressive like Yanagita in this period. Yanagita also supports the Diet, Japan’s national 
parliament, and political parties, if they effectively represent all national interests.   
1397 I found no evidence concerning Hirohito’s opinion of or image concerning political parties, but given 
his conservative political beliefs and experience in working with elite political actors and bodies, it is likely 
that he distrusted and disliked them. 
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origins, there is slight similarity in their images. In the imagery of Hirohito’s beliefs, we 
see strong connection between the imperial family and the history and creation of Japan. 
Yanagita also sees Japan and its people as founded on the imperial family, but, in 
addition, closely connected to the land and heartfelt worship of local spirits. 
 In imagery on Japanese society and politics, we see strong support in Yanagita 
for democratic politics and populist movements, while Hirohito’s suggest fear of 
democracy and too much popular involvement. Yanagita supports more such 
involvement, while Hirohito’s images suggest a preference for elite control. Yanagita’s 
images also reveal a strong concern for the daily concerns of peoples’ lives, and a stress 
on the importance of protecting indigenous solidarity and communality. If this 
communality is damaged, politics will suffer. We also find strong images supporting 
religion, spirituality and politics, from both Hirohito and Yanagita. Though Hirohito 
supports a stronger, more active role for the emperor than Yanagita does, the latter still 
sees the emperor as the nation’s greatest spiritual symbol. Both Hirohito and Yanagita 
suggest images which draw on Japanese spirituality and ethics very strongly, including 
Hirohito’s fervent, faithful performance of Shinto rituals, and Yanagita’s conviction that 
the Confucian-based ie1398 system connects people to their ancestors and the nation. 
 How did the above images function as possible perceptual filters or as cognitive 
organizing devices? In the images of general politics, Yanagita shows preferences for 
local and regional politics, agriculture, and local culture. Hirohito’s images stress strong 
roles for elites, the emperor and the military in politics, and limited democratic input. 
These could result in Yanagita failing to deal realistically with national or international 
                                                
1398 Ie means household. 
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level forces, interests or groups. Hirohito shows almost a total lack of touch with his 
subjects and their desires, and no comprehension of grassroots and local issues. On 
ideologies, Yanagita is basically independent, but shows a preference for liberalism, 
while Hirohito prefers nationalistic and imperialistic thought, and both see the nation’s 
founding through the lenses of imperialist ideology.1399 In these ideological biases, 
Yanagita shows potential anger or a lack of in-depth understanding of the intricacies of 
elite ideologies and forces, and their powerful lock on national politics from the late 
1920s through 1945. Again, Hirohito shows little knowledge of, and no experience with, 
local beliefs and issues, though he was trained in the same nationalist ideologies as other 
Japanese. On society and politics, in his images, Yanagita shows a strong concern for 
rural areas, solidarity, communality, and support for populist, democratic movements. 
Hirohito suggests a fear of democratic political involvement from his subjects. Yanagita’s 
images suggest few blind spots on society and politics issues, though his rural preference 
may have biased him slightly against urban needs and issues. Again, Hirohito has almost 
no connection with average Japanese or awareness of their true needs and issues. Finally, 
on religion and politics, in their images, while both leaders support Shinto-related beliefs, 
Hirohito’s have more connection with State Shinto and state-defined spirituality in 
service of politics, and Yanagita’s have more connection with grassroots society and 
popular belief and spiritual practice. Here Yanagita’s bias suggests a potential lack of 
relevance to the reality of State Shinto, what it is doing to the country, and an inability to 
                                                




resist or change it. Hirohito failed to see the devastating impacts of State Shinto and 
emperor ideology near the end of Word War II, which nearly destroyed Japan.   
 Worldview. In these worldviews about the nature of the domestic state, about 
the nature of the world, Yanagita is concerned about micro-level political matters, not 
just the macro-level. In his views, the most fundamental things that happen in Japan 
occur at the local level, related to agriculture and rural areas; the local drives the most 
basic things that happen in a society. Yanagita believes that progressive political thought 
will do more for the world. On the other hand, in Hirohito’s view, elites and leaders run 
the politics in all normal countries and in Japan. Without them, politics cannot function. 
To Yanagita, the world is driven by politics on both the macro- and micro-levels. To 
really understand it, we need to study both levels. He believes that the people have a right 
to be involved in politics; their voice must be heard. For politics to work effectively, the 
people’s interests must be heard, and their voices known. Hirohito, however, believes that 
leaders who are conservative, experienced and wise must lead politics. Leadership by 
those who are too young, inexperienced or radical will fail. Hirohito believes that the 
world needs stability and leadership by experienced leaders in order to function well. 
Regarding the world’s forms of political organization, for Yanagita, political order on the 
local and regional levels is important, not just the national or international levels. While 
Hirohito believes that elite-dominated political institutions run the nations of the world, 
Yanagita sees elite domination of politics as negative. To Hirohito, elite control of 
politics and leadership is both needed and good. Yanagita believes that to prevent abuses, 
leaders must be account to the people. Hirohito believes that democracy is dangerous, 
and should be limited, while Yanagita views populist, democratic political parties as 
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positive, and dislikes elitist political parties. He supports the representation of workers’ 
and peoples’ rights. 
 Regarding their views of the self (Japanese politics), to Yanagita, local and 
regional politics are more important in Japan than national politics. He sees the heart of 
politics in Japan as located in agriculture and local communality. Agriculture is a basic 
part of Japan’s political culture and how it works. On the other hand, to Hirohito, elites 
and the military must lead Japanese politics, and the emperor has a key role in Japan’s 
politics. Above all, stability is needed in Japan’s politics, and the people cannot govern 
themselves.1400 Yanagita believes that the emperor’s role in Japan should be limited, 
while in Hirohito’s view, the emperor has a primary role in guiding the Japanese state and 
military. To him, the emperor should not get mixed up in ground-level political 
complexities. Yanagita argues that all political interests in Japan should be represent at 
the national level, and that Japan needs democratic and representative government to 
control potential abuses by its leaders. In Hirohito’s view, democracy is dangerous for 
Japan, and should be limited. Again, Yanagita supports populist politics, and the rights of 
the workers and the people. To both Hirohito and Yanagita, Japan must be ruled by 
divine forces, the imperial family and order. Japanese are descended from the imperial 
family. To Yanagita, Japan and its people are closely related to the land and local 
spirituality. The needs of the people matter, and Japan’s indigenous solidarity and 
communality must be protected. If Japan’s communality is damaged, its politics will 
suffer. He views the emperor is Japan’s greatest spirit symbol. To Hirohito, Shinto 
rituals, honoring the kami, and ancestors are important for the success and functioning of 
                                                
1400 Both of these points are implied.  
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the nation. For Yanagita, the Confucian-based ie system connect all Japanese to their 
ancestors and to the nation.  
 What are the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who held 
these worldviews? How have these environments interacted with/affected the 
viewers’/actors’ worldviews? Yanagita’s views were shaped by his experiences in urban 
Japan, in rural Japan-regions and small villages, towns across the nation, by his own 
education in agro-politics at Tokyo Imperial University, and by his own experiences as a 
politician in the Diet and as a diplomat in the League of Nations. These experiences and 
environments have given Yanagita views that are quite broad and practical, but biased 
toward the rural, populist sector. Hirohito’s elite, isolated environment stressed 
militaristic training and the best learning and knowledge available at the time. He was 
isolated in the imperial court and in his interactions with only the highest leaders and 
aristocrats of the nation. This environment totally oriented Hirohito toward elitist views 
of the world, and the nationalist ideologies he was taught as a child. It totally isolated him 
from a capacity to relate to his subjects. How these worldviews and their associated 
environmental interactions influence the viewers’/actors’ perceptions, uses of 
information, and their understanding of events? Yanagita’s education in agro-politics and 
his own personal interests heavily biased him in the direction of focusing his own 
research on rural and agricultural Japan, also influenced his findings. These also strongly 
affected his interpretations of rural and indigenous spirituality. Hirohito’s isolated, 
heavily guarded, regulated upbringing and environment isolated him from understanding 
the concerns of average Japanese, to a large extent, and biased him exclusively toward 
elitist politics and conservative views of the military, what their roles in politics should 
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be, and against popular, democratic input. These also strongly biased his spiritual 
interpretations toward State Shinto and its ideologies and practices/rituals. In uses of 
information here, Yanagita was biased toward rural, popular, ethnographic, local level, 
bottom up sources, and Hirohito was biased toward top down, elitist, state/official views 
and sources of information regarding politics. Regarding their understanding of political 
events and their causes, Yanagita interprets events as influenced by organic causes, and 
by Japan’s indigenous spirituality and culture, to a large extent. Neglect of these, and 
over-reliance on foreign or urban sources and models will likely cause problems in Japan. 
Hirohito interprets the causes of political events through the evolutionary and also 
spiritual training he has received. Underneath all his education is the influence of 
evolutionary views on the behavior of foreign actors and of Japan in the international 
system (the strongest will survive). Regarding the blessing and survival of Japan, it seems 
his spiritual training (and his performance of proper Shinto rituals and prayers) is the 
most important part. Here we see the conflict between science and religion, “material 
reality” and spirituality, at a very basic level in the life of Japan’s most important 
Japanese political leader of recent times. What were the implications of this conflict for 
policy outcomes related to Hirohito’s life and actions? I will discuss this more in Chapter 
10. 
How did technological systems affect these worldviews? Because Yanagita 
preferred local level processes in nearly everything, he also preferred technology on a 
smaller scale, and other solutions on a smaller, more humane scale. He preferred 
localized politics and solutions better than national scale politics. Hirohito was oriented 
toward an elitist, large scale, national/international, militarist, and conservative 
491 
 
orientation in almost everything. Clearly he believed that solutions to political and 
military problems must come from strong, powerful, and technologically great solutions. 
 In sum, if we compare these worldviews, regarding the nature of the world, 
Yanagita focuses on the micro-, local level, rural areas, and progressive politics. Hirohito 
focuses on an elitist, narrow, statist view of politics and the world. On how the world 
functions, Yanagita sees the world operating on the micro- and macro-levels, and on 
additional levels too: local, national, international, and so forth. In his mind, we need an 
appropriate balance between these for effective politics and economics. Hirohito believes 
that experienced, elite leaders must lead the world. Concerning the world’s political 
order, order, to Yanagita, agriculture is a basic part of Japan’s culture. Democratic 
accountability and involvement are essential for effective politics. For Hirohito, elite 
control of politics is basic to the world and Japan;1401 democracy is dangerous. To 
Yanagita, local and regional politics are more import than national level politics. 
Democracy and representative politics are important for Japan, which needs limits on 
possible abuses by elites and leaders. Popular needs must be recognized. Japan’s 
indigenous solidarity and communality are essential. Spirituality and the imperial 
tradition are important parts of Japan’s identity, but the state must respect local 
differences. In Hirohito’s view, elites, the military and the imperial throne have key roles 
in Japan’s politics. The people cannot govern themselves; democracy is negative for 
Japan. The emperor should have strong role. Finally, he sees the Japanese as descended 
from the imperial family. On these two leaders’ views of Japanese politics, Yanagita sees 
local and national politics as more import than national level politics. Democracy and 
                                                
1401 This point is implied. 
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representative politics are import for Japan, which needs limits on possible abuses of 
power by elites and leaders. Popular needs must be recognized. Japan’s indigenous 
solidarity and communality are essential. Spirituality and the imperial tradition are 
important parts of Japan’s identity, but the state must respect local differences. For 
Hirohito, elites, the military, and the imperial throne have a key role in Japan’s politics. 
People cannot govern themselves; democracy is negative for Japan. The emperor should 
have a strong role, and all Japanese are descended from the imperial family. All of the 
people must be committed to the national honor and honoring the ancient (spiritual) ways 
of the ancestors and the imperial line. 
 Cultural Logics. The global phenomena to which these leaders responded 
included international ideas and ideologies about politics, such as democracy, political 
liberalism, Marxism, autocratic theories of European politics, monarchism, theories on 
warfare and the military, ideas about political institutions, such as a national parliament, 
role of a king or monarch, theories of nationalism, principles of absolute leadership, and 
East Asian-derived theories of politics (such as Confucianism). What are the leaders’ 
worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? Yanagita leaned toward 
democratic and liberal-leaning beliefs, including support for voting and democratic 
institutions. He believed that politics must be based on the needs, convictions, and daily 
lives of the people and the indigenous ways of life of Japan, best seen in rural areas. 
Democratic ideas from the West would support the effective representation of these ideas 
in the Japanese political system, so that is why Yanagita supported them to a degree. The 
new social science methods of ethnography, also gleaned from abroad, would enable 
Japan to study and know its own self, its own culture. Hirohito embraced ideas of nearly 
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absolute rule by the monarchy, little democratic representation, and authoritarian 
government with a strong military influence. While some of his political ideology drew 
on symbols and ideas from Japanese or East Asian origin, many of them also drew on 
ideas from other nations, especially Germany and other authoritarian systems in 
Europe.1402 Both Yanagita and Hirohito have a strong Confucian and imperial (family 
and throne) ideological foundation to their political views. Their beliefs are in many ways 
the of opposite each other.   
 The cultural logics emerging under Yanagita’s views are that the job of 
government is to create better conditions for the people, the average citizens, people and 
workers who make up the heart of society. This is a populist orientation; he really loved 
the average people and ways of Japan, and the country. He wants Japan to survive. 
Though he generally feels that Western ideologies and culture are totally unsuited for 
Japan, he is willing to draw on ideas and techniques from the West (certain political ideas 
and ideologies) when he feels they can be used to help Japan survive culturally and 
politically. The assumptions here are that the heart of the nation are the people, and rural 
people/farmers. These elements must be preserved and adapted by reasonable means for 
the people to survive. If they are not, the country will be destroyed. Additional 
assumptions are that it is worthwhile for Japan to survive, and that if intentional steps are 
not taken, Western culture will destroy Japan. Western culture is not compatible with 
Japanese culture. By flexibly adapting certain (political) ideas or research methods 
(ethnography) from abroad, Japan can survive. Hirohito’s cultural logics include the basic 
cultural logics under the Meiji political system, since his education stressed them. The 
                                                
1402 Bix, Hirohito. 
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basic logics under the Meiji system were that political ideas from countries with politics 
and culture most like Japan’s were the countries that were the best from which could 
Japan learn. In politics in Meiji Japan, that country was mostly Germany/Prussia, which 
had an authoritarian system. His logics also emphasized tradition, honor, state-defined 
rituals and spirituality. They also stressed that Japan would not survive if it did not have a 
strong military, that the country must be defended, and strong. There are many 
evolutionistic assumptions here also. The common people are like “children,” and cannot 
be trusted to handle complex political decisions. Those who are wealthy, wise, proven, 
well educated, and the elite members of society must provide guidance. There is the 
assumption that for Japan to be strong and survive, it needs to draw on the best ideas in 
the world, from the most powerful countries. Through World War I, the best, most 
appropriate political ideas were believed to come from Europe. After the failure of many 
states in Europe in World War I, and their authoritarian, monarchist systems, Japan lost 
some of its most admired models. Hirohito and his conservative court did not like the 
liberal leanings of Taisho democracy. They were happy that the military was rising (it 
was conservative, and it supported the throne). Hirohito did not like Marxism, and greatly 
feared the Soviet Union, remembering what they did to their monarchy.    
 What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? Yanagita disliked 
and philosophically resisted all of the conservative, authoritarian political movements.1403 
His main response was do research and much writing, to try to intellectually devise 
solutions to the problems Japan faced. Hirohito disliked and feared democratic and liberal 
movements, and wanted them to be as limited and impotent as possible. He got involved 
                                                
1403 In my research, I uncovered no evidence that Yanagita actively resisted conservative politics in Japan. 
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extensively in Japan’s politics at the top level, though “behind the scenes,” usually, 
especially its international political issues. He also prayed often for the nation through 
Shinto rituals, especially during World War II.  
 What were the cultural logics under these responses to these global phenomena? 
Yanagita’s views were deeply rooted in an emphasis on grassroots level society, people, 
and populist viewpoints, based on his ethnographic studies of Japanese society. Therefore 
he resisted conservative, elitist ideas. Hirohito was steeped in and trained in political 
ideas that emphasized the importance of authority, ritual, power, and tradition. 
Democratic, liberal ideas were not in his political vocabulary, training very much, nor in 
his worldviews and experience. What if we compare the cultural logics of these 
worldviews about the global phenomena, and the cultural logics of the worldviews under 
the responses to the phenomena? On the cultural logics of the global phenomena, 
Yanagita’s are that Japan’s survival depends on knowing and protecting the true, 
indigenous culture and “traditions” of Japan. To do that, he is willing to use tools from 
the West (some democratic ideas and institutions, and ethnography). He feels that elitist 
politics do not listen to or comprehend Japan’s grassroots level needs and politics, and 
therefore cannot help the country. Hirohito’s cultural logics here are based on 
assumptions that emphasize leadership and control of politics by elites and prominent, 
educated, wealthy members and forces of society, such as wealthy aristocrats, landowners 
and the military, not the masses. He is also willing to borrow or support political ideas 
from abroad that seem suitable for Japan. What he is willing to use is not democratic, but 
authoritarian or monarchical in nature. The cultural logics under the responses to the 
global phenomena are also extremely similar to the first cultural logics I identified. 
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Again, Yanagita shows a preference for grassroots, populist, democratic and liberal-
leaning ideas, and Hirohito prefers elite, authoritarian ones. There is no basic change in 
the logics here. 
Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Market Contexts 
 
 Yanagita Kunio.  Yanagita Kunio opposed the Japanese government’s 
economic policies of the early 1900s and its plans for Japan’s development on largely 
Western lines.1404  His criticisms were based partly on his thoughts about cultural effects 
on the process.  He saw weaknesses in Western patterns of modernization, and had 
serious concerns about whether Japan should follow them.1405  Yanagita concluded that 
Japan should take its own path to development, based on its own conditions.1406  He 
supported a re-orientation of the government’s plan by developing and improving Japan’s 
domestic economy, without totally altering its structure.  He developed his theories of 
agro-politics and regional development during a period that helped set the course for 
Japanese capitalism.  He believed that capital should be broadly distributed throughout 
Japan.  National domestic economic policy must involve a balance among agriculture, 
industry, and commerce, with the first two sectors as pillars, and the third a bridge 
between them.  Yanagita opposed protectionist policies in these sectors.  He wished to 
lessen conflict among various sectors, partly by strengthening the communal solidarity 
                                                
1404 The government’s plans stressed increasing industrialization and concentration of capital to finance 
Japan’s economic expansion overseas (Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 32). 
1405 Some of these weaknesses were revealed in the massive self-destruction of Europe in World War I 
(Ibid., 79).  
1406 Yanagita questioned whether there was only one path to modernization, and argued that there would 
likely be multiple paths for the varied cultures of the world to follow, based on the pattern of cultural 
variation in global cultures which he saw present in the early 1900s (Ibid., 79-80).  This thinking is similar 
to the recent thought of Japanese anthropologist Maegawa Keiji and Japanese development economists 
Hara Yonosuke and Ohno Kenichi.  For more, see the definition of translative adaptation in the Glossary 
section (Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” and K. Ohno, “Overview”).   
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that he believed had pervaded rural Japan.  Yanagita saw the importance of heavy 
industries for Japan’s international trade, but over-reliance on them could cause 
problems.  Instead, he supported the development of regional industries.  While 
Yanagita’s economic vision differed from that of national policymakers, Kawada 
concludes that it could have contributed to long-term economic stability.1407   
 Second, the nation’s agriculture must gradually change to small-scale 
independent farming. Yanagita opposed the “semi-feudal” landowners’ dominance of 
agriculture.1408  Tenant farmers must change to small-scale, independent status. 
Yanagita’s objectives differed from those of leading Japanese agricultural theorists.1409  
In the 1920s, he believed Japan’s agricultural population suffered from the extreme 
attention given to military and industrial buildup after the wars with China and Russia.  
To help, he wished to increase the productivity of agricultural labor, and offered many 
practical suggestions.1410 Also, industrial unions, legalized in 1901, should reflect the 
interests of small-scale farmers and the “traditional” rural sense of communality.1411 But 
Yanagita believed what unions could accomplish in rural regions was limited.1412         
                                                
1407 Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 3-4, 11, 32-33, 40-42, 77-79, 141. Yet his economic thought had several 
weaknesses, including vagueness on how small- and medium-sized enterprises and traditional communal 
values could strengthen regional development, and the plausibility of his theories in the international 
context of the era.  (For more details, see Ibid., 78-79).   
1408 Yanagita wished to aid independent and tenant farmers, not the landowners.  He rejected the idea of 
land expropriation.  It would be interesting to compare Yanagita’s prewar proposals for agricultural and 
land reform with those of the postwar American occupation of Japan, which were quite radical.  This is 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  
1409 Ibid., 19, 22-25. 
1410 Ibid., 10-11, 13-23. Among his suggestions were the improvement of agricultural production and 
technology, encouraging farmers to focus on agriculture, and decreasing the number of farmers to 
standardize landholdings (Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 10-11, 13-23).   
1411 For more on Yanagita’s concept of communality in rural Japan, see the section on domestic Japanese 
society. 
1412 Ibid., 34-38, 143-144, 149-150. In his earlier writings, Yanagita was hopeful that unions in rural areas 
could help bring regional unity among farmers and landowners, but later he grew pessimistic (Ibid., 76). 
And he came to believe that labor unions could not successfully help to establish a renewed rural spirit of 
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 From the early 1900s,Yanagita offered detailed plans for regional 
development.1413  He was especially concerned about increasing economic divisions 
between urban and rural areas.1414  During and after World I, Yanagita attributed Japan’s 
weakening economic condition to domestic factors.1415  To Yanagita, the central purpose 
of industrial policy was to improve people’s daily lives.  This influenced his theory of 
regional development.1416         
 Hirohito, Emperor.  In the late 1910s and early 1920s, Prime Minister Hara Kei 
faced pressure over the huge wealth of the monarchy becoming a source of conflict for 
the people.1417  As Japan’s largest landowner, the imperial house had to be careful not to 
engage in economic activities that might cause hardship or raise resentment.  For this 
purpose, Hara and other leaders, including Yamagata Aritomo, understood that the 
monarchy must use its wealth to “purchase” the people’s goodwill, such as selling some 
                                                                                                                                            
communality (Ibid., 149-151). Yanagita also supported unions in urban areas and unionization for all 
workers, including women. Without more cooperation and help for workers, he feared that the urban-rural 
divide would increase (Ibid., 158-159). 
1413 Yanagita’s plan was to handle surplus agricultural labor, promote regional stability, communality and 
growth (Ibid., 27-33, 61). 
1414 Ibid., 27-33, 61. For example, his vision for the domestic economy included a large industrial urban 
sector, and smaller regional industries, and the creation of regional small- and medium-sized markets.  The 
purpose of small and medium markets was to help eliminate intermediary exploitation, or urban industries 
would devastate local areas (for details, see Ibid., 29-30).  For local markets, many new administrative 
arrangements should be eliminated, and traditional political subdivisions renewed (Ibid., 30).  Within 
regions, he hoped to divide labor between industrial and agricultural sectors, including semi-independent 
units in each area (Ibid., 32).  Yanagita was also concerned about the increasing centralization of the 
economy into urban industries.  This centralization also occurred through zaibatsu, large industrial 
combines of interlocking companies in various industries.  These included such famous groupings as the 
Houses of Sumitomo, Mitsui and Mitsubishi.  They especially increased in strength in the period from 1905 
to the late 1910s, following the Russo-Japanese War and during World War I (Ibid., 70-71).      
1415 During this period, urban products continued to flood rural areas, and capital increasingly returned to 
cities.  According to Kawada, government promotion of urban versus rural growth caused general 
economic decline.  Earlier, Meiji rural industry policy on caused the decline of rural industries, lifestyles, 
and economy, increasing dependence on urban products.  Government policy favored rice, decreasing 
agricultural diversity, and affecting rural stability (Ibid., 64-65, 67-69). 
1416 Ibid., 64-65, 67-71, 74. 
1417 For example, I have noted elsewhere the rice riots over food prices that occurred in many towns, cities 
and rural areas across Japan, involving over 1 million protesters (Bix, Hirohito, 94). 
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stocks and land holdings.  The imperial family’s wealth was as great as that of Japan’s 
largest zaibatsu, and it increased the ability of the imperial house to relate to and 
influence the nation.1418  Although Hirohito received lectures on economics in his 
education, evidence suggests that neither he nor his court group understood economics 
very well.  By the late 1920s, it seems his interest in economics arose mainly from a 
concern for domestic and international order, stability, and peace, perhaps for the well-
being of the throne itself.1419  
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on the Domestic Market (1895-1945)  
 
 Yanagita Kunio’s and Emperor Hirohito’s views of Japan’s domestic market 
can be organized into three primary groups: general views of the economy and 
economics, views of economic development, and views of the rural and urban 
economies.1420 I found very little about Hirohito’s views, so I will explore Yanagita’s 
views in more depth. In Yanagita, we see a strong desire to promote balanced 
development that does not squelch Japan’s indigenous culture. He disliked development 
that was too large-scale, which he saw as inhumane. He was especially concerned about 
economic development across Japan’s various regions, and in its rural areas, which he 
saw as the heart of Japan’s culture and identity. A significant insight here is that Yanagita 
supports the recent argument of some of Japan’s leading development economists that 
there are multiple paths to development, to the market. Like them, he also supports 
                                                
1418 Ibid., 94-95. For example, among the monarchy’s land holdings were “… palaces, mansions, schools, 
mausoleums and museums in Kyoto, Nara and Tokyo,” income from investment in corporate stocks and 
bonds, profits from stocks in colonial banks and enterprises, including the Bank of Korea and the South 
Manchurian Railway, an annual government allotment of 3 million yen, and income from domestic mines 
and other enterprises.  In 1919 the imperial house had an income of 6-8 million yen from forest 
management activities alone (Ibid., 95).   
1419 Ibid., 130-131. 
1420 I will not repeat all of these ideas here, however, since they are found above. 
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capitalism, but insists it be humane. In contrast to Hirohito’s economic views (which, as 
with political views, also seem conservative), Yanagita’s views are economically 
progressive. He desires to modernize Japanese agriculture, support farmers’ and workers’ 
rights, and he opposes large-scale, centralizing economic forces such as the over-
concentration of heavy industry in urban areas and of financial power in the zaibatsu. 
Yanagita’s significant reflections on economic issues flow out of his concern to protect 
Japanese culture and identity from the onslaught of Western technology and cultural 
influence coming into Japan. Yet it seems his overall impact on economics in this era was 
small, given the generally conservative political atmosphere in Japan from the late 1920s 
through 1945. 
Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Domestic Market Worldviews (1895-1945) 
 
 Development Issues. The main question here (on “modernization” from 1895-
1945) is: as Japan was absorbed more and more into the world economy, and interacted 
with it, from the evidence in the domestic market worldviews here, what happened to 
Japan’s domestic economy and its effects on Japan’s “core” culture? Did its “core” 
become more “Western,” or did it stay basically “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On their 
general views of the economy and economics, Yanagita opposed the Japanese 
government policy for the domestic economy. His plan stressed regional development 
throughout Japan and communalism, not just large-scale industrial development in urban 
areas. He also supported balanced development among major sectors, labor unions, and 
workers’ rights. Hirohito had a poor understand of economics, was mainly concerned for 
the maintenance of peace and survival of the throne. Regarding the main question, the 
government did not really follow Yanagita’s recommends on regional development until 
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after 1945. It followed its goal of large-scale industrial development. It also supported the 
basic conservative political and emperor ideologies that Hirohito did. It does not seem 
that these things made the Japanese culture’s core less western. ”Modernization” 
prevailed, though it was not intentional. 
 On their views of economic development, to Yanagita, there are multiple paths 
to development. Japan must follow its own path, based on its own conditions, and the 
basic structure of the existing economy should not be altered. There are weaknesses in 
Western development models that will have negative effects on Japanese culture. 
Yanagita supports the broad application of capitalism across Japan’s regions, and the 
importance of smaller, regional industries, not just large scale ones.1421 On the main 
question, the pattern of Japan’s economic development did not follow the pattern of 
small-scale, regional and localized development that was recommended by Yanagita. 
Rather, it followed the large- scale, heavy industry preferences of the national state. What 
were the cultural effects of this process before 1945? Even though the country did not 
follow Yanagita’s economic dev goals, the agricultural roots of Japan’s culture remained 
very strong and abiding through 1945. Again, Japan’s cultural core, especially in rural 
areas, stayed basically Japanese, though this was not intentional. Japan’s development 
followed its own path, however. For the most part, its path was not the same as that trod 
by the economies of the United States and Great Britain. Japan did not have totally free 
trade, but much heavier state involvement and guidance. 
 On the rural and urban economy, Yanagita’s vision was to help independent and 
tenant farmers, to encourage small-scale independent farming, to support land reforms, 
                                                
1421 I had no data on Hirohito’s views of economic development.  
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and improve agricultural production and technologies. He was concerned about the 
increasing economic divide between urban and rural Japan, and the rising centralization 
of the economy. Yanagita supported urban unions and urban industries balanced with 
regional industries throughout Japan.1422 On the main question of “modernization,” 
Yanagita’s overall concern here, and especially his vision for rural Japan’s economy, 
became concerns of the postwar Japanese government, an era of rapid urban growth and 
population decline in rural areas. The problems that Yanagita predicted, such as over-
concentration of population and industries in urban conurbations, came to pass. In the 
prewar period, the process had of rapid urbanization had not yet accelerated too much. 
Japan’s population was still predominantly rural through 1945 [is this true? Try to 
confirm]. It seems likely that Japan’s cultural core in rural areas, Yanagita’s key concern, 
remained essentially “Japanese.” My data here does not concern what happened in the 
urban areas, so I cannot judge that. So it seems that on this level again, “modernization” 
prevailed, though it was not intentional. 
 Concerning domestic market worldviews and translative adaptation, in 
Yanagita’s vision for economic development, the core of Japan’s culture would definitely 
have been respected and likely protected, assuming that Japan could have developed 
effectively under this vision, enough to compete successfully in the global market. 
Economic success would buy the right to more cultural autonomy. But the government 
did not have this vision, and did not follow this scheme. Under the government’s existing 
scheme, a pattern of massive industrialization and militarization was followed in the pre-
                                                
1422 I also had no data on Hirohito’s views of the rural and urban economies. 
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1945 period. Even so, the core of Japan’s rural culture was not destroyed before 1945, but 
this was not because of public intentionality.   
 Also regarding translative adaptation, Yanagita’s vision for the rural and urban 
economy was not shared or followed by the Japanese government. In this period, their 
main concern was dealing effectively with the numerous international challenges and 
wars that Japan faced, through good and bad economic times. The heavy emphasis of the 
government in the 1930s and early 1940s was on militarization and maintaining domestic 
political stability. Their concern was not Japan’s internal cultural preservation, though 
domestic order was. But the social, indigenous glue that held rural Japan together was 
centuries old. Through 1945, it basically held. But again, on the urban scene, I cannot 
judge. After the war, with the nearly total destruction of cities, and rapid migration to 
urban areas, there was great change in both rural and urban areas.1423 So translative 
adaptation, at least in rural areas, seemed to hold through 1945, though it was not the 
government’s intentional policy. 
 Technology Issues. Assessing these domestic market worldviews through 
Glick’s concept of technology, Yanagita had a very holistic view of economics, and 
concerned about how they affected peoples’ daily lives and work. Hirohito had no 
concern for how the economy affects peoples’ daily lives and work. Here, Yanagita’s 
views fit Glick’s concept well, but Hirohito’s do not. Concerning technonationalism as 
ideology and the domestic market worldviews (1895 to 1945), Yanagita was not opposed 
to the idea that Japan needed to be wealthy to protect its security, but this is not his main 
concern. Rather, he would argue that Japan must be aware of, and protect, its own 
                                                
1423 However, investigating this is beyond the scope of the present research. 
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identity, or it will lose its heart, its culture. The real danger was that as Japan became 
rich, this might happen. Hirohito would also, in theory, support this concept, but he 
expressed no interest or awareness of this idea. Neither Yanagita nor Hirohito is a good 
exponent of technonationalism as ideology. On Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, 
Yanagita’s views were already explored under the worldviews of the domestic state. 
Yanagita did value government intervention in the economy, but not very much in favor 
of heavy industry, more in support of rural and agricultural industries. He desired some 
industrial input in urban areas, but insisted it be balanced with regional and rural efforts. 
To a limited degree, Yanagita supported Murakami’s concept of industrial policy. 
Hirohito had no concern for this.  
 Cognition Issues.1424 Image. Yanagita’s and Hirohito’s images on the domestic 
market fall into about four main categories, images on: 1) the economy, economics, and 
the Japanese economy, 2) economic development, 3) industry and industrialization, and 
4) the rural and urban economies. On the general economy, Hirohito’s likely images 
imply that it is good to be concerned about economics, to encourage international and 
domestic peace and stability.1425 Yanagita’s images condemn almost all aspects of the 
government’s current economic policies for Japan, including its plans to encourage a 
strong emphasis on heavy industry, trade, and concentration of capital, to develop Japan 
on mostly Western lines, and its strong promotion of protectionism and urban growth. To 
Yanagita, all of these damage the rural heart of Japan’s culture. Behind all of his images 
                                                
1424 Remember that on cognitive issues of Japan’s domestic market, almost all of the views I study are 
Yanagita’s.  
1425 See my comment on this point above at the end of my discussion of Hirohito’s worldview of Japan’s 
domestic market, based on Bix, Hirohito, 130-131. 
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on economics is the conviction that economics strongly affects culture, and that the 
cultural effects of the government’s current economic plans are negative. In his images of 
several economic sectors, Yanagita urges a balance and lessening of tension among them, 
with human-scale agriculture and industry of primary importance. His images of labor 
and labor unions are highly positive. Yanagita’s imagery portrays government policies as 
the source for many potential problems in Japan’s economy. To improve the economy, 
both greater sensitivity to Japan’s cultural realities and broader distribution of capital and 
industries throughout Japan are needed.1426  
 On economic development, Yanagita’s images focus on issues of culture, scale 
and distribution. Development will be good if it is based on Japan’s own culture, and 
follows models appropriate to it. Western models are not. Economic development should 
be of a smaller scale, suitable for the rural heartland of Japan’s culture, and it should be 
broadly distributed, not overly centralized. Yanagita’s images of Japanese development 
stress domestic development before external activities, and following paths suitable to 
Japan’s own conditions. His images of Western development find it inappropriate for 
Japan.  
 A large group of images concern industry and industrialization. In his basic 
images of industrialization, while Yanagita calls heavy industries beneficial for Japan’s 
trade, most of the images are negative. He finds that heavy industrialization for several 
wars has damaged Japan’s agriculture. Over-reliance on or over-concentration of heavy 
industry is bad for Japan’s economy. Rather, Yanagita prefers industrialization of a much 
                                                
1426 Looking back, we can see the wisdom of many of Yanagita’s insights. Over-concentration of industries 
and population has long been recognized as a major problem in postwar Japan. The government has 
attempted to encourage broader regional development for the last few decades. 
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more human scale. Development of a broad range of regional industries is good, and it is 
good for the government to place more emphasis on balanced, smaller scale rural 
development. Industrial policies should improve people’s daily lives. 
 The final group of images covers the rural and industrial economies and their 
relationship. These images reveal Yanagita’s concern over increasing gaps between rural 
and urban Japan, and over government policies for urban growth he finds inappropriate 
for rural areas. In his images of farming, Yanagita’s concern for human scale again 
emerges, as it does in his interest in improving the conditions for rural labor. Yanagita’s 
foundational concern for maintaining and restoring Japan’s commonality underlies many 
of these images.      
 How did these images possibly function as perceptual filters or organizing 
devices for Yanagita? Yanagita disliked many current Japanese government economic 
policies, felt that economic development must fit Japan’s conditions, and that Western 
economic schemes did not. In his images, he also shows a general dislike for heavy 
industry and feels it is often too over-concentrated and large scale for Japan. He also was 
concerned about economic policies more oriented for urban needs than for rural ones. 
Possibly these biases may have blinded Yanagita to the good that government economic 
policies did, to the possible benefits of Western development models, of large scale 
development, or of heavy industry. He also may have been lacking awareness concerning 
urban economic conditions and needs. 
 Worldview. The nature of the world revealed in these worldviews (mostly 
Yanagita’s) stresses the need for balance, between culture and the economy, rural and 
urban regions, various sectors, and so forth. Development at the expense of a country’s 
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culture, people, ways of life would not work. Balanced, human scale economic 
development was needed for economic success. To be effective, farming must be done at 
a scale appropriate for farmers. Regarding the world’s order, Hirohito believed that 
economics was vital for peace and order in the world. In Yanagita’s view, the Western 
economies were encroaching on Japan and other developing economies. Regarding 
Japan’s economy, Yanagita saw the Japanese government’s economic policies as 
negative and causing many problems. The heavy policy emphasis on industrialization, 
trade, over-concentration of heavy industry1427 and urban growth, excessive 
protectionism and capitalism would all damage Japan’s agriculture. Developing Japan on 
Western lines was negative as well.  Yanagita was concerned about the cultural effects of 
the government’s economic plans. Development with appropriate balance among Japan’s 
various sectors was needed. To improve the economy, greater sensitivity to Japan’s 
cultural realities and broader distribution of capital and industries throughout Japan were 
needed. A more human-scale economy, suitable for Japan’s present agriculture and labor 
conditions, was as well. Economic development and growth must enhance Japan’s 
solidarity and communality. Regarding the economies of the West, Yanagita saw the 
West’s development model as not useful for Japan.   
 What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who held 
these worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect their worldviews? 
Yanagita had some exposure to urban areas and the wider world, but much study and 
focus on rural Japan: its society, economy, politics, and ways of life. His long-term 
exposure to rural Japan and his study in college (on agro-politics) influenced these 
                                                
1427 Yet, in Yanagita’s view, heavy industry has potential benefits for trade. 
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perspectives. How did these worldviews and their environmental interactions influence 
these actors’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their 
causes? On perception, Yanagita’s in-depth exposure to rural Japan and its needs caused 
him to focus mostly on the economic needs of rural areas. He believed they were the 
center of Japan’s culture, so it made sense to center his analysis of Japan’s economy 
there. On uses of information, Yanagita made primary use of ethnographic data. He also 
made general observations and reflections about economic phenomena and processes. A 
focus on the local level influenced his conclusions and explains his emphasis on the local, 
rural economy, the main site of his research. Concerning events and their causes, 
Yanagita’s use of ethnography, his study of Western anthropology and its attempts at 
holistic methods, and his emphasis on rural areas as his primary study site(s) all 
influenced his view that culture and the economy were vitally interconnected in rural 
Japan. He saw culture as both fundamentally underlying the economy and affected by it. 
 How may have technological systems affected these worldviews?  To Yanagita, 
Western technologies and cultural products were in the process of invading Japan. 
Western technology brought these cultural products and influences to Japan in the first 
place; in part, that was what had enabled the West to “open” and culturally invade Japan. 
In Yanagita’s mind, Western technology was massive scale and inappropriate for Japan, 
its land, and culture. It must be adjusted and adapted to Japanese conditions.  
 In sum, Yanagita’s views of Japan’s domestic market (1895 to 1945) stress the 
need for balance and appropriate scale in many areas of Japan’s economy and its 
economic development. Though Yanagita had international experience of the wider 
world and traveled abroad for short periods, he chose to focus on rural Japan, what he 
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saw as the heart of Japan’s culture. As his academic training and research emphasized 
rural Japan, so did his views of economics.  In Yanagita’s worldview of Japan’s domestic 
market, culture and economy were vitally connected. Technology provided both the 
means for Western culture to enter Japan, and was itself part of the cultural threat Japan 
faced. 
 Cultural Logics. The global phenomena to which these leaders responded 
included Western products, imports, economic and trade theories, heavy industry, 
Japanese government economic, trade and agricultural policies, private sector forces, 
zaibatsu, smaller and medium sized businesses, economic and trade policies of Western 
countries, forces, actors, and items from the urban Japanese economy such as products, 
firms, and local and regional economic policies. What were the leaders’ worldviews/basic 
beliefs about these phenomena? Yanagita believed that these forces were destructive and 
insensitive to the needs of base Japanese society and heartland: rural Japan and its social 
solidarity. Western prods and imports did not fit Japanese culture and society; Japanese 
government trade policies focused on large-scale, heavy industries, the urban economy, 
and producing for export. They ignored Japan’s rural heartland, its needs, and the impacts 
of economic policies on the heart of Japan and its culture. Of course the Western 
technologies and forces gave no thought to or knowledge of Japanese conditions.  
 What are the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global 
phenomena? Modern economics clashes Western culture. It has little consideration of 
scale or humanity. The modern economy places more emphasis on the material, wealth 
and getting money. It ignores Japanese needs, culture and issues of the soul heart, and 
spirit. Of course Western economics clashes with Japanese culture. Sadly, most Japanese 
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economic efforts do too.  What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? 
Yanagita responded with intense study, writing, research of local and rural Japanese 
conditions, and various ideas and proposals about how to solve the problems he saw.  
What were the cultural logics under these responses? Yanagita felt that Japan 
must know its true self. Knowing itself, it must enact wise policies in various areas, 
including economy, to protect itself. If not, its heart and who it truly was would be lost, 
and Japan destroyed, at least in its identity. If we compare the cultural logics of the 
worldviews about the global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under 
the responses to the phenomena, what do we learn? For Yanagita, the former logics 
focused on the problems of modern economics, both Western and Japanese, and how they 
both ignored the heart of cult, especially Japanese culture. The latter logics focused more 
on what Japan must do to protect its culture, and what might happen if it did not. 
Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Society Contexts 
 
 Yanagita Kunio.  In the 1910s, Yanagita Kunio began developing his 
understanding of Japan’s domestic social development.  To reform Japan’s economic, 
agro-political and cultural systems (all intertwined), it was necessary to understand their 
contexts, all of Japanese life and worldviews, more holistically.  Yanagita was concerned 
with increasing gaps in the economic, social and psychological worldviews of urban and 
rural Japan, and the unmitigated penetration and export of urban products and culture into 
rural areas.  These heightened people’s thirst for luxury, without improving their lives.1428  
A new rural consciousness of culture was needed, new standards, self-awareness, and 
                                                
1428 Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 61-63, 68-69, 108, 110-111. 
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renewed identities, to strengthen “regional cultural autonomy.”1429  So Yanagita 
developed his ethnographic approach in the 1920s, stating, “we must endeavor to know 
ourselves.”1430           
 To help Japan endure the rapid changes of modernization, in writings from 1900 
to 1930, Yanagita stresses restoring “communality” to rural areas.  To develop 
successfully, Japan’s values, worldviews and indigenous ways of life must be seriously 
considered.  Japan needs a new communality to help it function in the contemporary 
world,1431 based on the past “traditional” communal spirit of generosity and cooperation, 
the most important, unifying rural feature relevant to successful modernization.1432  The 
rapid social changes hitting Japan required that the people adopt greatly refined 
worldviews.  Customized, local education was important for renewing communality.1433  
Yanagita identifies three different levels of communality: national, family, and village 
levels.  Confusion over national identity clouds modernization.  The breakdown in family 
communality threatens connections of family, land and nation, including the spiritual 
thread behind family unity. The Meiji rise of nuclear families threatened traditional 
                                                
1429 Yanagita defines culture as everything from everyday life, including “social systems, manners and 
customs, everyday consciousness and life patterns,” and “high culture” (fine arts, academic fields, ethics 
and religion).  On the national level, culture includes all lifestyles with elements new and old, internal and 
external to a nation, during a particular time period (Ibid., 66-67). 
1430 Ibid., 65-66, 74-75. Yanagita was the pioneer of the ethnographic method in Japan, where his approach 
came to be called “Yanagita Ethnography” (Ibid., 108).  For more on his approach to ethnography and how 
it developed, see Kawada, Origin Ethnography, Chapter 5. 
1431 Nevertheless, according to Yanagita, certain “age-old traditions” of rural villages must be preserved 
and other elements of their worldviews acknowledged.  Unless the people understood the foundations of 
their worldviews driving their behaviors and thoughts, they faced social destruction (Ibid., 151).   
1432 Some of examples of this “traditional communality” Yanagita includes are yui, a system of labor 
exchange, and two systems related to spirituality and village leadership, kô and moyai (Ibid., 152). 
1433 Ibid., 141, 145, 151-153, 155-156. Examples of localized education included “local community 
education” for children and youths, preserving local knowledge, common sense, and new “cultural 




village communality.  They isolated their members from extended families and support 
networks, leaving them lonely, suicidal, and often poor.1434  Problems with traditional 
communality included the “closed nature” of rural society, its class-based social 
structure, and pressures for social conformity.1435  Problems in renewing communality in 
rural and urban Japan included morality.1436  The government’s national education 
campaign weakened the spontaneous evolution of popular language and worldviews in 
villages, threatening communality.1437  “Traditional” values were destroyed by 
bureaucratic rationalization and modern capitalism.  Only ethnography could uncover the 
indigenous “glue” of values to strengthen Japan in the modern world.1438     
 Using ethnography, Yanagita studied Japanese folk religion.1439  He argues that 
there is a common faith for each people and nation, and in Japan throughout history.  This 
ujigami tradition, connected to Japanese “blood,” helps give Japan its identity.1440  
Ujigami, present throughout Japan, are the spirits protecting a locality, above the kami 
(ancestors or deities) protecting one’s family.  How ujigami are worshipped varies; most 
Japanese feel a deep affection for them.  Yanagita believed they could provide a 
foundation for national spiritual unity and modernization.1441  Rather than constructing a 
national, hierarchical pattern of worship for Japan’s “family-state,” or a national “mish-
                                                
1434 Ibid., 141-143, 145-146. 
1435 Ibid., 153. 
1436 Ibid., 159-162. Yanagita was optimistic that ethnography could help to resolve the moral crisis 
affecting Japan’s urban and rural areas, through identifying the spiritual elements that sustained “Japanese 
morality” “from the inside” (Ibid., 162). 
1437 Ibid., 157-158. 
1438 Ibid. 
1439 The primary periods of Yanagita’s work on folk religion were 1905 to the 1910s and the late 1920s to 
the early 1930s.  Kawada Minoru investigates the importance of this research within Yanagita’s overall 
scholarship (Ibid., 43). 
1440 Ibid., 43-44. 
1441 The ujigami system was community-centered, and included a strong emphasis on cooperation (Ibid., 
56-57).   
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mash” of customs, Yanagita supported a national, horizontal network of ujigami 
awareness, to respect the spontaneous, heartfelt practices of each region.1442  He also 
argues that the imperial family and its worship of the sun goddess Amaterasu Ômikami 
are at the center of ujigami worship, but he opposed the system of State Shinto 
established by the government from the Meiji period through 1945.1443  Only ujigami 
worship could play a crucial role in guarding the nation’s social morals, as opposed to 
other religious or philosophical systems present in Japan.1444  From 1914, Yanagita 
promoted kyôdo kenkyû (local community studies), to better understand ujigami worship.  
He believed that traditional belief in the kakureyo (the unseen spiritual world of the kami) 
influenced and constrained human behavior in the utsushiyo (the physical world of living 
humans).  Under modernization, without state support, ujigami worship could disappear 
as the nation’s best anchor of communality.1445   
 Hirohito, Emperor.  The Meiji state developed a new spiritual ideology to unify 
the nation under the emperor, drawing on ancient Shinto, arguing that the Japanese are 
descended from the gods.  Under State Shinto, a national hierarchy of Shinto shrines was 
                                                
1442 Ibid., 45-46, 49. 
1443 Ibid., 46-52. Yanagita views the imperial family as the nation’s spiritual symbol, not a “source” of 
political power.  His views differ from the Japanese government’s from the Meiji period onward.  It sought 
to develop a new national faith for Japan, State Shinto, to spiritually unify all citizens for modernization.  
Under State Shinto, the emperor was the supreme symbol of national unity.  Shinto shrines across the 
nation were forced under state control and rankings.  Yanagita condemned State Shinto as “fabricated,” 
disconnected with the “people’s faith” of ujigami worship.  It showed no concern for preserving ujigami, 
crucial for uniting the nation during rapid social change, and could destroy all Japanese cultural traditions 
(Ibid., 46-52). 
1444 Among the problems with others systems were Confucianism’s stress on hierarchical relationships, 
Buddhism’s focus on individual level spirituality, and the neglect of the Imperial Rescript on Education 
(1889) to consider the people’s love of village or region (Ibid., 56-57).  
1445 Ibid., 52-59. Yanagita worried about the increasing alienation and materialism caused by the rapid rise 
of urbanization and capitalism in Japan from the Meiji period onward, threatening to destroy the indigenous 
and cultural values of ujigami worship.  But he fails to prove whether rural villages were still the 
foundation of Japanese life, and if ujigami worship could also function as a spiritual anchor for urban areas, 
in a time of great urban growth and social change (Ibid., 57-60).   
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established.  All families in Japan had to join a shrine.  The Imperial Rescript on 
Education (1890) taught generations of Japanese about their supreme duty to the state and 
the emperor, the source of all morality.  By about 1910, the Rescript instilled intense 
paternalism, with all Japanese seen as descended from the imperial family, in the 
“family-state” of Japan.1446  Hirohito was affected by this ideology.  As emperor, he was 
Japan’s highest religious authority, and one of its top military, educational and political 
leaders.1447  He faithfully performed complex Shinto rituals, accepting the notions of 
State Shinto.1448  Hirohito’s early education included several paradoxes.  He was trained 
in the national myths and versions of Japanese history and supporting State Shinto, 
expected to honor Confucian ideals of benevolent rule, and the samurai bushido code of 
honor.  He was also exposed to the worldview of modern science.  Bix argues that the 
conflict between these worldviews formed an important basis for all of Hirohito’s 
actions.1449  
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on Domestic Society (1895-1945) 
 
 As with the domestic market, most of my data here concern the worldviews of 
Yanagita, not Hirohito. Their views fall into about three main categories: views of social 
development, of rural and urban social development, and of spirituality, religion and the 
state. For effective social development, in Yanagita, there is a great concern for 
understanding the various elements of society and social change, such as the economy, 
politics, agriculture, and culture, in a holistic manner, contextually, since he sees all parts 
                                                
1446 Bix, Hirohito, 30-32. 
1447 According to Bix, this multiple identity complicates the study of Hirohito (Ibid., 16, 31). 
1448 Ibid. During World War II, Hirohito performed his required religious ceremonies with zealousness, 
since routine and fixed order suited his personality, and provided relief for his frustrations (Ibid., 442-443). 
1449 Ibid., 49, 59. For details on Hirohito’s training in science, see my discussion on his views of science in 
the section on technology development. 
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of life as interconnected. He also stresses worldview’s crucial role in social development, 
that Japan’s indigenous worldviews, values and ways of life must be considered. To 
handle rapid social change, Japanese must adopt greatly refined worldviews. These views 
together suggest the need for worldview flexibility coupled with durability. In addition to 
the threats posed by Western culture and technology, Yanagita is concerned about 
increasing gaps in the economic, social and psychological worldviews of rural and urban 
Japan, and the cultural effects of the government’s national education campaign, which 
he sees as stifling the spontaneous development of popular culture, language and 
worldviews in rural villages, thus threatening communality, the heart of Japanese culture. 
To Yanagita, culture has a key role in social and economic development. He believes the 
core of Japanese culture is found in rural areas, so these areas need a new critical cultural 
consciousness of standards, identity, and awareness, to protect each region’s “cultural 
autonomy.” Yanagita’s view of culture is holistic and comprehensive, integrating daily 
life and the arts on the local, national, and international levels.1450  
Another major theme in Yanagita’s thought on social development is the need to 
protect Japanese social identity during the economic development process, for which he 
stresses renewing “communality” across Japan, starting with rural areas. Threats to 
communality included the rise of the urban nuclear family and the destruction of 
“traditional” values by increasing bureaucratization and capitalism, thus threatening 
family and village communalities, their extended social support networks, rural and urban 
morality, social, spiritual and national unity, development itself, and Japan’s capacity to 
function in the modern world. To protect its communality, Yanagita argues that it must be 
                                                
1450 See earlier in this chapter where I discuss Yanagita’s conceptions of culture. 
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renewed through ethnographic research (so the Japanese become aware of their true 
identities and values), customized, local education, “traditional” spirits of generosity and 
cooperation (common in rural areas), and invigorated ujigami worship. To Yanagita, the 
renewal and strengthening of local, indigenous forms of education, social cooperation, 
communality, and spirituality were particularly key in assuring Japan’s cultural survival 
during development.  
 On rural and urban social development, Yanagita is concerned about the 
corruption of rural values through the increasing materialism and uncritical import of 
urban products and culture into rural regions across Japan. Shoring up rural communality, 
cooperation, critical judgment and consensus regarding rural cultural standards is needed. 
Yanagita also cares about rural-urban social relations, including increasing gaps in basic 
outlook, the squelching of rural culture by new products, and the collapse of morality.   
 Regarding religion, spirituality, and social development, Yanagita believes that 
each country or people have had a common faith; Japan has had one throughout its 
history. He views the breakdown in communality as threatening the spiritual unity of 
families, which in turn threatens unity at every level across the country. In his general 
view of spirituality, there is a strong stress on the local. Ujigami are worshipped and 
loved on the local level, and Yanagita studied them on the local, community level. 
Another theme is the issue of how the spiritual world intersects with the material one. We 
noted above how Yanagita accepted the notion that the unseen spiritual world affects the 
seen, physical world on earth. His view that the collapse of communality threatens both 
spiritual and national unity reflects this viewpoint. So a breakdown in spirituality and 
communality may also threaten social development. How spirituality intersects with 
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physical reality also played out in Hirohito’s worldviews. The conflict between his 
spiritual training in State Shinto, Confucian ethics and bushido-type values and his 
training in scientific rationality and observation influenced many of his actions. We will 
explore this more shortly.      
 Concerning spirituality, the state, and the Japanese nation, Yanagita sees 
ujigami worship as connected to Japanese “blood,” something that gives Japanese their 
basic identity. He believed that effective ujigami worship could provide a basis for 
national spiritual unity and development, but he opposed the strict, standardizing effect of 
hierarchical State Shinto upon spontaneous, heart-felt ujigami worship, which varied 
slightly in different locales. Rather he preferred regional, localized forms of worship, 
connected in a loose, horizontal, national network. Because he believed that ujigami 
worship played an essential role in protecting social morality, he saw it as the most 
essential part of guarding Japan’s communality. So he was willing to allow state 
involvement in protecting ujigami, though he generally opposed State Shinto. In contrast, 
Hirohito supported the basic ideals of State Shinto, that all Japanese were descended from 
the gods, and that both the people’s and his supreme duty was to the state and to 
maintaining the throne. While Yanagita accepted some Shinto-esque notions, that the 
imperial family and Amaterasu Ômikami were the center of ujigami worship, he did not 
to the degree Hirohito did. Hirohito believed that he had a great duty to perform sacred 
rituals for the imperial ancestors and for the country, and he did so zealously, especially 






Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Domestic Society Worldviews (1895-1945) 
 
 Development Issues. On “modernization,” the key question here is: from 1895-
1945, as Japan was absorbed more and more into the world economy, and interacted with 
it, from the evidence in the domestic society worldviews here, what happened to Japan’s 
domestic society and to Japan’s “core” culture? Did the “core” become more “Western,” 
or did it stay basically “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On views of social development, 
Yanagita saw the need to understand Japanese society, indigenous culture and 
worldviews holistically (the need for Japanese to understand themselves), plus the need 
for worldview flexibility and durability. Yanagita was concerned about threats of 
increasing cultural standardization brought by Western culture and technology, urban-
rural gaps and the national education system. To him, culture had a key role in social and 
economic development; its core was found in rural areas. To protect Japan, critical 
awareness and standards for rural culture were needed. Yanagita also recognized the need 
to protect Japanese communality however possible. In his view, attacks on communality 
were occurring through increasing urbanization, bureaucratic complexities, changes in 
family structures, and politics. Yanagita desired to protect it through localized, accurate 
knowledge of the Japanese self/identity, indigenous social values and spirituality. These 
very wise insights by Yanagita, widely known in Japan today, were not applied until the 
postwar period, for the most part. It does not seem that these wise insights had any impact 
on policies in the prewar period. Rather, the state attempted spiritual mobilization and 
motivation for the citizens during World War II through ideologies connected with 
Japanese nationalism and State Shinto. These were standardizing forces with which even 
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Christians were forced to comply.1451 They were not respectful of local differences as 
Yanagita’s insights were. “Modernization” was not respected in these worldviews; 
indigenous rural spirituality was negatively affected.   
 In his views of rural and urban social development, Yanagita was concerned 
about increasing rural-urban gaps and the destruction of rural culture through increasing 
materialism and penetration of urban, Western products into rural areas. He believed that 
strengthening traditional Japanese values of communality and new critical standards for 
cultural awareness would help protect the rural heart of Japanese culture. Surely 
Yanagita’s observations on rural social change processes here transpired. The prewar 
Japanese government did not really apply any of these insights to protecting Japan’s 
“indigenous” cult before the war’s end, but only in the postwar period. 
 Regarding views of religion, spirituality and social development, Yanagita 
believed that all Japanese have a common spiritual faith. Japan’s national and spiritual 
unity and communality are based in that. This faith was first experienced, and must be 
renewed, on the local level. He believed that the spiritual world influences the physical 
one; a breakdown in spirituality and communality may harm social development. In 
Hirohito’s worldviews, there was seemingly a conflict between his spiritual values (of 
State Shinto, Japanese nationalism and emperor ideology) and of scientific observation 
and rationality. Did these actually conflict? If so, how? They especially conflicted in his 
policy decisions during World War II. While he was most often a highly shrewd, rational 
political actor in daily decisions, details and interactions, when it came to his decisions on 
                                                
1451 I say “even Christians” since Christians were a very tiny percentage of Japan’s total population during 
World War II. That even Christians were expected to comply indicates the wide reach that State Shinto and 
similar nationalistic propaganda had on Japanese society. 
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really major issues, such as whether to go to war with the United States and Britain, or 
how soon to declare Japan’s surrender, Hirohito’s spirituality and devotion to religious 
ritual seem to have clouded his rational capacity and judgment. He made several unwise 
decisions that cost many thousands of lives. In Hirohito’s case, spirituality definitely 
influenced the physical world reality of his policy decisions and actions.  
 In Yanagita’s case, the implementation of his insights would have, in theory, 
protected or enhanced local spirituality, but it was not applied in the pre-1945 period by 
the state. If so, would this strengthening of Japanese spirituality also have inoculated 
Japanese culture against excessive Western influences? Likely it would not have. The 
notion that the spiritual world has connections with and influences the physical one is 
very interesting, and a very common notion in the worldviews of many non-Western 
peoples throughout the world.1452 Regarding Hirohito’s worldviews, it does seem that his 
spirituality somewhat clouded his policy judgments, especially on really major issues.1453 
His embrace of State Shinto, and the standardizing effect it likely had on Shinto worship 
across Japan was likely great.1454 As a result of their views, in Yanagita’s case, it seems 
that on this issue, before 1945 his views had very little impact on the protection of 
Japan’s core culture. In Hirohito’s case, his embrace of State Shinto likely had a 
standardizing effect on Shinto worship across Japan, but it is hard to say exactly how 
                                                
1452 Note the arguments of anthropologists Charles Kraft and Paul Hiebert that are cited in Chapter 1. 
1453 Perhaps another case of this is Tsar Nicholas II, his wife the Empress Alexandra of Russia, and their 
interactions with the monk Rasputin. See Robert K. Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra (New York: 
Atheneum, 1967). 
1454 More concrete study of this issue would be needed to confirm the exact effects of State Shinto on local 
worship practices in Japan from the 1930s to 1945. 
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much. Despite the devastation of World War II, I wish to argue that the core of rural 
Japanese culture and society survived basically intact.1455  
 On their views of spirituality, the state and the Japanese nation, Yanagita 
stressed the central role of local, ujigami worship in Japanese identity, communality, and 
national unity. The standardizing effect of State Shinto destroyed this. Yanagita was 
willing to allow some state involvement in religion, though, to protect ujigami worship, 
what he saw as the heart of Japanese culture. Hirohito accepted the basic notions of State 
Shinto more than Yanagita did. As noted in just above, Yanagita’s views had little or no 
impact before World War II, perhaps they did after (on Japanese cultural preservation). 
Hirohito survived the war. I cannot judge the impact of his support of State Shinto on 
Japanese culture in rural areas (protecting it from Western influence). But on a basic 
level, the whole State Shinto system, including emperor ideology, proved disastrous for 
Japan in how it encouraged the Japanese to devote themselves to destructive actions in 
the war that finally nearly destroyed the nation, at least physically. But this was not the 
result of Shinto itself, but rather of its nationalistic perversion as State Shinto. Japan’s 
defeat subjected it to an unprecedented onslaught of American cultural and political 
influence after the war. At this level, ironically Hirohito’s embrace of State Shinto 
indirectly contributed to the postwar deluge of Western and American cultural influences 
into Japan in the postwar period. In this sense, Hirohito’s support of State Shinto had 
huge political and cultural impacts on Japan, especially after the war. Yet it does not 
seem that the core of Japanese culture or spirituality was destroyed before the war. 
                                                
1455 I cannot say anything about urban issues, since they are beyond this present data. 
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 On translative adaptation, in the evidence in the domestic society worldviews 
seen here, as Japan attempted to adapt to the global market, in spite of its importation of 
Western social and cultural items, did the “core” of its domestic society and culture stay 
mostly “non-Western” and “Japanese?” On views of social development, despite 
Yanagita’s wise conclusions, I have seen no evidence that Japanese policy makers 
intentionally heeded his sage advice. Nevertheless, it seems that in the pre-1945 period, 
rural Japanese culture (its core) remained durable, despite the huge changes brought 
during the war, and the damage in urban areas.1456  
 On rural and urban social development, Yanagita expressed wise concerns about 
increasing gaps between rural and urban areas and the destruction of rural culture. There 
is no evidence that his concerns were listened to in the prewar era. Yet it again appears 
that the core elements of rural Japanese culture, especially values, continued, though 
likely somewhat altered.  
 Concerning translative adaptation and these leaders’ views of religion, 
spirituality and soc development, again, I do not believe that Yanagita’s very wise 
conclusions had significant impacts on policies in Japan before 1945. Hirohito had 
gigantic impacts. Changes surely did result in rural Japan’s spirituality through the 
creation of State Shinto and its elaborate hierarchy of Shinto shrines—perhaps there was 
a standardizing and squelching of heart-felt regional worship, as Yanagita had feared. 
And the impacts on Japan at large because of Hirohito’s delay in ending the war were 
even larger. Did essential values continue, though? In rural Japan I wish to say yes. 
Though I am not sure for urban Japan, I postulate that changes were even greater there. 
                                                
1456 Again, I cannot comment on what happened in urban areas. 
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So translative adaptation seems basically valid in rural Japan on the issue of spirituality 
and society development. 
 On translative adaptation and leaders’ views of spirituality, the state and the 
Japanese nation, the state did not intervene as Yanagita wished in order to protect ujigami 
worship. But it did create various patriotic and neighborhood associations across Japan to 
mobilize all Japanese into sacrifice and hard work on behalf of the war effort. The 
ideologies that Hirohito supported (of nationalism, emperor worship, and State Shinto) 
were part of this mobilization. Despite the massive invasion of American presence into 
Japan that the failure of these ideologies permitted, Japanese culture’s “core” stayed 
durable, certainly through 1945. The process of translative adaptation seems affirmed 
here. 
 
 Technology Issues. If we view these leaders’ domestic society worldviews 
through Glick’s concept of technology, Yanagita’s basic view of culture and society is 
very holistic, multi-level, and includes concern for the effect of larger events on daily life 
and work. His view of social and economic development also manifests this; the idea that 
without careful judgment and standards, the very processes connected with development 
and commodities pouring into rural Japan will destroy its identity and soul (the global 
destroying the local). Yanagita fits Glick’s concept of technology very well here. 
Hirohito shows no concern for this, other than that both he and the Japanese people 
should faithfully worship and follow the dictates of Japan’s (imperial) ancestors, the 
kami, and State Shinto ideology and practices. If either they or he did not, in theory the 
nation would not be protected and blessed. 
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 In his views of domestic society, Yanagita supports the ideas of 
technonationalism as ideology, but only indirectly. Through his holistic concept of 
culture, where society and economy are closely connected, we see the view that if the 
nation wisely protects its communality, the unity and spiritual center of indigenous 
worship, the anchor of its identity, it will also be blessed economically, as a by-product. 
Hirohito is an even less a direct proponent of technonationalism as ideology. Similarly, 
he also seems to express the conviction that if both he and the Japanese people are 
faithful in their moral and ritual duties (i.e. faithful worship of the nation’s ancestors and 
the kami through State Shinto worship), then the nation will be protected and blessed 
economically and militarily. Although both Hirohito and many Japanese faithfully 
worshipped as they were taught, in World War II, this view proved false.  
 Cognition Issues. Image. Images on Japan’s domestic society (1895 to 1945) 
cover those on 1) society, culture, social change and development; 2) rural and urban 
societies; and 3) religion and spirituality. Most of these images are Yanagita’s; only a few 
are from Hirohito. Yanagita’s images of culture portray it as holistic. In his images of 
Japanese society and its problems, a lack of self-knowledge and the breakdown of 
indigenous Japanese communality, partly driven by national, standardizing forces of 
bureaucracy, education, and similar phenomena, threaten Japanese society and culture. 
Yanagita’s images of how to protect Japanese culture stress the issues of how to guard 
communality, and increase cultural awareness. On social change and development, 
Yanagita stresses worldview issues. Increasing worldview gaps between rural and urban 
Japan threaten society. Without increased, balanced flexibility in their worldviews and 
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consideration of indigenous factors, Japanese cannot develop their nation 
successfully.1457 
 Concerning Yanagita’s images of rural and urban societies,1458 those on rural 
social development emphasize the danger of increasing materialism, and Western and 
urban cultures destroying Japan’s indigenous, rural culture. Images on social solidarity 
and communality stress the challenges of renewing communality. One of the challenges 
is morality. Another is the multiple levels on which communality increasingly occurs, 
including family, village/local, and national levels.  
 There are many images on religion and spirituality. Yanagita’s images on 
religion and spirituality in general stress local spirits (ujigami or kami) protecting local 
areas or families. Though styles of worship vary across regions, Yanagita sees the 
imperial family and the sun goddess as their foundation. If family and other levels of 
communality are nurtured and renewed, the communality of the whole nation will be 
also. The spiritual world affects the physically visible world. Regarding spirituality and 
the nation, Yanagita’s images stress the common bonds of faith, blood, descent and 
history that all Japanese possess through ujigami worship and the imperial family. 
Hirohito’s images also stress the imperial family as the foundation of the people’s lineage 
and identity, and the importance of Shinto rituals for the life of the nation. In his images 
on State Shinto, Yanagita opposes its imposition of a strict hierarchy on the nation’s 
localized patterns of worship, though he personally does not disagree with many of State 
Shinto’s doctrines. Yanagita’s images of rural and local spirituality stress the localized, 
                                                
1457 Yanagita would define successful development as that which both encourages economic growth and 
respect for Japan’s indigenous culture and identity. 
1458 All of these images are Yanagita’s. 
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regional nature of Japanese (ujigami) spirituality, the necessity to understand it on the 
local level, and how ujigami worship can provide a basis for renewing national 
communality, which in turn can renew the whole nation’s social development.     
 How did these images possibly function as perceptual filters or organizing 
devices? While the images on society of Yanagita show that he was an astute, brilliant 
observer, there are various potential weaknesses in his findings. His bias toward rural 
society shows he had a potential ignorance of both urban and international issues, needs, 
and realities. He also ignores potential positive contributions from Western culture that 
may strengthen Japan: improvements in education, technology, health, and human rights, 
among other areas. In his views of religion and spirituality, Yanagita fails to recognize 
the values of Japanese nationalism, of uniting the nation for more effective defense, trade, 
and survival in the modern world. He has not fully proven that the “heart” of Japanese 
culture is indeed in rural Japan. Though he accurately describes rural worship and 
spirituality, and criticizes negative aspects of State Shinto, he fails to offer practical 
alternatives to counter its influence. Regarding Hirohito’s images and potential blind 
spots, they are many. He failed to recognize that State Shinto and his embrace of it failed 
the nation. The distorted views that resulted helped contribute to Japan’s near destruction. 
Hirohito also failed to see his own personal responsibility in this and, according to Bix, 
seemed more interested in his and the throne’s survival after the war (Bix 2000). This 
perpetuated his lack of accountability, and perhaps the nation’s. 
 Worldview. The main views about the nature of the world that emerges from the 
worldviews constructed from the above images about domestic society, especially from 
Yanagita, are that human life and culture are holistic, and that we need to understand the 
527 
 
world, including society and spirituality, on the local level as well. Regarding how the 
world functions, to handle social change, flexibility to change and awareness of one’s 
own self (culture, worldviews) are needed. On the world’s order, Yanagita saw 
worldview issues as an important part of social change and development. Regarding 
Japan, Yanagita believed that standardizing forces, such as bureaucratization and national 
education, were destroying Japanese culture and societal features like social solidarity 
and communality. The lack of self-knowledge of the Japanese threatened their culture. 
New awareness and cultural standards could help protect Japanese culture and 
communality. Yanagita believed that flexible but durable worldviews were necessary for 
Japan to successfully adjust to rapid social change. Increasing worldview gaps between 
rural and urban Japan, materialism and Western and urban cultures were destroying 
Japan’s indigenous, rural culture and threatening society. Yanagita saw Japan’s 
communality occurring on multiple levels, including the local; local spirits protect areas 
and families in Japan. To both Yanagita and Hirohito, a foundation for all Japanese was 
their spirituality and the imperial family. Yanagita believed it was bad to standardize 
much of Japanese worship into standardized forms (State Shinto), as that destroyed 
Japanese spirituality and culture, but renewing local indigenous worship could help 
renew national communality and social development. Regarding the West, both Yanagita 
and Hirohito believed that Western culture was ill-suited for Japan, especially its 
traditional culture. 
 What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who hold 
these worldviews, and how did the environments interacted with or affected these 
leaders’ worldviews? Immersion in rural Japanese society through research and 
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university studies greatly affected Yanagita. Although he had exposure to urban Japanese 
and international environments as well, the rural focus affected Yanagita’s findings, 
images and worldviews on domestic society. Hirohito was immersed in elite, imperial, 
state, and militarist subcultures. These biased him toward elite responses, and he seems to 
have had almost zero comprehension of local Japanese culture.1459  
 How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions 
influence the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understandings of events and 
their causes? On perception, Yanagita’s immersion in rural areas strongly affected his 
findings and conclusions. Hirohito’s isolation and exposure to nationalist ideologies 
greatly shaped his views and beliefs. Concerning uses of information, Yanagita relied on 
ethnographic research, local observations, personal study, and new theories of 
ethnographic research from leading scholars in the West. Hirohito relied on his own 
education, isolated upbringing, advice from court officials and other leading aristocrats in 
Japan. He had no exposure to local Japanese and their lives. Regarding events and their 
causes, Yanagita had a holistic view of Japanese society and life. He saw nothing seen in 
isolation, but assumed that all Japanese social life flowed out of what he determined to be 
“indigenous”—the heartfelt worship and communality in rural areas. Hirohito accepted 
all his training and ideological notions of emperor and imperial ideologies, nationalistic 
ideologies, and State Shinto. 
 How have technological systems affected these worldviews?  If so, which 
aspects? The main effect of technology on Yanagita’s worldviews of society was his 
                                                
1459 The same basic environmental effects on Hirohito’s domestic society worldviews were also noted 
earlier under my findings for the environmental effects on his domestic state and market worldviews.  
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concern over whether the flood of Western products and culture into rural Japan would 
destroy rural culture. Hirohito’s chief concern was that the technological power and 
military successes of Japan in various wars, including World War II at certain points, 
seemed to confirm to conservative Japanese and others, including himself, the rightness 
of their worldview and system. This also reinforced his belief in Shinto and nationalist 
ideologies through the war’s end.  
 In comparing the domestic society worldviews of these two leaders, I am struck 
by Yanagita’s in-depth observations of rural society, and Hirohito’s few observations and 
images of society, due to his lack of exposure to it. The two leaders are similar in a few 
of their convictions of spirituality (on imperial origins and the descent of the nation). 
Yanagita supports spontaneous rural worship; Hirohito supports State Shinto as the true 
practice of the land. 
 Cultural Logics. The global phenomena behind domestic society worldviews to 
which these leaders responded included Western theories about society and culture, ideas 
from politics and economics that affected society, evolutionistic thought, thought about 
social institutions, health and education, overseas wars in Asia and elsewhere and their 
effects on Japanese society, new ideas about social change, morality, workers’ and 
human rights, freedom, democracy and how those affected Japanese society, Western 
cultural and social influences on literature, music and the arts, new media influences 
(radio, broader circulation of newspapers), and technological innovations (i.e. telephones 
and increased mobility through the spread of railroads). As Japanese society turned more 
inward in the 1930s and 1940, several domestic features became increasingly influential 
on Japanese society, including State Shinto, nationalistic and militaristic ideologies. 
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 What were the leaders’ worldviews/basic beliefs about these phenomena?  
While Yanagita felt that Western culture in general was incompatible with Japanese 
culture and society, and was somewhat wary of Western culture and science, he accepted 
that some Western theories about society might be used to protect Japanese culture from 
the onslaught of Western influences, his first concern, and give voice to the Japanese 
people. In Yanagita’s mind, the people were wise; they had more common sense than 
foolish, selfish leaders. The people should be heard, not crushed.1460 He also believed that 
the heart of Japanese culture was in the lives and beliefs of people in “traditional,” rural, 
agricultural Japan. Yanagita supported several progressive ideas about democracy, 
workers’ and farmers’ rights. He worried about the influences of elites, the military, 
Western culture and technology, and thought they should be controlled by careful 
judgment, increased awareness and self-knowledge by all Japanese. Hirohito saw 
Western culture as relatively unfamiliar, strange, foreign, and generally not compatible 
with Japanese culture. He believed that the heart of Japan, the deepest part of its identity, 
was found in the Meiji state-manufactured State Shinto. Though I have not read exactly 
what he believed about Japanese society, Hirohito’s actions suggest that he deeply 
honored and valued Japan’s “traditions” as he learned them, and was concerned that they 
be preserved against corrupting Western influences. Some of what Hirohito learned about 
State Shinto was corrupted and a distorted version of Japanese spirituality, as Yanagita 
                                                
1460 This reminds one of Lawrence F. Salmen’s Listen to the People: Participant-Observer Observation of 
Development Projects (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), which stresses the wisdom of learning 




argued. Hirohito was not seem opposed to technology, per se, but did not like democratic 
movements. 
 What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global 
phenomena, and what were the leaders’ responses to the phenomena?  To both Yanagita 
and Hirohito, Western culture was generally not seen as compatible with ideologies of 
State Shinto, the emperor and imperial throne ideologies. What were their responses to 
these phenomena? Yanagita used Western theories about society and culture to study 
Japan and its culture, so it might be protected. He attempted in his writings to inform and 
train other Japanese about who they were (identity) and to get them to incorporate new 
critical standards for judging culture, so they could protect themselves. Hirohito was 
informed about various Western phenomena and ideas, including politics, science, 
economics and culture, though his education was highly oriented toward conservative, 
militaristic and nationalist ideologies. His unique, isolated environment meant that he 
could not respond very flexibly to these issues. His responses were cautious, guarded, and 
ideologically conservative. Though he loved pure scientific investigation, he did not 
concern himself very much with direct Western cultural and social influences, but more 
with Western political issues and threats. 
 What were the cultural logics under these responses? To Yanagita, Western 
culture was basically incompatible with Japanese culture, though it did have some useful 
ideas and methods that were practical and ironically could help Japan strengthen itself 
against the West. To Hirohito, Japan was a divine and unique nation, unlike all others. 
The West did not understand Japan, and never could. The emperor’s sacred, 
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unchangeable duty was to guard, protect and lead the nation, the people and their sacred 
heritage.  
 In comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena 
with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena, it 
emerges that Yanagita’s logics in both cases stress that Western culture was incompatible 
with Japan, though it could provide tools to help protect Japanese culture. The former 
logics stressed the inherent wisdom of the Japanese people more than the latter ones, 
which focused more on the West. Hirohito’s first logics accepted the common Japanese 
view that Western culture is highly different from Japanese culture. He also accepted the 
general, official ideological views of the state; there is no indication he did not. 





 First, I will offer some preliminary reflections from this chapter on the first key 
research question of the dissertation, how Japan’s experiences with technology, 
development and foreign relations from 1850 to 1945 (here, focusing on 1895 to 1945), 
and key leaders’ worldviews of those issues, may have affected its current foreign aid 
policies. General trends will be noted here, while more concrete linkages between ideas 
and experiences in this era and Japan’s current ODA policies will be noted in Chapters 9 
and 10, the concluding chapters. On sociocultural issues (technological development and 
domestic society), both the Japanese military and state played a huge role in Japan’s 
R&D from 1895-1945. There was also a repressive environment toward the end of the 
era. Today, while the government plays a large role in encouraging Japanese R&D, the 
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private sector also has a huge role. In its aid, Japan most certainly does not encourage 
heavy development of military R&D for the growth of LDCs. It also heavily involves the 
private sector. Developing a high quality education system was a top priority for Japan, 
with a proper balance of foreign and imported elements. It should be one of the top 
priorities for successful development. For that, education must be free from ideological or 
propagandistic influences. It was not in Japan before 1945. Related to social change and 
economic development, there are other issues in this period (1895 to 1945) that were 
decisive, including women’s participation in the economy, development’s effects on 
them, media freedoms, social and worldview flexibility/durability, and the need for 
policies to encourage social solidarity through localized approaches to education, social 
cooperation, and morality.1461 Japan’s policies in these areas fell far short. They focused 
on national goals, to the detriment of local identities, and generally ignored women’s 
needs (actually seeking to discourage the participation of most women in the economy 
during World War II). They also limited media freedoms from the 1930s to 1945, and 
sought to impose ultra-conservative worldviews from the top down. Today’s Japanese 
ODA seeks to be increasingly sensitive to these social goals and needs, and to incorporate 
them into its agenda.1462 
 On cultural issues and development, in Japan in this period, there was a varied, 
vibrant response to economic development and international forces, especially seen in 
                                                
1461 Remember that the policies to encourage social solidarity and communality were the recommendation 
of Yanagita Kunio. 
1462 Evidence of this is seen on JICA’s website (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 
www.jica.go.jp/english, accessed September 26, 2008). Several global issues of priority for JICA listed on 
the website, and involving social change and development, include education, health, governance, peace-
building, gender and development, and poverty reduction. But how effectively is consideration of these 
issues actually being incorporated?   
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Japan’s popular culture, and in its intellectual life. The focus of many of Japan’s top 
political leaders at this time, such as Hirohito, was external, not very internal. A balance 
between internal and external focus is needed for successful development. A government 
should initiate policies to protect social solidarity and identity at all levels, not just the 
national, including encouraging critical cultural standards, but not censorship. Japan 
failed in many of these areas; today’s LDCs might learn from its mistakes. A key 
question is: what is Japan’s aid doing now? 
 On religion and development, for effective development, separation of religion 
and state are paramount. The state should not endorse any religion or (indigenous) 
ideology, even for development. In Japan, the state endorsed Shinto, and reformulated it. 
This negatively affected other religious groups, and deceived Japanese into waging a 
disastrous war that nearly destroyed the country. It has continued to sour Japan’s relations 
with nearby countries over controversies such as the Yasukuni Shrine. How can a 
developing nation’s government help religion can to encourage development, even 
indirectly, without coercion or endorsement of one faith over another? 
 A concept that prevailed in Japan at this time, still influential, is that Japanese 
identity, even kinship, is strongly connected to particular forms of religion and 
spirituality. In a sense, a conviction of the strong connections between the spiritual and 
physical worlds seems predominant throughout much of the developing world, unlike in 
the West and its Flaw of the Excluded Middle. For development and aid plans to succeed, 
they need to consider the religion and spirituality factor among others, since it is such an 
important part of a people’s core identity and worldviews.  The strong connection 
between presumed identity and spirituality in so much of the non-Western world may 
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make separation of religion and state a very difficult thing to achieve in policy. Yet if this 
is not respectfully achieved, the state may coercively endorse one religion over another, 
and the nation risks some of the mistakes Japan and other authoritarian societies have 
made on the issue of religion.  
 On domestic political economy issues, in prewar Japanese politics, there was a 
continuing battle between those who supported more liberal, democratic politics, and the 
repressive, oligarchic tendencies of the state. The repressive side won. In Japan, from the 
1920s to 1945, authoritarianism and the military grew too strong, and nearly destroyed 
Japan as a result. Conversely, Japan has prospered much more greatly under a democratic 
type system than was ever imaginable under the repressive system. Ideologically, two key 
leaders we studied in this period (Yanagita and Hirohito) had rather conservative political 
ideologies, though Yanagita preferred more populist, democratic political approaches. In 
several postwar developing countries in East Asia, conservative politics have often 
guided economic development (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore). Though 
authoritarianism is not desirable, conservative political approaches may be best, at first. 
For general ODA policy and Japan’s, it seems that aid for LDC should encourage the 
development of democracy, while allowing for the presence of more conservative 
ideologies, since these have worked so well in many East Asian LDCs. A strong state is 
also a common factor in all of these cases. 
 On domestic economic policy and development, one of the most important 
economic issues in Japan (1895-1945) was the issue of balance. While Japan experienced 
great growth until the 1920s, and later decline the Showa depression and World II, it 
struggled to balance large-scale industrialization with small-scale industries, urban with 
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rural growth, and military domination of the economy and economic growth in the 1930s 
and early 1940s. Two additional significant points here include the strong state presence 
in Japan’s economy, and Yanagita’s idea that there are multiple paths to development, 
and that they must be customized by each nation’s conditions. Yanagita’s idea of 
customized development also seems evident in current Japanese development scholars’ 
support for translative adaptation. Ironically, in much its current aid, and throughout the 
postwar period, Japan has argued for a rather universalizing approach to aid that 
emphasizes economic infrastructure. And ironically, the Western/global development 
agenda now argues that more ground-level, customized approaches. Concerning the 
impact of Japan’s military on its domestic economy, while several military conflicts in 
this era built up Japan’s economy (i.e. the Russo-Japanese War and World War I), World 
War II totally destroyed it. Given the destructive impacts of warfare on society, ODA 
policies must encourage limits on conflict, military force and its growth. Japan’s aid 
policies now do. 
 On the role of development and security ideologies in Japan’s domestic issues, 
in the era 1895 to 1945, the Japanese state did not hesitate to draw on propagandistic 
ideologies incorporating race and religion to promote to promote development and war.  
ODA policy should never promote such ideas for the pursuit of development, and Japan’s 
ODA policy does not.  These ideologies violate the idea of separation of religion and 
state, among many other problems, and caused many difficulties for Japan before World 
War II. 
 On culture and the arts, the arts in Japan were largely unfettered before the late 
1920s. Especially from the 1930s to 1945, more government control and censorship 
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occurred. ODA policies from Japan and other nations should seek to enhance cultural 
freedom where they can. 
 On the second key research question of the dissertation, are the ideas of 
“modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation, as reflected in the 
domestic worldviews studied here, an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with 
technology and development in this period? Concerning views of Japan’s technological 
development, Yanagita was concerned about the effects of aggressive internationalization 
of Japan by the West, seen in the affects of Western technology and cultural products on 
Japanese society. Hirohito’s views focused on the external challenges brought by Japan’s 
internationalization. On technology and translative adaptation, Yanagita focuses most on 
how Japan’s domestic core culture could remain intact during the flood of Western input 
entering Japan. Hirohito’s views do not show concern for translative adaptation. 
 In views of the domestic state, on “modernization,” as the domestic state was 
increasingly absorbed into the global economy, did its “core” culture of politics become 
more Western, or stay “Japanese”? I conclude that the core of Japan’s politics in this era 
did not change much. Popular input remained limited, and authoritarianism on the 
national level and decision-making by consensus in rural areas both continued. In 
domestic politics worldviews of Yanagita and Hirohito, “modernization” basically 
prevails. Yanagita is more concerned for local, grassroots politics, and is democratic 
populist in orientation. Hirohito more focused on oligarchic control of the political 
system, and on national and international issues. In their support for varying degrees of 
emperor-centered Shinto nationalism, both leaders again support “modernization.” I also 
argued above that in Japan’s core culture of politics, the worldviews of Yanagita also 
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support the concept of translative adaptation, though Hirohito’s did not. Yanagita in 
particular was concerned for the preservation of Japan’s local political life. 
  On worldviews of the domestic market, in Japan’s general economy, I 
concluded above that “modernization” basically prevailed, though this was not 
intentional. In views of Japan’s economic development, I also argue that Japan’s core 
culture, especially in rural areas, stayed basically Japanese. I argued this also seemed true 
on the issues of the rural and urban economy. In the prewar period, Japan’s cultural core, 
Yanagita’s main concern, essentially stayed the same. Regarding translative adaptation, 
before 1945, though the government did not follow Yanagita’s vision for localized and 
regional economic development on the rural level, Japan’s rural social structure and 
stability remained basically intact, so the concept seems validated here, though I cannot 
comment on urban culture. On economic development, though the government followed 
policies supporting massive industrialization and militarization, it seems Japan’s rural 
cultural core remained stable, so again, translative adaptation seems validated. The 
government’s focus during this period was not on the rural and urban divide, or on 
protecting Japan’s indigenous culture, but on strengthening Japan against external threats 
and maintaining internal stability and security. Through the evidence studied here, it 
seems that translative adaptation held true through 1945, at least for rural areas.  
 On views of domestic society, despite Yanagita’s wise insights about how to 
better protect Japan’s cultural heritage and its rural spirituality in the midst of rapid 
changes in Japan’s rural and urban social development, the government paid no attention. 
Hirohito supported the ideologies of nationalistic State Shinto, and his views had 
somewhat of a standardizing effect on Shinto worship across the nation, since they 
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concurred with official government policies. Despite the damage of World War II, I 
concluded above that the core of rural Japanese culture remained basically stable through 
1945, and that Hirohito’s support of State Shinto before the war contributed somewhat to 
the defeat of Japan,1463 and so ironically opened the door to massive American cultural 
penetration into Japan after 1945. In all of these processes, it seems that the ideals of 
“modernization” were not really respected by Hirohito or by the government, though they 
were by Yanagita. Yet in practice, since the “core” of rural Japan stayed basically stable 
through 1945, the ideals of “modernization” prevailed here. Concerning translative 
adaptation, in various areas of the worldviews of the domestic society studied here, 
including views of social development, rural and urban society, religion, spirituality and 
social development, and spirituality and the state, although Yanagita offered advice that 
seemed very wise, few of his policy suggestions were adopted by the state before 1945. 
On spirituality and social development, Hirohito had a large policy impact, through his 
support for the emperor ideology and the standardizing effect of State Shinto. In all of 
these areas, in rural Japan, the ideals of translative adaptation were affirmed through 
1945. 
  From the domestic contexts presented in Chapter 7, what lessons emerge about 
Japan’s experiences with technology and development?1464 As noted above, enhancing 
Japan’s capacity in science and technology was perceived by Meiji policymakers as one 
of the key ways to strengthen the nation against Western invasion. The state had a degree 
                                                
1463 I make this argument since Hirohito supported State Shinto and its nationalistic efforts that encouraged 
large popular support for Japan’s war efforts, which nearly destroyed the nation.   
1464 Here I will not consider contextual aspects related to foreign relations, since this chapter is mainly 
focused on domestic issues. I did the same in two previous chapters, 3 and 4, which were similarly mainly 
focused on domestic issues. 
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of involvement in research and development that was, for the time, high by global 
standards. Industrial and research activities generally received a boon during periods of 
military escalation, although they were isolated from key foreign sources during World 
War II. Though Japan pioneered several significant developments before the war, most of 
its technological achievements in that era were based on technological imports from 
abroad.   
  Development contexts fall into three main areas, political, economic and social. 
From 1895 to 1945, authoritarianism dominated the Japanese political landscape, except 
for brief cultural trends (called Taisho democracy) supporting democratic tendencies 
from about 1912 to the early 1930s. Meiji politicians purposely limited democratic input, 
since they felt Japan was not yet prepared for it. Militarism was ascendant in political 
influence from the late 1920s through 1945. Political and religious nationalism were 
heavily promoted by the state during the 1930s through 1945, to enhance patriotism and 
the national war effort. State involvement in the Japanese economy was heavy throughout 
this period, and promoted heavy industry, large-scale business, including zaibatsu, and 
national security through economic and technological strength.1465 Though an economic 
boom occurred in Japan due to several wars from 1894 through World War I and new 
colonization, Japan was hit by several economic depressions and slowdowns during the 
1920s and 1930s. From 1931, the government increased military spending, which helped 
prompt some growth in key industries. On social development, we noted how state-
promoted nationalism, begun in the early Meiji period, accelerated through 1945, through 
the promotion of religious nationalism, neo-Confucian values, emperor ideology, the 
                                                
1465 In other words, this last point refers to the ideology of fukoku kyôhei. 
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national education system, and various rituals. Other significant social trends included 
increased involvement by women in the economy, the expansion of national media, and 
continuing vitality in Japanese religion, despite government manipulation of spirituality 
through State Shinto. 
  How did the worldviews of Yanagita and Hirohito compare with Japan’s 
experiences in this period? Though Yanagita showed more concern for maintaining the 
cultural identity and integrity of the rural Japanese heartland, both Hirohito and the 
Japanese state placed more priority on Japan’s international security, especially economic 
and political.1466 Japan’s basic culture of politics, emphasizing oligarchic control of 
political institutions and decision-making at the national level, and consensual decision-
making at the local level, remained fairly stable in overall tendencies, so the concepts of 
“modernization” and translative adaptation were generally affirmed. In Yanagita’s views 
of the domestic market, concern for preservation of local rural cultural integrity also 
seemed affirmed, though this was not government policy. Hence, “modernization” and 
translative adaptation were again supported. On social development, though Yanagita 
offered many wise observations about how to preserve rural Japan’s cultural integrity, the 
government did not pay attention. Hirohito was not explicitly concerned about the 
cultural integrity of rural Japan (though no doubt he would have desired it). Rather, his 
concern was mainly for Japan’s international security and the stability of the throne. The 
government also ignored Yanagita’s many suggestions about protecting Japan’s rural 
spirituality. Hirohito’s support for State Shinto likely had a standardizing effect on 
                                                
1466 This is not to suggest that they did not also feel that internal security did not matter. 
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elements of Japanese spirituality. I concluded that through 1945, in social development, 
the goals of “modernization” and translative adaptation were basically supported.  
  Japan’s general experience with technological development (1895-1945) 
essentially agrees with the external security focus of Hirohito and the Japanese 
government, not the internal concerns of Yanagita. The focus of technological 
development was mainly external, on building up Japan’s technological capabilities 
internally so they could contribute to Japan’s national security, and on what foreign 
technological innovations needed to be copied and mastered. The contexts of Japan’s 
domestic politics also leaned more in the direction of Hirohito’s and the Japanese 
government’s authoritarian tendencies, not toward Yanagita’s democratic populism. In 
the economy, as with technological development, the emphasis tended toward 
strengthening Japan’s internal infrastructure for the purpose of national (external) 
security, again, more in line with Hirohito’s and the state’s concerns, not Yanagita’s. On 
the social front, the state exercised increasingly nationalistic manipulation of education, 
spirituality and education, in support of national security, especially from the 1930s to 
1945. This was the general policy tendency from 1895 to 1945, increasingly so as time 
went on. Yanagita’s domestic cultural concerns do not seem to have become a major 
policy concern until Japan became more affluent in the postwar period. In all of these 
policy areas, both the prevalent worldviews and contexts emphasize domestic strength 
and stability in support of Japan’s national security, or technonationalism as ideology. 
  Regarding the third key question of the dissertation, how Japanese spirituality 
has perhaps affected Japan’s foreign aid policies, what evidence do we see in the 
historical data in Chapter 7 of how views of spirituality and religion may have affected 
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policies in this period? Yanagita’s views stress spirituality in the local level, and its role 
in protecting communality and social solidarity. Hirohito’s emphasize his role on the 
national level. Each leader’s view of the role of spirituality in the life of the nation was 
influenced by each one’s respective upbringing and professional experience. While 
Yanagita emphasized spirituality as a vital part of Japanese identity, and the role of the 
state in protecting Japan’s culture, Hirohito saw it as an important pillar of the nation-
state, its politics, and the throne. Hirohito accepted the notions of State Shinto more than 
Yanagita. Hirohito also wished to use spirituality (State Shinto) to promote the nation. 
Both share a view of the importance of spirituality in promoting the health and life of the 
nation, though differ in how that will happen. In a few of their observations of 
spirituality, of the imperial origins and descent of the nation, there are also similarities. 
There are weaknesses in their views. Yanagita is not able to offer a counter to the 
influences of State Shinto. Hirohito is blind to the damage done to Japan by the same, and 
his participation in that process. 
  On religion in Chapter 7, it is clear that Yanagita is especially concerned about 
the preservation of Japan’s identity by preserving local religious and spiritual practices 
throughout rural Japan. He believes that the government, including elements of State 
Shinto, does not respect them. Though both Hirohito and Yanagita support elements of 
Shinto ideology, such as the emperor as the supreme spiritual authority, Hirohito does 
more so. Hirohito desires to use religion more as a tool to promote the state and throne on 
the national level, while Yanagita’s primary concern is the survival of rural Japanese 
spirituality, culture and identity, on the local level.   
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  What impacts might these views of spirituality and religion have had on policy 
issues in this era? The further into the period (1895 to 1945) we proceed, the more 
advanced becomes the role of spirituality in promoting state aims. Spirituality had a big 
role in Japanese nationalism, seen in such images and phenomena as the emperor as the 
nation’s intercessor and high priest, the use of State Shinto to encourage nationalism, and 
the presence of spiritual symbols in the national education system for the same purpose. 
State Shinto was also a prime government tool to influence patriotism and support for the 
state, the emperor system, and World War II, through education. Both Yanagita and 
Hirohito have images and beliefs supporting the important role of the emperor as the 
nation’s spiritual leader, Hirohito to a more extreme degree. Both use images suggesting 
the strong connections among Japanese religion, spirituality, and politics. Hirohito’s 
views on spirituality had a much greater policy impact than Yanagita’s did, especially 
before 1945. Both Yanagita and Hirohito suggest the attitude that if the people practice 
proper Shinto rituals and spirituality, that the nation will be protected from aggressive 
foreign invasion, either politically or culturally. Though Hirohito was very faithful to his 
spiritual duties, this was not the case. Despite Yanagita’s wise recommendations for what 
Japan should do to protect its local and indigenous cultures and spirituality, the 
government ignored his advice. The State Shinto supported by the government and 
Hirohito ultimately seemed to have a rather negative standardizing effect on indigenous 
spirituality, and almost destroyed the nation. 
  At the beginning of this conclusion of this chapter I offer policy lessons on the 
issues of economic development, religion, spirituality, politics, and religious freedom. 
One is that leaders of LDCs should be aware of the positive roles that spirituality and 
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religion can possibly play in economic development. Religion, if properly free and 
encouraged, yet kept separate from the state, can be an extremely vital encourager of 
development. An LDC’s state should not trample on religious freedom, a vital sector of 
civil society. Freedom of religion must be guaranteed. Religious leaders should not seek 
to invade the domain of the state and politics, though their limited ethical input should be 
allowed. In the challenging area of religion and politics, careful balance and wisdom 
should be sought. LDC leaders must also receive broad training in the diverse social and 
ethnic issues they will confront, including religion and spirituality, to positively engage 
them for the nation’s benefit, in development and security. An LDC’s leaders must learn 
how to include religion as a positive part of their development and security tool kit. 
Another major policy lesson here is that an LDC’s government should seek to protect 
itself from the impact of negative cultural values of forces such as hyper-materialism (or 
hyper-secularism), which ignores the important contributions of religion and spirituality, 
by enacting proactive policies. It should seek to encourage opportunities to enhance the 
nation’s both material and cultural/spiritual lives, without overt interference in the 
religious sphere. 
  In pre-1945 Japan (since 1868), the state drew heavily on religious and spiritual 
ideologies and images to support patriotism, nationalism, and national development. It 
did not hesitate to mix these images and symbols with the political system. In the 1930s 
and 1940s, it was also happy to attempt to control, suppress or marshal religious bodies 
such as Shinto, Buddhist and Christian groups, and new religions such as Sôka Gakkai, in 
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service of the national interest.1467 In spite of these efforts by the state, religion and 
spirituality remained very active and vital in Japan, even more so after the war. The 
state’s strict withdrawal from active involvement in religion, prompted by the separation 
of religion and the state as mandated in the American-imposed Constitution of 1947, 
contrasts sharply with the state’s gradual increasing use of spirituality as a pragmatic 
policy tool from 1868 to 1945. If anything, this modern behavior seems more in line with 
much of Japanese history, where political officials have often been wary of over-
involvement by different sects in the affairs of the state.1468 So the willingness of the state 
to create State Shinto seems almost a reflection of attitudes toward spirituality in popular 
Japanese culture, namely a rejection of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle, and a pragmatic 
willingness to draw on any form of spirituality that meets one’s current particular 
need.1469  
                                                
1467 We noted above how Sôka Gakkai resisted the government’s attempts at state control. During World 
War II, the government forced Protestant churches into one grouping, and encouraged both Protestants and 
Catholics to include honoring the emperor as part of their worship services. Marshalling religion in the 
service of the state is also a feature of several postwar Communist systems in East Asia. In China, the 
government organized all legal Protestant churches into the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, and Catholics 
into the Catholic Patriotic Association. Unregistered groups are illegal, but currently tolerated. After the 
enormous earthquake near Chengdu, Sichuan, China in May 2008, the Chinese government showed more 
willingness to allow volunteer groups from outside China, even religious ones, to assist with relief efforts. 
In North Korea, religion has been strictly banned and controlled for state purposes.  
1468 I noted an example of this wariness in an earlier chapter, when the Japanese state relocated the capital 
to Kyoto to avoid excessive influence of Buddhist clergy in state affairs.  
1469 The attitudes toward spirituality and religion mentioned in this paragraph and in the footnote 
immediately preceding show a pragmatic attitude toward religion that is common throughout East Asia, 
including in China, Japan, and Korea. This is a willingness to participate in any spiritual activity or site that 
will aid one’s current needs. In the examples just cited, the governments of China, North Korea and Japan 
have been happy to either ban religion, restrict it, or promote it, depending on what would serve state 
purposes. The Tokugawa government in Japan did the same thing when it banned Christianity in the 
seventeenth century. Despite the normally highly secularized nature of the states of China and Japan since 
ancient times (mentioned earlier in this research), this attitude shows a rejection of the Flaw of the 
Excluded Middle. Most of the time, rather than totally ignoring or banning spiritual reality, these East 
Asian states, like their citizens, are happy to acknowledge religion and utilize it when it serves their 
material, pragmatic purposes.    
547 
 
  What are the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and 
science and similar issues for policy issues in this period? There is a strong connection 
between the spiritual and material worlds in the views of both Yanagita and Hirohito; in 
neither one is a conflict between these two realms seen to be inherent. In Chapter 6, there 
are not as many mentions and occurrences of materialism as there are of spirituality and 
religion. The most prominent occur in the views of Yanagita. For example, he is 
concerned that modern economics places too much emphasis on the material world and 
on wealth, and ignores the needs of the heart and soul. He also cares about the corrupting 
influence on rural life by increasing materialism and the penetration of urban and 
Western products. The “conflict” in Hirohito’s views between scientific rationality and 
spiritual rituality/practice does not seem to be as present in the views of Yanagita. He 
used a Western scientific methodology, ethnography, to uncover the nature of rural 
Japanese spirituality, so the cultural life of the nation might be protected. 
  Where were the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign aid? 
Here we observed Yanagita’s stress on local level impacts, and Hirohito’s stress on the 
national level. In contemporary Japanese aid, there is likely little consideration of 
spiritual issues and impacts of aid on any level. Yanagita stressed how protecting and 
respecting the indigenous spirituality of local and rural regions across Japan in must be 
the foundation of all policies to guard Japan’s essential culture and identity. Hirohito 
offered no consideration of these issues at all; he only desired to help impose a national 
level spirituality to strengthen the overall state. Contemporary Japanese aid has a basic 
attitude not to intervene in the religious and internal political/cultural matters of aid 
recipients. This ignores issues of how spirituality/religion in a given aid recipient affects 
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its receipt of aid, and the effectiveness of the recipient’s development programs. How 
could such a consideration enhance aid’s effectiveness?1470  
 Some states desire to use religion to help promote the state’s development, or at 
least they do not want development to conflict with the state’s national religious 
ideology.1471 Could the failure of an aid donor to consider how religion affects the 
delivery or receipt of aid have a “secularizing” effect on the society of the aid recipient 
that might negatively affect its social stability or durability? This would be interesting to 
consider.   
 I noted above the very heavy role of spirituality in some areas of Japanese 
policy from 1868 to 1945, contrasted with its intentional absence in the postwar period, 
due to legal restrictions. But is there some sort of subtle influence anyway, even in aid? 
In some of my policy lessons, I argue that religion, in its proper sphere (separate from the 
state) can possibly enhance or complement economic development efforts, even those 
promoted by the state. Is contemporary Japanese aid cognizant of this fact? If so, is the 
Japanese government’s avoidance of the spiritual implications of its aid hampering, rather 
than enhancing, Japan’s aid efforts? If so, how could this situation be improved? 
                                                
1470 Recall the observation of many foreign observers that Japan’s aid agencies have historically been weak 
in their skills in analyzing the “soft,” social aspects of aid (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid). Religion and 
spirituality are two of those components. Yet since JICA and the OECO division of JBIC have just 
completed their new merger (on October 1, 2008) as I write this on October 11, 2008, things may slowly 
change. In a luncheon speech in Tokyo on October 1, 2008, New JICA president Ogata Sadako reported 
that the New JICA intends to establish a new research institute that will conduct research by first rate 
researchers on various soft components of aid, including economic, political and social issues, both in 
Japan and abroad. Reportedly, a big area of focus in the research will be aid to Africa, to which Japan has 
recently given increased priority (“Luncheon Speech at FCCJ,” http://glocom.blog59.fc2.com/blog-entry-
832.html; accessed 11 October 2008). Hopefully consideration of religion and spirituality factors in Japan’s 
ODA by Japanese aid agencies may gradually improve. To comment definitively on this issue, 
ethnographic research would be necessary.  
1471 Two such states are contemporary Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
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 Increasing numbers of foreign policy policymakers acknowledge the importance 
of the “religion” factor in foreign policy and international politics, and the need of 
foreign policymakers and diplomats to understand it.1472 Given the most obvious example 
of this issue since the 9-11 terrorist attack, Islamic terrorism, what is the Japanese state 
doing to better prepare its future diplomats and aid workers to better understand and 
handle the “religion” factor? What about in the issue of aid? Though Japan is not paying 
much attention to religion questions in its aid policies, is there a way that they might 
bring the religion factor into consideration? Despite the “messiness” of religious and 
similar cultural issues, if Japanese policymakers can be shown that such integration 
would be in their pragmatic interest, would they not be willing to embrace it?1473 I will 
explore some of these questions further in Chapter 9.  
 
                                                
1472 See Albright and Woodward, Mighty and Almighty. 
1473 If they can be shown that doing so is in the best interests of Japan, its ODA programs, and aid 
recipients, given the pragmatic attitudes in Japan toward policy, foreign aid, and spirituality, I believe 
agencies like the New JICA will research these issues, especially if they can be practically shown how to 















 In Chapter 8, regarding international issues (1895-1945), on external political 
relations, I examine the worldviews of Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Yanagita 
Kunio, and Emperor Hirohito, on external economic relations, those of Yanagita, on 
external cultural relations, Yanagita and Hirohito, and on imperialism, the views of Ito, 
Yamagata, Kato Hiroyuki, Yanagita, and Hirohito. 
 Chapter 8, like Chapters 5 and 6, considers primarily international issues, not 
domestic ones. Therefore here, as in Chapters 5 and 6, for the conceptual analysis of the 
technology aspects of the various worldviews about external matters, I will again ask 
questions on these six major themes related to technological issues on the international 
level, but not the domestic one: 1) general concepts of technology, 2) technology in the 
international system, 1474 3) technology transfer, 4) technology, culture, and the 
                                                
1474 See the insights about technology as a system offered by Szyliowicz in Politics, Technology, 
Development, 8 and mentioned in this dissertation.  
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international system, 5) technology, cognition, and international relations,1475 and 6) 
technonationalism as ideology. 
 
Contexts of Japan’s Foreign Relations (1895-1945): Major Trends 
 
 
Contexts: Japan’s External Political Relations 
 
 Regarding Japan’s general international relations, earlier in this period, major 
themes included Japan’s attempt to renegotiate the unequal treaties imposed on it by the 
West (not achieved until 1911), increasing Japanese expansion on the mainland, conflicts 
with China, Korea, and Russia, increasing Japanese influence in Southern Manchuria and 
Inner Mongolia in the 1900s and 1910s, and several conflicts with the United States.1476 
During and shortly after World War I, Japan moved to consolidate its hold over territories 
in China and the South Pacific, including several formerly held by Germany.1477 Japan 
put increasing pressure on China to allow more Japanese input into Chinese government 
affairs. From 1917 to 1922, Japan, along with several other allied nations, stationed up to 
70,000 troops in eastern Siberia during the Russian Revolution. The Washington 
Conference of 1921 resulted in the “Washington System,” to encourage more cooperation 
in East Asia. Japan began to come under pressure to curb some of its actions in China, 
Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia.1478  
                                                
1475  Note the discussion on technology and cognitive factors above in Chapter 5, based on Ibid., 8, 212, 
223.  
1476 Conflicts with the United States included disputes over trade and railway issues in China, U.S. 
restrictions over Japanese immigration in the United States, and increasing rivalry between the U.S. and 
Japanese navies in the Pacific (Japan, “History of International Relations,” 618).  
1477 The territories over which Japan moved to strengthen its control included southern Manchuria, eastern 
Inner Mongolia, the Shandong peninsula in Shandong province, China, and Pacific islands formerly 




 Further Japanese incursions on the mainland in the 1930s, including the 
Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the founding of the Manchukuo puppet state in 1932, 
increased tensions between the United States and Japan. Both the United States and the 
League of Nations responded negatively. By early 1933, Japan withdrew from the 
League. Facing less trade with the United States and Britain, Japan turned to more 
intervention in Manchuria and northern China, which increased tension with the Soviet 
Union. Japan’s second war with China broke out in mid-1937. In 1938 and 1940 Japan 
issued two declarations of intention to create a new Pan-Asian, non-Western political 
order throughout Asia.1479 After rapid German victories in Europe with the start of World 
War II there in September 1939, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy 
in September 1940.1480 By April 1941, Japan invaded all of French Indochina, and the 
United States stiffened economic sanctions against Japan by declaring an oil embargo and 
freezing Japanese assets. After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, war with the United States 
began in late 1941. Early, sweeping victories across the Pacific enabled Japan to occupy 
all of Southeast Asia, including French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Malaya, 
and the Philippines. A turning point in the war was Japan’s defeat in the Battle of 
Midway in June 1942, and from that incident, Japan grew steadily weaker. The empire 
became more challenging to maintain.1481  
 On late July 1945, the United States, China and Britain issued the Potsdam 
Declaration, informing Japan that it must immediately surrender or face “prompt and 
                                                
1479 Ibid., 618-619. These were the Tôa Shinchitsujo (New Order in East Asia, declared in 1938), and the 
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, announced in 1940.  
1480 Japan, “Tripartite Pact,” 1626. 
1481 Japan, “History of International Relations,” 619. For more details on World War II, see my discussion 
below on Hirohito’s views of Japan’s external political relations, later in this chapter, and in Chapter 9, in 
the section on the policy implications of external political relations worldviews. 
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utter destruction.” The Japanese government was divided on the issue. Delay resulted in 
the dropping of two atomic bombs and Soviet invasion of territories held on the 
mainland.1482 Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender by radio on August 15, 1945, and the 
Instrument of Surrender was signed on September 2, 1945.1483     
 Regarding Japan’s foreign relations (1895 to 1945), throughout this era, the 
military increasingly challenged MOFA’s monopoly on the conduct of Japan’s foreign 
affairs, especially during conflicts such as the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese 
War, and World War I. From 1931, MOFA was increasingly forced to share foreign 
policy functions with various military representatives.1484 
 In Northeast Asia, Japan’s victory against China in the Sino-Japanese War 
(1895) forced China to recognize Korea’s independence, cede Taiwan and the Liaodong 
peninsula, pay a large indemnity, and grant Japan broad trading privileges. Tumultuous 
events in China in the early 1900s included the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and its 
aftermath. Japan gave sanctuary to Sun Yat-sen’s political party and movement when 
they fled there. After World War I began, European powers fled Asia, and Japan rushed 
into China, claiming formerly German-held concessions. In 1915, Japan forced China to 
accept various demands.1485 Affronts such as these to China’s integrity led to the eruption 
of the May Fourth Movement, in which 4,000 Beijing university students protested in 
May 1919, causing widespread protests and strikes in China throughout the 1920s against 
foreign imperialist actions. After Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1905), 
                                                
1482 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Potsdam Declaration,” 404-405.  
1483 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Surrender,” 487. For more details on Japan’s surrender, see my 
discussion in Chapter 9. 
1484 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 317. 
1485 These are known as the Twenty One Demands, which Japan made to China at this time. 
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Japan again won the right to the Liaodong peninsula, and extended its influence in 
Manchuria through the South Manchuria Railway. In the early 1930s, China’s Nationalist 
government and the Soviet Union increasingly threatened Japan’s interests in Manchuria. 
To solidify their hold on Manchuria, Japan’s Guandong Army blew up a section of the 
South Manchuria Railway north of Shenyang, and blamed the Chinese.1486 After setting 
up the puppet state of Manchukuo in Manchuria in early 1932, Japan invaded Hebei 
province, near Beijing, in 1933. The second Sino-Japanese War began in late 1937 over 
fire exchanged near Beijing in July. Japanese hostilities in China continued through 1945, 
killing many millions.1487 Concerning Korea, after victory in the Russo-Japanese War 
(1905), Japan gained the legal right to exercise increasing influence in Korea. In 1910 
Japan annexed Korea as a colony, controlling it through 1945.1488  
 Japan established consulates in Southeast Asia from the 1880s. During World 
War I, Japan occupied several South Pacific islands previously controlled by Germany, 
(considered by Japan to be in Southeast Asia). By 1936, Nanshinron (the “Southern 
Expansion Doctrine”) became official policy, implemented in 1940 in the Greater East 
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.1489 By late 1941, Japan occupied many areas in the region, 
including French Indochina, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, the Philippines, the 
Dutch East Indies, and Burma. In late 1942 Japan formed the Greater East Asia Ministry, 
                                                
1486 This is known as the Manchurian Incident.  
1487 Japan, “China and Japan,” 189-190.  
1488 Japan, “Korea and Japan,” 828. 
1489 The Greater East Co-prosperity Sphere was a slogan used by the Japanese government (1940 to 1945) 
to represent the idea of an economically and politically united Asia, led by Japan, to successfully resist 
Western imperialism and hegemony. The government also used the slogan to justify its imperialist plans for 
expansion on the mainland and elsewhere. The sphere included Japan, Manchukuo (Japan’s puppet state in 
Manchuria), additional areas of China under Japan’s control, the Dutch East Indies, and French Indochina. 
Before long, all of Southeast Asia and Japanese-controlled Pacific islands were added (Japan, “Greater 
East Asia Coprosperity Sphere,” 475). 
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which did not exercise much decisive control. During World War II, most of Japan’s 
diplomatic efforts focused on Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, not China.1490    
 Russia aided China during the first Sino-Japanese War (1894 to 1895), 
obtaining a leasehold in the Liaodong peninsula. After 1900, as Russia constructed the 
China Eastern Railway, it sent troops into Manchuria. Japan was increasingly nervous, 
and attacked the Russian military at Port Arthur (Lüshun), Manchuria in early 1904. 
After a war fought mainly in Korea and Manchuria, Japan received the Liaodong 
peninsula, the South Manchuria Railway, south Sakhalin, and recognition of its interests 
in Korea. Shortly after, Russia and Japan signed various agreements that were rejected by 
the Soviet Union after 1917.1491 Through 1945, Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union 
were affected by Soviet ideologies, various foreign policies, and colonial competition in 
north Asia. Japan’s dispatch of troops to Siberia from 1917 to 1922 to fight against the 
Bolsheviks raised tensions. Yet the two nations shared mutual economic interests and 
needs. Japan recognized the Soviet Union in exchange for economic and trading rights, 
but the rise of militarism in Japan from the late 1920s increased chances for hostility. The 
Soviets allowed Japan to take the China Eastern Railway, but grew nervous in the late 
1930s over Japanese actions in China. In April 1941 the Soviets and Japan signed a treaty 
of neutrality, but in early August 1945, the Soviet Union initiated huge attacks on 
Japanese forces in Manchuria, the Kuriles, south Sakhalin, and Korea. Japan effectively 
surrendered by August 14.1492   
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 Though the United States and Japan had stable relations in the early Meiji era, 
after Japan’s victory over China in 1895 and U.S. victory over Spain in 1898, both 
nations emerged as “great powers.” They then had to deal with each other on military, 
balance of power and colonial issues, not simply trade and education. After Japan’s 
victory over Russia in 1905, both Japan and the United States drew up hypothetical war 
plans concerning each other. Tensions increased over American restrictions on Japanese 
immigration. Japanese and Americans competed economically in China. Though some 
leaders attempted to strengthen mutual ties and understanding between the U.S. and 
Japan, the rise of militarism in Japan in the 1930s hampered this. The United States 
reacted negatively to Japanese actions in East and Southeast Asia, and Japan increasingly 
saw the United States as the chief obstacle to its Asian goals. After Japan joined the Axis 
and the United States increased economic sanctions, to many in Japan, conflict was 
inevitable.1493    
 In Europe, Japan had close relations with Great Britain through the early 1900s. 
Britain was a model for Japan on modernization, Western culture, and a key contributor 
of technology and foreign knowledge.1494 The Anglo-Japanese military alliance, Japan’s 
first military treaty with a foreign nation (1902 to 1923),1495 was one sign of Japan’s 
emergence as a major power. Both Britain and Japan were concerned with protecting 
their Asian interests in the face of an increasing Russian presence. One faction led by Ito 
Hirobumi favored accommodation with Russia, while another led by Yamagata favored 
Britain. The second prevailed. In the 1930s, Japanese interventions in China increasingly 
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strained relations with Britain, including their economic competition in third countries. 
After Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in the late 1930s and moved to attack Indochina 
and Southeast Asia, tensions boiled over. Japan declared war on the U.S. and Britain after 
Pearl Harbor, and seized British possessions in Asia. Britain participated in the American 
occupation of Japan after World War II.1496 Though Germany influenced Japanese 
politics through advising Ito as he wrote the Constitution of 1889, and Yamagata 
modeled the Japanese army after Prussia’s, World War I interrupted German-Japanese 
relations, and Japan seized German possessions in China and the South Pacific. In the late 
1930s, both countries had fascist systems, and signed treaties to increase cooperation 
against the Soviet Union and the West, but with little effect.1497 France assisted the Meiji 
government as it sought to modernize Japan. After Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese 
War, France and Japan signed a treaty in 1907, agreeing to recognize their respective 
Asian possessions. Diplomatic and economic cooperation followed. But in the 1920s and 
1930s, both nations experienced tension over events in Asia. In the early 1940s, Japan 
invaded French Indochina, and the Free French government declared war in late 1941. 
Japan formally annexed Indochina in 1945.1498 Japan’s relations with other world regions 
such as Latin America and the Middle East increased in significance after 1945.1499 
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 Of several intellectual currents affecting Japan’s international relations (1895 to 
1945), one of the most important was Pan-Asianism (Han-Ajia-shugi). This intellectual 
movement stressed the uniqueness of Asia contrasted with the West. Pan-Asianists in 
Japan argued that Japan should pay more attention to commonalities that Japan had with 
Asia, that Japan’s future lay in Asia. Other proponents stressed that Japan’s future lay 
with China,1500 while in the early 1900s, Okakura Kakuzo stressed that “Asia is one,” and 
East-West distinctions. Pan-Asianism was revived in the 1930s to justify Japan’s actions 
in Asia, arguing that wars in China and the Pacific were basically cultural warfare, the 
East versus the West, necessary to awaken Asia to its true destiny.1501 
 On military and defense issues, as the leaders of Meiji Japan created Japan’s 
modern military, modeled on leading Western examples, they instituted special privileges 
for them that would decisively influence the course of the nation. After the Sino-Japanese 
and Russo-Japanese Wars (1894-1895 and 1904-1905), the military’s “right of supreme 
command” was increasingly applied over the civil authority in the national government. 
After war with Russia, a debate between the Nanshinron and Hokushinron doctrines 
erupted among Japan’s military leaders.1502 Ultimately, a compromise was reached, 
where the army focused on preparing for a Russian threat, and the Navy a U.S. one. After 
World War I, there was international pressure against militarism. But with the onset of 
the Great Depression in the late 1920s and 1930s, militarism rose in Japan, increasingly 
                                                
1500 Those who argued this included Tarui Tokichi, Miyazaki Toten, and Sun Yat-sen (Japan, “Pan-
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1501 Ibid. 
1502 See my discussion of the Nanshinron and Hokushinron doctrines in Chapter 5, in the section on the 
contexts of imperialism. 
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influencing society. Militarism’s grip on Japanese society was not broken until Japan’s 
defeat in 1945.1503 
 Significant conflicts during this era included the Russo-Japanese War (1904-
1904), World War I (1914-1918), the war in China (1937-1945), and the Pacific War 
(World War II) with the United States (1941-1945). In the Russo-Japanese conflict, Japan 
attacked Russia in southern Manchuria over Russia’s increasing presence in Korea, to 
firmly establish Japan’s interests there. The war was costly, especially for Japan, but 
afterward, Japan won the right to exercise exclusive influence over Korea, control of 
south Sakhalin and the Liaodong peninsula. Significantly, Japan achieved the status of an 
imperialist state in the Far East, in direct competition with the West, and in the minds of 
many Meiji Japanese, finally achieved its independence and security against the West.1504  
 In World War I, after conflict began in Europe, Japan declared war against 
Germany in support of Britain, Japan’s ally. Japan quickly took control of German 
possessions in China and several German–controlled islands in the South Pacific. Soon 
after, Japan pressured China to accept its “Twenty-One Demands.” In the face of British 
and American protests, Japan dropped several of the demands while forcing China to 
accept the remainder, which granted Japan greater influence in China. In 1917 and 1918 
Japan attempted to consolidate its gains in China, somewhat in competition with the 
United States, though the U.S. finally agreed to respect Japan’s interests, in exchange for 
equal opportunities in commerce and recognition of China’s integrity. By the end of the 
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war, Japan held former German territories in Shandong province and the South Pacific, 
more sections of mainland China, northern Manchuria, and some of eastern Siberia.1505  
 In the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 to 1945, the Japanese military fought against 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Army and the Communist Army led by Mao Zedong. The 
conflict included numerous battles, war atrocities, and cost millions of lives. Japan’s 
attack on China essentially enabled the rise of peasant nationalism by the 
Communists,1506 eventually leading to the rise of communist China a few years after 
1945.1507 Starting in the 1930s through 1945, an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 women 
(comfort women—jûgun ianfu) were forced to serve in military brothels in areas such as 
China, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific and New Guinea.1508  
 World War II was complex for Japan, on multiple levels. From 1930 to 1936, an 
increasing number of political assassinations in Japan slowly increased the political 
power of the military. Both the Imperial Army and Navy competed for attention for their 
respective agendas, military adventurism in China and Northeast Asia, and invasion of 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific islands. Later in the decade, as Japan’s military 
increased its power in the nation’s politics, there was more emphasis on heavy 
industrialization, militarization, and mobilizing the people for war. The role of the Diet 
and the political parties slowly decreased, and the nation plunged haphazardly toward 
possible conflict with the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, and Western powers in 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Though the war in China from 1937 may be viewed as 
                                                
1505 Japan, “World War I,” 1711. 
1506 Johnson, Peasant Nationalism.  
1507 Japan, “Sino-Japanese War of 1937 to 1945,” 1432-1434. For more details on the events of this war, 
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part of World War II, many Japanese see it as a separate but related conflict. The China 
war drained Japan’s resources and risked war with the West, not to mention the damage 
inflicted on China. Though Japan and Germany shared several possible enemies (the 
Soviet Union, Britain and the United States), they lacked a common strategy. As 
Germany attacked various nations in Europe, it became more tempting for Japan to attack 
their possessions in Southeast Asia. That angered the United States, and risked war with 
the Americans and European powers. The nation pursued a desperate, risky gamble by 
attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor, hoping that along with immobilizing 
American naval power, it could quickly establish a wide network of naval and air bases to 
discourage American response. Japanese progress for the first months of the war was 
rapid, but Japan met increasingly decisive resistance from the United States, including the 
Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway (in May and June 1942). From then on, Japan was 
on the defensive. In additional, costly battles across the South and Central Pacific and 
Southeast Asia, Japan’s resources gradually waned, though its determination to fiercely 
resist American victory did not. In the final stages of the war, the devastating costs to 
both the U.S. and Japan included painful, bloody battles in locations such as Iwo Jima 
and Okinawa, costing hundreds of thousands of lives. There were also devastating fire 
bombings of most major Japanese cities, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, killing many more hundreds of thousands, and leaving over 13 million or more 
homeless. After the atomic bombings, Japan finally surrendered.1509 
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Contexts: Japan’s External Economic Relations 
 
 In policies for foreign trade from 1895 to 1945, Japan’s government traded with 
foreign nations to help Japan achieve economic parity with the West. Until the end of the 
unequal treaties with the West (1911), Japan paid for needed imports (things it did not 
produce itself, such as ships, steel, and equipment) with exports. To promote 
industrialization and development through technical assistance, subsidies and loans, 
Japan also imported needed items. Exporting to import has remained a basic part of 
Japan’s trade policy for decades. From 1899, tariff protection was granted to particular 
industries. Tariffs on raw materials were kept low, to help stimulate manufacturing. 
Policies for the protection of Japan’s domestic market were also extended to Japan’s 
colonies and occupied territories.1510 During World War I, Japan experienced a large 
economic boom as its exports to the rest of Asia greatly increased in the European 
absence during the war, leading to great inflation in Japan.1511 In the 1920s and 1930s, 
Japan exported heavy industrial products to the colonies, and imported mostly raw 
materials and food. Japan’s need to import and export in such a manner in the hostile 
international environment of the 1930s was one factor contributing to efforts to establish 
something akin to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.1512 
 Concerning Japan’s foreign economic relations with Asia (1895 to 1945), a 
large motivator of Japanese colonial and military intervention in China was economic in 
nature. From the late nineteenth century through 1945, Japan viewed various markets and 
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resources in China as vital for Japan’s survival. Japan’s intervention in China in various 
regions, was motivated, in large part, by economic factors, and Japan’s desire for survival 
in the harsh international system.1513 After gaining Taiwan as a colony in 1895, Japan 
developed the island’s economy mainly for Japan’s economic benefit. The same policy 
was followed in Korea. In the Korean case, resentment against the Japanese presence and 
economic policies was more overt than in Taiwan, but in both, resistance was often 
harshly suppressed.1514 Around 1900, Japanese shipping companies opened trade routes 
between Japan and major ports in Southeast Asia. Communities of Japanese traders 
opened in all parts of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific (the latter also considered by 
Japan to be a part of Southeast Asia). From 1914 to 1920, Japanese trade with the region 
increased dramatically, especially in cotton textiles, and Japanese investment in rubber 
and coconut plantations. Expanded trade brought an increased Japanese presence in the 
region.1515  
 Japan’s foreign economic relations with Europe (1895 to 1945) included 
significant connections with Great Britain, Germany and France. Great Britain had a 
great impact on Japan’s development, providing the model for its railway system, and 
many foreign instructors who helped teach subjects related to economic and 
technological growth. Japan and Britain signed the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty 
in 1894, partly ending their unequal trade relations and Britain’s extraterritoriality. But by 
the 1930s, trade friction over British and Japanese competition in third markets such as 
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China, and Britain granting its own colonies preferential trading status from 1932, 
contributed to tension between the two nations.1516 From the Meiji period forward, 
German and Japanese economic relations also quickly increased through growing 
trade.1517 France provided crucial assistance to the Meiji government as it began Japan’s 
efforts to industrialize, helping with advice and technical assistance. After the Franco-
Japanese Agreement of 1907 was signed, both nations agreed to respect each other’s 
possessions in Asia. Economic and diplomatic cooperation followed. Economic and 
financial cooperation continued after World War I. In the 1920s and 1930s, increasing 
tension during negotiations over economic issues between French Indochina and Japan 
was further heightened during aggressive Japanese actions in Indochina in the early 
1940s.1518    
 Japan also had significant economic relations with the United States from 1895 
to 1945. American teachers had significant impact on Meiji Japan’s mastery of various 
forms of economic and technical knowledge. By 1907, more than 125,000 Japanese had 
settled on the U.S. West Coast in addition to Hawaii.1519 Japanese laborers made 
important contributions to the economies of Hawaii and California, especially to 
agriculture.1520 In the early 1900s, there were various military, economic and cultural 
tensions brewing in the U.S.-Japan relationship, however indirect. The U.S. passage of 
the 1924 immigration law excluding Japanese immigration was a serious blow to the 
countries’ relations. Increased Japanese intervention in Southeast Asia, China and other 
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parts of Asia, in the name of Japan’s economic survival, caused relations to further 
decline.1521  
 Concerning foreign trade, around 1900, Japan’s primary imports shifted to raw 
cotton from cotton thread, to iron, and to machinery instead of ships. From 1868 to 1915, 
Japan had a positive balance of trade in only twelve years. From the late 1800s, there was 
a boom in the construction of large textile mills. During World War I, Japan replaced 
European and American exports to many Asian nations, especially to Southeast Asia and 
Russia. The percentage of finished goods in Japan’s total exports increased. By 1918, the 
last year of the war, the volume of exports was three times the prewar level. After World 
War I, although conditions were again favorable for exports to Europe and the U.S., 
domestic demand in Japan created a foreign trade deficit. In the 1920 and 1930s, general 
trading companies, especially those connected with the zaibatsu, played a large role in 
increasing Japan’s foreign trade. Large shipyards produced heavy machinery, railway 
equipment, and other heavy steel and iron products. Several major shipping firms 
emerged. From 1929, the Great Depression had a drastic effect on Japan’s economy. The 
volume of imports, exports, and Japan’s currency fell dramatically. After 1931, Japan 
adopted controls over foreign exchange and trade to organize a war type economy. 
During the 1930s, global trading blocs and Japan’s trade with its colonies both increased 
in importance. After the start of the war with China in 1937, Japan’s trade became more 
war-oriented, focusing on imports of war-related materials, items for basic living, and 
exports devoted to earning foreign currency for needed imports. Trade controls were 
imposed in 1937, and from 1941, general mobilization for war began. Trade became 
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heavily focused on Japan’s “yen bloc,” especially its colonies, and trade outside the yen 
bloc was reduced. Japan had a trade surplus with the yen bloc, but deficit with countries 
outside the bloc.1522 Before 1930, Japan had no widespread foreign exchange controls, 
but during the 1930s, an extensive system of production, distribution, and foreign trade 
ensued, characteristic of an economy on wartime footing.1523 
 Regarding foreign investments (1895 to 1945), after the Sino-Japanese War 
(1894 to 1895) to World War I, Japanese firms in the chemical and heavy manufacturing 
sectors sought connections with Western firms in the U.S. and Europe for access to 
proprietary knowledge and technologies, sometimes through technical licensing 
agreements. Several leading American firms such as General Electric and International 
Telephone and Telegraph played a significant role in Japanese firms.1524 In the 1890s, 
after trade-related companies, including insurance and trading firms and banks, 
established overseas offices, several major spinning firms established branches in Tianjin 
and Shanghai. In the 1930s, Japan’s heavy industries actively invested in Manchuria, but 
Japan lost all of these in World War II.1525 Two of the major assets that aided Japan’s 
control of Manchuria were the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria 
Railway, both of which Japan obtained from Russia and the Soviet Union by 1935.1526 
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Contexts: Japan’s External Cultural Relations 
 
 Regarding international cultural exchange and the study of foreign cultures in 
Japan from 1895 to 1945, in the Meiji and Taisho periods (1868 to 1926), English 
language training focused on the mastery of written English for learning Western 
knowledge and technology, though there were unsuccessful efforts to introduce the oral 
method of language teaching.1527 From the 1880s to 1945, the study of German law was 
especially important, forming the major influence on Japan’s first Constitution (of 1889), 
which in turn affected all of Japanese society throughout this period. In the Meiji era, 
prominent foreign legal scholars from countries such as France and Germany advised 
Japan on many legal reforms, and outstanding Japanese experts in the fields of English, 
German and French law emerged.1528 From the late nineteenth century through World 
War I, Japan’s external cultural relations focused on the introduction of Western culture 
in Japan, rather than the promotion of Japanese culture abroad, which was motivated by 
the national goal to build Japan into a modern state based on Western models. After 
World War 1, the importance of promoting international understanding was more widely 
recognized. In 1934, Japan’s Society for International Cultural Relations (KBS, Kokusai 
Bunka Shinkokai) was formed.1529 From the late 1890s to the 1920s, principles of 
progressive Western education influenced a movement in Japanese education called the 
New Education Movement. It encouraged initiative and individuality in children, but its 
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influence decreased with the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s.1530 The first foreign 
students came from China after the Sino-Japanese War (1894 to 1895).1531   
 In this period, there were many Japanese intellectual trends influenced by 
foreign cultural influences, including Marxism, liberalism and democracy, but I will limit 
my comments to two fields. The Meiji enlightenment intellectuals such as Fukuzawa 
Yukichi and Mori Arinori, explored in earlier chapters, worked broadly at introducing 
Western social institutions, customs, and thought into Meiji Japan, and served as leaders 
in the movement. They helped to introduce Western ideals of reason and enlightenment, 
and other important principles to be followed for Japan’s modernization.1532 Feminist 
thought and movements, inevitably influenced by their Western counterparts, began in 
the late nineteenth century. They included arguments in favor of women’s rights (joken) 
(1880s), the emergence of women’s literary journals (1910s), socialist debates over the 
“woman question” (fujin mondai) (early 1900s), and unsuccessful campaigns for 
women’s suffrage (1920s and 1930s). The militarist governments of the 1930s suppressed 
autonomous women’s movements through 1945.1533 
 Concerning Japanese interaction with foreign cultures overseas, Japan had 
major interactions with China in this period, through the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese 
War (1894 to 1895), continuing disputes over the right to influence and control Korea, 
Japanese investments in Manchuria and other parts of China, Japan’s demands for more 
influence in China in the 1920s, Japanese incursions and attacks on China in the 1930s, 
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and the war with China from 1937 to 1945.1534 These interactions were highly painful and 
costly for both Japan and China, and have had long-term effects on Asia and the world, 
up to the present. Japan also had extensive interactions with Korea, which it absorbed as 
a major colony in 1910. This included Japanese intervention in Korea during the wars 
with China and Russia (1894 to 1895 and 1904 to 1905), and major influence in Korea 
after 1905. Japan’s rule and exploitation of Korea was harsh and painful on multiple 
levels, economically, politically, and culturally.1535 Up to the early twenty-first century, 
these interactions have also had major influences on other world powers, including on 
China, Russia, and the United States. In this period, the United States continued to have 
major cultural impacts on Japan through sending many instructors, experts and 
missionaries, and some prominent young Japanese also studied in the U.S. Yet cultural 
misunderstandings between the two nations increased in the early twentieth century 
through the 1930s as the United States moved to limit Japanese emigration through 
several laws, through racist fears of a “Yellow Peril.” The two nations also felt tension 
due to their economic competition in China, and Japan’s increasing sense that the United 
States stood in the path of its pursuit of “Asia for Asians.”1536 
 On Japanese interaction with foreign cultures in Japan (1895 to 1945), earlier in 
the period, Western nations including the United States, Britain and others had a major 
cultural influence on Japan through foreign instructors at Japanese universities. The two 
other major groups of foreigners present in Japan at this time were Chinese and Koreans. 
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In the Meiji era, many Japanese accepted Western notions that Chinese were unhygienic. 
Though foreign concessions were abolished in Japan in 1899, Japan passed laws that 
forced Chinese to continue to live in those areas. The two major Chinese areas in Japan 
slowly emerged as “Chinatowns” in Yokohama and Kobe, composed of mostly 
professionals and merchants. By 1930 the number of Chinese in Japan had decreased to 
30,000, but the number from Taiwan increased greatly. By 1943 150,000 Taiwanese were 
in Japan, mostly conscripted soldiers.1537 While Korea was a Japanese colony (1910 to 
1945), some Koreans migrated to Japan, looking for jobs and better economic welfare. 
After the Pacific War started in 1941, hundreds of thousands were brought to Japan as 
wartime laborers, many by force. In 1945, over 2 million Koreans were present in 
Japan.1538     
 
Contexts: Japan’s External Relations-Imperialism 
 
 About ten years after deciding to compete with the West for Asian colonies, 
Japan declared war on China in 1894 to gain control of Korea, but instead gained Taiwan, 
the Liaodong peninsula of southern Manchuria, the Pescadore islands, and trade benefits 
in China.  Japan’s victory over China in 1895 stirred “xenophobic nationalism” and a 
sense of racial superiority over the Koreans and the Chinese in many Japanese.  From the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Japan gained influence in Korea, control of the South 
Manchurian Railway, southern Sakhalin, and the Liaodong peninsula (this last location, 
for a second time), but at great financial and human cost.1539 The empire eventually 
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occupied all or portions of Korea, Taiwan, China, the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, 
islands in the North and South Pacific, and threatened additional regions such as India 
and Australia. Ultimately Japan’s imperial expansion cost about 23 million lives in World 
War II alone.1540 
 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a new mood emerged in Japan, in praise of 
imperialism.  During the Taisho period (1912-1926) and Taisho democracy, there was 
little praise of Japan’s victories in the late Meiji wars in China and Russia.  But in the 
1930s, the Japanese army celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the victory in the Russo-
Japanese War, and there was a large literary, artistic and dramatic output of books and 
plays lauding the victory, in patriotic, jingoistic, emotional terms.  Through this, Japan 
experienced a large cultural affirmation of the glories of empire, its “war god” military 
heroes, and its “virtuous” young emperor, Hirohito.1541 
 New colonial ideologies arose in connection with the formation of Japan’s 
colonial puppet state of Manchukuo (1932).  Japan crossed a threshold in “self-defense,” 
gaining new victories over “Western decadence” and Chinese “warlordism” on the path 
to modernity.  For Japan’s politically active military leaders, the tropes of “crisis” and 
“Anglo-Saxon encirclement” became useful political tools to strengthen the army’s 
involvement in politics and Emperor Hirohito’s image.  As “virtuous” Japan fought 
morally inferior foreign “devilish” states, people were encouraged to support the “holy 
mission” to spread “the emperor’s benevolence” to other regions, and to overtake the 
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West in every field.  During the Meiji era Japan adopted the concept of “Datsu-A,” the 
sense of escaping from inferior Asia, to assimilate the superior cultural features and 
technologies of the West.  Now an independent Japan emerged as the rightful leader of 
Asia, to resist Western aggression, and spread morally superior, harmonious living to the 
continent. Though Japan never developed the systematic racism of Nazi Germany, from 
the start of Japanese colonialism in 1895, many Japanese manifested a strong racism 
toward other Asians.1542 These new ideologies were supported by Japanese views of 
Manchuria and its potential.  In the early 1930s, speeches by military officials 
emphasized Japan’s need for raw materials, national security, land, increasing population, 
racial competition for empire, and the coming necessity for war.  Manchuria would help 
Japan through its vast resources, and as a buffer between the latter, Russia and China.  
Japanese diplomat Matsuoka Yosuke called Manchuria-Mongolia Japan’s “economic, 
strategic, and moral ‘lifeline,’” stirring patriotic feelings in Japan.1543 In 1938, the 
Japanese government introduced the slogan Tôa Shinchitsujo (New Order in East Asia) in 
justification of its China policy. It supported the expansion of Japan’s presence in China 
as a stepping-stone to build increased economic, cultural and political ties among Japan, 
China, and Manchukuo (Japan’s Manchurian puppet state).1544 Additional ideologies that 
provided support for Japan’s imperialistic expansion in this period included hakkô ichiu 
(“eight corners of the world under one roof”), Nanshinron (“advanced to the south”), 
                                                
1542 Ibid., 279-280. 
1543 Ibid.,  265-269. 
1544 Japan, “Tôa Shinchitsujo,” 1563. 
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Hokushinron (“advance to the north”), and Hokushu nanshin (hold the north, advance to 
the south).1545 
 The most important colony for Japan was Korea, in terms of size, nearness to 
Japan, and historical connections. Korean resistance became fierce. Taiwan served as a 
training ground for Japanese colonial officials, and economically, was the most profitable 
colony in the empire. The southern half of Sakhalin, known as Karafuto, was occupied in 
Japanese in a manner similar to Hokkaido, and became a genuine “settlement colony.” 
Japan’s Pacific Island colonies stretched across Micronesia, and included 84,000 
Japanese settlers by 1942. Japan also received the southern tip of Manchuria, the 
Guandong territory, from Russia in 1905, and used the South Manchuria Railway to 
eventually influence the rest of Manchuria. Though Japan hoped to use the colonies to 
absorb excess population from Japan, this had only mixed success, since several areas 
were highly populated, and generous subsidies for settlers had limited impact. Japan also 
desired to use the colonies to create an integrated economy in which it exported 
technology and capital in exchange for raw materials, foodstuffs, and investment 
opportunities. Though it did largely integrate its economy with the five colonies (Korea, 
Taiwan, Karafuto, Guandong Territory and the Pacific Islands), it did so mainly for its 
own benefit, not theirs. Japan also used these colonies and territories as a springboard to 
expand into China, the Pacific and Southeast Asia.1546  
 What were the effects of Japanese national identity on the colonies? From 1895, 
the Japanese state also imposed the Tokyo dialect of educated Japanese beyond Japan 
                                                
1545 Many of these ideologies were discussed in earlier chapters. Also see Japan, “Imperial Japanese Armed 
Forces,” 54. 
1546 Japan, “Colonialism,” 214. 
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proper, on newly acquired territories of Hokkaido, Okinawa, colonies in Taiwan, in 
Korea from 1910, and beyond. Debates on race and Japanese identity affected colonial 
policies, in that while Koreans and Taiwanese came to be called “Japanese subjects,” 
they were not given the same political rights as other Japanese. Policymakers argued over 
whether there should be strict separation between Japanese colonizers and the colonized, 
or whether the colonized should be fully absorbed.1547 
 After Japan annexed Korea as a colony in late 1910, it took control of the 
government, military, education system, major enterprises, ended the Joseon dynasty, and 
suppressed all political parties, meetings, and the press. Since Koreans were subjected to 
harsher punishment than Japanese in Korea, and forced to use Japanese in schools, 
resentment increased, leading to the Samil Independence Movement that began with a 
declaration of independence read in Seoul in March 1919, resulting in widespread riots 
that were violently suppressed by Japan. In the 1920s economic conditions became 
harder in Korea as the nation was forced to produce increasing amounts of rice for Japan. 
The number of tenant farmers increased, and by the early 1930s, hundreds of thousands 
sought better employment conditions in Manchuria or Japan. Feeling in Japan against 
Korean immigrants was high; more than 6,000 Koreans were killed in anti-Korean 
violence following the massive 1923 Tokyo earthquake. Conditions in Korea became 
more repressive as State Shinto, emperor worship, and Japanese names were forced on all 
Koreans after the war in China started in 1937. From 1939 to 1945, about 1.2 million 
                                                
1547 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “National Identity and Minorities,” 344-345.  
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Koreans were forcibly transported to Japan as laborers, and drafted into the military near 
the end of World War II.1548 
 Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945. Taiwanese resistance to 
Japan’s takeover was suppressed. Japan’s colonial control of the island was modeled after 
Western imperialism. A Japanese governor-general controlled Taiwan’s government, and 
its economy was developed for the benefit of Japan. Japan introduced modern economic 
infrastructure and technology to the island, primarily benefiting resident Japanese. These 
actions stimulated agricultural and commercial development, and the island became a 
major supplier to Japan of sugar, rice, and other agricultural products and raw materials. 
In the 1920s, light industry began to develop. Despite occasional resistance from the 
indigenous and educated Taiwanese, general peace, stability and economic growth 
prevailed. From 1937 to 1945, Japan used the island as a base from which to conduct war 
operations in China and Southeast Asia. Taiwan contributed heavily to the war effort, 
both economically and in terms of military recruits. Taiwan was attacked in 1944, and 
severe economic shortages and inflation soon followed.1549   
 
Views About Japan’s Foreign Relations (1895-1945) 
 
 
Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations 
 
 Ito Hirobumi.  In the late 1890s, Ito declared that the real object of the Japanese 
government was friendship, assistance, and ultimate independence for Korea, since the 
two countries’ interests were so close. By the early 1900s, Ito feared that conflict with 
                                                
1548 Japan, “Korea and Japan,” 828. 
1549 Japan, “Taiwan,” 1504. 
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Russia in Korea was inevitable. In the new century, Japan felt threatened by Russia’s 
increasing influence in Manchuria and Korea.  In response, Prime Minister Katsura’s 
government favored signing an Anglo-Japanese alliance (done in 1902).  Ito agreed, but 
feared it could lead to war with Russia.  Japan sent Ito to Russia to informally negotiate 
over Korea and Manchuria. 1550  When Russia moved too slowly, in Japan’s eyes, the 
latter attacked Russian forces in Port Arthur, Manchuria in February 1904.  Ito went to 
Korea as an envoy.  Hayashi asserts that his intention was never the absorption of Korea, 
but to offer Japan’s aid and protection, until Korea could stand independently.  After the 
Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s interests in Korea were internationally recognized in 1905.  
While the Katsura government sought to tighten its control over Korea, Ito’s goal was to 
slowly strengthen Korea’s capacity for self-government and development.  In late 1905, 
under duress, the Korean king agreed to Japan’s control of Korea’s foreign affairs.  Next, 
Ito was appointed resident-general of Korea.  By mid-1907, the King abdicated.1551  In 
1906, Ito called the Japanese military government on the Liaodong peninsula in 
Manchuria a great insult to Imperial China.  By 1909, he stressed the promotion of peace 
and cooperation among the Far Eastern powers (China, Japan, and Russia) without 
interference from outside powers, and equal opportunity for commerce for all nations in 
the region.1552   
 Hamada calls Ito a realist and moderate on foreign policy issues.1553 As a young 
man, Ito recognized the West’s power, and the threat it presented to Japan’s security and 
                                                
1550 Hamada, Prince Ito, 124-125, 137-141, 145, 160-162, 166. 
1551 Ibid., 170-171, 173-177, 181-187, 194-198. 
1552 Ibid., 212-213, 215-217, 221-223, 227-229. 
1553 Ibid., 138, 211, 222. 
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independence. He wanted to quickly strengthen Japan’s global standing by ending 
unequal treaties, and responding to security threats. Was he an imperialist?1554 We will 
consider this further. Ito believed that Japan needed to stand up to other regional powers 
to protect its own interests. Hamada also calls Ito a man of peace.1555 
 Yamagata Aritomo. After 1914, Yamagata’s fear of worldwide racial war of 
whites against non-whites made him support closer ties with China.1556 In 1916 he 
supported an agreement with Russia to counter a possible “all-white alliance.”1557 After 
1905, to counter increasing American interest in South Manchuria, he supported stronger 
ties with Russia. From 1907-1912, Japan and Russia signed three conventions.1558 
Through World War I, Yamagata increasingly saw improved Russo-Japanese relations as 
key to countering an increasing American presence in East Asia.1559 By 1914, many other 
members of the military-bureaucratic elite shared Yamagata’s view about the low value 
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japanese imperial expansion to counter the coming race 
                                                
1554 On imperialism, perhaps compared to military hardliners in Tokyo, Ito was moderate.  They waited 
until 1910 to formally annex Korea into the Japanese empire, one year after Ito’s assassination in 1909.  A 
Korean nationalist assassinated him in Harbin.  
1555 Ibid., 139, 162. “Man of Peace” is the title of Chapter 14 of Hamada’s biography about Ito.  
Throughout his life, Ito negotiated for peace between Japan and other nations on several occasions.  The 
first time was before 1868, when several Western powers prepared to bombard Shimonoseki after Chôshu 
forces stationed there had attacked several passing foreign ships. Ito negotiated with both Chôshu and 
British leaders.    
1556 In his very racist picture of international relations, Yamagata believed that only an alliance with China 
could protect Asia from Western and American encroachment.  For the Yamagata faction, China had an 
almost “religious” significance, as the former center of East Asian civilization.  Faction members saw 
dangers in Japan’s over-reliance on the Western powers.  To counter the threat of increasing Western 
imperialism, and an impending race war, close relations with China were seen as mandatory (Dickinson, 
War and National, 44, 250). 
1557 Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 250, 270-271. 
1558 Yamagata believed that a clash between the United States and Japan in East Asia was unavoidable, 
although he had no idea when it might happen (Dickinson, War and National, 142-143). 
1559 Ibid., 42-48, 81. Yamagata supported the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1916 in which Russia replaced 
Britain as the focus of Japanese foreign affairs, to obtain Russian acknowledgement of expanded Japanese 
interests on the continent, and potential Russian help against the United States.  During World War I, the 
Yamagata faction saw the United States and Britain as the two chief threats to Japan’s interests in East Asia 




war, and the United States as the biggest threat to Japanese power in Asia.1560 Concerning 
the United States, as early as 1916, prominent publications and top intellectuals began 
pondering how Japan should with deal with rising American power in East Asia.1561          
 Hirohito, Emperor.  Here we will consider Hirohito’s prewar views of Japan’s 
foreign relations at some length, given his huge importance in twentieth century Japanese 
politics. Concerning Japan’s foreign relations, Hirohito was taught a rather social 
Darwinian and racialist philosophy, stressing competition between races for global 
dominance, Japan’s superiority and a disdain for democratic principles.  The only 
absolute was the state.1562  On international history, he learned that during the wars with 
China and Russia, Japan always acted justly, for “peace.”1563  He devoured books about 
Western history that saw revolution and war as monarchy’s greatest threats.  His 
instruction in history was at times rational and rich in examples, yet reflected official 
ideologies of Japan’s racial origins and the emperor as the center of its power and 
empire.1564  When young, he viewed modern history in terms of Emperor Meiji and his 
court, and the world in light of the Meiji empire.  The Meiji wars with China and Russia 
reshaped the situation of Japan’s national life, and its international environment.1565 
                                                
1560 Ibid., 48. 
1561 Ibid., 155. Yamagata and other members of his faction grew increasingly worried about the threat of 
“radical” ideas of representative government and Wilsonian international egalitarianism presented at the 
postwar Versailles peace conference, both emanating from the United States (Ibid., 227, 234-237). 
1562 Bix, Hirohito, 66-69. 
1563 Though his history instructor acknowledged Chinese resistance to Japan’s colonization of Taiwan after 
the Sino-Japanese war, he was silent about Japanese injustices committed against Korea (Ibid., 74).  
1564 Ibid., 74-76. 
1565 Ibid., 33. Related to Hirohito’s views, during World War I, Japan’s leaders supported a foreign policy 
of “Asian Monroeism,” the right of Japan to protect Asia from the West, and to use war to oust Western 
powers from China.  Japan’s leaders viewed the world as locked in endless racial conflict.  Hinting at 
Japanese military goals in the 1930s, they secretly formulated plans to make China a Japanese protectorate, 
dominate Manchuria and Mongolia, control resource-rich Indonesia, and declare Asia for Asian (Japanese) 
control (Ibid., 146-148, 264).  
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During Hirohito’s regency (1921-1926), Japan signed several treaties that 
changed its foreign relations, shifting the emphasis on multilateral treaties, the League of 
Nations and its “peace code.”  Hirohito and the court supported this reorientation.1566  
The new order recognized Japan as a great power, but had weaknesses, not allowing 
racial equality.  Japan’s leaders and Hirohito continued to view international relations as 
competition between the races, and that each nation must have adequate arms.  Treaties 
signed by Japan in 1921-19221567 limited its naval power, and committed it to “open 
door” and “equal opportunity” policies for China’s development.  Realizing that the new 
system would not support Japan’s true goals, Hirohito and the court finally withdrew 
their support, supporting actions in violation of the League of Nations.1568 
In the early-mid 1920s, Hirohito was proud of Japan’s victories in World War I 
and its wars with China and Russia, yet he was somewhat open to the international peace 
perspectives, given the dangers of rapid military buildup and engagement in China.1569  In 
1921, court officials urged Hirohito to go to Europe and see the world and its leaders, to 
prepare Japan for its new international relations.   They wanted to project an image of 
                                                
1566 Hirohito and the court supported this reorientation to goals also supported by the United States since 
they hoped to limit Japan’s military spending increases (Bix, Hirohito). 
1567 These are referred to as the treaties of the Washington Conference (Ibid., 147). 
1568 Ibid., 146-150. Japan’s leaders’ support of these treaties was based on certain assumptions, that peace 
would guarantee Japan’s gains in Mongolia and Manchuria, allow its future plans for China and Asia, and 
that Japan could separate foreign policy from domestic repression (Ibid., 149-150).  In 1922, some of 
Japan’s leaders supported the Washington treaties, since they believed that agreement with the United 
States was necessary for Japan to flourish economically, but many in the right wing and the military 
disagreed (Ibid., 128).  In 1923 Japan’s military leaders defined the Soviet Union as Japan’s number one 
potential enemy, number two as the United States, and number three as China (Ibid., 151).  
1569 Ibid., 146. He praised the principles of the League of Nations, but out of youthful zeal.  He believed he 
must support peace as the context where the Japanese empire could develop to the level of the “Great 
Powers.”  He also denounced “extremist” thought and “luxury,” in line with Japan’s conservative elites and 
military (Ibid., 91-93). 
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Hirohito as Japan’s worldly-wise, confident, great regent, to strengthen the monarchy’s 
“declining” image.1570   
 In the late 1920s, Hirohito evolved a view of diplomacy and international law 
stressing that leaders must sometimes use force in support of their national interests.1571  
In August 1928, Japan signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which stressed pacifist 
principles.1572  The Pact enjoyed broad support in the United States, but not in Japan, 
where leading scholars denounced it.1573  Hirohito and his court group never encouraged 
it.  The signing of the Pact occurred amidst a developing crisis over Japan’s presence in 
Manchuria, and new efforts of the government and court to unite the Japanese with their 
emperor, and to renew national spirit.1574  Hirohito and the court group decided to pump 
                                                
1570 Ibid., 103-105. For the trip, the Imperial Household ministry carefully trained him, and prepared the 
press to cover it extensively, since this was the Taisho government’s first major effort to groom Hirohito’s 
image.  He visited six European nations, including the Vatican, but not the United States (Ibid., 106-108). 
He was especially impressed with England and France.  Court officials decided not to send him to the 
United States, since they thought that he might be too shocked by the different “national sentiment” of that 
nation, and the rough behavior of its reporters and citizens (Ibid., 106).  In England, Hirohito especially 
desired to learn from King George V, who survived the storms that destroyed many of Europe’s 
monarchies.  The king eagerly welcomed Hirohito, in front of cheering crowds.  Some of the chief lessons 
that Hirohito took from George V were that a monarch could be both a political activist who approved 
prime ministers, and exercise great influence behind the scenes.  Also, he observed how the king used large 
ceremonies and court rituals to strengthen the appeal of the throne and nationalism.  Yet, Japanese politics 
were very different from Britain’s (Ibid., 115-118).    
1571 Ibid., 133-135. Hirohito received regular lectures by academic experts on these topics.  One of his 
lecturers was Prof. Tachi Sakutaro, Japan’s leading international lawyer.  His view of international law was 
that war was always legal, that international law existed to serve state interests, and that self-defense 
included war to extend territory or protect a nation’s citizens or property located abroad.  These views were 
contrary to the views of international law of leading American experts, who argued that aggressive war was 
a crime, and aggressors must be punished.  Hirohito also heard from additional lecturers on the conditions 
in other important locations, such as the Soviet Union and Japan’s colonies (Ibid., 133-135). 
1572 In Japan, the Kellogg-Briand Pact is referred to as the No-War Treaty.  According to the Pact, 
signatories agreed to recognize aggressive war as an international crime, condemn war as a solution for 
international disputes, and seek to use “pacific means” for such conflicts (Ibid., 220-221). 
1573 Among those who denounced it were Tachi Sakutaro, Japan’s top international law expert and 
Hirohito’s personal lecturer on the subject.  In the minds of Japan’s intellectuals, the No-War Treaty was 
another example of the Western liberal democracies, such as Britain and the United States, forcing their 
pacifist interpretations of international law on the post-World War I world order, for their own advantage 
(Ibid.,  222-223). 
1574 Hirohito did not see the Pact as a barrier to resolving any potential crisis over Japan’s presence in 
Manchuria through force.  Japan’s leasehold, centered on Dalian, southern Manchuria, had been acquired 
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up nationalist spirit through the enthronement events.1575 Like many Japanese bureaucrats 
of the late 1930s, he likely viewed international law as a Western invention, useful for 
Western, but not Japanese, interests.1576 
 In the early 1930s, the worldview of the Japanese of themselves and the world 
changed.  The military, not the elites, seemed to have more awareness of the people’s 
suffering in the depression, so the people supported the former.  Overall, Japan accepted 
“anti-Chinese, anti-Western xenophobia,” supporting the Manchurian incident in 
1931.1577  Hirohito and the court could have reversed this, but they saw international 
relations in racial terms, disagreed over the proper path, and allowed the military’s view 
to prevail.1578  In the predominant Japanese worldview of international relations, the 
United States and Britain seemed very hypocritical for proclaiming democracy at home 
while supporting imperialism abroad.1579  The Soviet Union seemed a huge threat, with 
its potential might and communist ideology.  The breakdown of global capitalism, 
                                                                                                                                            
during the Qing dynasty.  Hirohito viewed it as part of the “sacred” legacy he inherited from the Emperor 
Meiji.  Prof. Tachi looked for loopholes in the Pact that might allow Japan to protect its rights and interests 
there (Ibid., 222-223).   
1575 Ibid., 221-224. 
1576 Ibid., 359-360. In the late 1930s, Hirohito did not support complying with international laws governing 
the treatment of prisoners of war.  He could have issued orders to prevent the mass murder and torture of 
numerous Chinese prisoners, but did not (Ibid., 360). 
1577 The Manchurian Incident refers to the situation where Japan’s Guandong Army faked an explosion on a 
railway bridge near Shenyang, Manchuria in order to falsely blame China and provoke an excuse to further 
invade Manchuria. 
1578 Ibid., 263-264. 
1579 Many Japanese became willing to confront Britain and the United States for Japan’s honor.  Prince and 
multi-term Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe argued that the white race had violated international law by 
dominating the yellow race.  Konoe’s views were highly influential for the emperor and the court (Ibid., 
265-269).   
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emerging monetary and trade blocs, and domestic disagreement over politics and 
ideology were used to justify Japan’s actions in Manchuria.1580   
 Also in the early 1930s, Hirohito knew that only superior arms would permit 
Japan to achieve victory in war with the United States or Britain, and hesitated to break 
relations with them.1581 Rapid mobilization would threaten the stability of the throne.1582  
In July 1940, Japan contemplated invading Southeast Asia, and strengthening its axis ties.  
Hirohito worried about the response of Britain and the United States, but hoped for their 
continued cooperation, and that invading would help end the China war.  The Americans 
saw it as a direct provocation.1583  Japan signed the axis Tripartite Pact in September 
1940, which the Japanese government contemplated for three years.  Hirohito could have 
halted it, but did not.1584  He broke with Meiji Japan’s heritage of friendship with Britain 
and the United States.  He hesitated, knowing it might cause war.1585   
 Hirohito did nothing to counter the views of military officers suggesting that 
China was merely a geographical designation, not a distinct people or nation, and that 
Japan should be allowed to seize all desired regions.1586  Many university professors 
supported official, ideological defense of the attack on China—Japan offered China the 
                                                
1580 Ibid., 265-269. For the specifics on the views of many Japanese, Hirohito, the court and other leading 
officials on Manchuria and empire in the 1930s, see my discussion later in this chapter in the section on 
Japanese views of imperialism in the 1930s.  
1581 For example, Hirohito did not accept all of the nationalist propaganda put forth by the government in 
some well-known patriotic films released in 1933 to 1934 that portrayed the West as Japan’s insidious 
enemy.  I discuss a couple of these films later in this chapter in the section on Hirohito’s view of outside 
cultural influences on Japan (1895-1945). 
1582 Ibid., 278. 
1583 Ibid., 375-379. 
1584 The axis states Japan eventually allied with were Germany, Italy, Romania, and Hungary (Ibid., 380). 
1585 Ibid., 380-382. 
1586 For example, he allowed the military to increase the size of its China garrison in 1936, and approved 
the construction of a new military base at Fengtai outside Beijing.  He also believed that resource-rich 
provinces in North China should be available for seizure (Ibid., 306-307).  
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emperor’s benevolent “imperial way” (kôdô).1587  Hirohito supported the war.  Behind 
Japanese support was the throne, and his powerful image as benevolent emperor, the 
virtuous embodiment of morality, aristocratic and national values.  Hirohito symbolically 
clouded “principles of peace” that later emerged as “policies of violence,” serving as 
supreme war commander, and shaping policy and strategy.  By the late 1930s, he did not 
view China as a modern state, likely viewed the invasion as correct, and supported a 
policy of undeclared war.  
 Policy documents from July 1941 mention the possibility of wars with the 
Soviet Union, the United States and Britain.1588  Hirohito most feared war with the Soviet 
Union.  Soon he believed that war with the latter two must be risked but avoided if 
possible.  When Japan’s military hastened their advance into Southeast Asia, the United 
States responded with harsh economic sanctions, but only light military reaction.  The 
sanctions greatly shocked Hirohito and Japan’s top leaders.  Different factions in the 
court group debated whether or how soon to declare war on the United States and 
Britain.1589  Hirohito and many leaders assumed that the axis would be victorious over 
Britain and the Soviet Union, so they plunged ahead.  Indecision risked internal stability 
and the throne’s strength.  Hirohito had several options, to favor diplomacy, focus on 
China, or keep Japan neutral.  In fall 1941, he assented to war.1590                  
                                                
1587 This is related to the ideology of hakkô ichiu (Ibid., 326-327). 
1588 One document called for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, ending the 
war in China, and invading southward, to ensure Japan’s “self-existence and self-defense” (Ibid., 397).   
1589 Hirohito worried about the possibility of Japan’s “ABCD encirclement,” Japan being surrounded by 
America, Britain, China, and the Dutch (Ibid., 559).  He also blamed Japan’s situation on the U.S. oil 
embargo on Japan, and stalemated U.S.-Japan negotiations.  He had no realization that Japan’s situation 
was due to the cabinet’s aggressive policies against China and Southeast Asia (Ibid., 407). 
1590 Ibid., 397-405, 408-410, 419, 426-427, 429-439. While preparations for war with the U.S., Britain, and 
Holland continued in fall 1941, Hirohito stalled and quietly urged officials to seek other options.  He was 
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 Yanagita Kunio.  Yanagita’s thought on Japan’s social and economic policies 
of the early 1900s suggests that he supported a non-assertive, non-expansionary pattern 
for Japan’s international relations.1591  His primary political writings from 1924 to 1930 
show important clues about his overall political thought.1592  He laments the deterioration 
of Sino-Japanese relations, and Japan’s imposition of the Twenty-One Demands on China 
during World War I. Although he felt Japan had no alternative but war in the Sino-
Japanese War, he was uncertain if it was justified.  His comments about the Japanese 
immigration exclusion law passed in the United States in 1924 reveal his general attitude 
about international relations.  He felt the law was symptomatic of Japan’s general 
international isolation since the late 1800s.  Overall, national interests were still more 
primary in the international system than the cooperative spirit of international 
humanitarianism.  But power imbalances and conflicts between nations are likely 
temporary phenomena in world history.  Yanagita also distrusted oligarchic dominance of 




                                                                                                                                            
hesitant concerning possible invasions and war with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Southeast 
Asia.  Some reports likely convinced him that a prolonged war with the United States could be sustainable, 
and so he finally assented.  In the days leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, as Hirohito 
reviewed numerous details about the attack and other aspects of the coming war, he was amazingly calm 
and optimistic.  On the eve of the Pearl Harbor, in late 1941, faced with the possibilities of an oil embargo 
that strangled the military, defeat in China and loss of most of the empire, and endangering the throne, 
Hirohito chose war with the United States and Britain.  He believed that the axis would defeat Britain, and 
hoped that quick action by Japan could lead to a standoff with the more powerful United States (Ibid., 414-
415, 433, 437, 439, 441).   
1591 Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 77-78. 
1592 Kawada Minoru studied Yanagita’s political writings from this period that appeared as political 
editorials in the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (Ibid., 81). 
1593 Ibid., 81-82, 84-87. For example, Yanagita doubted if Japan could learn anything from fascist Italy, and 
he thoroughly opposed elite dominance of decision-making in Japan’s international relations, such as going 
to war.  Such important matters should be decided with input from the people (Ibid., 86-87). 
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Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Political Relations 
(1895-1945) 
 
 These leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external relations can be classified in 
three main groups: their general views of foreign relations and the world, their views of 
relations with specific regions (Asia and the West), and their views of international 
conflicts, peace and diplomacy. On foreign relations and the world, Hamada concludes 
that Ito was a moderate on foreign policy, a realist, and a general supporter of peace.1594 
Yanagita supported a populist, more democratic approach to international relations, 
similar to his approach to domestic politics. He opposed elite domination of foreign 
policy decision-making, and instead advocated a non-aggressive, non-imperialist 
approach to Japan’s foreign relations. Temporarily, he believed that realist, national 
interests and power struggles dominated foreign policy, but that international cooperation 
would eventually prevail. Perhaps we could call Yanagita a progressive idealist. 
Hirohito’s views of international relations stress social Darwinism, competition between 
the races for global domination, Japanese superiority, a disdain for democracy, and 
preference for absolute state power. In the late 1930s, he viewed international law as 
useful for Western, but not Japanese, interests. The ideological tendencies of Ito and 
Hirohito were more conservative, while Yanagita’s were more liberal. Concerning their 
views of the world and world history, Hirohito was an avid reader of world and Western 
history who received (in his education) fairly accurate yet racialist views that supported 
state ideologies, empire (via the lens of the Meiji era, the Emperor Meiji and the Meiji 
empire), and the empire as absolute. After 1914, Yamagata was preoccupied with fear of 
                                                
1594 Hamada, Prince Ito. Ito negotiated with foreign powers for peace on several occasions. 
586 
 
an impending race war the West, centered in Asia, which he believed the United States 
and Britain would wage.   
 Regarding relations with other Asian powers, by 1909, Ito stressed peace and 
cooperation among major East Asia powers, non-interference from outsiders, and fair 
trade. Similarly, it is likely that Hirohito supported the doctrine of “Asian Monroeism,” 
that Asia should be free from intervention from outsiders, but open to Japanese input. 
Views of China varied, from Ito and Yamagata who desired cooperation with China 
against Western encroachment, to Hirohito, who, in addition to that view, was proud of 
Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War, and who supported, by his actions, the right of 
Japan to invade, exploit, and control China as a protectorate in the 1930s. In contrast, 
Yanagita was ashamed of the Sino-Japanese War. Views of Manchuria also varied. Ito 
was nervous about both Russia’s and Japan’s presence there in the early twentieth 
century, and negotiated with Russia over its future. But in the 1930s, Hirohito saw 
Manchuria as part of a “sacred legacy” inherited from the Emperor Meiji, and did not 
oppose Japanese intervention in Manchuria in 1931. Ito desired close relations and 
friendship with Korea in the late 1890s, feared conflict with Russia over it, and wanted to 
help Korea maintain its independence. Ironically he became the first Japanese governor-
general there, and demonstrated a patronizing attitude that the Koreans resented; it 
resulted in Ito’s death. Tensions over Korea and Manchuria led him to negotiate with 
Russia before the Russo-Japanese War, with whom he desired peace. Somewhat 
similarly, in the early 1900s and 1910s, Yamagata sought stronger ties with Russia to 
counter increasing American influence and an impending “race war.” In contrast, though 
Hirohito seemed proud of Japan’s victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, he 
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feared the Soviet Union as Japan’s greatest potential enemy. Hirohito supported invasion 
of Southeast Asia in 1940, and hoped it would not provoke a harsh Western response, but 
it resulted in sharp U.S. economic sanctions. Hirohito was shocked, worried about 
Japan’s need for resources from the region, and the possibility of Japan’s “ABCD” 
encirclement. He hoped that conflict with the U.S., partly over Southeast Asia, could be 
avoided, but finally consented to it with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Some common 
themes that emerge here among these leaders are a common desire for Japan to help its 
Asian neighbors defend themselves against the West. However, later in the period, by the 
1920s and 1930s, more than two decades into the era of overseas Japanese imperialism, 
Hirohito shows more support for Japanese intervention in Asia, China, Manchuria, 
Taiwan1595 and Southeast Asia than other leader we have studied. 
 In their views of relations with the West, commonly there was caution and fear. 
When young, Ito was worried about the West’s power. During and after World War I, 
Yamagata saw increasing American interest in China, Manchuria, spreading democracy 
and international Wilsonian egalitarianism, along with Britain, as Japan’s greatest 
security threats, and sought Russian help to counter them. By the early 1930s, it seems 
likely that Hirohito and his court group supported the main view of the military elite, that 
the United States and Britain were very hypocritical for supporting democracy at home 
and imperialism abroad. Japanese leaders slowly became willing to confront the U.S. on 
its racism, but Hirohito knew the danger of conflict with the Americans, and hesitated to 
cut ties. By 1940, despite hoping for cooperation, he finally, hesitatingly broke Japan’s 
                                                
1595 See comments on Hirohito’s tour of Taiwan below in the section on leaders’ views of imperialism, later 
in this chapter.  
588 
 
long Meiji tradition of friendship with the U.S. and Britain. In 1941, frustrated over U.S. 
economic sanctions because of Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia, Hirohito proceeded to 
war, without realizing that the U.S. reaction was mainly due to Japan’s aggressive 
military actions in China and Southeast Asia. Regarding Britain, Ito disliked it as a 
youth,1596 and was wary of signing a treaty with it in the early 1900s, for fear of angering 
Russia. Similarly, Yamagata’s racist view of coming conflicts caused him to value peace 
with Russia more than with Britain, and since he saw the United States and Britain as the 
chief threats to Japan’s interests in East Asia, he preferred relations with Russia more 
than with Britain. Despite Hirohito’s highly positive impressions of Britain garnered 
during his imperial tour there in the early 1920s, he also noticed the hypocrisy of British 
imperialism. As with the United States, he also desired peace with Britain, and worried 
about Britain’s response to Japanese intervention in Southeast Asia. But by the time he 
signed the Tripartite treaty with the Axis in September 1940, he was willing to bet on 
Britain’s losing the war, and to risk it. Britain was also the “B” in the “ABCD” threat of 
Japan’s encirclement. At the beginning of this period (1895 to 1945), these leaders 
generally viewed both the United States and Britain as threats, and feared them. Leaders 
throughout the period expressed frustration over the hypocrisy and racist nature of Anglo-
American imperialism. These events resulted in Japanese war with both of these powers 
by the end of this era. At the beginning of the period, these leaders seemed more willing, 
at times, to cooperate with Russia, but Hirohito greatly feared the Soviet Union, and 
seemed generally more pro-Asian than pro-Western in his view of international relations 
before 1945.  
                                                
1596 Remember that as a youth, Ito participated in the burning of the British legation house. 
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 In their views of international conflict, peace and diplomacy, three of these 
leaders saw international conflicts in racial terms, to a large extent. In the early 1900s, 
Yamagata feared worldwide racial wars, and sought ties with both China and Russia to 
counter the possibility. In the early 1930s, Hirohito largely envisioned international 
relations in racial terms, though he saw revolution and war as the monarchy’s greatest 
threats, and was proud of Japan’s victories in wars with China, Russia, and in World War 
I. While he hoped to avoid war with the United States and Britain, he was willing to risk 
it for Japan’s national interests. While he supported Japan’s invasions of China and 
Southeast Asia, and finally assented to war with the United States, as we noted above, he 
most feared war with the Soviet Union. Yanagita’s view of international relations was 
seemingly partly colored by the issue of race. He saw Japan’s international relations as 
characterized by the twin issues of isolation and exclusion on the basis of race.1597 
Regarding specific conflicts, while two of the leaders regretted some of them, Hirohito 
took a more positive view before 1945.1598 
 The power of Hirohito’s supreme authority and position meant that his actions, 
inactions, and decisions gave extremely influential input into the events in China and 
World War II in the 1930s and 1940s.  For example, in the late 1930s, in the military’s 
“Imperial Headquarters” and the “imperial conferences” (gozen kaigi), Hirohito 
influenced and approved major decisions affecting Japan, its colonies, and other 
                                                
1597 I say this based on Yanagita’s view of the 1924 Japanese immigration exclusion act in the United States 
that we noted earlier in this chapter.  
1598 Yanagita regretted Japan’s actions in the Sino-Japanese War, and Ito tried to discourage war with 
Russia. In the 1920s, Hirohito felt that each nation had a right to adequate arms, and that war was 
sometimes necessary, for a nation to pursue its national interests. We already noted his pride in Japan’s 
victories in earlier modern wars.  
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nations.1599 These basic facts, argued at length by Herbert Bix (Bix 2000), stand in stark 
contrast to Hirohito’s postwar image long cultivated by the Japanese government, that of 
Hirohito as a passive, pacifist ruler controlled and manipulated by aggressive militarists 
and ultraconservative bureaucrats he was powerless to stop. Hirohito was highly 
concerned about his image,1600 an effort he continued after the war, and which, with 
American cooperation, enabled his survival.  Bix charges that Hirohito’s concern for the 
image of the emperor, the throne and their survival even delayed the surrender of Japan at 
the war’s end.1601 
 Ito and Yanagita stand out as the strongest supporters of peace here.1602 
Interestingly, Hirohito believed that Japan waged the earlier wars with China and Russia 
for the sake of peace. In the early 1920s, at first Hirohito and his court somewhat 
supported the prevailing international atmosphere of peace-building, multilateral treaties, 
and the activation of the League of Nations. But shortly later they dropped their support, 
since these various instruments seemed to limit what Hirohito and other conservative 
political and military leaders viewed as Japan’s legitimate interests in Asia. These leaders 
also displayed mixed attitudes concerning various treaties.1603   
                                                
1599 Bix, Hirohito, 327-332. 
1600 Starting in the 1920s, the Japanese government used, created, and projected many select images of 
Hirohito and the imperial throne to encourage Japanese nationalism, patriotism, and support for the throne, 
stressed at various places in Bix, Hirohito. This concern for image is also seen in Hirohito’s imperial tours 
of colonies as regent (Ibid., 137-139, 156), and in the Imperial Household Ministry’s excessive attention to 
detail in promoting and maintaining Hirohito’s image in such events as his enthronement ceremony (Bix, 
Hirohito). 
1601 For more on Bix’s discussion of how Hirohito hesitated to end the war, see Ibid., 16-17, 487-493, 499-
505, 519-521, 523-524.  
1602 We noted above how Hamada called Ito a “man of peace,” given his opposition to the Russo-Japanese 
War, support for and negotiations for peace with various powers. 
1603 For example, Ito desired to quickly end the unequal trade treaties that the West had forced on Japan in 
the late nineteenth century. He also reluctantly agreed to the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902, fearing it 




Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Political 
Relations (1895-1945) 
 
 Development Issues. Internationalization asks, as Japan engaged in increasing 
trade in the global economy from 1895 to 1945, what happened culturally on the 
international level? What, if any evidence, do we see from these worldviews of Japan’s 
external political relations? Most of the leaders here, except for Yanagita, were 
conservative in their politics, and expected Japan to soon get sucked into various race 
wars. Most of these leaders have very realist views of international relations, somewhat 
affected by evolutionistic thought. All of this is especially true for Hirohito. All these 
leaders support Japan’s leadership of the Asian region against Western imperialism. 
During World War II, Hirohito expressed increasing support for Japanese imperialism in 
several regions. He was fearful of the West, but finally willing to sacrifice war with the 
United States and Britain for the pursuit of Japan’s interests. He showed a more favorable 
attitude toward conflict than any other leader here. While the leaders had varied attitudes 
toward treaties, Hirohito only supported them when, again, they were judged to be in 
Japan’s interests. The generally conservative, assertive attitudes toward external political 
relations and conflict seen in these leaders tended to encourage assertive Japanese 
political and diplomatic action as Japan’s domestic politics became increasingly 
conservative and militaristic in the 1930s. The assertion of Japanese power in the East 
Asian region could not help but affect the cultures of other countries there as Japan 
exercised increasing political and economic influence. Whether through trade during 
                                                                                                                                            
various multilateral treaties, but soon opposed most of them. They also never supported the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact of the late 1920s, since its pacifist nature seemed contrary to Japan’s overseas interests.  
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World War I, later conflict, or direct imperialism, the projection of these attitudes on 
other nations in the region surely had profound effects. 
 Technology Issues. On general concepts of technology, what are the most 
important technology-related ideas associated with these worldviews of external political 
relations? The main technological phenomena connected with these worldviews were the 
technologies of heavy industrialization, militarism, and military arms. While Japan 
imported some of the weapons it used in its various conflicts, without this 
industrialization, Japan could not have mastered or built the military arms it needed to 
support the military actions in which it engaged in this period, from the Russo-Japanese 
War through World War II. If Japan had not produced and used these technologies in all 
of these conflicts, perhaps the future of East Asia would have been very different. 
 What are some the most significant political factors present in the imported 
technologies and related ideas in the worldviews of external political relations studied 
here?1604 Some of the main imported technologies related to these worldviews were 
industrial and military technologies, military arms, and political ideas of authoritarian 
government, monarchy, military theories, and theories of evolutionistic political 
development.1605 Did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively 
or negatively? Why? Though more liberal thought from Great Britain and the United 
States was influential in Japan during the Taisho democracy movement (about 1905 to 
1932), especially in academic circles and popular culture, conservative thought from 
                                                
1604 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
1605 For a more detailed list of the types of ideas and technologies that were imported, see the discussion 
later in this chapter, under cognition issues, on the cultural logics of these worldviews of external political 
relations, specifically on the global phenomena to which these leaders reacted. Evolutionistic ideas seemed 
more relevant earlier in the period (seen here especially in the thought of Kato), but touched even the 
thinking of Hirohito, due to his education early in the twentieth century.  
593 
 
Europe was more predominant in the government, the military and the imperial court. 
This conservative influence constrained the actions of the Japanese government and its 
top decision makers. It also had a decisive impact on the overall direction Japan’s 
politics, international and military relations took. 
 What were the important ideas and technologies transferred in these worldviews 
of external political relations? These ideas and technologies were mentioned in the 
immediately preceding paragraph. Who were the main international actors in the external 
environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and what impacts did they 
have on the transfer outcomes? Some of the main international actors included foreign 
governments and leaders, foreign diplomatic bodies and actors, such as the League of 
Nations, and foreign military bodies who advised Japan. Important domestic actors 
included ministries and agencies of the Japanese government related to heavy industry, 
foreign affairs and relations, the various emperors and their courts, branches of the 
Japanese armed forces, and military leaders. The main impacts of the foreign actors on 
these transfers included allowing the Japanese government, military, and heavy 
industries, both public and private, to import these technologies and develop them 
further. The primary impacts of the domestic actors, beyond importing and further 
developing the technologies and ideas, included deploying and spreading them 
throughout areas under Japanese influence in East Asia and the South Pacific.  
 What are the significant lessons here, or could these outcomes have been 
improved? A possible lesson is that Western exporters should perhaps have been more 
selective in what they allowed Japan to import, by asking for what purposes the imported 
items would be used. This was perhaps too advanced a concept for the time. Did the 
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international system affect the technologies and ideas Japan imported positively or 
negatively? Japan imported some ideas and technologies that became very destructive to 
the peoples of East Asia in the 1930s and 1940s. Most of the time, foreign governments 
did not consider very much what Japan was importing, or what the effects might be. 
When Japan attacked Southeast Asia in 1941, the United States enacted strict economic 
sanctions. This was one case of a foreign government reflecting seriously on what Japan 
was doing, and taking action as a result. 
 What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported 
technologies and ideas in these worldviews?1606 Some of the most important cultural 
factors were conservative political ideologies that stressed the virtue of power and 
military victory, that the strong would be victorious and rule the weak. The state, 
military, and imperial court especially embraced ideas that were conservative, as Japan’s 
own predominant culture of politics was. Some of these ideas partly had their basis in 
evolutionistic thought, while some were accentuated by the nationalist, imperialist 
propaganda that became influential in Japan in the late 1920s through the 1930s. This 
combination of ideas helped Japan’s conservative political and military leaders come to 
the conclusion that Japan had a duty, or right, to help defend both itself and other Asian 
nations against the West. Astute Japanese leaders quickly observed the hypocrisy of how 
the West handled the issue of race. There was no strong culture of peace in Japan at this 
                                                
1606 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
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time, neither in the main political ideas the state imported, nor in Japan’s own 
“traditions.”1607 
 In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies and 
ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments 
on the international level?1608 Japan’s leaders often used ideas of strong military action, 
aggression, and military intervention in the affairs of other nations to pursue Japan’s 
national interests, and what they interpreted to be the interests of neighboring regions, 
including Korea, Taiwan and others. Japan used the most advanced military technologies 
it could obtain to seek to obtain access to or control territories and resources that they 
believed were necessary to defend Japan and the rest of Asia against the West.    
 How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the 
international system or environment? These technologies, especially military ones, 
enabled Japan to invade and attack Russia, Korea, Taiwan, China, the United States 
(Hawaii), and other areas. Earlier attacks brought wealth and honor to the nation’s 
military, and new areas came under Japan’s predominant influence for the first time. But 
the long-term costs were devastating; ultimately Japan was virtually destroyed at the end 
of World War II, and damage to other areas was also huge, in many cases. 
 Do the belief systems of any of these leaders (on technology issues on the 
international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Yamagata, 
Hirohito and Kato were more conservative and militarist leaning, Ito was conservative 
                                                
1607 Note my previous comments on pacifism in Japan. When pacifist ideologies were first imported from 
the West in the 1800s, Japan had no recent, significant experience of war, so many Japanese had a hard 
connecting with these ideas. 
1608 Again, this is what I call the “international cultural ecology approach” to technology, drawn from 
anthropology, based on Clemmer,  Myers, and Rudden, Julian Steward, and  Glick, “Technology,” 464.  
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but less militarist, and Yanagita was more of a progressive pacifist. Several of the 
leaders’ belief systems definitely blinded them to certain realities. The clearest example 
here is Hirohito. His unusual, tightly controlled environment, steeped in imperialist, 
nationalist, and spiritual ideologies, could not help but constrain his viewpoints and 
actions. Did the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing conditions 
and reality? If so, how did these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes? In Hirohito 
we have a very strong case of a leader who failed to adequately adjust his decisions to 
rapidly changing conditions, especially during World War II.1609 The results for Japan 
and East Asia were devastating. Through the war, Japan experienced the ultimate 
technological nightmare to date: two atomic bombings. And ironically, this supreme loss 
eventually resulted in Japan’s postwar technological renaissance with open export access 
to the world’s largest consumer market, the United States. 
 Finally, in these worldviews on external relations, is the concept of 
technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how? Views of technonationalism were 
very strongly present in the views of Yamagata and Hirohito. Yamagata strongly relied 
on military power and technology to create the strong military forces needed to defend 
Japan and allow it to pursue its national interests in Asia. Though his overt use of military 
technologies for this purpose was more evident in the previous period (1850 to 1895), 
these factors were still present in his thought early in this period (1895 to 1945). In his 
thought on international relations in this era, Hirohito shows implicit support for the ideas 
of technonationalism as ideology. Though his thinking and actions were more driven by 
                                                
1609 I will mention only two examples discussed in Bix, Hirohito. One example was Hirohito’s minute 
attention to detail in many policy areas, which caused him on occasion to lose sight of the “big picture,” 
and also his hesitancy to allow Japan to surrender until the last possible moment (Bix, Hirohito).   
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ideas of power politics and evolutionistic images of survival of the strongest nations, and 
less by overt economics, he surely realized that economics and resources had connection 
to political power.1610 
 Cognition Issues. Image. The basic images in these leaders’ minds (1895 to 
1945) about Japan’s international relations may be organized into about four major 
groups. In the first group, images of international relations and general foreign policy, 
concerning their primary images of foreign policy and international relations, most of the 
images lean toward realism and competition between nation states for power.1611 Images 
of intense competition between nations, based on their own interests,1612 battles for 
power, and competition between the races1613 suggest the influence of evolutionary 
thought.1614 Of the leaders who commented on external political relations in this period 
(Ito, Hirohito, Yanagita, and Yamagata), only Yanagita’s images suggest non-aggression 
or distrust of oligarchic dominance of leadership in diplomacy. Some of Hirohito’s 
images reveal the opposite: a dislike for democratic input in international relations. In all 
of the images on basic international relations, there is a desire for equality between Japan 
and other nations.1615 Images of the place of Japan in international relations mention 
competing images: Japan’s superiority to other nations,1616 the danger of its encirclement 
by other powers,1617 and its general isolation.1618 The images of several leaders include 
                                                
1610 He demonstrates this idea in his support for Japan’s attack on Southeast Asia, to obtain needed 
resources, in the early 1940s (Bix, Hirohito). 
1611 Ito, Hirohito. 
1612 Hirohito, Yanagita. 
1613 Hirohito. 
1614 Hirohito. 





references to competition between races and impending race-based conflict between 
Japan and Western powers.1619 In these leaders’ images of Western and international 
history, we see a stress on conflict, power, and competition between nations.1620 In 
Hirohito’s images of international law, the stress is on nations acting in their own 
interests, and the assumption is that through international law, Western nations do just 
that. 
 A second major group of international relations images are those of Japan’s 
relations with Asian powers. In his images of general relations with Far Eastern 
countries, Ito expresses support for peace, cooperation, commerce, and for Japan 
defending its interests against other regional powers if necessary. He also offers images 
of friendly relations with Korea. On images of China and Manchuria, in the 1930s, 
Hirohito is supportive of invasion and inferior status for both regions, and earlier, fearful 
of China helping to “encircle” Japan. In contrast, Yanagita regrets Japanese aggressive 
action in China. Images on relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, from Ito, 
Yamagata, and Hirohito, are contrasting. While Hirohito and Ito greatly fear conflict with 
Russia or the Soviet Union, Yamagata is eager for treaties with Russia to counter threats 
he sees from the United States. Finally, in his images of relations with Southeast Asia, 
Hirohito reveals he is willing to go to war with the United States and Britain in order to 
gain the resources of Southeast Asia for Japan. 
                                                                                                                                            
1618 Yanagita. 
1619 These various images are offered by Hirohito, Yamagata and suggested by Yanagita. 
1620 This is true of all of Hirohito’s images. Yanagita is an exception. He views power imbalances and 
conflicts between nations as most likely a temporary phenomenon. 
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 The third group of images concerns Japan’s relations with Western powers. In 
their images of relations with the West and Europe at large, while Ito recognizes the 
West’s power, and the potential of conflict with it, Hirohito was highly impressed with 
Europe, especially Britain, when he traveled there as regent. In the images of U.S.-
Japanese relations, we see negative images. While Yamagata viewed the United States as 
Japan’s greatest threat in East Asia, in Hirohito’s images, we see caution and fear about 
possible ruptures in the relationship. On relations with Britain, there are similar images—
fears about conflict with Britain, or that signing a treaty could bring conflict.1621 
 The final group features images of war, peace and diplomacy. In his images of 
many conflicts, Hirohito reveals a belief that Japan acted justly, for peace, or that he was 
proud of what was accomplished.1622 He also voices support for each nation possessing 
adequate arms. In contrast, Ito and Yanagita both express doubts about several wars. On 
peace and diplomacy, several images from Ito show that he was often supportive of peace 
and ending unequal relationships in international relations. In Hirohito’s images on peace 
and diplomacy, we see a mixed record, of support for peace early in the 1920s, and later, 
general opposition.  
 How may these images functioned as perceptual filters or organizing devices?  
On international relations and foreign policy, several blind spots existed in the views of 
these leaders, including blindness on paths to peace, non-aggression, idealism, 
cooperation, the dangers of Japan toward other regions, and what Japan could learn from 
Asia. Yanagita was less blind in these areas. Perhaps a balance of influence in foreign 
                                                
1621 These are the images of Ito, Yamagata or Hirohito. 




policy, both democratic and elite, would have been best for Japan at this time. On 
relations with Asia, the leaders’ blindspots included a general ignorance of the 
possibilities of peace through trade and cooperation, not aggression. In their minds, how 
could cooperation with Asia be possible if not through colonialism and imperialism? On 
relations with the West, these leaders seemed blind to the benefits and possibilities of 
cooperation with the West, the United States, and Britain. What might have been gained? 
Ito and Yanagita often supported peace and diplomacy, but Hirohito had a mixed record 
and generally did not, except when it seemed they would benefit Japan. On war, if 
Japan’s leaders, in practice, had been more cautious about war, perhaps the government 
and Hirohito would have been less aggressive toward Asia, and Japan’s postwar relations 
with the continent smoother.  
 Worldview. From the above images, the predominant worldview that emerges 
sees the world as made up of power hungry groups and actors, competing for position and 
strength in the international system. These groups and actors include different countries 
and races. Western nations are seen as more of a threat to Japan than Asian nations, and 
the latter seem weaker than Japan.  The international system is mostly driven by 
competition for power, and nations, by their own interests. Powerful countries control the 
world, and want to dominate weaker ones. The West wants to dominate the countries of 
Asia and other non-Western regions, and usually does. Non-Asians want to dominate 
Asians. In the world’s political order, stronger countries dominate weaker ones. The West 
dominates the non-West. Elites and powerful groups in different countries dominate the 




 In this worldview, Japan should be equal with Western nations, but is not. Japan 
must grow stronger to fight for its interests in the international system. It is in danger of 
being invaded, controlled or encircled by aggressive foreign (especially Western) nations. 
In Hirohito’s mind, Japan has acted justly in its wars with other countries (Hirohito). 
Regarding views of peace, to Yanagita and Ito, conflict is negative, and should be 
avoided whenever possible. Yanagita alone felt Japan should not compete with other 
nations, but should seek cooperative non-aggression.  
 Regarding the non-self, on Asia, these leaders express a desire for Japan to 
cooperate with them. There is a common belief that Japan is superior to other Asian 
nations, and that Japan is best able to lead them against the West. Later, in Hirohito, we 
see the view that Japan has the right to dominate other countries. Yanagita believed that 
Japan should seek to set an example for other Asian countries, try to lead them toward 
development, and cooperate with them against the West. On the West, images show fear 
in the minds of other leaders, that the West threatens Japan, wants to control and encircle 
it. In general, most of these leaders desired, if possible, to avoid conflict with major 
Western powers. Among the most threatening Western states were the United States, 
Russia/the Soviet Union, and Britain. Hirohito is the leader who finally took Japan to war 
against all three.   
 What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who hold 
these worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect the leaders’ 
worldviews? The environment was the system of international relations in Asia, largely 
dominated or influenced by major Western powers: the United States, Britain, Russia, 
and several lesser Western powers, including France, Germany, and Holland (the latter, 
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through World War II). Earlier in this period, there were several non-Western powers 
who are important actors in connection with Japan, especially China and Korea. There 
was also the system of international diplomacy and international bodies such as the 
League of Nations. This system and bodies were absolutely dominated by the West, and 
not open to much input from those outside the West. The international diplomatic system 
and the Western powers did not respect Japan or non-Western powers, expect or want 
them to have a voice in the international system. But Japan’s military victories in the 
Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars won it a small amount of respect. In the 
international system, Japan had almost no voice. The Western nations assumed that they 
knew best, had the right to dominate international diplomacy, and expected Japan to 
cooperate. When Japan did not, the West found it incomprehensible, and was willing to 
resort to force in the Russo-Japanese war or World War II if Japan actually attacked 
Western interests, especially in Asia. Otherwise, the West was not interested in listening 
to Japan or other non-Western powers and their interests.   
 How these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions may 
have influenced the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of 
events and their causes? The perception that strong, aggressive countries dominate 
international diplomacy made Japanese leaders very open to realist, military-oriented 
interpretations of international relations. They generally were not open to perceptions that 
hinted at cooperation. These power-oriented views also encouraged Japan to take a more 
aggressive stance toward its Asian neighbors. On uses of information, the power-oriented 
views of international relations likely encouraged Japan’s leaders to read views of 
international relations and military theory that stressed realist views and building Japan’s 
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defenses. These views downplayed and persecuted individuals, groups and scholars who 
hinted at pacifist views. The leaders’ understanding of events and their causes made most 
of these actors view international events as reflective of the power-hungry drive of 
nations for survival. These events were caused by countries’ pursuit of their national 
interests and the desire to survive. How did technological systems affect these 
worldviews? The stress on power and the military throughout this period made Japanese 
leaders prefer powerful, technological solutions to the problems of international relations. 
These solutions had to be supported by the industrial, military complex in Japan. These 
worldviews leaned overwhelmingly in the direction of realism, conservatism, and 
militarism. The only exceptions were the views of Ito and Yanagita on peace and 
cooperation. 
 Cultural Logics. The global phenomena to which these leaders responded 
included foreign governments (Western and Asian), Western ideas and theories about 
politics and international relations, military forces, theories and technologies, Asian 
military forces (China and Korea), international conflicts such as the Russo-Japanese War 
and World War II, Western powers, East Asian powers, Western diplomatic institutions 
and structures, Western writings on politics, diplomacy and military affairs, international 
treaties, and international bodies such as the League of Nations. What were the leaders’ 
worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? Of the leaders here (Ito, Yamagata, 
Hirohito, Yanagita), most saw international relations as competition between different 
nations and/or races.1623 Regarding conflict, while all of the leaders were fearful of war to 
varying degrees, some saw the use of arms as acceptable to defend Japan’s national 
                                                
1623 Yamagata and Hirohito agree with the racial factor. 
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interests, worth risking if it would strengthen Japan.1624 Others saw it as dangerous, to be 
avoided if possible.1625 Regarding Japan and international relations, Yamagata was 
determined to defend Japan through foreign alliances and a strong military, and Ito 
desired to strengthen Japan so it could stand independently on the international stage. On 
Asia, all of these leaders saw other Asian countries besides Japan as weaker and more 
inferior, and believed that Japan could help lead and strengthen them to successfully 
resist the West. They seemed to accept the view of some Japanese leaders during World 
War I, “Asian Monroeism”—that Asia should be for Asians, not just for the West’s 
domination. Some of these leaders thought it was acceptable for Japan to invade or 
control other Asian countries,1626 while others implied that Japan should help them, but 
not invade.1627 On the West, all of the leaders were cautious about or fearful of the power 
and potential actions of such nations as the United States, Britain and Russia/the Soviet 
Union. On peace and diplomacy, some of the leaders supported treaties and diplomacy as 
long as Japan’s national interests were furthered,1628 while others were more generally 
supportive.1629  
 The cultural logics under these worldviews saw international relations as driven 
by power and competition between different nations and groups. Nations that are stronger 
militarily will have more power, and be able to conquer and lead other nations. If Japan 
became strong, it would have the right to lead other Asian countries, and to guide them in 
                                                
1624 Yamagata and Hirohito. 
1625 Ito and Yanagita.  
1626 Yamagata and Hirohito. 
1627 Ito and Yanagita. 
1628 Yamagata and Hirohito. 
1629 Ito and Yanagita. 
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resisting the West. It was not merely Japan’s power that gave it the right to lead other 
Asians, but also its superior character. 
 The response of these leaders to these global phenomena was to personally be 
involved however each one was able in areas of action or reflection relevant to these 
issues. Ito was personally involved in diplomacy and in becoming the first Japanese 
resident governor-general in Korea. Yamagata founded and led one of the most powerful 
political factions in early twentieth century Japan, advocating for policies that would 
maintain Japan’s modern military. Later, Hirohito was personally involved as the leader 
and emperor of Japan. He continued his policy efforts behind the scenes at the imperial 
court. Yanagita most actively opposed the various wars and elitist tendencies of Japanese 
diplomacy in his writings in Japan’s press, and in personal reflections. 
 The cultural logics under these responses are that as the West overtly threatened 
Japan up through the period of 1850 to 1895, it continues to threaten the rest of Asia in a 
somewhat similar manner in the current period (1895 to 1945). Japan needs to help these 
other countries strengthen themselves, unite and rise up against Western domination. In 
all of these leaders, except Yanagita, there is also the assumption that if Japan is strong, it 
has the right to use some of the other countries’ resources. We see the assumption that the 
strong will rule those who are weaker. It is ironic that most of these leaders assume that 
other Asian nations will welcome Japanese leadership, just because Japan is also Asian, 
and stronger. They fail to realize that most other Asians do not want any foreign 
domination or influence, even from a fellow Asian country, especially one that invades.     
-Compare the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena, and then 
compare the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena. 
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In both of these sets of cultural logics, there is the assumption that the strong have the 
right to rule the weak. The first set assumes simply that those who have the most power 
have the right to, and will, rule the weak. In the second case, the cultural logics under the 
responses, Japan also has the right. There is little realization, except by Yanagita, that 
Japan’s Asian neighbors do not want its intervention, leadership, or control. 
 Globalization Issues. To consider globalization issues, as in Chapters 5 and 6, 
the first question I ask here is, how do some of the most important worldviews here 
reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, 
peoples, money, media, or technology)? In the momentous events that take place in 
Japan’s external political relations during this period, ranging from Japan’s surprise 
attack on Port Arthur in China in 1904 to its large-scale production supporting the allies 
in World War I to the events in World War II, this period represents greatly intensified 
processes of globalization in external political relations. For these various conflicts, Japan 
produced an impressive range of technologies and armaments. Each successive conflict 
represents an increased degree of technological sophistication and global connection. By 
the time of World War II, Japan launched transpacific attacks on Hawaii and Alaska, 
controlled a vast area of the South Pacific, and soon faced massive bombing from 
American planes and the atomic bomb before the end of the war. Not only in these 
technologies, but also in the thinking of the leaders on Japan’s external political relations, 
we see intensified consideration of global issues, including concerns over the actions of 
various Western powers, and important Asian powers such as China and Russia. As the 
single most influential leader in Japan in this period, Hirohito had access to frequent 
reports and briefings of the best available information about various political and military 
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issues and events. His reactions had global and regional consequences for thousands, 
indeed millions of lives.    
 And how does globalization affect the worldviews? The intensification of 
political and military information and technologies helped Japan to continue modernizing 
its military forces during this period, enabling it to attack such major powers as Russia, 
China, the United States, and Britain, either directly and/or their colonies. Japan’s access 
to excellent military know-how and technologies greatly complicated its political, 
diplomatic, and military interactions during this period, across an increasingly broad 
geographic range. While these actors often showed great skill and astuteness in these 
interactions, the broadened scope necessitated an increasingly larger range of experience 
and skills. Some mistakes were inevitable.   
 If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro- 
(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? As these leaders 
interacted with important political and military forces and ideas, they worked very hard, 
and were often very deeply affected. For example, Ito was assassinated in Korea in 1909. 
Hirohito nearly lost the imperial throne at the end of World War II, and contributed to 
greater destruction in the nation by surrendering so late. On a macro-level, many 
Japanese were affected by the various wars and changes in Japanese society that took 
place as millions of lives were lost, as the nation increasingly industrialized and 
transformed itself to supply the conflicts, and as it suffered terrible attacks and 
deprivation during the war. The scale of shared suffering increased exponentially by the 
end of World War II. These processes of global politics and conflicts affected millions of 
Japanese, and millions more in foreign lands and Japan’s colonies.  
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 Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or non-
Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? Based on the above definition of 
globalization, the events from 1895 to 1945 do represent a new form of globalization, of 
intensified, regional connections, unprecedented in their intensity, coming from Japan. 
As Japan drew in other regions and nations into its colonial orbit, its political, economic, 
and cultural influence on them grew. Regarding politics, colonial areas were forced to 
come under Japanese administration and submit to Japan’s political and nationalistic 
ideologies, including State Shinto and emperor worship.1630 This was the first period of 
global Japanese influence in history, but it was relatively short-lived. The region with the 
most extended influence was Taiwan, where it lasted from 1895 to 1945 (fifty years). 
Japan’s influence on certain regions, such as Taiwan and Korea, was great, and minimal 
on others, such as the Philippines and Burma. The prewar case of Japanese globalization 
in some ways prepared the way for vastly increased, new forms of global influence after 
1945, when Japanese globalization truly became global in its scope, through trade, 
exported economic and cultural products, aid, and other means.1631 
Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations 
 
 Yanagita Kunio. In 1925, Yanagita Kunio wrote that national-focused 
economics had ended, that the age of international economics had begun.  Yet countries 
still regarded their national interests as primary. Because of social evolution, the stronger 
nations would devour the weaker ones.1632 Japan still needed a system of national 
                                                
1630 It is beyond the scope of this study to consider the long-term impacts of this influence. I will note that 
the intense cult of leader worship in North Korea, focused mainly on its former leader Kim Il Sung, is 
perhaps a manifestation of emperor worship imposed on Korea before 1945. 
1631 We do not have time to discuss details of postwar Japanese globalization at this stage in the research. 
1632 Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 62. 
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economic planning, and excessive economic liberalism was not advisable. The Meiji’s 
government’s basic economic policy favored development of commerce and industry 
focused on exports, and top-down capitalism. The contributions of agriculture were seen 
as secondary.1633 The government and some other scholars advocated protectionism in the 
early 1900s. Yanagita, aware that Japan was a developing nation, disagreed with some of 
their ideas, but agreed that Japan needed limited protectionism.  Some officials and 
scholars like Ito Hirobumi supported primary protection of commerce and industry, and 
agriculture as secondary. Yanagita felt that over-dependence on manufactured exports 
would place Japan at the mercy of international economics.  Less-developed nations that 
received Japan’s products would build up their own industries, reject imports, and 
attempt to export their own products.1634  In the late 1920s, the government’s economic 
policies focused on exports and the rationalization of industry.  Yanagita disagreed, 
arguing that the economy should focus on reforming agriculture, and domestic-oriented 
production.1635   
Conceptual Analysis of Yanagita’s Worldviews About Japan’s External Economic 
Relations (1895-1945) 
 
 General Issues. Yanagita’s views about the structure of Japan’s external 
economic relations differed greatly from official Japanese government policy from the 
                                                
1633 From our discussion of Yanagita’s view of agriculture in the section on Japan’s domestic economy, it is 
clear that he viewed the role of agriculture as foundational in Japan’s economy and culture.  In global 
competition, the “loser nations” will be those who over-consume the commercial products of other 
countries, and forget how to produce their own (i.e., agricultural and other basic products) (Ibid., 62-63).    
1634 Ibid., 4-9. Interestingly, one could argue that this is essentially what has happened in the late 1900s and 
early 2000s as countries like Taiwan, South Korea and China have developed their own economies, and 
begun to export their goods to Japan and other countries that were formerly Japanese colonies or less 
developed markets for its exports. 
1635 Ibid., 106-107. I do not include comparative assessment of Japan’s external economic relations here, 
since I focus mainly on the views of only one leader, Yanagita.  
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early 1900s through the 1920s. While the government placed emphasis on heavy and 
large-scale industries geared for exports, Yanagita favored smaller-scale production, 
regional industries, a focus on agriculture and the domestic market. In the mid-1920s, 
though he felt the age of international economics had truly arrived, he still felt that most 
nations focused on their own economic interests, with the strong devouring the weak. 
Since Japan was still a developing country, he favored national economic planning, and 
distrusted too much economic liberalism. Overall, Yanagita’s international economic 
views seem somewhat progressive, supportive of heavy state involvement in promotion 
of human scale industries, and cautious about economic plans that turned Japan’s 
productivity away from basic commodities like agricultural products and increased its 
dependence on the uncertainties of international markets through over-reliance on 
industrial products. There is also a slight influence of evolutionary views here. 
 Development Issues. If we examine Yanagita’s views of Japan’s external 
economic relations in the 1920s through the lens of internationalization, we see that his 
entire concern was the protection of Japan’s domestic culture from the ravages of the 
impacts of international economic and cultural forces on Japan as it engaged the global 
marketplace. He favored the revitalization of regional industry and agriculture so that 
Japan could be strengthened internally on both the economic and cultural levels, and so 
be able to better withstand the impacts of foreign influences. However, 
internationalization considers the economic and cultural impacts of a developing 
country’s absorption into the global market on the international, not domestic level. But 
Yanagita does not consider the issue of the impacts of Japan’s external economic 
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relations on the international level, so the concept of internationalization is not very 
relevant here. 
 Technology Issues. What are the most important technology-related ideas and 
phenomena associated with Yanagita’s worldview of external economic relations? The 
most notable concept related to technology here is Yanagita, in general, opposes a heavy 
emphasis on large-scale industries and technologies mainly geared for generating exports. 
He acknowledges that some large-scale industries should be present, but for Japan, he 
favors industries and technologies that are more human scale, suited for broad 
distribution across the nation. 
 What are the most significant economic factors present in the imported 
technologies and related ideas in the worldview studied here?1636 In his emphasis on 
regional, human scale industries, Yanagita also places more emphasis on Japan’s 
domestic market, rather than on international trade. While Japanese government policy in 
the early twentieth century favored heavy industries geared for exports, Yanagita takes 
the opposite track. If Japan does care for its own house first, the house may collapse. Yet 
the government’s policy on heavy promotion of exports, coupled with fierce competition 
within Japan’s domestic market, is the basic policy that finally prevailed through the 
postwar period. Did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively or 
negatively? Why? There is no evidence here that international forces influenced 
Yanagita’s views of external economic relations, though he was surely aware of the 
major economic theories through his training in agro-politics in college. 
                                                
1636 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
612 
 
 What were the important ideas/technologies transferred in this worldview? 
Among the most important ideas in Yanagita’s worldview are that economic activities 
should fit the scale of life and level of the people whom it affects, and that they should be 
broadly distributed (geographically) across a society, not just centered in one or a few 
locales. He also believed that though international trade had reached unprecedented 
levels, that the national interests of various nation-states still drove the system, and that 
production, in Japan’s case, should focus on primary products, such as agricultural ones. I 
have no idea what the sources for these economic ideas are, whether they are Japanese or 
foreign. The main international actors in the external environment, and domestic actors, 
individual or state, involved here included foreign governments and their trade and 
economics-related ministries, trading companies, international firms, zaibatsu, the 
Japanese government and its economic ministries. Their impacts on the transfer outcomes 
here were important, especially in the case of the Japanese government. The 
government’s policies on economics and trade directly affected what Japan’s economy 
did on the international level. It is interesting that the Japanese government’s concerns for 
protecting regional and rural economies took off in the 1960s and 1970s, in an era of 
extremely rapid urbanization. It seems that Yanagita’s economic vision, while not 
embraced in the prewar period, may have been somewhat prophetic. 
 What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported 
technologies and ideas in this worldview?1637 The most significant cultural idea here, 
imported or not, is that economics must be human scale, and sensitive to human needs. It 
must not engulf ways of life in local areas, but strengthen and complement them. Another 
                                                
1637 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
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cultural value is that it is moral for the state to intervene in the economy for the common 
good. Yanagita does not trust in the automatic good or morality of the marketplace. There 
is no evidence here that Yanagita used these technologies/ideas as means or agencies to 
cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level. 
Rather, his concern was for Japan’s survival on the domestic level. He assumes that if 
Japan prospers on the domestic level, that its international prosperity, or survival at a 
minimum, will follow. His first concern is for Japan’s mere cultural survival (economic 
survival is seen as a means for achieving that end). Did these technology-related ideas 
affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment? Since 
Yanagita’s cultural ideas here found no application in the prewar system, they had no 
opportunity to enhance its survival on the international level. It is interesting to 
contemplate what they might have done if they had had the chance. 
 Does Yanagita’s belief system here, on technology issues on the international 
level, blind him to certain realities? Yanagita seems convinced that Japan’s priorities 
must be on building its economy and technologies for the human scale. What did he 
believe about technology on the international level? He likely would have argued that 
although the economy (and presumably technologies, too) is now internationally driven, 
individual developing nations, such as Japan, must not allow themselves to be engulfed 
or coerced by international forces to determine what their economies and technologies 
do. Rather, these decisions and policies should be determined by each nation, by each 
one’s own peoples and government, according to the unique conditions and situation of 
each. If this was Yanagita’s conviction, did it blind him to certain realities? Yanagita was 
certainly aware of international realities, but he was biased toward the domestic level. 
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Does Yanagita fail to adjust his viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? Perhaps 
he does. While he argued against the Japanese government’s policies, that it was too 
biased toward heavy industry and exports, he was biased toward the domestic side. It 
seems that a balanced policy, integrating both extremes, might have been more advisable. 
 In this worldview of external economic relations, is the concept of 
technonationalism as ideology manifested? Technonationalism as ideology is not central 
to Yanagita’s thought. Rather, the idea of “cultural nationalism as ideology” can be called 
one of its central emphases. Yanagita is not concerned about economics as the most 
important aspect of Japan’s survival. Japanese must not lose their sense of self, who they 
are. If they do, all the money in the world will not matter. To Yanagita, economics is a 
by-product of culture, but not the item of most fundamental concern. 
 Cognition Issues. Image. Most of the images of Japan’s external economic 
relations are Yanagita’s, and fall into three groups: images of international economics, of 
Japan’s economy within the international economic system, and of Japan’s trade and 
international economic policies. In Yanagita’s images of international economics, we see 
a stress on the irony that although the age of international economics has truly begun as 
of the late 1920s, nations will still act primarily in their own national economic self-
interests. Perhaps because of this, stronger nations will continue to devour weaker ones in 
the global marketplace. Regarding images of Japan’s place in the international economy, 
Yanagita sees Japan as a developing country, and expresses concern that over-
dependence on exporting manufactured goods, rather than primary products such as 
agriculture, will make Japan vulnerable. Yanagita’s images of Japan’s trade and 
international economic policies show disagreement with most Japanese government 
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policies. Yanagita disagrees with the emphases of these policies on heavy industries, 
commerce, and exports of manufactured goods, and argues that there should be more 
emphasis on agriculture. His images also reveal his support for national economic 
planning, some protection of the Japanese market, emphasis on domestic reforms and 
issues first, and opposition to unfettered economic liberalism [by implication, free trade].  
 How might these images have served as perceptual filters or organizing 
devices? On the international economy, these leaders failed to see where there were any 
opportunities for economic cooperation, or cases where positive trade with other nations 
would result in greater growth and prosperity for Japan and others. On the Japanese 
economy in the international economic system, perhaps it would have been best to 
include a balance of industry, commerce and agriculture, not one more than the other. 
Both Yanagita and the government had differing views of this subject. Regarding Japan’s 
trade and international economic policies, Yanagita’s emphasis on mainly agriculture 
might have depleted Japan’s food resources, and left it vulnerable to boycotts from other 
nations such as the United States. What difference would seeking a policy of balanced 
trade, with some free trade and some sectors with limits have made? What if the 
government had been encouraged to consider trade’s impacts on local areas? 
 Worldview. In the worldview framework that emerges from the above images, 
concerning the nature of the world, the world is affected by fierce econ competition. A 
developing country like Japan would do better to depend more on primary products, not 
manufactured ones. Concerning how the world works, though the world is now an 
international economic system, nations still act in their own international economic 
interests. The economically stronger nations devour weaker ones. Free trade is not good; 
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LDCs need more protectionism, not less. More state intervention in the economies of 
LDCs would probably be positive. On the world’s order, in these worldviews, the world 
is truly an international economic system for the first time, but in practicality, national 
economic interests still largely drive the system. 
 Concerning views of the self (Japan and the self’s actions, beliefs, and roles), 
Japan is still seen as an LDC. If it depends on exporting manufactured goods too much, it 
will be vulnerable to what other nations want to do. The Japanese government’s 
economic policies are wrong. They overemphasize heavy industries, exports, and 
commerce. There should more emphasis on exporting agriculture. More state intervention 
in Japan’s economy would also be good. On views of the non-self (non-Japanese 
nations), nations that are stronger than Japan or other Asian nations (namely, the West) 
will devour Japan and Asia economically if given the chance. Therefore they cannot and 
should not be totally trusted in the economic system. Japan and similar nations need some 
level of protectionism and strong state economic intervention to prevent being devoured.  
 What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding these leaders and these 
worldviews? How have these environments interacted with and/or affected the leaders’ 
worldviews? The international trading system, dominated by Western countries, was also 
a highly aggressive environment. Countries, even large ones, that could not organize 
themselves would be invaded, economically dominated and perhaps colonized by the 
West.  
 How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interaction 
influence the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and 
their causes? Regarding perception, harsh economic environment and evolution-
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influenced economic views made Yanagita oppose free trade and liberal economic 
policies. If “weak” Japan was too open, it would simply be devoured. Yanagita preferred 
more state intervention to protect Japan’s agriculture and domestic economy, since he 
generally was more concerned about domestic issues, and feared that too open an 
economic environment would destroy the heart of Japan, the rural economy, agriculture 
and its culture. Foreign nations did not care about rural Japan’s culture, and nor did 
Japan’s government. On information use, Yanagita’s views on international economics 
were limited, since he was greatly concerned about there domestic economy. Therefore 
my data on this section, based on only Yanagita, is short. On understanding of events and 
their causes Yanagita believed that the unlimited international market was driven by 
greed and lack of concern for an individual country’s needs or cultures. Therefore these 
countries must protect themselves. It also seems that evolutionary thought affected his 
basic thoughts on the international economy. 
 How did technological systems affect these worldviews on the international 
economy? Yanagita saw large, heavy industries, a major emphasis of Japan’s trade 
policies, as totally disconnected with the cultural realities of Japan, and what needed to be 
done to protect it. Therefore he opposed many basic aspects of Japan’s trade and 
economic policies.  
 Cultural Logics. In their worldviews, the global phenomena to which these 
leaders responded the Western trading system, the global economic system dominated by 
the West, commodities traded with other countries, the global monetary system, foreign 
investments in Japan, Japanese investments overseas and in the colonies, foreign 
technologies, foreign governments and the Japanese government, their economic and 
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trade policies and economic-related ministries, international companies and players from 
overseas and Japan, Western economic knowledge, modern business practices and 
technologies, theories of international trade, industrialization, evolutionism, imperialism, 
colonialism, governmental trade and economic policies, thought about business, industry, 
production, factories, management, labor, Western theories of economics and business, 
theories of economic growth, wealth and prosperity, commodities traded with Japan’s 
colonies. 
 What were the leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? 
Yanagita believed that the Japanese economy should be domestically focused, especially 
on agriculture and the production of primary products. The export of mainly 
manufactured goods was unhealthy. Strong state intervention in the market and in trade 
was needed by the state in the face of intense economic competition between nations still 
acting in their self-interests. Some protectionism was needed; totally free trade was ill 
advised for a developing country like Japan. If free trade prevailed, Japan would be 
devoured. 
 What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global 
phenomena? They see economics as one of the most powerful forces in the world. It 
could destroy vulnerable countries. A state must intervene in the affairs of a country and 
their people, to protect them from economic or cultural exploitation from other countries. 
If Japan’s government did not take decisive action to protect Japan, Japan could be 
controlled or destroyed by other countries’ economies.  
 What were Yanagita’s responses to these global phenomena? He reflected 
deeply about a broad range of issues that he observed affecting Japan, one of which was 
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its economic interactions and trade with foreign countries. His main area of concern was 
protecting the heart of Japan’s indigenous culture and identity, found in rural Japan. He 
saw that Japan’s trade with foreign countries could overwhelm the country economically, 
and that unguided importation of too many products would damage Japan’s culture. He 
desires that Japan’s government consider and take decisive action regarding its foreign 
trade, as he argues in the writings studied here.   
 What were the cultural logics under these responses? An uncontrolled flood of 
foreign money and influence could overwhelm the culture of a weaker nation. Japan’s 
culture and economy were in a weaker state than those of the Western countries. Japan 
had a valuable culture and country, and they had the right to exist. A weaker country and 
its government must take defensive steps to protect the country. If they did not, they 
might lose.   
 What do we learn by comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the 
global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the 
phenomena? In both cases the logics stressed the weaker state of Japan’s economy and 
culture. Without intervention by the state, either one or both might be destroyed or 
controlled by foreign forces. 
 Globalization Issues. Again, to assess globalization issues connected with 
Yanagita’s worldviews of Japan’s external economic relations (1895-1945), the first 
question I will ask is, how do these worldviews reflect and/or affect processes of 
globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or 
technology)? And how does globalization affect the worldviews?  Yanagita’s views here 
focus on the effects of Western economic globalization on Japan’s indigenous culture. 
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Large-scale industries and the massive import of Western products into rural Japan 
threatened to engulf local ways of life. 
 Regarding how globalization affected Yanagita’s worldviews here, while he 
saw Western globalization, in the form of the cultural effects of the reach of Western 
trade and its economic products, as a huge threat to Japan’s indigenous culture and 
identity, he expresses no direct concern about how Japanese global influences would 
affect the cultures of other regions in Asia. Given his sensitivities, while he expressed a 
desire for Japan to offer positive guidance for other Asian countries, likely he would not 
have wanted Japan to impose its ways on them. I do not see evidence that Yanagita’s 
culturally sensitive insights had much impact on the actions of the Japanese government 
toward other Asian regions. 
 If we consider these economic processes as people experienced them, on micro- 
(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? As Yanagita observed 
and studied the impacts of Western economic globalization on rural Japan, he became 
concerned about the disappearance of its culture. His ethnographic observations were 
made on the local, micro level, though over the years, he studied several locations across 
Japan. His conclusions are made on the basis of observations and interviews with 
multiple actors in several locations across several regions in Japan. So these are micro-
level observations of the local impacts of macro-level, global, economic phenomena.    
 Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or non-
Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? Yanagita’s observations here 
focus on the impacts of Western globalization on a non-Western region (Japan). They do 
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not examine Japanese or another form of non-Western globalization affecting another 
region. 
Worldviews on Japan’s External Cultural Relations 
 
 Hirohito, Emperor.  In Hirohito’s youth and early adulthood, the Taisho 
democracy movement (influential from about 1905 to 1932) heavily influenced Japan’s 
political life and culture.1638  Regarding culture, according to Bix, Taisho democracy 
includes “…the transmission to Japan of American [and other Western] cultural and 
political products, lifestyles, and such ideologies as individualism.”  It also challenged 
the assumption of Meiji Japan that the government, rather than the individual, should be 
the main factor in regulating correct morality.1639  As noted above, the values of Meiji 
Japan heavily influenced the education and worldviews of Hirohito in many areas, likely 
contributing to his resistance to Western democratic values before World War II.      
  In 1928, connected with enthronement events, a theme emerged in the Japanese 
press that Japan was about to begin a new global mission as the center of world culture, 
sharing superior values of peace, filial piety and loyalty with the world.  This thought 
emerged as a variant of the ideology of hakkô ichiu.1640 Hakkô ichiu revived about 1928 
in support of Hirohito’s reign, contributing new energy to Japanese nationalism.1641 
                                                
1638 Taisho democracy movement refers to public efforts, often by politicians, journalists, and leading 
thinkers, to press for a more democratic political system, based on political party action in the Diet, rather 
than political cliques outside it, universal male suffrage, and cabinet governments led by the strongest 
political party’s chief (Bix, Hirohito).  See Japan, “Taisho Democracy Movement,” 1500-1501). 
1639 Bix, Hirohito, 41. 
1640 This 1928 version of hakkô ichiu, “eight corners of the world under one roof,” was related to the 
concept of hakkô ichiu in Tokugawa era writings that eventually each nation would recognize its proper 
place in the world hierarchy of nations, and follow the leadership of Japan in bringing world peace.  In the 
1850s and 1860s the concept re-emerged with the argument that Japan’s emperor should always be a 
dynamic leader who furthers the cause of enlightenment and civilization (Bix, Hirohito). 
1641 Ibid., 200-201. 
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 In 1933 and 1934, the military began producing propaganda films and books to 
mobilize the public for war.  Some of them attempted to make the Japanese reject 
decadent Western culture, evoking images of the honor of sacrifice, Shinto worship, 
patriotic images of emperor and shrine worship, and village life.  These films connected 
emperor and military ideologies by suggesting that through imperialism, the military 
embodied “national virtue” and the “sacred spirit” of Hirohito. “Spiritual mobilization” 
would allow Japan to break the “iron ring” of foreign powers starting to surround it.1642 
 Yanagita Kunio.  Yanagita Kunio argued that only by helping the peoples of 
Japan’s different regions to strengthen their cultural identities and autonomy would they 
be able to pick what was beneficial from the onslaught of Western culture.  Unless they 
understood their own indigenous cultures at the grassroots, they could not defend 
them.1643  Without understanding how modernization1644 interacted with Japan’s existing 
cultural values, its imposition on top of Japanese culture would be disastrous.1645  The 
source of confusion in Japan, seen in crises in the rural economy and urban morality, was 
the failure of the government to examine the effects of imported Western culture on 
indigenous lifestyles.  This blindness of policymakers resulted from policies focused on 
short-term economic gains and losses.1646  Unless the Japanese re-examined their lives 
                                                
1642 Ibid., 273-278. One book issued by the army, Hijôji kokumin zenshû (Essays on the Time of Emergency 
confronting the Nation) (1934), argued for government control and mobilization of all areas of the 
economy, politics, and society for war (Ibid., 277). 
1643 Kawada, Origin Ethnography,  66. Yanagita felt this understanding was necessary at several levels, 
including those of the government and of the citizens themselves (Ibid., 76). 
1644 Note that this is the conventional, Western meaning of modernization, not the Japanese version that I 
list in quotation marks. 
1645 Ibid., 77. 
1646 Ibid., 75. 
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and indigenous values, adequate policies for international politics and economics would 
be impossible.1647   
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Cultural Relations  
(1895-1945) 
 
 In brief, there are four main themes that emerge here regarding Japan’s external 
cultural relations in this period: 1) views of the clash of Japanese culture with Western 
culture, and how to protect the former, 2) views of Western cultural influences in Japan, 
3) views of the place of Japan in international culture, and 4) images of Western culture 
in comparison with Japanese culture. Regarding the clash of Japanese and Western 
cultures, Yanagita stressed these major factors: 1) Japanese must understand their own 
cultures and ways of life at the public, private and personal levels in order to effectively 
protect them during the onslaught of Western culture and values. 2) This cultural 
understanding must be encouraged in local and regional areas across Japan, to protect 
each area’s cultural autonomy and identity. 3) The Japanese government needed to be 
involved in the process of studying and protecting Japanese culture, but unfortunately its 
policy emphases on short-term economic gain blinded it to this reality.1648 4) Without 
effective cultural self-awareness, not only will Japanese not be able to protect their own 
culture, their policies in international politics and economics will be handicapped.  
 Concerning views of Western cultural influence, we noted above how Hirohito 
was heavily influenced in his personal values by the cultural values of Meiji Japan and 
                                                
1647 Ibid., 107. The use of ethnography to develop this sense of self-understanding is implied here, as well 
as the need for long-term historical perspective and reflection (Ibid., 77).   
1648 Eventually the Japanese government seemed to catch on to Yanagita’s point here. The government has 
had, for some decades in the postwar period, extensive programs to recognize, protect and nurture rare 
cultural treasures and knowledge in danger of disappearing. One example is the government’s policy of 
recognizing “living national treasures,” people who have knowledge of rare and unique cultural practices 
and arts that few others possess. 
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the Emperor Meiji, which were heavily stressed in his education. His highly conservative 
education discouraged the liberal type of Western democratic values that the Taisho 
democracy movement promoted: individualism, personal choice in morality, democracy, 
and Western, particularly American, cultural products and values. Hirohito was generally 
very conservative in both his political and cultural values. It is likely that in the pre-1945 
period, he also distrusted the kinds of liberal values that the Taisho democracy movement 
promoted. 
 On views regarding the place of Japan’s culture in international culture, in the 
late 1920s, Hirohito supported, to some degree, the thinking of the hakkô ichiu ideology, 
that Japan would now help bring world peace, culture, and virtuous Confucian values to 
the world, especially to Asia. His strict thought about the proper place of Japanese 
colonies in the hierarchy of nations also shows he supported hakkô ichiu.1649  
 On images of Western culture compared with Japanese culture, in the late 
1930s, how much did Hirohito support government propaganda showing Japanese 
virtuous images of Shinto, farm life, emperor worship, and the decadence of Western 
culture? Remember that as a child, he was trained in the same basic ideas of nationalism, 
State Shinto and emperor ideology as his subjects. This propaganda also showed the 
virtuous Japanese spirit breaking the “iron ring” of foreign nations trying to surround and 
strangle Japan.  While we cannot be absolutely certain of Hirohito’s beliefs about 
Western culture, he zealously participated in Shinto rituals, and accepted the ideas of the 
“iron ring” and Western threats against Japan in his foreign policy decisions and actions 
through 1945. He was also likely wary of Western culture to some degree. 
                                                
1649 On this point, see my discussion later in this chapter on Hirohito’s views of Japanese imperialism. 
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 Yanagita was more progressive in his beliefs, especially on politics, while 
Hirohito was highly conservative. Like Yanagita, Hirohito also disliked Western cultural 
values, but for different reasons. Yanagita was concerned about Japan’s cultural integrity 
from the bottom up. Hirohito was most concerned about protecting Japan from the top 
down, i.e. from potential military invaders. In the ideology of hakkô ichiu, Hirohito also 
displays a top down view of the place of Japanese culture in the world. Yanagita is most 
concerned about protecting the integrity of Japan’s own culture and identity amidst the 
cultural onslaught of Western values flooding into Japan: Japanese culture must hold its 
own in the midst of world cultures. Like Yanagita, Hirohito seems wary of Western 
cultural influences in Japan, and also accepted that the government had a role in 
protecting Japan’s culture. In sum, Yanagita had a much more populist, grassroots 
concern for Japanese culture, while Hirohito had more top-down, elitist perspectives. 
Both felt the government had a role in protecting Japan’s cultural and political integrity 
against the West.  
Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Cultural 
Relations (1895-1945) 
 
 Development Issues. In applying the concept of internationalization to these 
worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations (1895-1945), we see that Yanagita and 
Hirohito mainly had a concern for what international forces might do to Japan’s domestic 
culture, which is not the concern of internationalization, which mainly focuses on what 
happens to developing countries on the international level. Internationalization is relevant 
if we note the ideology of hakkô ichiu, the idea that Japan would become a beacon of 
peace and Confucian civilization for the world, including East Asia. In the pre-World 
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War II international community, Japan never had such an influence in East Asia or 
globally. It is beyond the scope of this brief section to investigate the impacts of Japan’s 
external cultural relations with other nations in this period, but it is safe to say that its 
deepest impacts were likely upon the regions it ruled as colonies, especially Korea and 
Taiwan. Were these impacts those symbolized by the hakkô ichiu ideology? While Japan 
laid very valuable economic and infrastructural foundations in Korea and Taiwan, its 
cultural exports were deeply resented and resisted, especially in Korea.1650 From this brief 
examination, it seems the ideals of hakkô ichiu were not effectively shared during 
Japanese colonialism in this period. The concept of internationalization applies in only a 
limited fashion for these worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations.    
 Technology Issues. What are the most important technology-related ideas and 
phenomena associated with the worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations studied 
here? As noted in the discussion of technology and culture in the Glossary, technology 
includes cultural values, even intrinsically.1651 Technology is influenced by the social 
structures and cultural values of the societies where it is created, by the structures and 
values of the societies that export it, and those of the societies that receive it. Technology 
also affects the structures and values of receiving societies.1652 In addition, technology 
that is transferred across cultural or international boundaries is deeply affected by the 
structures and cultures of both the sending and receiving organizations.1653 Obviously, 
cross-cultural technology transfer is a very complex process.  
                                                
1650 For example, in Korea, children were required to learn Japanese in school. 
1651 Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52; Salomon, Sagasti, and Sachs-Jeantet, Uncertain Quest, 6-8. 
1652 Ibid.; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52-54. 
1653 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 10. 
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 Yanagita reflected deeply on the effects of the transfer of Western technology 
and cultural products, mediated by urban Japanese environments, where they were 
usually first received, on the life and social structures of rural Japan. He was disturbed by 
what he observed through his ethnographic research, and spent much effort trying to 
devise practical solutions to relieve what he believed were very devastating impacts. 
Hirohito and the Japanese government observed what the impacts of Western culture and 
technology on Japan were at a much more general, less grounded level. As reflected in 
propaganda films of the late 1930s (already noted), the government argued that Western 
values were corrupting the discipline and sincere cultural/spiritual purity of Japanese. 
Through these propaganda tools, they hoped to alert Japanese to this danger, and 
encourage them to return to “purer” “Japanese” ways, such as filial piety and emperor 
worship. These films were also designed to raise patriotic, nationalistic pride. 
 What are the most significant social factors present in the imported technologies 
and related ideas in the worldviews studied here?1654 The imported cultural and 
technological items and ideas in this period included a huge range of things, such as new 
inventions (the radio, the automobile, telephones), consumer products and gadgets, art, 
Western novels, films, and the “Western” values of individualism, personal freedoms, 
and broader morality connected with the Taisho democracy movement. These inevitably 
had massive effects across Japanese society. It is impossible to say in this brief 
consideration whether the international system affected these technologies and issues 
                                                
1654 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
628 
 
positively or negatively.1655 But Yanagita, the conservative Japanese government of this 
era, and likely Hirohito all viewed and interpreted these effects negatively, as they 
surveyed their impacts on Japan’s domestic scene. They did not consider what effects 
Japanese imperialism or cultural influences might be having on the rest of East Asia and 
the Pacific. As reflected in the hakkô ichiu ideology, it seems that the government and 
Hirohito wanted to believe that Japan’s cultural influence across the region was positive. 
 What were the important ideas/technologies transferred here, in the worldviews 
under consideration? We noted in them in the paragraph immediately preceding this one. 
They include various items drawn from international science, business, the arts, and 
cultural ideas and values. Who were the main international actors in the external 
environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and hat impacts did they 
have on the transfer outcomes? Individual entrepreneurs, world travelers, artists, writers, 
intellectuals, teachers, and scholars, some foreign and many Japanese, and international 
firms and trading companies were among the chief actors driving these exchanges, but 
the Japanese government and its relevant ministries and agencies also played a role. 
While it is impossible for governments in relatively open societies to dictate or control 
the cultural directions its citizens take, certainly government policies have some effect. 
The more open atmosphere in the Taisho period (1912-1926) generally allowed a more 
open embrace of foreign and Western influences. The restrictive, ultraconservative 
policies of Japan’s militaristic government in the 1930s and 1940s also narrowed the 
flow. What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn here? It would have been 
                                                
1655 To comment more decisively on this would require the review of more grounded, definitive studies, 
some of them ethnographic, which is beyond the scope of the present research. 
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good if the governments of the late 1920s through 1945 had been more constructive, 
intentional, and intentionally listened to the critiques of leaders like Yanagita, without the 
outright censorship and propaganda it did, but this was not the case. 
 What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported 
technologies and ideas in these worldviews?1656 The most important cultural items and 
values in these worldviews included more cosmopolitan, international values connected 
to science, communication, increased mobility, comfort, convenience, and individual 
tastes, preferences, and freedoms. In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned 
use these technologies/ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s 
(material) environments on the international level, if at all? While Yanagita was not 
involved in seeking to transform Japan’s international environment in the cultural sense, 
the Japanese government used Hirohito and his carefully cultivated image to shore up 
support for the Japanese state, both in Japan and in the overseas colonies. Ironically, in 
the 1930s and 1940s, the state attempted to use fear of these Western values to encourage 
support for “Japanese” values, as evidenced in the propaganda films already noted. How 
did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international 
system or environment? I see very little connection between what the Japanese militarist 
state and Hirohito did here, and what happened on the international level. The military 
actions of Japan in World War II cost it whatever goodwill and cultural capital it 
possessed before the war. 
 Do the belief systems of these leaders (on technology issues on the international 
level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Yanagita’s beliefs about 
                                                
1656 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
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Western culture and technology were highly oriented toward “traditional” and 
“indigenous” items in Japanese culture on the domestic, rural level from what he believed 
were the highly negative effects of the former on the latter. But there is no evidence in his 
beliefs of what positive effects of Western culture and technology might be. I will 
mention just two from the postwar period: increased mechanization of Japanese 
agriculture in the postwar period greatly raised its productivity, and land reforms induced 
by the American occupation also aided the numerous tenant farmers for whom Yanagita 
expressed much concern. Hirohito encouraged the use of military technologies (many 
originally imported) for use in spreading Japanese influence, trade and imperialism in the 
1930s and 1940s. His own nationalistic and spiritual biases blinded him to the negative 
impacts of these efforts and the terrible damage inflicted on China and additional regions. 
The costs for Japanese international relations and foreign policy are still felt today. Did 
the leaders fail to adjust their viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? As noted 
earlier, the biases and blindness of Hirohito on the effects of various technological 
phenomena on the world around him (i.e. Japanese attacks on millions of civilians in 
China, and American bombing of cities across Japan) led to very costly suffering and the 
difficult surrender of Japan at the end of World War II. On a sixth issue, 
technonationalism as ideology, neither Yanagita nor Hirohito manifested a strong 
concern or awareness for the ideology in their worldviews of external cultural relations 
here. 
 Cognition Issues. Image. There are six main groups into which we can organize 
these leaders’ images of Japan’s external cultural relations (1895 to 1945). In the first, 
images of Japanese culture compared with other cultures, Hirohito implicitly stresses the 
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honor of Japanese culture, its values of sacrifice and others, seen in the ideas and 
practices found in emperor worship, State Shinto, nationalist and imperialist ideologies. 
In his images, Yanagita stresses that Western culture will destroy Japanese culture unless 
Japanese know themselves, their culture, and strengthen their own cultural autonomy. In 
the second group of images, on Western culture, both Yanagita and Hirohito show fear 
and concern over the impacts of Western culture as it enters Japan. It is likely that 
Hirohito viewed Western culture as decadent and that he resisted American cultural 
values such as individualism.1657 Yanagita fears that Western culture flooding into Japan 
may destroy Japan’s culture if Japanese do not grow in cultural self-awareness and 
independence. A third group of images concern cultural values associated with 
democratic ideas (the Taisho democracy movement in particular).1658 It seems likely that 
Hirohito personally resisted these and similar values. In the fourth group of images, those 
of Japanese cultural interaction with other cultures, we have already noted Yanagita’s 
concern about the impacts of Western culture flooding into Japan. His images also reflect 
awareness of the need for careful reflection, study and understanding of these issues, by 
Japanese and the government.1659 Without these efforts, their culture will be destroyed. 
The fifth group of images focuses on images of the Japanese government’s policies on 
cultural issues. Yanagita laments the government’s general lack of input on a coherent 
                                                
1657 I say that it is likely because many of Hirohito’s views must be determined indirectly by contextual 
clues, diaries by court officials, and from reports of his actual behavior, the general methods Bix used in 
Bix, Hirohito. This is because the Imperial Household Agency in Japan maintains a very tight grip on the 
image, writings and possessions of Hirohito and of other members of the imperial family.  
1658 Remember that these values stressed individualism, liberalism, personal freedoms, and various other 
cultural values associated with American culture, in particular. 
1659 Yanagita’s images suggest that understanding is needed of the effect of modernization on Japanese 
culture, and understanding of Japanese culture and identity themselves. Yanagita is further concerned that 




policy or study of the effect of imported Western cultural products on indigenous 
Japanese culture and values. In Yanagita’s images, ignorance on these issues, partly due 
to a focus on short-term economic gain by policymakers, and lack of reflection and 
knowledge by Japanese themselves, threatens all of Japan’s other international policies. 
And sixth, on images of the place of Japan in world culture, evidence suggests that 
Hirohito supported the images of the hakkô ichiu ideology, that Japan would become a 
center of world culture, and share noble values of loyalty, peace, and devotion to family 
and parents with the world. His enthronement in 1928 was steeped in these images. 
According to Yanagita’s images, unless Japanese understood their own culture at the 
grassroots, they could not protect it in its relations with other world societies.  
 How did these images serve as perceptual organizing devices or filters? 
Regarding Japan compared with other cultures, Hirohito was blind to Japan’s weaknesses 
of culture and character, and about what Japan could continue to learn from overseas. 
Yanagita failed to see good aspects of Western culture, and presumed that Japan must 
totally be on the cultural defensive. He also seemed blind to external issues, with his 
nearly total focus on the domestic level. For example, he failed to consider what was 
valuable for Japan to import from the West. What cultural products should Japan export, 
and what might it gain? On Western culture, both Yanagita and Hirohito missed the good 
things that Western culture had done and was doing in Japan. What positive Western 
values fit Japan well? How could Japan build on and improve those (i.e. Western 
education, technologies, hospitals, health care, democracy, and human rights), as it had 
“improved” Chinese culture over the centuries? On culture and democracy, Hirohito 
failed to see how empowering the people could empower both the nation and its cultures. 
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Postwar Japan has learned this. Yanagita did not have this problem, but supported 
popular democratic and workers’ rights. On Japan’s interaction with other cultures, these 
images show that these leaders misunderstood, on some levels, the benefit of interaction 
with Western culture, how Japan could grow, improve, and improve Western cultural 
items. This was seen very clearly in the postwar Japanese experience. I agree with 
Yanagita’s basic argument on Japan’s policy on culture, but I believe that the main thing 
that destroyed Japanese culture at this time was not ignorance of Western culture’s 
effects on Japan, but the government’s twisted policies of manipulating State Shinto, 
patriotism and other nationalistic values. This caused Japan to invade other countries, and 
destroy most of its infrastructure in World War II. That literally nearly destroyed the 
country, and subjected it to defeat and foreign invasion. How fortunate Japan was that the 
United States invaded it, and not the Soviet Union.1660 On Japan’s place in world 
cultures, consider briefly the place of Japan in Asia during this era. Did other East Asian 
countries, including Japan’s colonies and the territories it invaded, desire the values that 
Japan offered? In general, they did not, since imperialist invaders forced these values on 
them. Japan, in reality, did not offer the noble values of hakkô ichiu in the various wars 
and its imperialism. Rather it offered the foreign values1661 of State Shinto, the emperor 
ideology, and other nationalistic ideologies, in a largely brutal and coercive manner. Yet 
Yanagita’s basic viewpoint about the place of Japan in world culture was true. Without 
                                                
1660 After Japan’s defeat by the United States, the Soviet Union demanded the right to invade and occupy 
Hokkaido, but General McArthur absolutely refused. To imagine what might have happened to Japan in 
this case, just picture the case of Korea, and what happened to North Korea.  




the Japanese achieving a better understanding of their self-identity, Japan’s culture faced 
potential destruction. 
 Worldview. In the cognitive framework of worldviews that emerges from the 
above, what is the view of the nature of the world? In this view, different countries have 
different cultures. The cultures of stronger societies threaten those of weaker societies. 
Though some societies like Japan are currently weaker, their cultures still have honor and 
positive points. It is good if weaker countries with honorable cultures can protect and 
preserve the good parts of their cultures. They should make efforts to do so. They can do 
so by knowing and studying themselves, and taking time to honor their “traditions.” In 
this cognitive framework, how does the world work? Implicit in even these worldviews is 
a degree of evolutionary thought, in which the cultures of dominant, stronger societies 
will flood and wipe out those of weaker societies. Here we also see a stress on economics 
driving the world. The drive to survive, economically and otherwise, will make a country 
or government forget what really matters, its heart, its deeply latent culture. If weaker 
countries are not more careful and self-aware, they will lose the core of who they are. In 
Hirohito and the state’s hakkô ichiu ideology, we see the wish that Japan will become a 
virtuous center for world culture and peace. In the world’s order in this cognitive 
framework, the economies and cultures of stronger nations control the world, and 
dominate those of weaker countries. The economies and cultures of the West now 
dominate those of Japan and other non-Western cultures.  
 Regarding views of the self (Japan and its actions, beliefs, and roles in the 
world’s culture), even though is presently a weaker country economically, its culture has 
huge importance and honor in its values of sacrifice, duty, and love of nature and family. 
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Its culture is worth saving and protecting from the onslaught of Western values. Japanese 
must know themselves, and the government must make efforts to help save Japan’s 
culture.  
 On the views of non-self (others) in this cognitive framework, Western 
countries are stronger than Japan. Their cultural values are flooding into Japan and other 
non-Western countries. Western culture and values do not fit them. Western culture 
seems decadent, individualistic, selfish, and inferior to Japan’s.  
 What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the leaders who held these 
worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect the leaders’ worldviews? 
These views arose in a hostile international environment of harsh political and economic 
international competition and trade. Accompanying these interactions was intense 
cultural interchange of the cultural products and ideas of stronger societies flooding into 
weaker societies like Japan. The West might engulf or greatly weaken Japan politically, 
economically and culturally unless Japan was active and defended itself. In addition, we 
must not forget the rural environment that surrounded Yanagita in his research, and the 
isolated imperial environment in which Hirohito was immersed. These colored each 
man’s views. Regarding environmental interactions, the “hostile” international 
environment gave Yanagita and Hirohito’s views here a negative tone regarding potential 
cultural impacts of the West on Japan. Part of this was due to the negative effects of 
economic shocks in Japan in the 1920s and the 1930s, from the worldwide depression. 
Each actor’s predominant environment in this era (Yanagita in rural Japan, and Hirohito 
in the imperial court and government) influenced each one’s emphasis here (Yanagita on 
the value of rural Japanese culture, and Hirohito on the virtue of “traditional” Japanese 
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values, due to its unique nature and divine descent). Each actor here seems blind to 
potential positive aspects of Japan’s interaction with the world, to provide much greater 
wealth and comfort for more Japanese, which happened during the 1910s and the 1960s 
to the 1990s.  
 How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions 
influence these leaders’ perceptions, utilization of information and interpretation of 
events and their causes? On perception, each actor had a mainly negative worldview 
regarding the interaction of Western culture with Japanese culture in Japan, and wished to 
defend the latter. They were concerned about Japan’s political and cultural survival. 
Yanagita seemed more concerned than Hirohito. What Yanagita observed happening to 
the cultures of rural Japan, as more Western and urban Japanese cultural influence came 
in, greatly colored his thinking. Hirohito’s isolated imperial environment and his lack of 
practical exposure to the West also colored his views and reactions. But in the postwar 
period, in his interactions with General Douglas MacArthur and other important 
American actors, with the aid of many of his top officials, he proved very adept at 
surviving and transforming his image in the greatly transformed postwar cultural universe 
(Bix 2000). In his uses of information, Yanagita used ethnographic information from his 
personal research, and reflection based on his own research and readings, to form his 
opinions. Hirohito received daily in-depth briefings of the best available information. 
Each man’s environment (Yanagita, rural Japan and Hirohito, the imperial court) colored 
sources of information and final interpretations of each. It seems it was more difficult for 
Hirohito, because he could not humanly break out of his imperial cocoon. On events and 
their causes, Yanagita was rather biased toward his views of rural Japan as the foundation 
637 
 
of all Japanese culture and identity. Despite his perceptivity, he largely ignored the many 
important events and influences in urban Japan. It seems impossible for Hirohito to have 
escaped the intense training and cultural universe in which he lived, which was steeped in 
imperial and nationalistic influences in the prewar period. If he had been of exceptional 
intelligence or leadership ability, like Peter the Great or Abraham Lincoln, perhaps he 
could have, but he was not. 
 How did technological systems affect these worldviews? The technological 
major factors here were the increased manufacture and transport of urban and foreign 
products into rural regions across the nation in the case of Yanagita). For Hirohito, it was 
the increasing rise of heavy industry partly related to Japan’s military in the 1920s and 
1930s, and partly connected to Japan’s imperialism.  
 What do we learn by comparing these worldviews? Yanagita emphasized 
protecting rural Japanese culture from the flood of Western and urban cultural influences. 
In contrast, Hirohito seemed to show concern about protecting his image of traditional 
Japanese culture embodied in imperial and nationalistic ideologies of what Japan 
supposedly was.  
 Cultural Logics. Under these worldviews on Japan’s external cultural relations 
(1895 to 1945), the global phenomena to which these leaders responded included 
Western cultural influences entering Japan, such as ideas from politics, science, literature, 
and the arts, including movies, science, technology, new products, materials, books, 
information, and from people, including Western diplomats, teachers, and others coming 
to Japan. What are these leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? 
In their mind, Western culture and values were not suitable for Japan, and did not fit its 
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culture and identity. Western culture was highly individualistic and selfish. Japanese 
culture, as defined by the state, or as indigenously practiced by the people, was worth 
saving. Japanese moral character was superior to Western values, which were decadent 
and selfish. Japanese must critically assess their indigenous culture and identity, and the 
government had the duty to help them in this. If Japanese did not know who they were, 
they could not protect themselves from the flood of Western culture, and their culture 
would be lost.  
 What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global 
phenomena? Western culture did not fit Japan. Japan’s culture and identity should be 
saved, since they had value. The state was a strong actor, and could help in this task. It 
seemed that Western culture might overwhelm Japanese culture. There is no assumption 
that the two cultures could mix, and a new one result, only that the old Japanese culture 
might be destroyed. 
 What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? Hirohito 
supported the state’s cultural campaign of nationalistic and spiritual ideologies, such as 
State Shinto and hakkô ichiu, from the late 1920s to 1945. To warn Japan about the 
dangers of losing its identity and heritage it faced if it did not take careful, critical action, 
Yanagita researched rural Japanese culture extensively and wrote much about it. 
 What were the cultural logics under these responses? For Hirohito, the 
assumptions were likely that the state-defined culture of Japanese identity and spirituality 
was who Japanese really were. For Yanagita, Western values were not true Japanese 
identity. Western values were often negative, and did not fit Japan. Western values and 
culture were aggressive, appealing, and might seductively destroy Japan’s real culture 
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and identity if allowed to enter unchecked. Japan’s state was strong, and positive action 
by the state in the affairs of the nation, such as culture, would normally help the situation.  
 In comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena, 
and the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena, in the 
former logics, there is an emphasis on what will happen to Japanese culture as it and 
Western culture interact. In the second set of logics, there is more of an emphasis on what 
both Japanese and Western culture and values actually were. In both cases, strong action 
by the state was desired, to prevent a negative outcome. 
 Globalization Issues. How do the most important worldviews here reflect 
and/or affect processes of cultural globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, 
peoples, money, media, or technology)? How does globalization affect these worldviews? 
Western globalization affected Yanagita’s worldviews to a great degree. His worldviews 
here reflect concerns over the long-term impact of Western culture on Japan’s regional, 
indigenous cultures. His perception of the intensification of Western globalization’s 
impacts, and their long-term effects, based on his own ethnographic research in rural 
Japan, is what has spurred his concerns. His concern also reflects the impacts of Western 
culture mediated through the urban gateways of Japan, where usually the Western 
cultural products first enter Japan and are then distributed across the nation. The spread 
of newspapers and radio also contributes to these effects. Hirohito also mediated certain 
cultural values, of official nationalism, State Shinto, and the imperial throne, to the 
nation. His actions show support for these official ideologies that opposed Western 
cultural influences and values, sought to minimize their influence, and to maximize the 
impact of official ideologies. What was the actual impact of these ideologies on the daily 
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lives of persons in rural Japan? Perhaps it was not that much.1662 But the overall costs, 
revealed in the loss of lives and Japan’s defeat in the war, were huge.  
 If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro- 
(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Yanagita’s 
ethnographic study of the effects of Western globalization on rural Japanese culture 
spurred many of his writings, and they are well known and respected in Japan, even 
today. What kind of policy impacts did they have? Their policy impact through 1945 
seems to have been minimal. On the other hand, the macro-level impact of Hirohito’s 
worldviews here was much larger, since his views reflected the official policies of the 
state, and he was the most influential political actor in the nation in prewar twentieth 
century Japan. The social costs of the state’s nationalistic policies during World War II, 
reflected in millions of deaths and the defeat of the nation, were tremendous.    
 Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or non-
Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? Over the fifty years of this 
period, the impact of Western cultural forces on Japan was certainly great. Huge changes 
in Japan’s economy, industrialization and urban-rural balance could not help but result 
from its increasing engagement in the global economy, in several wars, and greater 
connections with the outside world. The whole period seems, overall, to represent a 
conservative counter-reaction to Western cultural influences, contrary to their generally 
                                                
1662 John Dower notes this in his Embracing Defeat, which investigates the overall cultural conditions of 
Japan during its early postwar recovery in the American occupation period, 1945 to 1952. He mentions the 
research of a social scientist who found that in prewar Japan, few villagers studied manifested much impact 
from emperor ideology in their daily lives (John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of 
World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1999).  
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enthusiastic reception from 1850 to 1895.1663 Also in this period, we see the initial spread 
of Japanese cultural globalization through its empire and increased global connections.  
Worldviews on Japan’s External Relations: Imperialism 
 
 Kato Hiroyuki.  According to Kato Hiroyuki, imperialism and colonialism are 
related to evolutionary progress.  If the imperialist European powers had not ventured 
overseas, they would have progressed less, and colonial regions benefited less.  Even 
slavery is a form of progress.1664  International law is unsuccessful since the Europeans 
use their power to exploit, destroy and colonize weaker peoples.1665  Yet while Kato 
observed the nationalism and imperialism of the western “Christian” nations, because of 
progress, he could not totally condemn them.  As the strongest, they had a right to control 
the world.  But he found Western imperialism to be hypocritical, against Christianity.  
Yet Kato remained almost silent about Japanese imperialism, arguing that parts of the 
empire, such as Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia, were merely satellites of Japan.  
“Patriarchal sovereignty”1666 and Japan would always remain the center of the empire, 
and the imperial family would always be the “quintessence” of the race.  According to 
evolution, the ruler will always be the Denkcentrum (thought-center) or tôchi kikan 
(Denkorgan—controlling organ) of the state [and empire].1667 
                                                
1663 This is despite the brief period of Western influence in the Taisho democracy movement from about 
1912 through the late 1920s.  
1664 Davis, Moral and Political, 103-106. In Kato’s view, without slavery, the achievements of ancient 
civilizations such as Egypt would have been impossible.  Africans enslaved in America escaped the 
barbarism of Africa, and some even received education and enlightenment (Ibid., 105-106). 
1665 Ibid., 76. 
1666 This is the concept that all Japanese are ultimately descended from and connected to the imperial 
family, the foundation of the kokka, the “family-state” (Ibid., 71-72).  
1667 Ibid., 37, 71-72, 91-92, 113, 124-125. 
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 Ito Hirobumi. Ito supported large colonization schemes for Taiwan and 
Hokkaido.1668 Before 1895, Ito showed a somewhat paternalistic attitude toward 
Korea.1669 Later, in the early 1900s, in his role as governor-general for Korea, this 
attitude about Korean development surely had a major impact, encouraging the eventual 
transfer of technologies and other areas of know-how to the peninsula. He had extensive 
plans for Korea’s development.1670  Hamada argues that in the face of a second conflict 
over the Korea issue, Ito stood as a force of moderation, against pressures for war from 
Russian and Japanese militarists.1671 After Japan won that war, Ito brought in Japanese 
experts to improve Korea’s infrastructure in transportation, health, education, economy, 
and government.1672 After the Korean king abdicated in 1907, Ito issued a plan for the 
resident general’s control of Korea’s internal and foreign affairs, resisting pressure from 
Tokyo to annex Korea.1673 In August 1907 he returned pessimistically to Japan to secure 
loans and experts for Korea’s development.1674  To improve relations, Ito and the new 
king went on a failed national tour.  Ito resigned, returning to Japan.1675  In some ways, 
perhaps Ito was attempting to steer Korea’s reforms in the image of Japan’s.  There was 
much similarity between his vision for Korea’s development and the Meiji approach to 
                                                
1668 Hamada, Prince Ito, 113-114, 116-118, 120. After the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan claimed 
China’s Liaodong peninsula.  Under pressure from Russia, France and Germany, Japan renounced it, but 
won Taiwan (Ibid., 113-114, 116-118, 120). 
1669 See discussion of this in Chapter 5, where I discuss Ito’s worldviews of external political relations from 
1850 to 1895 (Ibid., 87-90, 110-111). 
1670 The Japanese annexation of Korea did not occur until 1910.  Ito declared his plan about 1907. 
1671 Ibid., 168-169. The first conflict was the Sino-Japanese War, and the second potential conflict was 
between Japan and Russia. 
1672 Ibid., 188-191. Ito planned to reform Korea’s bureaucratic structure and government ministries.  The 
ministries would be subject to the advice of the resident-general (Ibid.).   
1673 Ibid., 199-201. In announcing his plan, Ito declared that Korea had finally been freed from China, and 
that Japan had merely suspended Korea’s independence, not violated it (Ibid.).   
1674 Ibid., 202-203. Ito was pessimistic since he felt that Koreans could not initiate reforms, that they 
resisted his own, and that they might rebel (Ibid., 202-203). 
1675 Ibid., 205-206, 208. 
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Japan’s development.  His desire was to strengthen the Korean nation and render 
constructive advice, yet most Koreans resented against his efforts.1676  It is tempting to 
call Ito an imperialist, since he felt that Japan must be the power to restore Korea’s 
strength and independence.1677 
 Yanagita Kunio.  According to Kawada Minoru, in the early 1900s, as Western 
nations sought more colonies, a shift occurred in the world economy, from capitalism to 
imperialistic militarism.  As Japan’s economy developed, it laid the groundwork for 
imperialism through wars with China and Russia.  Japan evolved into a “semi-feudal,” 
militaristic, capitalistic state in the first half of the twentieth century.  Yanagita wished to 
strengthen Japan so it could stand independently and in prosperity against possible 
Western imperialism.1678  He strongly opposed nationalist forces that favored use of the 
military for overseas imperialism.1679  He believed that Japan must not blindly copy 
Western imperialism, but seek to lead other Asian nations by example, encouraging their 
development and unity against the West.1680  Yet Yanagita does not explain how to do 
this.  How realistic was his theory of agro-politics in the context of expanding 
imperialism in the early 1900s?1681  And how would increasing the sense of national unity 
                                                
1676 Ibid., 192-193. 
1677 It is hard to imagine any contemporary scholar today who would not call Ito an imperialist.  In spite of 
his doubts about Korea and China, both have become global economic powers, although it has taken them 
longer than Japan. 
1678 Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 3. 
1679 Ibid., 107. 
1680 Ibid., 82-86. Yanagita especially was concerned with Sino-Japanese relations and regretted Japan’s 
copying of Western imperialism and racism toward its Asian neighbors (Ibid.).   
1681 Ibid., 27, 32. On a related issue, Yanagita later criticized the government’s policy of diverting rural 
capital for investment in overseas colonies, although he thought that colonization might reduce the surplus 
of agricultural labor (Ibid.).   
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and communality in Japan affect its expansive tendencies?1682 Yanagita was much more 
concerned with Japan’s internal development, and very little with its overseas expansion. 
 Yamagata Aritomo. In 1918, in the face of Russia’s Bolshevik revolution in 
Russia, Yamagata enthusiastically supported dispatching Japanese troops to Siberia, a 
wonderful opportunity for Japan to expand from “small house” to “grand master” status, 
and for his faction to strengthen its position at home.  Official approval followed, but 
soon huge riots over rice price increases broke out across Japan.  The Siberian 
Intervention failed to arouse nationalistic sentiment as the wars with China and Russia 
had.1683 
 Hirohito, Emperor.  As one of the most complex political figures in twentieth 
century Japanese life, from 1926 to 1945 Hirohito had a huge influence over Japan and its 
short-lived empire, exercising authority in a manner that was ultimately calamitous.  
Under Hirohito, the empire occupied various parts of Northeast and Southeast Asia, the 
Soviet Union, and the North and South Pacific.1684  He inherited the origins of this empire 
from Emperor Meiji.1685 Even before becoming emperor, Hirohito exercised influence 
over the empire.  As regent, in April 1923, he traveled to Japan’s Taiwan colony.1686  
Hirohito especially wanted to visit schools, to impress Taiwan’s youth.  His tour had 
many purposes, in terms of the imperial image, to remind all Japanese that the throne was 
                                                
1682 Ibid., 42. Kawada poses these significant questions, but fails to answer them. 
1683 Dickinson, War and National, 188-190, 200-203. Similarly, Dickinson argues that Japanese 
imperialism in the late 1800s was driven not so much by fear of Western invasion as by incredible euphoria 
at Japan’s unprecedented “opportunities” (i.e., Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese 
Wars, 1894-1895 and 1904-1905) (Ibid., 256-257). 
1684 Bix, Hirohito, 3-4. 
1685 Ibid., 9. 
1686 The Taiwan colony’s people, weather and culture were distinct from Japan, although a small number of 
Japanese had settled there.  About four years before, control of Taiwan’s government passed from Japan’s 
military to a civilian governor-general, though in reality, the military continued to rule (Bix, Hirohito). 
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the moral source of their wealth, affirm Japan’s possession of Taiwan, and strengthen the 
peoples’ belief in the monarchy as the source of all morality. Hirohito’s official visits 
always had a great deal of pomp and formality, extensive press coverage, and the Taiwan 
tour was no different.  In 1925, he took a similar tour of the southern Sakhalin colony.1687     
 Military considerations made Hirohito support the military in its invasion of 
Manchuria in 1931.  After the invasion, he felt the most important issue was to stabilize 
Japan’s internal politics, which he thought the invasion would aid.1688  In the late 1930s, 
as Hirohito pressed for more “unity” among his perpetually divided government and high 
command, these differences were wallpapered over in policy statements bringing 
increasing pressure for imperialist expansion.  Both Japan’s aggressive military and its 
“religiously charged” throne impelled expansion in China in the mid- to late 1930s.  
While a few military leaders argued for “rationality” in Japan’s imperialist policies, soon 
the nation was carried away, and conflicts with China, the United States, and Britain were 
unavoidable.1689 
 In 1942, Hirohito and Prime Minister Tojo planned to establish a new Greater 
East Asia Ministry to control the conquered territories in mainland China and Southeast 
Asia.1690  In late 1943 and early 1944, they encouraged a new approach to China, treating 
it as a co-equal, which they hoped would allow a reduction in Japanese forces there.1691  
                                                
1687 Ibid., 137-139, 156. There are further comments about how in the late 1920s and 1930s the Japanese 
government manipulated images of imperialism to encourage support of the emperor and the throne above 
in the contexts of imperialism section.   
1688 Ibid., 265-269. 
1689 Ibid., 310-312. 
1690 Ibid., 457. The ministry was not going to control colonies in Korea, Taiwan, and Sakhalin (Ibid.). 
1691 In January 1944, Japan and the puppet regime of Wang Ching-wei in Nanjing signed a treaty in which 
Japan agreed to end its treaty-port settlements and extraterritorial rights in China, treat Wang’s regime as a 
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But Hirohito did not support the concept of “national self-determination,” nor any change 
in the relationships of Korea and Taiwan with Japan.  Rather, he supported a hierarchical 
notion of each “race” in the empire assuming its proper place, with Japan guaranteed its 
proper lead-position and privileges.1692   
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japanese Imperialism (1895-1945) 
 
 Here I will evaluate four categories of these leaders’ views: 1) their general 
views of imperialism and colonialism, 2) views of Western imperialism, 3) views of 
Japanese imperialism, and 4) views of Japanese colonies and colonialism. On the general 
nature of colonialism and imperialism, Kato Hiroyuki had mixed views. While he sees 
them as positive signs of evolutionary progress, he laments the exploitation and damage 
that European colonialism has wreaked on weaker peoples. Nevertheless, the strong have 
that right. Yamagata and Hirohito see imperialism by Japan as positive; Yanagita does 
not. In 1918, Yamagata believed that successful Japanese colonization in Siberia would 
enhance Japan’s international status, and his faction’s own domestic political power. 
Similarly, in the 1930s, Hirohito hoped that Japanese achievements in Manchuria and the 
colonies would calm the domestic political scene. This suggests an attitude that external 
adventures will alleviate challenging domestic situations. Yanagita had a more domestic 
focus, preferring Japan’s internal development more than overseas expansion. Bix 
charges that domestic forces, including religion, created additional pressure on the throne 
to increase imperial expansion in China in the mid- to late 1930s.1693 Similar to Kato, we 
                                                                                                                                            
co-equal, and no longer supervise Chinese administration in occupied regions.  Wang Ching-wei, a member 
of China’s Nationalist Party, established his regime in Nanjing in March 1940 (Bix, Hirohito). 
1692 Ibid., 473-474. 
1693 Ibid., 310-312. What were these religious pressures? Perhaps they came from the nationalistic pressures 
inherent in the emperor ideology and State Shinto, both taken to extremes. 
647 
 
see evolutionistic influence in Hirohito’s preference for each “race” in the empire to take 
its proper place in the hierarchy, with Japan in the lead. In their views of colonialism and 
imperialism, these leaders have both negative and positive impressions. 
 On Western imperialism, Kato argues that although Western imperialism has 
done damage, it has also benefited European powers and their colonies. To Kato, this 
“progress” means that Western colonialists cannot be totally condemned; they have the 
right to rule the world, and eventually will. But the damage they have done is at odds 
with the values of Christianity, and Kato finds this troubling. Yanagita felt that imitating 
Western imperialism would be negative for Japan. Yamagata believed that weakness in a 
Western power, i.e. Russia, could create positive opportunities for Japan overseas. These 
leaders (Kato, Ito, Yamagata, Hirohito, and Yanagita) universally condemn the idea that 
Japan should be subject to the West. All of them want Japan to repel Western 
imperialism, and to remain free.   
 On Japanese imperialism, Kato saw the emperor, imperial descent and the 
throne as the center of Japan, the “satellite” colonies, the “race,” and the empire. So 
biological, evolutionary thought, mixed with Confucian and Shinto influences, also 
colors his thought on Japanese imperialism. While Yanagita hoped that Japan would 
develop and lead other Asian nations against Western exploitation, he strongly opposed 
use of the military for Japanese imperialism. The evidence from Kato, Yamagata and 
Hirohito suggests that they viewed Japanese imperialism as positive. Kato and Hirohito 
also believed that the emperor had a central role in Japan’s imperialism.1694 In Hirohito 
                                                
1694 Kato saw him as the “brain” of the nation and empire, and Hirohito was delighted to use his early 
colonial tours of places like Taiwan and south Sakhalin to strengthen the imperial image. 
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we see tacit or direct approval of various imperialistic ventures in areas such as China, 
Manchuria, and Southeast Asia. Despite rhetoric suggesting equality, colonial self-
determination, and the proposed creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry in 1942, in 
reality, Hirohito seemed to most highly value imperialism for how it might help domestic 
concerns, including empowering the throne. 
 Concerning their views of Japanese colonies and colonialism, though Kato 
called Taiwan and Korea mere “satellites” of Japan, Ito and Hirohito both felt highly 
supportive of the colony in Taiwan, Hirohito for propaganda purposes.1695 Ito had 
particularly strong, paternalistic feelings for Korea, and tried to offer it guidance for its 
internal and external affairs without making it a colony, as most in Tokyo desired. But 
near the end of World War II, Hirohito failed to support much self-determination for 
either Taiwan or Korea, or any change in their current status. Rather, he supported a rigid 
international, racist hierarchy of regions, with Japan at the front.1696 Regarding 
development, Ito’s vision for Korea here was the most significant. As governor-general 
of Korea, he requested that Tokyo dispatch experts in numerous fields to Korea to help it 
begin to modernize, even before it became a colony. But he was shot before much 
happened.            
 In sum, all of these leaders saw Western imperialism and colonialism as 
negative, and most of them regarded Japanese imperialism as positive, protecting 
                                                
1695 I am referring to his tour of Taiwan as the imperial regent in the early 1920s. 
1696 This reminds one of the famous Japanese vision of economic development for Asia, the flying geese 




Asia.1697 Most see negative effects of Western imperialism, and all universally want 
Japan to stay free. Most focus most on what colonialism and imperialism will do for 
Japan’s domestic affairs. We noted biological, evolutionistic, Shinto, and Confucian 
influences in the thought of Kato and Hirohito here, where there is also a strong 
connection of imperialism with the emperor ideology. Ito and Yanagita have the most 
sincere vision, genuinely desiring to help colonial regions grow, and defend themselves 
against the West. Hirohito had the greatest influence here; most of it was negative. 
Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japanese Imperialism  
(1895-1945) 
 
 Development Issues. The concept of internationalization is highly relevant to 
the issue of imperialism. What do we learn from these leaders’ worldviews on 
imperialism if we examine them through the lens of the concept of internationalization? 
Again, the key question of internationalization is, what happened on the international 
level, especially culturally, as Japan was drawn into the global trading system? It is 
especially relevant to consider this in terms of Japanese colonialism and Japan’s actions 
across Asia during World War II. Three of the leaders here1698 paint a positive picture of 
the impacts of Japanese imperialism, while Ito and Yanagita are somewhat doubtful. 
Several of the leaders1699 think about Japan’s imperialism in terms of the benefits it may 
bring Japan’s domestic situation or picture it as something that Japan inherently deserves, 
                                                
1697 While Yanagita condemned Japanese imperialism, he supported Japanese strengthening and defense of 
Asia against the West.  
1698 Kato, Yamagata, and Hirohito. 
1699 Yamagata and Hirohito. 
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if it becomes strong.1700 They also imagine the benefits colonies or areas under Japanese 
influence will gain.1701  
 While each of the leaders acknowledged negative things that Western 
imperialism did to peripheral countries, only Yanagita expressed active concern about 
what aggressive Japanese imperialism might do. Yet even he was hopeful Japan could 
exercise positive leadership to help East Asia and the Pacific resist the West. Ito hoped 
Japanese intervention might aid Korea and Taiwan. While it is beyond the scope of this 
research to examine what Japan’s impacts on the colonies actually were, it seems in the 
short term that they brought some economic benefit to the regions under colonial rule. 
Examples include the development of railroads and transportation networks in 
Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan, heavy industries in Manchuria, and the expansion of 
education in Taiwan and Korea. But it was at a heavy toll. As I noted earlier, resistance, 
especially in Korea, was fierce. If we consider the impacts and destruction on other 
nearby regions during the war, such as China proper, they were devastating.1702 Of these 
leaders, only Yanagita hints at a slightly realistic appraisal of what Japanese imperialism 
actually did.   
 Technology Issues. What are the most important technology-related ideas and 
phenomena associated with these worldviews of imperialism? Military technologies and 
power are partly what enabled Japan to fight and achieve victory in the conflicts that won 
it its colonies and empire. Additional technologies of communication and transportation 
                                                
1700 Kato. 
1701 Hirohito, Ito, Yamagata, and Kato. 
1702 It is also fascinating to think about what the legacy of Japan’s prewar cultural impact has been in the 
postwar period and even today, but beyond our present study. 
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also provided Japan with the technical means to develop and exploit various resources in 
areas such as Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan. And technology provided much of the 
sheer power helped allow Japan to maintain control of these areas for as long as it did. 
The pro-imperialism viewpoints of all these leaders, except Yanagita, no doubt approved 
of these coercive and exploitive uses of technology. 
 What are the most significant factors related to imperialism present in the 
imported technologies and related ideas in the worldviews of imperialism studied here? 
The main imported technologies and related ideas connected with these worldviews 
included military technologies, heavy industrial, mining and agricultural technologies, 
new transportation and communication technologies, management principles, certain 
political ideas and theories, and evolutionistic ideas, to a degree. The key imperialism 
related factors included the ideas that strong nations had a right to have colonies, that the 
strong rule the weak, that Japan and the rest of Asia must not be colonies of the West, 
that Japan was weaker than some of the Western countries, but stronger and more 
disciplined than the other Asian countries, and therefore entitled to colonies itself. The 
international system affected these issues both positively and negatively, at multiple 
levels. Japan imported Western military technologies and products to enable it to attack 
China (1894-1895), and Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Technological 
expertise, imported and enhanced in Japan, allowed Japan to provide commodities for 
many Asian markets and its allies during World War I. Relevant technologies helped 
enable Japan to maintain control of its colonies through 1945, to attack and wage warfare 
against the United States, and then suffer huge defeat in the war, which also meant the 
loss of its colonies. 
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 What were the important ideas/technologies transferred here, in these 
worldviews of imperialism? Who were the main international actors in the external 
environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and what impacts did they 
have on the transfer outcomes? What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn? 
The main ideas and technologies related to imperialism here, revolving around military 
strength, technological power, and the right of the strong to exploit the weak, were 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. The chief international and domestic actors 
included the foreign governments of the countries and regions Japan attacked and/or 
gained as colonies or areas of influence, the Japanese government and its relevant 
ministries related to the military, colonies, and international economic issues, Japan’s 
military and the military forces of the foreign countries concerned, new governments 
installed in colonial or occupied territories, multinational and trading companies, and 
various leaders and important individual actors involved in the above groups. The 
impacts of these various groups and actors on the transfer of empire-related technologies 
and ideas were complex, and many. Japan’s industrial actors imported and then produced 
the military technologies that enabled Japan’s military to attack, influence, and/or control 
other regions. The Japanese government set major policies influencing what technologies 
were produced, and how they were used, whether for military or industrial purposes in 
the colonies. Some of the main lessons from this complex situation we learn are that the 
predominant beliefs of many of the top leaders in the country (in this case, on 
imperialism) eventually prevailed, resulting in horrific consequences for Japan and other 
nations. This argues in favor of the perspectives of Yanagita, for more popular and 
democratic oversight of governing and military elites, to help prevent abuses of power. 
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 What are the most significant factors and values present in the imported 
technologies and ideas in these worldviews of imperialism?1703 There is a mixture of 
many contrasting values. In addition to the images and ideas connected with military 
power, here we see ideas of evolutionistic influence, that the strong have the right to rule 
and exploit the weak, and yet discomfort with the hypocrisy of that, with the realization 
that no weaker nation, including Japan, wishes to be exploited. There are racial values, 
and a Confucian influenced sense of the hierarchy of nations in East Asia, with Japan in 
the lead. This is related to ethnocentric values of Japanese superiority. There is 
admiration for Western power and “progress,” coupled with resentment of Western 
racism, cruelty, and bigotry toward non-Westerners. There are values of greed and power 
contrasted with altruistic desires to liberate, protect, and defend neighboring Asian 
regions from Western influence or control. There is also the desire to strengthen Japan 
domestically (politically and economically) through the colonies. 
 In their worldviews, most of these leaders, except Yanagita, used these 
technologies and ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s 
(material) environments on the international level by justifying Japan’s intervention in 
neighboring countries in terms of the overall benefit that both Japan and the colonies 
would gain if the West were repelled, and the colonies were given the benefits of 
Japanese protection and development expertise. The supposed economic benefits for 
Japan were also added bonuses. The outcome of these technological issues finally 
threatened Japan’s survival in the international system, since it bankrupted and nearly 
destroyed Japan by the end of World War II. 
                                                
1703 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
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 The belief systems of many of these leaders, on technology issues on the 
international level, blinded them to the reality that Japan’s neighboring regions did not 
want to be colonies of Japan just as Japan did not wish to be a colony of the West. 
Though Japan was, in many ways, more developed than the others, and almost the lone 
Asian actor to not become a Western colony, did not mean that Japan should control its 
neighbors. But an alternative view was almost unknown. In the mind of most of Japan’s 
leaders, Japan had no choice but to engage in assertive interventions in its neighbors, 
because if Japan did not, the Western countries would, to the peril of all East Asia. 
Toward the end of this era, even though it became impossible for Japan to maintain 
control of its colonies, Hirohito in particular stubbornly refused to admit the need for 
flexibility in colonial policies, and to surrender as soon as was needed. It is hard to 
believe that the nationalistic ideologies of hakkô ichiu, imperial descent and Japanese 
superiority did not cloud his actions on the empire at least a little. 
 In these worldviews on imperialism, technonationalism as ideology is strongly 
manifested. Kato, Yamagata and Hirohito all implicitly, yet definitely, support the idea 
that Japan’s colonies and imperial ventures must benefit Japan, economically and 
politically, to enable it to resist Western encroachment. Only Yanagita resists this ideal. 
His view, like Fukuzawa’s in an earlier era, was that Japan’s internal development must 
precede foreign adventures. But Yanagita’s vision did not prevail; that of the other 
leaders did. Ultimately aggressive intervention in other nations nearly destroyed Japan 




 Cognition Issues. Image. These leaders’ images of imperialism may be 
organized into four groups. In the first group, basic images of colonialism and 
imperialism, the images are generally positive. Kato calls imperialism and colonialism 
evidence of evolutionary progress, and argues that the strongest have the right to rule the 
world. Yamagata hints that imperialism can enhance a nation’s power and prestige in the 
international system. The images of European and Western imperialism are mixed. 
European and Western colonialism are called positive in that they have contributed to 
global progress. In Kato’s eyes early in the twentieth century, as the strongest nations, 
they have a right to power and control of the world.1704 Negatively, Western colonialism 
has exploited weaker peoples and destroyed many of their cultures, is hypocritical, and 
contrary to Christianity.1705 Western imperialism can be positive for Japan if it serves as a 
motivator for the nation to grow to resist the West.1706 Images of Japanese imperialism, 
offered by Kato, Yamagata, Yanagita, and Hirohito, are generally supportive and 
positive. Hirohito offers the most positive images,1707 while Yamagata strongly supported 
the unsuccessful Siberian Intervention in 1918. Other images, of Kato and Yanagita, 
suggest that Japan is superior, more powerful, central, and important than its colonial 
satellites.1708 Yanagita offers the only negative images of Japanese imperialism here.1709 




1707 In his images, Hirohito shows support for the general idea of Japanese imperialism in his imperial tours 
and elsewhere, for the invasion of Manchuria in the 1930s, and for Japan’s additional imperial expansion in 
the late 1930s. He also believed that Japanese imperialism could aid politics and the throne at home. 
1708 For example, Kato declared that “patriarchal sovereignty” and Japan would always be the center of the 
empire, that the emperor was the “brain” of the empire, and that the imperial family would be the 
“quintessence” of the Japanese race at the empire’s center. Even Yanagita, who opposed Japanese 
imperialism, suggested that Japan must lead other Asian nations by example, and that Japan must 
encourage the development and unity of other Asian nations against the West.   
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Regarding images of Japanese colonies, although Ito opposed colonialism in Korea, he 
calls colonialism in Taiwan and Hokkaido good. Hirohito’s images suggest that each 
colony should take its proper place in the imperial hierarchy, and that each is naturally 
inferior to Japan. Images of how Japan should relate to the colonies stress that Japan 
should take the lead position in the empire,1710 and that some colonies need Japan’s 
guidance, protection, and help with development.1711 Rhetoric near the end of World War 
II, suggesting that certain regions in the empire should have some autonomy or equality 
with Japan, proved not to be genuine.1712 
 How may these images have served as perceptual filters or organizing devices? 
On colonialism and imperialism, these images ignore the negative impacts of 
colonialism, including exploitation, moral and human rights problems, economic 
injustices, oppression, and so forth. On European and Western colonialism, Kato’s 
images were overly positive. Negative aspects of Western colonialism were true. Western 
colonialism was really a mixed case. It would have been good if Japan had not copied so 
much Western colonialism. From the social and political points of view, there seemed to 
be many negative impacts on other Asian countries from Western imperialism. From the 
standpoint of technology and economics, in the long run there were some positive 
impacts. In images on Japanese imperialism, there were several blind spots. Hirohito in 
particular failed to recognize that Japanese imperialism was often brutal, despite 
economic benefits and infrastructural development it brought some areas, including 
                                                                                                                                            
1709 For example, Yanagita argued that Japan’s internal development was more important than its 
colonialism or imperialism, that using Japan’s military for overseas imperialism was bad, and that Japan 
must not blindly copy Western imperialism. 
1710 Hirohito. 
1711 These are suggested by Ito’s images of Korea. 
1712 These were some of Hirohito’s statements about China, Taiwan and Korea, noted earlier in the chapter.  
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Korea, Manchuria and Taiwan. Since it was forced on these areas, it was often resented. 
This has caused many foreign policy headaches for Japan that often continue until now. 
The images on Japanese colonies included false ideas that Japan was inherently better 
than all of its colonies. It is true that the colonies benefited somewhat from Japan’s input 
and its higher level of development. This help should have been given without force, not 
as a result of invasion. Perhaps some nations would have welcomed Japanese help that 
was not forced, perhaps not.1713 There was a failure to recognize the ultimate failure this 
forced policy would have, and the baggage it would create for Japan’s future international 
relations. 
 Worldview. What worldviews of Japan’s imperialism emerge from the above 
images? In the nature of the world, the strong have the right to rule the world. 
Imperialism is good if it contributes to progress, though weak nations may suffer. 
Imperialism can be hypocritical, and this also is not good. The strongest nations will rule 
and control the weak ones. If Japan or any other nation does not want to be ruled or 
controlled by others, it must become strong. If Japan becomes strong, it has the right to 
have an empire too. On views of the world’s order, the strong rule the weak. If a nation 
has an empire or colonies, it can build its power and prestige. It is good for nations to 
submit themselves to the proper international hierarchy of nations. Hirohito believed that 
those in Asia should willingly let Japan lead, since it was the most advanced nation in the 
region. 
 In views of Japan, imperialism could help Japan grow, domestic politics and 
other domestic issues. Japan was superior and therefore fit to lead other Asian countries. 
                                                
1713 In the case of Korea, the answer was definitely no in either case.  
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Japan could help these other countries with development, and to resist the West. In the 
views of non-self (non-Japanese) here, Western countries were seen as superior to Japan. 
Their imperialism had helped bring progress to Asia and elsewhere, but they exploited 
and harmed the cultures of weaker countries, which was not good. Weaker peoples, 
namely other Asian countries, were not as strong as Japan or the West. Japan should help 
lead them. Colonialism in Taiwan and Korea and similar regions was good. Hirohito 
especially believed that each Asian country should take its proper position in the empire 
so Japan could lead.   
 What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the leaders who held these 
worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect the leaders’ worldviews? 
The environment included Western imperialism and colonialism threatening other Asian 
countries. Though not a current threat to Japan, it was in the recent past. Several of the 
leaders, including Hirohito, were afraid of the threat of war with or invasion (of Japan) by 
the Soviet Union. There was great competition between Japan and the Western powers on 
the Asian mainland for resources and influence. Concerning environmental interactions, 
to many except Yanagita, Japan’s rapid military victories in the late 1800s and early 
1900s, its gain of colonies in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria, and rapid economic growth 
through the mid-1920s, seemed to confirm Japanese power and the rightness of Japanese 
imperialism and its cause. However, the collapse of Japan’s empire in World War II, the 
huge suffering and defeat of the nation caused many to feel betrayed after the war. How 
did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions influence the 
leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes? 
On the issue of perception, for Hirohito, Japan’s victories in the earlier wars since 1895, 
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and tours to several colonies, seemed outstanding proof of the rightness of Japanese 
militarism and imperialism. Others, such as Kato and Yamagata, were generally 
supportive of Japanese imperialism. But Ito and Yanagita expressed doubts. On uses of 
information, information for several of these leaders was limited, due to various 
circumstances. Difficulties in travel and tight control on information later in the period 
meant that they sometimes had a hard time having an accurate picture of what was really 
happening abroad. This was not the case for Hirohito, who usually had access to the best 
possible information.1714 Power politics, realism, and evolutionary thinking, to some 
degree, influence many of these views of imperialism and colonialism. Imperialist and 
nationalist ideologies, some from Meiji Japan, influenced the thought of Hirohito, Kato 
and others. The main exception was Yanagita. 
 How may have technological systems affected these worldviews?  Heavy 
industry, powerful military technologies, and successful industrialization and trade all 
enabled Japan to buy or produce the technologies it used in its warfare and imperialism. 
Railroad, port and mining technologies allowed economic exploitation in several 
colonies, such as Manchuria. To these leaders, except Yanagita, these successes, 
especially before the full breakout of World War II, suggested that imperialism was the 
right path for Japan. 
 Cultural Logics. Under their worldviews of imperialism, what were the global 
phenomena to which these leaders responded? These included Western imperialism, 
colonialism, theories and ideas about colonialism, evolutionistic theories, economic 
pressures for colonies and more wealth, the idea that Japan was threatened with invasion 
                                                
1714 Bix, Hirohito. 
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or foreign control if it did not obtain more wealth, colonies, and pressure for natural 
resources. What were the leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? 
Some believed that Western imperialism had contributed much to evolutionary progress. 
The strong have the right to rule the weak.1715 All believed that Western imperialism 
should be repelled, Japan should not be a colony of the West; it must remain free. Kato 
and Hirohito believed that superior races have the right to control weaker countries and 
races. Some saw Japanese imperialism as positive.1716 They believed it could strengthen 
Japanese politics and economics, and help various domestic issues.1717 Japanese 
imperialism could help Asia defend itself against the West.1718 Kato saw Japan as 
superior to its colonies, as the necessary the center of the empire. Colonies were mere 
“satellites” of Japan.1719 Japan should help the colonies to develop and be 
strengthened.1720 Only Yanagita believed that Japan should be more focused on home, not 
overseas adventures.   
 What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global 
phenomena? These included evolutionary assumptions that the strong and superior races 
usually win, seen as positive. Because the West had many colonies, it had contributed to 
“progress.” There were assumptions that progress and imperialism were good, because 
they would strengthen the controlling country, and often the colonies. Japan should not 
become a colony; it should stay free. Freedom for one’s self was seen as good. It was 
permissible for Japan to have colonies although Japan did not want to be controlled by 
                                                
1715 The previous two beliefs were Kato’s. 
1716 Kato, Yamagata and Hirohito.  
1717 Yamagata and Hirohito.  
1718 This was the belief of all the leaders studied in this section. 




others. That was a right of stronger countries, and Japan was such a country. Japan was 
superior to other Asian countries, so it could and should help them.      
 What were these responses to these global phenomena? They responded with 
hard work, study, writing, and much effort in policymaking (in some cases) to help build 
up Japan and help it grow so it could resist the West. Ito was personally involved in 
helping to administer a region under Japanese control (Korea). Hirohito had the biggest 
impacts on imperialism, due to his position as emperor, and the huge macro-level policies 
during World War II that he either allowed or did not stop.   
 What were the cultural logics under these responses? They included hard work 
to help Japan fend off Western imperialism. This was seen as a matter of survival. 
Actions regarding Japanese imperialism, colonies were seen as contributing to Japanese 
survival. They were also as a means of helping Japan’s Asian neighbors to develop, 
grow, progress and resist the West. 
 What do we learn if we compare the cultural logics of the worldviews about the 
global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the 
phenomena? The former logics were more basic, such as what the meaning and 
motivations for imperialism were, and whether imperialism was good. The latter logics 
examined more specialized issues, such as the value of Japanese imperialism and 
colonialism. 
 Globalization Issues. How do the most important worldviews of imperialism 
and colonialism here reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or 
speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? How does 
globalization affect these worldviews?  Intensified global connections of technology and 
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communication enabled Japan to be both threatened by Western imperialism, and then to 
threaten its Asian neighbors. The spread of political ideas and military technology from 
the West enabled Japan to study and make sense of the actions of the West, and the new 
threats that Japan and other Asian nations faced. The chief understanding that emerged is 
that the world is now driven by wealth and power, and that if Japan is to repel the West 
and become strong itself, it must grow strong enough to resist the West, but then 
influence other Asian countries near it so it too can become great. The worldviews of 
these leaders reflect their own understanding of, and reactions to, the Western 
imperialism that had threatened Japan, and then their interpretations of how the enterprise 
and concept of imperialism should be acted upon by Japan and nearby regions. In this 
sense, these leaders received the concept of Western imperialism and mediated it in 
somewhat different forms to the rest of East and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. 
While all these leaders condemned Western imperialism, not all supported the Japanese 
form. Yanagita is the exception.     
 If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro- 
(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Ito, Hirohito1721 and 
Yamagata had limited experiences of living in and/or traveling to nearby regions. 
Yanagita served briefly in Europe in the League of Nations.1722 The thought of all of 
these leaders on imperialism and colonialism is fundamentally based on what they read 
and were taught in their conservative educations, public service, and limited travel 
overseas. Their conservative training colored and influenced their reactions, especially in 
                                                
1721 Hirohito did brief colonial tours to nearby regions when he was regent in the early 1920s (Bix, 
Hirohito). 
1722 To my knowledge, Kato Hiroyuki never had a chance to live and travel overseas much. 
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the case of Hirohito. The exception is Yanagita. Why was Yanagita different? How were 
his progressive-leaning political beliefs acquired, and why did they make him oppose 
harsh, militaristic Japanese imperialism?1723 This is beyond the present project’s scope to 
answer, but perhaps because he so opposed the destructive effects of Western 
globalization on Japan, he did not want Japan repeating similar mistakes on its neighbors.     
 Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or non-
Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? These processes are an example 
of a non-Western power, Japan, receiving the impacts of Western globalization, in the 
form of imperialism, and then mediating them in similar, though altered forms, as 
Japanese forms of global impact (Japanese imperialism and colonialism). They are 
significant as the first forms of non-Western globalization in the modern world, though 






  From the above study of several key leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external 
relations (1895 to 1945), and of Japan’s experiences with technology, development, and 
external relations in this period, what are some of the main lessons and conclusions that 
may be possible for Japan’s current foreign aid and development policies? Here I will 
explore general tendencies, but will save the exploration of more concrete linkages for 
the concluding chapters (9 and 10). Regarding sociocultural issues, on the role of 
                                                
1723 Remember that Yanagita supported positive Japanese leadership of nearby regions, but not harsh 
control forced on them. 
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ideology on social change, development and security in this era, various imperialist 
doctrines, such as hakkô ichiu, were used by Japan’s government and military to 
convince Japan’s citizens that Japan’s actions in other countries were practically, 
intellectually, and divinely justifiable. Thankfully, this is not the case in Japan’s current 
ODA policy. In addition, images of biology, evolution and indigenous ideologies (i.e. 
Shinto) colored the visions of imperialism and colonialism of some of these leaders 
(Hirohito, Kato). Certainly some particular images, even if not imperialistic ones, 
influence the views of current Japanese aid workers, images such as globalization, free 
trade, self-help, and others. 
  In this period, Japan had close relations with a wide variety of nations and world 
regions, including its Asian neighbors, the West, and geoculturally distant places such as 
Africa and Latin America. Though Japan enjoyed peace with many of these nations 
during much of this era, it also had horrifically painful conflicts, such as World War II. 
Japan’s overall foreign relations in this era seem painful, and filled with many 
misunderstandings. Japan’s leaders had various misunderstandings about other nations 
that influenced the policies they enacted. Hirohito’s views of other nations were highly 
colored by racist, biological notions. On the policy level, his problem was not one of 
inaccurate information or a lack of it—it was a worldview problem. How could this have 
been corrected? The political worldviews of most of Japan’s leaders in this period stress 
conservative ideologies and various forms of competition between nations. Their views 
have various racial overtones, hint of evolutionism, Japan’s superiority, and the desire for 
empire (the exception is Yanagita). All of the views have a degree of realism. Some 
conservative ideologies emerging in this era suggested that Japan had the right to control 
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certain resources in neighboring regions, or a duty to unite Asia and lead it against 
Western domination. This thought influenced some of Japan’s leaders. Another major 
issue here, again, is the further rise of Japan’s military and its powerful grip on Japan’s 
economy, society, politics, and its international relations. Mistakes in these two areas—
misreadings of international conditions by Japan’s top leaders, based partly on (in my 
opinion) faulty worldviews, and the unhampered power of Japan’s military, had 
disastrous consequences for Japan, Asia, the Pacific, and the United States, costing tens 
of millions of lives, and partially enabling the victory of communism in China and 
elsewhere in Asia, which would cost tens of millions of more lives after the war. 
  There are at least two important, basic lessons for ODA and development 
policies here. First, the worldviews of leaders will influence the kinds of foreign policy 
they support and enact. This was the case in prewar Japan, and also is for contemporary 
LDCs. Japan’s current aid policies inevitably reflect a complex mix of the worldviews of 
Japan’s current policymakers, bureaucrats, and aid staff, and competing political and 
economic forces, pressures and interests, domestic and foreign. Similar forces will shape 
the development and aid policies of LDCs, though in different ways from Japan. A key 
question is, where leaders of an LDC have inaccurate worldviews which misread 
domestic or foreign conditions, how might they be corrected? Access to accurate 
information is obvious, but how can leaders be helped when they are influenced by faulty 
worldviews, as Japan’s leaders were before World War II? Frequent change of 
leadership, as in a democracy, seems the simplest answer. The second issue concerns 
controlling a nation’s military so that it does not abuse its power. It seems that 
encouraging democratic governance and controls on abuse of power and militarism are 
666 
 
fundamental for ODA and development policies, to prevent help prevent problems like 
these in today’s LDCs.  
 In its external economic relations in this period, for the first thirty years, Japan 
had extensive trade with the outside world, Western and Asian nations and others, and 
benefited immensely. Earlier wars such as the Russo-Japanese War and World War I 
expanded Japan’s economy, though World War II destroyed it. Trade built up the 
Japanese nation and the wealth and prosperity of its people, to a very widespread degree. 
Yet because of its new global connections, when the Great Depression hit in the late 
1920s, Japan also suffered. The expansion of the power of Japan’s military in domestic 
society, and its aggressive actions caused great damage to it and other nations. 
International isolation for Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s greatly harmed its 
economy. The strong state emphasis on heavy industrialization and trade failed to deal 
with the issues of small and medium enterprises. The views of the only leader studied 
here, Yanagita, also emphasized the issues of local and more regional business, and more 
on the domestic side. Today Japanese economic policy has more balanced emphases and 
examines both domestic and international issues. The more advanced an LDC’s economy 
becomes, likely the greater its engagement with international trade. Aid and development 
plans for a particular country should be geared around this fact. LLDCs should therefore 
have a lesser degree of openness to the international economy than more advanced LDCs. 
So economic openness to international trade should be geared to an LDC’s actual 
economic conditions. This idea seems based on Japan’s actual experience, and fits well 
the Japanese concept of customized development for LDCs. It also fits Japan’s actual 
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ODA policy, which has sought to encourage bilateral trade and investment based on 
LDCs’ actual conditions. 
 In the period 1895 to 1945, the study of foreign and Western cultures seemed to 
have somewhat of a liberalizing effect on Japan through the early 1930s (the period of 
Taisho democracy), both in popular culture and in some intellectual trends. In the late 
1920s to 1945, due to conservative pressure from the Japanese government, there was 
much censorship and oppression against these “decadent” Western influences, but they 
could not be totally eliminated. Interactions with foreigners in this era had big impacts on 
Japan’s relations with other countries, some lasting until today. Japan’s anger against the 
United States was provoked when the latter passed the racist anti-Japanese immigration 
exclusion act in 1924, and Japanese cruelty against the Chinese in China in World War II 
and Koreans in Japan during and after the war have had long-lasting effects on Japan’s 
international relations. Foreign employees and experts who brought Western knowledge 
to Japan, starting in the Meiji period, had huge impacts on Japan’s knowledge. Rather 
than contaminating Japan, ultimately this contact with foreigners greatly enriched it. 
 The wise policy ideas of Yanagita Kunio, designed to protect Japanese identity 
and culture against the onslaught of Western influences, did not affect Japan’s cultural 
preservation policies until later in the postwar period. Yanagita’s policies stressed 
understanding and protecting Japan’s culture from the bottom–up, while Hirohito’s and 
official views supported more of a top-down approach. Both leaders supported the role of 
government in this process. Japan’s aid has also demonstrated more of a top-down 
approach in many issues, even toward cultural issues. The global aid agenda has also 
historically supported a top-down approach when it has paid any attention to cultural 
668 
 
issues, but lately it is beginning to emphasize a bottom-up approach, at least in its 
discourse. Japan is now also attempting to incorporate more such bottom-up approaches, 
in line with the global agenda. But can it really do so?  
 Leaders who were most influential for most of this period supported more 
conservative cultural values, though some supported more liberal ideas during the period 
of Taisho democracy. We also see rather conservative approaches in Japan’s general aid 
philosophy—conservative economic approaches, loans, the emphasis on self-
help/reliance, and so forth. As noted in Chapter 2, other countries’ development 
approaches also reflect their own beliefs and experiences. Hirohito and the Japanese 
government also supported the conservative, imperialist ideology of hakkô ichiu, the idea 
that Japan could bring peace and Confucian virtue to the world. This ideology was 
somewhat implicit in official Japanese propaganda in the 1930s and 1940s. This may be 
seen in current Japanese ideas about Japan’s role as a cultural and development bridge 
between East and West, and North and South. True, Japan’s aid approach has been rather 
distinctive. But is it really such a bridge?1724 
 What are the possible implications of Japan’s experiences and its leaders’ views 
of colonialism and imperialism for Japan’s aid policies? By 1895, Japan incorporated 
Hokkaido and Okinawa as integral parts of the nation. Japanese colonialism went into full 
swing in Taiwan in 1895, soon followed by parts of Southern Manchuria, Sakhalin and 
                                                
1724 The idea of serving as a cultural bridge between East and West is shared by other East Asian societies, 
including South Korea and China. For example, consider the new Back to Jerusalem missionary movement 
of China’s persecuted underground Protestant church, which aims to take the Christian gospel to the largely 
Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist cultures of South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Brother Yun and 
Paul Hattaway, The Heavenly Man: The Remarkable True Story of Chinese Christian Brother Yun 
(London: Monarch Books, 2002); Back to Jerusalem, “God’s call to the Chinese Church to Complete the 
Great Mission”; http://www.backtojerusalem.com; Internet; accessed 15 October 2008). 
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Korea (the last in 1910). Japan began massive infrastructural investment in each of these 
regions. Later, Japan acquired many new territories in mainland China and Southeast 
Asia. In some places, its rule was quite brutal; in others, it was barely present. From the 
early 1940s, Japan created new policies for both its older colonies and newly conquered 
territories. They were designed in principle to grant more autonomy to some colonies, 
and to strengthen the empire, but most of the policies had little impact. Japan’s impacts 
on its colonies and territories were sometimes positive (in terms of economic 
infrastructural development), but often harsh or negative. As noted already, many 
millions of lives were affected, both foreign and Japanese. 
 What were the cultural impacts and implications of Japanese imperialism? 
Japanese colonialism often created widespread resentment in indigenous populations, 
including from the Okinawans and the Ainu in Hokkaido. Koreans felt even greater 
resentment toward Japan’s long, harsh colonial rule. Japan’s cruel behavior in mainland 
China helped to unite China’s peasants under Chinese communists for nationalist 
resistance.1725 In many of these places, the Japanese imposed the use of the Japanese 
language, State Shinto, the Japanese education system, and other 
imperialistic/nationalistic ideologies. Current international ODA policies, including 
Japan’s, prohibit imperialistic, hegemonic influences such as these.  
 In Japan proper, from the late 1920s to 1945, Japan’s government heavily 
promoted the glories of imperialism and its past military victories in Japanese society, 
and ideologies supporting such ideas. This eventually had a large impact in generating 
much popular Japanese support for World War II and Japanese imperialism. In Japanese 
                                                
1725 Johnson, Peasant Nationalism. 
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thought, Western imperialism and colonialism were negative, and should not be 
permitted. Japan felt that it was a stronger non-Western country, so it should help other 
Asians defend themselves against Western outsiders/invaders. Supposed economic and 
political benefit for Japan was an added bonus. 
 Most Japanese felt that indigenous peoples in the colonies were racially inferior, 
and debates over colonial identity and the role of colonists in the empire followed. 
Colonies were seen as “inferior” (mere “satellites”) to more developed/advanced nations 
such as Japan (Kato). In the view of Japan’s leaders, including Hirohito, there should be a 
“hierarchy” of Asian nations and colonies, with Japan at the front, like the “flying geese” 
pattern mentioned in an earlier chapter. Contemporary aid suggests that LDCs are inferior 
to donor countries, and that donor countries like Japan have a right to continue to lead 
them. Donor countries support this position. It is doubtful that aid from Japan or 
elsewhere can challenge this. 
 What are the (economic) implications of Japan’s imperialism (1895-1945) for 
Japan’s current ODA? Japan’s pattern of offering mainly infrastructural help in its ODA 
follows not only Japan’s own pattern of development, but also the development pattern it 
followed in the colonial regions it held for a fairly long time. Japanese could not tolerate 
a foreign or colonial presence in their midst, and Japan’s colonies generally felt the same 
about Japan’s presence. This is especially true among young people in most other Asian 
countries that were Japanese colonies. While Japanese infrastructural investments laid the 
foundation for later development of colonies such as South Korea and Taiwan, many of 
these populations deeply resented former Japanese control, and the tremendous damage 
671 
 
of World War II. This anti-imperialism attitude common in the postwar world has made 
imperialism deeply resented, and prohibited in international law. 
 But while today imperialism is illegal and condemned by global public opinion, 
are the attitudes of more advanced countries, including Japan, still “imperialistic” in their 
development and aid policies? The idea of more advanced countries “helping” LDCs to 
develop is very much a part of the global development agenda, common in Japan and 
other advanced OECD nations, and hints at colonial and evolutionistic ideas of a 
hierarchy of nations. Various “non-Western” countries, such as China, Japan, and the 
Soviet Union/Russia have shown a desire to help LDCs in other parts of Asia, Africa and 
elsewhere to develop. Japan desires to help them come into the global trading system. 
Japan and China display the attitude that aid to these LDCs will benefit the domestic 
economies of the former (i.e. their aid to Africa). The ideal of helping LDCs to resist 
Western “imperialism” (or the “West”) was also strong in Chinese and Soviet aid in the 
late twentieth century.  
 Non-intervention in the internal affairs and sovereignty of other nations is also a 
strong principle in contemporary international relations and law. Advanced nations such 
as Japan hope to set a “positive” example for LDCs, and through aid and development 
plans, hope they do so. Ito Hirobumi hoped to “help” Korea develop in the early 
twentieth century, and tried to arrange for many Japanese experts to be dispatched there. 
Today, Japan and other advanced nations show a similar attitude through their 
dispatching of technical assistance and volunteers in programs like the Peace Corps, and 
JICA’s JOCV. Do these programs perpetuate ethnocentric attitudes of national 
superiority?  “Advanced” nations like Japan still feel “superior” to LDCs, economically 
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and culturally, perhaps even racially. How much cultural and economic control over 
LDCs is still generated by contemporary aid, even from non-Western donors like Japan 
and China? 
  On the second key question of the dissertation, the development related concept 
of internationalization an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and 
development?1726 Regarding internationalization and Japan’s external political relations, 
most of the leaders discussed in this chapter were politically conservative,1727 and 
expected Japan to get involved in race wars with the West. Their thought is mostly 
realist, and influenced by evolutionism. All wanted Japan to lead Asia against the West. 
As Japan’s domestic politics turned increasingly militaristic in the 1930s and 1940s, more 
assertive attitudes in its foreign relations emerged, having great effects on the countries 
with which it interacted. Internationalization does not really apply to Yanagita’s views on 
external economic relations (the only leader studied on that topic for this period). His 
major concern was protecting Japan’s domestic, especially rural, culture from destructive 
cultural and economic influences from abroad. His policies emphasized strengthening 
local and regional industries, such as agriculture, so local regions could be empowered. 
Internationalization only has limited relevance for external cultural relations. Yanagita 
and Hirohito, the two leaders studied, were mainly concerned about how international 
cultural forces would affect Japan’s domestic culture. But on internationalization, since 
Hirohito accepted most of the nationalistic and emperor ideologies, it is likely that he 
                                                
1726 The concepts of “modernization” and translative adaptation are not considered here, so I do mention 
them. 
1727 The exception is Yanagita, who was politically liberal. 
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accepted the hakkô ichiu ideology too.1728 But there is no strong evidence that hakkô 
ichiu affected other countries in Asia, or that Hirohito strongly believed it could. 
Internationalization is extremely relevant to Japanese imperialism. Three leaders see 
Japanese imperialism as positive,1729 and two see it as doubtful.1730 Several think of it in 
terms of the benefits it may bring Japan or to other countries/colonies.1731 Only Yanagita 
showed concern for negative effects it might have on other regions. As we considered 
what the effects were, there were several that were positive, but we also noted the 
overwhelmingly devastating consequences of World War II. 
 From my earlier survey of Japan’s external political, economic, cultural 
relations, and relations with its empire (1895 to 1945), what contextual factors relevant to 
Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations emerge that are 
important for the issue of internationalization? There are many issues covered in these 
contexts relevant to the concept, since internationalization concerns the economic and 
cultural effects occurring as weaker regions are absorbed into the world market. What 
happened here as both Japan and its empire entered the global economy? 
 In this era, Japan exercised increasing political, economic and cultural influence 
on surrounding regions, including Korea, Taiwan, southern Manchuria, and others. 
Aggression occurred at many points, especially during conflicts. Earlier in the period, 
major Western powers tolerated Japan’s actions against its neighbors. But from the 1920s 
to 1940s, as Japan faced increasing opposition from Western powers for hostilities in 
                                                
1728 According to the hakkô ichiu ideology, Japan would become a beacon of world peace and Confucian 
wisdom, 
1729 Kato, Yamagata, and Hirohito. 
1730 Ito and Yanagita. 
1731 Hirohito, Ito, Yamagata, and Kato. 
674 
 
Asia, it gradually decreased its political, economic and cultural ties with the West and 
increased them with its Asian sphere of influence. Japan slowly became more aggressive 
toward its neighbors. Though the West was the international provider of the knowledge 
that Japan craved for its survival in the early to mid- Meiji period, as well as Japan’s 
chief threat, now the Western powers were seen as Japan’s chief obstacle to wealth, 
power and survival in Asia. While Japan’s military exercised influence over Japan’s 
politics, especially during war, this influence greatly increased in the 1930s, with 
devastating impacts on Japan’s international relations, even on the economic and cultural 
levels, with its empire and Asian neighbors. 
 Economically, Japan’s trade and economic ties with the empire and Asia greatly 
increased during this period. Economic factors and survival were among the main factors 
contributing to Japan’s involvement in Asia. Most of the trade, development and 
economic activity with the colonies were carried out mainly for the benefit of Japan. 
Though Japan had significant trade relations with several Western nations, increasing 
political tensions toward the end of the period strained these ties. The withdrawal of the 
Western powers from East Asia during World War I helped increase Japan’s ties with the 
mainland as it strove to supply the needs of Asian markets. Through the 1920s, Japan 
quickly mastered large-scale industrial production and trade with the rise of the zaibatsu 
and major trading companies. Increasing trade with the colonies further cemented its ties 
with Asia. In the 1930s, the increasingly militarized nature of Japan’s economy and its 
colonial ties meant that the colonies would also be leashed to Japan’s wartime fate. 
 Japan’s cultural ties with the West continued to be great, though direct ties 
decreased in the 1930s and 1940s. Intellectual influences in many areas were strong, 
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though the totalitarianism of the Japanese government in the 1930s reduced their impact. 
Cultural tensions with the United States over immigration increased general hostility 
between the two nations, reinforcing to some Japanese that the United States and other 
Western nations were fundamentally racist. This was one more factor encouraging Japan 
to cast its gaze to the East, not the West, for the future. Japan’s cultural relations with 
neighbors like China and Korea were extensive during the period, and filled with tension. 
Though teachers from the West exercised decisive influence in Japan until the 1930s, two 
other groups of foreigners in Japan, the Chinese and the Koreans, experienced intense 
discrimination. 
 Through its expanding empire, Japan exercised increasing influence on the lives 
of other Asians, economically, culturally and politically. The influence of jingoistic, 
imperialistic ideologies in Japan also increased. The Japanese government heavily 
promoted these ideologies, which were economically motivated but culturally tinged by 
racism. They reinforced the worldviews promoted by the state, encouraging the Japanese 
public to support its extremist actions. As Japan’s economic and political ties with its 
colonies increased, it attempted to impose Japanese identity on them, through language, 
education, citizenship, State Shinto, and the military draft, but the colonized were not 
given full political rights. Examining the cultural conditions in colonies such as Korea 
and Taiwan under Japanese imperialism, we see that Japanese rule was often oppressive, 
in Korea, to the extreme. The ultimate irony was that Japan’s non-Western colonialism 
was just as exploitive and violent as the West’s was. 
 In sum, in Chapter 8, Japan represents both an example of and an exception to 
internationalization. It is a good example in that it actively, aggressively exercised 
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domination and control over its weaker neighbors, with broad cultural, economic and 
political impacts upon them. Japan is somewhat an exception in that it was not a Western 
power, and the definition assumes that acts of aggression that occur as non-Western 
regions enter the global economy will be committed by Western nations. This is not 
always the case, as seen in Japan’s actions in Asia at this time, and in contemporary 
China’s powerful economic interventions in Africa and Latin America in the 2000s. Also, 
Japan did not passively react to the threat of the West, but aggressively and assertively 
responded on many levels. In these ways, Japan does not fit the conventional definition of 
internationalization.    
 What, if anything, do we see in the historical and worldview evidence presented 
here about how Japanese spirituality and religion may have affected policies during this 
period? While this chapter has fewer references than some previous chapters, above I 
noted how spirituality and nationalism mixed in the views of both Hirohito and 
Yanagita.1732 Hirohito’s mixing of spirituality and politics blinded him on the effects of 
Japanese actions in China and other overseas regions in the 1930s,1733 and he supported 
nationalistic, spiritual ideologies such as State Shinto and hakkô ichiu in reaction to the 
external cultural influences that he felt threatened Japan. The government used 
spirituality and spiritual values in national education and State Shinto to increase citizen 
                                                
1732 Remember how Hirohito and his court emphasized the connections of nationalism and spirituality in 
the enthronement ceremonies (in 1928) (Bix, Hirohito), and how Yanagita connected ujigami spirituality 
and the emperor with true Japanese (national) identity. Hirohito also assumed that state-defined ideologies 
such as State Shinto represented who Japanese really were. In addition, he was surrounded by nationalistic 
and spiritual input in his education and upbringing, greatly affecting his future policy stances and 
outcomes.   
1733 See my comments in Chapter 9 on Hirohito’s attitude toward Japan’s actions in China in the late 1930s. 
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support for militaristic policies, and to minimize resistance to them.1734  In the policy 
lessons offered above, I argued that based on the Japanese experience in this period, 
while the state of a developing country should not endorse any religion, positive spiritual 
values, apart from the state, can sometimes encourage a nation to seek humble paths of 
service in the international arena. This is not what happened in Japan in this era.  
 Japan’s leaders also used material means (military technologies, industries, and 
aggression) to try to transform Japan’s external environment—to expand Japan’s 
overseas influence, control, wealth, and to help “defend” Asia against Western 
encroachment. Japan also used these material means to gain access to additional 
territories and natural resources for “defense” purposes. These actions were also justified 
in terms of the benefits that Japanese influence would bring these newly conquered 
regions. Yanagita did not concur with these actions. Instead, he argued that Japan must 
use material means (regional industries and agriculture) to defend its indigenous rural 
culture and spirituality, what he saw as the foundation of Japanese culture, identity, and 
survival, against the flood of Western material and spiritual products (technology and 
culture). In reality, the aggressive material actions of the Japanese state, undergirded by 
forced acceptance of State Shinto in conquered territories and Japan itself, greatly 
alienated foreign populations against Japan, and nearly destroyed both. 
 What are the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and 
science and similar issues for policy matters in this period? What emerges is that the 
main leaders studied here, including Hirohito and Yanagita, and the Japanese 
                                                
1734 Earlier in this chapter I also noted how Bix argues that Japan’s aggressive military and the “religiously 




government, did not see essential conflicts between spiritual and material concerns, 
including nationalism, patriotism, and encouraging citizen support for state goals. These 
leaders and the Japanese state saw no essential conflict in drawing on either material or 
spiritual tools to accomplish their purposes. Again these seem to be manifestations of the 
practical Japanese attitude toward spirituality, to use any means necessary, spiritual or 
material, to accomplish important, pragmatic goals. In actuality, the Flaw of the Excluded 
Middle does not seem to be at work here. The conflict between Western and Japanese 
values is of much greater concern for these leaders than any conflict between the spiritual 
and material realms. 
 What are the possible effects of these issues for Japanese aid? Though leaders of 
this era were not afraid to consider spiritual and material issues in tandem, according the 
constitutionally mandated separation of religion and state in contemporary Japan, the 
state does not routinely consider religious issues, unless they explicitly affect policy 
matters, as in the case of the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway system 
in 1995, and the continuing controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.1735 But as I 
noted in the previous chapter’s conclusion, religion and spirituality are increasingly 
important features in contemporary international relations. More scholars are beginning 
to investigate the implications of these issues, and how they can be handled.1736 How the 
issue of religion and spirituality may affect contemporary Japanese aid policy, and what 
might be done to equip Japanese policymakers to better handle this aspect of Japanese 
aid, will be addressed in Chapter 9. 
                                                
1735 I have referred to both of these cases elsewhere in the dissertation. 








































 In this chapter, I offer final comments on several important subjects and 
questions explored at length in earlier chapters. I will consider key findings on the three 
key research questions of the dissertation and the working hypothesis. As a reminder, 
these questions concern lessons from Japan’s historical experiences and leaders’ 
worldviews of technology, development and foreign relations for contemporary Japanese 
aid policy (1850 to 1945), whether the concepts of “modernization,” internationalization, 
and translative adaptation present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with 
technology and development, and the possible effects of spirituality and religion on 
Japan’s contemporary aid policies. In the conclusion of the chapter, I review and explore 
primary implications of these key findings for contemporary aid policy and international 
affairs in Japan and beyond, including lessons from the Japanese case on religion and 










Lessons from Worldviews and Experiences with Technology, Development, and 
Foreign Relations (1850 to 1945) for Current Japanese Foreign Aid Policies 
 
 
 The first key question of the dissertation is: how have Japan’s experiences with 
technology, development and foreign relations (and key leaders’ worldviews of those 
issues) from 1850 to 1945 affected its current foreign aid policies? What conclusions 
about these impacts can we draw from the research in this dissertation? Is the working 
hypothesis of this dissertation true, that Japan’s experience (seen in the beliefs of several 
key leaders) somehow has affected its current aid policies? Third, what lessons for 
current aid can be drawn from those views and experience? Of course the effect of 
prewar trends on today’s aid policies has been greatly mediated by what happened after 
1945, but in-depth consideration of postwar factors must be saved for another study. 
 Concerning the impacts of Japan’s experiences and leaders’ views (1850 to 
1945) on current Japanese ODA policies, I will divide my comments into three broad 
categories: cultural/social issues; politics, foreign policy and political relations; and 
economic policy issues. On each issue, I will begin by commenting on lessons emerging 
from Japan’s historical experiences. General remarks about the influence of leaders’ 
views and later ODA will be found at the end of each issue section.  
 On historical experiences, I will comment on general trends, and then on 
possible sources for key concepts in contemporary Japanese aid policy. On a general 
level, on many issues that emerge in Japan’s historical experiences, what Japan’s ODA 
policy is today often seems related to what it should not be, based on negative 
experiences of Japan in the prewar period. In some cases, positive prewar experiences 
seem to have influenced, to some degree, what Japan’s aid does or seeks to do today. But 
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negative lessons seem common, especially in the cultural and political areas. On 
economic issues, historical influences seem more positive.  
Sociocultural Issues 
 
 On cultural/social issues, policies based on negative results from prewar 
experiences include the negative role of nationalist, propagandistic development 
ideologies and their impact on Japanese education from the 1880s through 1945, and the 
failure of the Japanese government to concretely consider and enact policies to 
effectively protect Japanese culture from negative Western influences in the prewar 
period. Regarding nationalistic propaganda, from 1850 to 1895, the Japanese government 
developed and then imposed State Shinto on the nation as a mandatory spiritual/patriotic 
practice, starting in the education system. This damaged human rights and freedoms, and 
helped justify extremist military policies and civilian sacrifices on behalf of the nation in 
World War II. Though the government studied and considered the important role of 
religion and spirituality in economic development, this resulted in repressive, coercive 
policies. It also utilized several other ideologies, such as the emperor ideology, for similar 
purposes.  
 On protecting Japanese culture, several leading leaders and thinkers, such as 
Fukuzawa, Mori, and Yanagita, reflected deeply on Western technology and culture, and 
how they should be adopted by Japan. But in the prewar period, from the early Meiji 
period through the 1920s, the state first placed priority on national economic 
development and trade promotion, and through 1945, on industrialization and 
mobilization to support Japan’s increasing militarization. In these pressures for national 
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survival and expansion in the hostile global environment, serious government policy for 
protecting Japan’s heart and soul got lost.  
 The government also failed to enact effective policies that proactively enhanced 
the nation’s adjustment to the massive social and economic changes resulting from the 
rapid economic development and reform processes. As the nation moved closer to World 
War II in the 1930s and 1940s, government repression against culture got worse. The 
massive mobilization of society in support of militarization and the war effort at various 
times, during the Russo-Japanese War and especially World War II, had grave costs, both 
economic and social, though the nation enjoyed a huge economic and cultural boom 
during and right after World War I.1737  
 While Japan developed important economic infrastructure in long-term colonies 
such as Korea and Taiwan, it also imposed elements of Japanese identity, including 
language, State Shinto, and education on those colonies, so its presence was often 
resented. The idea of more “advanced” countries “helping” weaker ones was strong in 
Japan’s imperialistic ideologies, and remains so in today’s global foreign aid policies, 
even from Japan. “Helping” and “aid” may sometimes hint at national ethnocentrism and 
“superiority,” even from non-Western donors such as Japan and China, toward other 
(non-Western) nations.  
 On the positive side, regarding cultural/social issues, from the late Tokugawa 
period forward, the Japanese state took numerous efforts to help Japan import many 
crucial areas of technology and other areas of knowledge needed for the nation’s survival, 
                                                
1737 I discussed the positive economic effects of World War I in Japan, from acting as chief industrial 
supplier to the Asian markets and colonies that the West had fled, and also the cultural stimulation during 
the Taisho democracy movement, in earlier chapters. 
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including sending scholars and missions abroad, and importing foreign experts, books 
and technology into Japan. As noted earlier, Japan had tremendous cultural and 
geographic barriers to overcome to master this knowledge, and what it accomplished as 
an LDC in the late 1800s and early 1900s was truly amazing. Cultural barriers greatly 
affected the effective transfer of foreign knowledge into Japan in the Meiji era and later, 
creating a great chasm between what Japan was and what it needed to access foreign 
knowledge in order to effectively change and develop. These barriers are equally great, if 
not greater, for today’s developing societies. This is a major issue in ODA and 
development policy, and there are certainly valuable lessons for other LDCs to be gained 
from Japan’s transfer experience.1738 While interaction with foreign cultures and 
technologies greatly stimulated Japanese politics, economy, and society through the 
1920s, the isolationist turn of Japanese society from the 1930s to 1945 had a highly 
negative effect on these processes.  
 Regarding possible sources for specific concepts in contemporary Japanese aid 
policy, on sociocultural issues, main concepts can be organized into four main themes: 1) 
how aid reflects Japan’s own experience and culture; 2) how aid should be customized 
for each aid recipient, and local conditions respected;1739 3) using aid to enhance Japan’s 
face or (global) image; and 4) possible conflicts between Japan’s development/aid goals 
and the West’s.1740  
 
 
                                                
1738 Many of these lessons are explored further in Hayashi, Japanese Experience. 
1739 As noted earlier, these ideas are a variant on the concept of translative adaptation. 




Table 9.1 Sources for Contemporary Japanese Aid Concepts: Sociocultural Issues 
 
Note on sources: PRW: pre-World War II sources and influences are likely present here. 
PTW: post-World War II sources and influences are likely present.  
 
Idea/Concept   Thematic area(s)   Possible source(s)   
Offer aid based on lessons  






Japan’s prewar, postwar dev. experiences, 
Asia’s recent experiences. PRW, PTW. 
Long-term regional emphasis 
on Asia 
How aid 
reflects Japan’s  
culture, 
experience 
Japan’s historical, cultural, geographic 
linkages to Asia. Historically, Japan had the 
closest economic links with these countries. 
PRW, PTW. 
Japan’s aid stresses goals of 
self-help, reliance through 
mostly giving loans, request-
based aid 
How aid 
reflects Japan’s  
culture, 
experience 
Japan’s work culture of self-help, 
perseverance and hard work; their role in its 
own development. PRW, PTW. 
Many goals1741 for Japan’s aid  
reflect Japan’s political 
culture, development and IR 
experience 
How aid 
reflects Japan’s  
culture, 
experience 
PC: strong state involvement; dev: 1st non-
Western country to industrialize; IR: Japan 
has grown most through peaceful trade, not 
aggression. PRW, PTW. 
Size of Japan’s aid budget 
usually parallels its overall 
economy 
How aid 
reflects Japan’s  
culture, 
experience 
For most countries, size of ODA budget is 
partly determined by state of overall 
economy. PTW. 
Philosophy of “pragmatism” 
and “opportunism” in Japan’s 
aid 
How aid 
reflects Japan’s  
culture, 
experience 
Likely reflects the strong business sense and 
spirit of hard work in Japanese culture since 
pre-World War II times. PRW, PTW. 
Long-term goals:  
commercialism and self-help,  
first for Japan 
How aid 
reflects Japan’s  
culture, 
experience 
Likely reflects the strong business sense and 
spirit of hard work in Japanese culture since 
pre-World War II times, putting Japan’s 
national interests and survival first. PRW, 
PTW. 
Goals from Japan’s private 
sector: influential in ODA 
policy 
How aid 
reflects Japan’s  
culture, 
experience 
Japan’s political and corporate cultures that 
often mix public, private sectors; tremendous 
wealth of Japan’s private sector. Mainly 
PTW. 
Japan’s ODA often reflects  
competing goals of different  
public ministries, agencies 
How aid 
reflects Japan’s  
culture, 
experience 
Inevitability of bureaucratic politics shaping 
aid’s outcomes. PTW. 
Global1742 poverty reduction 
goals may conflict with Japan 
How aid 
reflects Japan’s  
Economic infrastructure goals reflect Japan’s 
own development experience (since Meiji 
                                                
1741 These goals include the presence of ODA loans, request-based aid, and various political and economic 











era); tradition of charity (beyond one’s 
family) has no long historical or cultural 
background in Japan. Especially PRW. 
Implicit goal: to not mix  
religion with Japan’s aid,  
especially not overseas 
How aid 
reflects Japan’s  
culture, 
experience 
Long tradition of separation of religion and 
state in Japan (except for 1868-1945), 1947 
Constitution that mandates this separation, 
postwar desire not to intervene in the internal 
affairs of other states (based on negative 
experience of prewar imperialism). PRW, 
PTW. 
Specific goal to customize aid 
for each country (emerged 
since 2000) 
Customizing 
aid for local 
conditions 
Goal in line with global aid agenda, and 
concept of translative adaptation, based on 
Japan’s own unique dev. experience. PRW, 
PTW.  
Goal for Japan’s aid to be 
more aware of ground level 
conditions 
Customizing 
aid for local 
conditions 
In line with current global aid agenda goals 
for improved social development and 
recipient participative aid approaches; 
somewhat in line with translative adaptation 
concept. PRW, PTW. 
Goal for Japan’s aid to not  
interfere in recipients’ internal 
affairs (i.e. politics, religion) 
Customizing 
aid for local 
conditions 
Based on Japan’s negative experiences in pre-
1945 imperialism, negative reactions of other 
states, postwar global standard in int’l law. 
PRW, PTW. 
Goal to increase aid to Africa 





In line with global aid humanitarian agenda; 
desire to impress the West and to compete 
with China for African resources. PTW. 
Goal for Japan and its aid to 
be development “bridge” 






Desire to impress other nations by serving as 
global leader in aid, belief that Japan’s unique 
experience as 1st non-Western nation to 
develop can help other LDCs. PRW, PTW. 
Domestic/international image 
problems: Japan no longer an  
econ. superpower, scandals, 
less support from business, 
LDP, pressure by Western aid 





Strong sense of face, reputation and honor and 
honor in Japanese culture. Shame: a major 
theme in the culture. Desire for honor of the 
nation. Mainly PTW. 
Goal to greatly increase  





Desire for Japan’s national honor, strong 
national concept of face, recycle huge budget 
surpluses, win LDC support for Japan’s 
foreign policy goals. Mostly PTW. 
MDGs seem to conflict with  





Difference in aid philosophies and experience. 
Japan’s experience: successful economic 
development preceded its capacity to address 
                                                                                                                                            
1742 Here I mean the poverty reduction and alleviation goals of the global, Western-dominated development 
and aid agendas.  
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its social development needs, but MDG goals 
mainly focus on relieving poverty, other 
problem areas, and using concrete measures 
first, without much consideration of 
stimulating growth. PRW, PTW. 
 
 From the above table comparing sociocultural issues of Japanese ODA with 
their possible sources, several possible trends emerge. In the main ideas from 
contemporary Japanese ODA identified here, possible causes in both the prewar and 
postwar periods often occur. It is likely because this category emphasizes cultural and 
historical connections. In the largest subcategory (“how aid reflects Japan’s culture and 
experience”), possible prewar and postwar causation also appears often. In the third 
largest subcategory, “customizing aid for local conditions,” a highly cultural one, all of 
the ideas have likely occurrences in both the prewar and postwar periods. In the 
sociocultural area, there are only a few key ideas whose source(s) mainly or exclusively 
occurred in the postwar period, and only one idea I identified whose source mainly 
happened in the prewar era. On key ideas on sociocultural issues in Japanese ODA in the 
early 2000s, it appears that there may be a fairly high degree of historical continuity of 
influence or similarity of occurrence between the prewar and postwar periods.   
 Concerning the relationship of leaders’ views/ideas on sociocultural issues and 
later ODA policies, an important theme in sociocultural concepts in current Japanese aid 
policy identified above is how Japan’s aid reflects its own culture and historical 
experiences. Key current ideas in the sociocultural area on Japan’s aid reflecting this 
theme include the fact that some aspects of Japan’s aid are based on lessons from the 
Japanese development model, Japan’s long-term emphasis on aid to Asia, encouraging 
688 
 
values of self-help and self-reliance in recipients, and an emphasis on economic 
infrastructure. Japan’s development model stresses, in part, a primary emphasis on 
economic growth and the development of industrial infrastructure. Among the leaders 
studied, Fukuzawa in particular stressed this emphasis. Ito, Yanagita, and Hirohito 
stressed close relations with Asia. Fukuzawa and Mori stressed the necessity of importing 
superior Western technology and knowledge so that Japan might once again become self-
reliant economically and politically, and remain independent. 
 On the theme of customizing aid, key ideas include the goal to customize 
Japan’s aid for each recipient’s unique conditions. The one leader here whose thought 
represents this genre is Yanagita. I am not sure if Maegawa Keiji drew directly on 
Yanagita in developing the concept of translative adaptation, but since Yanagita is a 
leading pioneer of Japanese ethnography, it is quite possible. 
 On the “enhancing Japan’s (international) image through aid” theme, important 
ideas include the desire for Japan to be a development “bridge” between different 
regions, and the desire for Japan to be perceived as great. Ito, Yanagita and Hirohito all 
embody, to some extent, the desire for Japan to encourage and/or lead fellow Asian 
countries, in Yanagita’s case, quite positively. The first two leaders also embodied the 
idea, in some respects, that Japan, as the superior Asian power at the time, could serve as 
a model and example of development and modernization for the other Asian countries, 
and help them to develop. All seven leaders studied in this project felt a pride and belief 
in Japan’s greatness, even if the West had temporarily overshadowed it.  
 Concerning the theme of conflicts between the Japanese and global agendas for 
aid, above I noted that many of the MDGs seem to conflict with Japan’s own aid 
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philosophies, especially with Japan’s historic stress that economic growth must come 
before concern over social and cultural issues. Fukuzawa was greatly concerned about 
cultural issues, and about how to translate Western technology into Japan’s context. But 
overall, he emphasized the importance of economics as the single most important area of 
knowledge that Japan must master to survive.  
 In general, on sociocultural issues, all the leaders from 1850 to 1895 struggled 
with how Japan could effectively import Western technology and knowledge needed for 
development without compromising Japanese culture and identity. Many of their views of 
society and social change were colored by “scientific,” evolutionary thought. Similar 
notions of change and “progress” have also been embodied, historically, in most concepts 
of development. Science also colored some, not all, of these leaders’ views of religion 
and spirituality related to development. Several of them identified important spiritual and 
cultural values they believed to be important for encouraging successful development in 
Japanese society.  
 Although current Japanese (and international) law tends to mandate the 
separation of religion and state, more international development bodies and international 
organizations are considering possible contributions religion and religious values can 
make to international affairs, conflict resolution, and international development 
cooperation. Yet the global/Western international affairs and international development 
establishments tend to suffer from the Flaw of the Excluded Middle in their worldviews, 
without knowing it. In their formalized legal and political structures, to a great extent, 
Japan’s leaders do too, though in their daily lives and practice, most everyday Japanese 
(and many other non-Westerners) do not. Though spirituality may naturally connect with 
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daily life, practice, and worldviews for most non-Westerners, separation of religion and 
the state at formal, legal, and institutional levels seems important. If not, an LDC may 
make mistakes similar to those Japan made with State Shinto before World War II, a case 
where one of the state’s chosen development ideologies, based on spirituality, became a 
weapon of coercion that damaged the religion, the nation overall, its empire, and Japan’s 
future international relations.  
 A rather unique, important idea that these Meiji era leaders supported was the 
conviction that Japan must import, study and master selected items of foreign technology 
and knowledge in order to survive. In practice, they and many other Japanese struggled 
with how they could successfully interact with the foreign carriers of this knowledge, 
interpersonally and intellectually. This was a huge struggle for Japanese in this era, and 
today, many other LDCs also struggle with overcoming cultural barriers to successful 
technology and knowledge transfers for development. 
 Sociocultural struggles similar to those seen in the views of the leaders studied 
for 1850 to 1895 emerge in the views of leaders studied for 1895 to 1945. The leaders for 
the latter period, Yanagita and Hirohito, strongly embodied spiritual concepts in their 
general and sociocultural worldviews, Yanagita on the levels of daily and local life, and 
Hirohito on the levels of imperial duty, personal practice, and the role of spirituality in 
national life. While Yanagita saw foreign technology as a threat to Japanese cultural 
integrity and survival, Hirohito viewed it as a means to secure Japan’s survival in the 
hostile global environment, through military and industrial strength. Yanagita, through 
his years of ethnographic study, developed sophisticated concepts about the nature of 
Japanese identity and culture that exceeded the understandings of most other Japanese 
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scholars and policymakers of his era. He believed both were based on local spiritual 
practices, rural culture, and social and kin-related bonds.  
 In contrast, similar to the practices of other nations like France, the United 
States, Great Britain and others, from 1895 to 1945, the Japanese government’s process 
of encouraging nationalism and national unity for Japan’s development and national 
security presumed that local and regional differences must be minimized, and the entire 
“nation” united around common bonds of such things as language, ethnicity, identity, 
geography/particular places, patriotism, ideology, and in some cases, spirituality. 
Hirohito and most of Japan’s leaders supported this top-down approach to nationalism 
and social change that generally failed to appreciate or nurture local differences, as 
Yanagita wished. At the national level, the Japanese state attempted to create a national 
identity for all Japanese that made them unique from all other countries, incorporating 
tools as State Shinto and the emperor ideology. Hirohito was thoroughly trained in, 
supported and participated in these efforts.        
 On Japan’s external cultural relations (1895 to 1945), Yanagita stressed that 
Japanese must know themselves, and that the Japanese government must support policies 
for local cultural self-awareness and protection as the basis for Japan’s success in other 
international policy arenas. The government did not acknowledge these proposals, but 
advocated nationalistic, conservative views similar to those of Hirohito and of many 
other conservative leaders. Hirohito and the government were wary of the influence of 
Western decadence on Japanese culture. While Yanagita stressed strengthening Japanese 
cultural integrity from the bottom up, Hirohito and the government focused on protecting 
it from the top down.   
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 Among the valuable lessons here for LDCs are that, as they seek to develop, the 
threats to their cultural integrity and survival will be great, as they were for Japan. LDCs 
need basic skills in ethnographic study and knowledge, so that they may know 
themselves and their own societies. If they do not, how can they proactively protect their 
own social integrity during development? Top down approaches did not work for Japan, 
nor will they work for other LDCs. LDCs have also struggled profoundly with 
constructing their own national identities, especially many nations in Africa, where their 
borders are more arbitrary and artificial than Japan’s. Adopting coercive or 
propagandistic ideologies of nationalism, such as State Shinto and hakkô ichiu, ultimately 
damaged Japan, and will damage other LDCs too. Today, Japan’s and global ODA 
policies should seek to incorporate cultural knowledge, awareness and ethnographic 
research skills into their ODA and development policies. While the global aid agenda is 
now generally encouraging this (using ground level research skills for development), 
Japan’s long-term aid emphasis on economic infrastructure seems to contradict it. While 
developing these capabilities is not easy or cost-free, their use is more consonant with 
customized approaches to development and the principles of translative adaptation that 
many Japanese development experts advocate.1743 Their application, however valuable, 




                                                
1743 Ohno and Ohno, Japanese Views; Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures.”  
1744 On the issue of applying translative adaptation, see “Vietnam’s Industrialization Strategy in the Age of 
Globalization: Overview and Key Proposals (Main Page);” http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/vietnam/ 
main.html; accessed 3 October 2008; and “Vietnam’s Industrialization Strategy in the Age of 
Globalization: Translative Adaptation”; http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/vietnam/ materials/ adaptation.htm; 





 Regarding general trends in Japan’s political issues from 1850 to 1945, most of 
the lessons and impacts emerging here for ODA come from negative experiences. On the 
domestic front, the Japanese state tended to turn toward repression and nationalistic 
ideologies to shore up support for the state, to unify the nation politically and socially for 
development, and to build the nation. Reliance on repression and negative ideologies 
intensified as the nation moved closer to World War II. In promoting political reform in 
LDCs, ODA policies should encourage political diversity, along with the goals of 
building national unity and freedom. To help LDCs evolve a civil society that can help 
put a check on repressive tendencies of the state, it is good if ODA policies for political 
development encourage the growth of democracy. Democracy was too weak in Japan 
from the 1920s to 1945, and the end result was disastrous. Concerning positive lessons 
from Japanese politics (1850 to 1945) for today’s ODA policies, conservative political 
and strong state approaches allowed Japan to develop rapidly. This has often been true in 
other East Asian states from the twentieth century until today. ODA policies should allow 
conservative (non-repressive) politics in LDCs, and acknowledge that they may be 
positive for encouraging development. 
 In its political relations with Asia, Japan was generally hostile. It repeated many 
mistakes of Western imperialists. In its ODA policies today, Japan seeks to not repeat 
past mistakes of hostility and aggression. It also often refuses to offer aid to states that 
have large arms build-ups (China is a notable exception). From 1895 to 1945, two major 
dangers emerged concerning Japan’s international relations. In my opinion, leaders’ 
faulty worldviews damaged their policy decisions, resulting in faulty policy outcomes. 
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Second, unhampered military power damaged both Japanese society and Japan’s 
international relations. To try to control these problems in other LDCs, ODA policies 
should encourage the development of democratic accountability in LDC political 
systems; at a minimum, frequent change in political administrations, and limits on 
military power in society.  
 Japan also had mixed success in policies for it colonies and conquered 
territories, some positive results, and many negative ones. One positive result was the 
economic infrastructure Japan developed and left in many longer-term colonies, such as 
Taiwan and Korea. Negatively, Japan often turned to political repression in the colonies 
and, during wartime, gross oppression and violence in conquered territories. This 
generated angry reaction in most of the territories, and continues to often hamper Japan’s 
international relations with them today. Imperialism is universally condemned in 
international law today. In both imperialism and foreign aid, “advanced” countries have 
tended to view colonies or developing countries as inferior, believing they have a duty to 
lead and teach them. It is very hard to break this pattern. ODA policies should seek to 
discourage such relations that hint at dependency. Rather, advanced countries, such as 
Japan, should seek to serve and learn from LDCs, not just teach them. 
 On possible sources for specific concepts in contemporary Japanese aid policy 
for issues in politics, main concepts may be organized into four main groups: 1) aid for 
strategic goals, both political and economic; 2) Japan’s external political relations; 3) the 
desire to cooperate with global aid agenda goals; and 4) goals to reform Japan’s 




Table 9.2 Sources for Contemporary Japanese Aid Concepts: Political Issues 
 
Note on sources: PRW: pre-World War II sources, influences present here. PTW: post-
World War II sources, influences present here.  
 
Idea/Concept       Thematic area(s)      Possible source(s) 
Japan becomes assertive, 
denying/giving aid based on its 
goals, behavior of other states. 
Aid for strategic 
(political, 
economic) goals 
Similar to prewar Japanese assertiveness 
in foreign policy and acting in its national 
interests, Japan now wishes to pursue its 
own security goals, not be a “political 
dwarf.” PRW, PTW. 
Increase global distribution of 
Japan’s ODA 
Aid for strategic 
(political, 
economic) goals 
New Japanese foreign policy 
assertiveness is similar to its prewar 
assertiveness, desire for peaceful trade, 
enhance Japan’s global image, honor, 
obtain resources. PRW, PTW. 
Political goals emerge in Japan’s 
ODA: promoting democracy, 
human rights, etc (early 1990s) 
Aid for strategic 
(political, 
economic) goals 
Increased assertiveness in Japan’s foreign 
policy (like prewar behavior), enhance 
Japan’s global image. Some PRW, mainly 
PTW. 
Contribute to world peace and  
peacekeeping through  
contributing to global economic 
infrastructure (1980s, 1990s and  
after)  
Aid for strategic 
(political, 
economic) goals 
Peaceful global environment is key for 
Japan’s trade and prosperity, goal for 
Japan’s national survival (like prewar 
survival goals). Some PRW, mainly 
PTW. 
Use aid to help other countries, 
build Japan’s global reputation, 
and solve economic problems at  
home (1980s) 
Aid for strategic 
(political, 
economic) goals 
By helping other countries, Japan also 
helps itself: global prestige, recycle 
surpluses, win support for its foreign 
policy goals. PTW.   
ODA: strongly connected with  
Japan’s economic interests,  
security and development  
(since early 1950s) 
Aid for strategic 
(political, 
economic) goals 
These postwar goals: like Japan’s primary 
prewar national goals (national survival, 
based first on economics). PRW, PTW. 
Goal of Japan’s ODA: to   
support Japan’s national  
interests 
Aid for strategic 
(political, 
economic) goals 
Japan: not ashamed to put national 
interests first, both prewar and postwar 
eras. Postwar era: much concern about 
what other nations think. PRW, PTW. 
Goal to vastly increase Japan’s  
aid budget 
Aid for strategic 
(political, 
economic) goals 
Increase Japan’s international prestige, 
influence, markets, resources, support for 
its foreign policy goals. Mostly PTW.  
Goal to use aid to improve  
Japan’s image/relations with the 
US/other Western allies, partly  





Increase Japan’s international prestige 
with Western allies, Asian countries; 
decrease foreign hostility against Japan’s 
trade, investment. PTW.  
Use aid to build positive  
relations with other Asian  




Through aid, gain better relations with 
Asian, distant nations, gain better access 
to trade, resources, win more support for 
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as regional/global leader, join  
UN Security Council   
Japan’s foreign policy goals. Mainly 
PTW. 
Use aid to build Japan’s general 




Use aid to enhance Japan’s int’l image, 
support for Japan’s foreign policy goals, 
create more options for trade, getting 
resources. PTW.  
Support global aid agenda’s  
political goals: promote  
democracy, human rights,  
peace, etc 
Cooperate with 
global aid agenda 
goals 
Increased assertiveness in Japan’s foreign 
policy (like prewar behavior), enhance 
Japan’s global image. Increased public 
pressure for accountability, desire to use 
aid to actually solve world issues, do 
global good. Mainly PTW.  
Elevate additional global aid  
agenda goals in Japan’s ODA:  
humanitarian, environment,  
famine goals (1990s) 
Cooperate with 
global aid agenda 
goals 
Enhance Japan’s international prestige, 
Japanese public’s desire to contribute to 
global good, int’l stability. PTW.   
Japan seeks some degree of  
aid coordination with other  
aid donors (from 1980s) 
Cooperate with 
global aid agenda 
goals 
Enhance Japan’s int’l image, increase 
aid’s efficiency, please Japan’s allies, 
fellow donors. PTW. 
Goal for increased aid  
cooperation, assertiveness  
through multilateral and IFI 
channels: “ideas, not just  
money” since the 1990s 
Cooperate with 
global aid agenda 
goals 
Desire of Japan to increase its int’l 
prestige, influence, image; desire to 
contribute more to success of int’l 
development by contributing from its own 
development successes/experience. 
Somewhat PRW, mostly PTW. 
Goal for Japanese aid to become 
more aware of ground level 
conditions 
Cooperate with 
global aid agenda 
goals 
Desire of Japan to comply with int’l aid 
agenda, enhance its int’l prestige; 
somewhat in line with translative 
adaptation concept. PRW, PTW. 
Goal for Japan to better  
coordinate aid with other  
bilateral (especially Western) 
donors 
Cooperate with 
global aid agenda 
goals 
Desire to partially comply with demands 
of Western allies/global aid community, 
enhance Japan’s int’l image, improve 
global aid to the degree possible. PTW. 
Goal to increase aid to Africa 
(late 1970s, 1990s, 2000s) 
Cooperate with 
global aid agenda 
goals 
In line with global aid humanitarian 
agenda; desire to impress the West and to 
compete with China for African 
resources. Mainly PTW. 
Goal for Japan’s aid to serve  
as a development “bridge”  
between world regions  
Cooperate with 
global aid agenda 
goals 
Desire to impress other nations by serving 
as global leader in aid, belief that Japan’s 
unique experience as 1st non-Western 
nation to develop can help other LDCs. 
PRW, PTW. 
Global poverty reduction goals  
may conflict with Japan ODA’s  
economic infrastructure/growth  
promotion goals 
Cooperate with 
global aid agenda 
goals 
Economic infrastructure goals reflect 
Japan’s own development experience 
(since Meiji era); tradition of charity 
(beyond one’s family) has no long 




Goals to increase efficiency,  
accountability, openness and  
accomplishments of Japan’s  
aid, from early 1990s 
Governmental, 
aid reforms 
Domestic and int’l pressures for reform of 
Japan’s aid; aid policymakers’ fight for 
aid programs’ prestige, budget, public 
support, survival. PTW. 
Goal to cooperate more with  
Japanese public, civil society,  
NGOs, from early 1990s 
Governmental, 
aid reforms 
Domestic public pressure, need to make 
Japan’s aid more flexible, open, reform 
pressures. PTW.   
The ideas in Japan’s aid, and  
underlying its aid philosophies, 
are an integral factor in 
determining its capacity for 
innovation and reform, among 
other things (Rix 1993) 
Governmental, 
aid reforms 
Ideas: one important source for Japan 
ODA’s policy decisions, goals, outcomes, 
and its ability to change. PRW, PTW. 
 
 From this table comparing political issues in Japanese ODA with their possible 
sources, we see that with most of the ideas, joint possible pre-World War II and post-
World War II causation occurs only a few times. This joint causation occurs the most 
often in the “aid for strategic goals” subcategory. The ideas here are divided between 
possible joint prewar and postwar sources, and mainly/only postwar sources. In the 
“cooperation with the global aid agenda” subcategory, mainly/only post-World War II 
causation occurs only a few times, while joint pre-, post- World War II causation and 
mainly/only prewar causation occurs even less. The sole case of mainly/solely prewar 
causation occurring within political issues happens in the “cooperation with the global aid 
agenda” subcategory. So in political issues that concern primarily external politics, it 
appears that postwar influences may predominate. Given the enormous political influence 
of the United States on the Japanese political system in the postwar period, this should be 
no surprise. Joint prewar/postwar influences occur most often in a subcategory (“aid for 
strategic goals”) that tends to be heavily influenced by Japan’s domestic interests, which 
seek to ensure Japan’s survival and to enhance its political interests in the international 
system. While external influences such as the United States influence the issues of 
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Japan’s aid system and its overall strategic goals to some degree, given the huge overall 
American influence on Japan’s postwar political system, and the great changes that 
occurred in the postwar structure of Japanese politics compared with the prewar system 
(1868 to 1945), it is no surprise that occurrences of joint prewar/postwar causation and 
mainly/solely prewar causation seem so low in the political issues area.  
 Regarding the relationship of leaders’ views/ideas on political issues (1850 to 
1945) and later ODA policies, on a general level, in the first period (1850 to 1895), the 
overall political climate, both internationally and in Japan, was conservative. Japan was 
also conservative in its ideological climate. All five of the leaders studied for this period 
(Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Yamagata and Kato) were highly supportive of Japanese 
nationalism, a strong, effective state, and national unity. The need for a strong, effective 
state, so important in Japan, is also crucial for LDCs, to help aid succeed. For all, Japan’s 
national survival was the overarching goal. For that, Japan’s leaders scoured the globe to 
determine the most culturally relevant political institutions and effective military 
technologies needed to unify Japan and make it strong. There was also a need for the best 
possible, most appropriate political knowledge to help both Japan grow. The need 
remains for today’s LDCs. The leaders varied on their views of various issues, including 
the appropriate pace for political reform, on how much the state should exercise its 
power, how many freedoms should be allowed, and on the best type of foreign sources, 
almost universally Western, for Japan’s political reforms (more liberal or more autocratic 
sources). In Japan in this era, there were disagreements on many political issues and 
sometimes on ideologies. There is a need, at some point, for agreement among a 
developing society’s leaders about the most effective path for development. Even if there 
699 
 
is agreement, the chosen approach must be appropriate for the society’s current 
conditions. It must actually work, and be effective. Japan’s economic approaches worked 
very well, though its political path went astray, and nearly destroyed the nation. 
 Japan’s political reforms (1850 to 1895) reflected its political and ideological 
climate, as much of its aid does today. Japan’s overarching goal in the Meiji era was 
national survival, and ultimately, it is today too (seemingly related to Japan’s perpetual 
view of itself as a small, resource-poor nation). It is no surprise that aid should be 
affected by this “do-or-die” mentality. As we have already observed, benefiting Japan 
economically, politically (and enhancing its economic and political survival) has been 
one of the key aspects of its aid. National survival is also often one of the key goals for 
LDCs.  
 One also notices the strong influence of evolutionistic thought in some of these 
leaders’ views of politics and the international system. At various points, evolutionistic 
thought colors their thinking about political development and reforms, especially Kato’s. 
This thought is similar to some bias present in the ODA and development programs of 
Japan and other advanced countries, which often see themselves as superior. The bias 
here toward political knowledge that incorporates scientific and technological knowledge 
also reminds one the bias of today’s LDCs toward the same. But this latter bias is logical. 
Science and technology formed an important basis for Japan’s survival, over the long- 
term, and also seem important for LDCs. 
 For these leaders (1850 to 1895), realism and Western thought commonly 
influenced their views of international relations, and in several cases, evolutionism was 
influential. Kato in particular was quite creative in how he combined political ideas of 
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German Social Darwinism and evolutionism with Confucian thought to form new 
concepts about the future of Japan’s international relations and global politics. All five 
leaders acknowledged that Japan needed to borrow Western knowledge to survive in the 
international system. All five borrowed various aspects of Western thought, science and 
technology to explain and address what Japan should do politically and militarily to 
survive in the Western-dominated international system. For Japan and today’s LDCs, 
there is need to effectively import appropriate, expert, practical foreign knowledge, and 
to effectively combine it with indigenous ideologies. This should strengthen the LDC’s 
development process. It is also important not to distort indigenous ideologies as they are 
remade for this new purpose, which is what happened with State Shinto, that they not 
become too ethnocentric, violent, or ultranationalistic. 
 Three of the leaders’ views were influenced by concepts of religion and 
morality, Kato’s in the most complex fashion.1745 All of these leaders looked down on the 
rest of Asia, and saw Japan and the West as its superior. It is inevitable that a developing 
society’s culture, including religion and spirituality, should at some level affect its 
leaders’ views of everything, including international relations. Awareness of these issues 
would be helpful in ODA policy, including Japan’s. The religion factor should be 
                                                
1745 These comments relate to Meiji era leaders’ views of morality and religion, including the thought of 
Kato that Japan needed more “scientific” morality. The Meiji state also desired to have more scientific 
bases from which to intellectually promote Japan’s development. Perhaps these issues connect with the 
desire of modern Japanese, from 1868 onward, to have “scientific” approaches for everything, including 
development. This affects contemporary Japanese, who have “scientific” educations, use the latest 
technologies, and who often practice Shinto and other spiritual rituals on a daily or regular basis. This may 
be an interesting dichotomy. Does this relate to the Flaw of the Excluded Middle? Do we have a similar 
dichotomy in the United States? Realistically, it is very possible to be both “scientific” and “spiritual” or 
“religious” in one’s daily practices and worldview(s). It must also be possible for aid policy staff, including 
those in Japan. 
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included. If the overall effect of the indigenous spirituality is leaders’ emerging views of 
international relations is negative, means should be determined in ODA policies to try to  
counteract it. 
 Regarding the political thought of the leaders studied for 1895 to 1945 
(Yanagita Kunio and Emperor Hirohito),1746 in a broad, though imperfect manner, each 
may perhaps represent two major streams of political thought influential in early 
twentieth century Japan, first, demands for democratic change and liberal political values 
(Yanagita), and second, pressure for oligarchic, autocratic political control (Hirohito).1747 
Yanagita worried that national political consolidation was trampling the rural solidarity 
that he saw as the foundation of Japanese identity and unity, while Hirohito preferred 
only limited democratic and popular input in politics. This contrast in views (between 
democratic versus oligarchic control of politics) is also seen in the two leaders’ views of 
political institutions, where they again supported similar positions to those they held on 
overall domestic politics. This broad contrast is also seen between postwar Japanese 
politics (more democratic), and prewar politics (more autocratic). This is also a major 
theme in today’s ODA programs, both Japanese and global. Both seek to actively 
encourage democratic development in LDCs, and to discourage autocratic trends.  
 On political ideologies, both Yanagita and Hirohito had generally conservative 
viewpoints (especially Hirohito), often connected to Japanese identity, spirituality and 
                                                
1746 I originally chose Yanagita because he deeply engaged several of the major themes of this project, 
among others: how Japan should handle the massive influx of Western technology and culture, and how it 
might develop without destroying itself. Hirohito was chosen because he was the most influential political 
leader of the twentieth century, and is an excellent representative of the autocratic, oligarchic stream of 
Japanese politics from the 1920s to 1945. Hirohito in particular was hugely influential on many 
developments in Japanese politics toward the end of this era, both domestic and international. 
1747 This does not include a third important stream of thought that was particularly influential among 
intellectuals and in academia: Marxism, the trends of which I briefly discussed in earlier chapters. 
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kinship, though in different ways. But Yanagita remained more populist and concerned 
for local identities and solidarity. Hirohito also strongly embodied the heavily state-
sanctioned, highly influential ideologies of nationalism of this era, including State Shinto. 
Though nationalism may be a natural trend in any LDC as it develops politically, the 
propagandistic nationalism seen in prewar Japan (1930s and 1940s) should not be. ODA 
policy should discourage this. Japanese ODA seeks to encourage democracy and human 
rights, but also strives to not intervene in the internal affairs of LDCs. 
 While both Yanagita and Hirohito were willing to permit some mixing of 
religion and politics (Hirohito, to an extreme degree), Yanagita was more cautious, and 
did not support the unlimited influence of the emperor or State Shinto over Japanese 
society and politics. His stance was much wiser. Japanese aid tries to not mix religion 
with aid at all. This is safe, but some cognizance of the role of religion in the overall 
development of LDCs would be wise, and could only help improve the quality of 
Japanese aid. 
 On Japan’s external political relations and imperialism (1895 to 1945), views 
are more complex, since I studied a slightly larger number of leaders on these issues.1748  
Regarding Japan’s external politics, on foreign relations and the world, all the leaders’ 
views were mostly conservative, except Yanagita’s. Conservative political beliefs and 
ideologies have also been dominant in postwar Japanese political culture and Japan’s 
ODA culture.  
                                                
1748 To repeat, on external political relations (1895 to 1945), I studied the views of Ito, Yamagata, Yanagita, 




 All of the leaders supported Japan’s leadership in Asia to help other Asian 
powers resist Western imperialism. Hirohito held the most hardened views of several 
neighboring regions, including China, Russia, Manchuria and Southeast Asia. The idea of 
Japan leading and helping Asia hints at a vision of “mission.” This reminds one of 
postwar Japan’s desire to exercise its leadership and influence in Asia for the benefit of 
both. Other Asian nations resist it, part of the residue of World War II). What is the 
reaction of other regions, such as Africa, to Japan’s aid today? Perhaps they can 
encourage aid competition between the West, China, Japan and India, for their own 
benefit. 
 These leaders were generally fearful and cautious in their views of major 
Western powers in this period, including the United States, Britain, and Russia. The fears, 
attitudes, and beliefs of Japanese leaders toward the West, especially of Hirohito, led to 
horrific war. While relations were friendly with different Western powers at various 
points, and some treaties signed, terribly damaging, costly wars with the West were 
fought, including the Russo-Japanese War and World War II. So today Japan is totally 
committed to encouraging peace through its ODA policies, among other means. On 
international conflict, three of these leaders, including Hirohito, saw war in largely racial 
terms. Practically speaking, Hirohito took a more positive view of these conflicts than the 
other leaders studied, and only supported peace when he strongly felt it was in Japan’s 
own interests. In particular, Hirohito’s attitudes matter, since as an autocratic emperor, he 
had such an enormous influence over the nation and its politics. How should Japan’s aid 
work to discourage or correct faulty perceptions in LDCs and their leaders that may help 
lead to conflict? As Japan was fearful of the West, today’s LDCs often are fearful and , 
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angry toward it. In aid and other areas, what lessons can Japan offer the LDCs about 
learning to work successfully with the West? 
 Concerning imperialism and colonialism, images about Western imperialism are 
mostly negative, and images of Japanese imperialism positive. All of the leaders studied 
wanted Japan to remain free. Most of them focus on what imperialism and colonialism 
can do for Japan’s domestic affairs. Ito and especially Yanagita want Japan to genuinely 
help other Asian regions develop and resist the West. Kato and Hirohito’s thought about 
imperialism contains ideology with evolutionary, biological, and Shintoistic overtones. 
For both, there was a strong connection of the emperor with imperialist ideologies. The 
effects of Japan’s imperialistic ideologies were extremely negative. These ideologies 
included racist distortions of both science and religion. In postwar Japanese aid, these 
negative effects encourage Japan to seek to use technology and science in positive, non-
ideological ways to help the growth and development of LDCs. Today Japan’s aid does 
not really consider religion or spirituality, since it is too controversial an issue. But it 
would be positive for Japanese aid policymakers to consider the role of religion and 
spirituality in general ODA and development, in Japan’s aid, and in how they affect other 
countries. To not do so ignores the ground level issues now important in the Japanese and 
global aid agendas. 
 Hirohito’s views became highly influential for policies that affected millions of 
people in China, Northeast and Southeast Asia and beyond. Most of his influence was 
negative. These leaders had varied views of Japan’s colonies, as “mere satellites” of 
Japan, places with genuine, valuable resources, or as regions that Japan could really help 
to develop, defend and protect. Throughout the postwar period, Japan has desired and 
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needed to improve its relations with the rest of Asia. The prewar legacies have made this 
very hard. Yet Japan has learned some very valuable lessons, about how, as a non-
Western country, to work positively with the West and the U.S. How can Japan do so 
now, through its international relations and aid with LDCs, and help them also learn how 
to successfully work with the West?   
 Great fear about competition between nations and races, influenced by 
evolutionistic thought, colors the thought of Yamagata and Hirohito, while Ito and 
Yanagita offer more support for peace and international cooperation. One senses the 
influence of evolutionism in the hierarchical view of international relations present in the 
views of Hirohito, Kato, and others. This view also influences the views of nations as 
developed/undeveloped, weak/strong, advanced/not advanced, as seen in aid relations 
today. What steps could be taken to encourage increased mutual respect between aid 
donors and recipients, and two way learning? How can Japan learn to view LDCs more 
positively, not as mere satellites, resource depositories or needy, inferior aid recipients? 
How can Japan genuinely help them, and how can it learn from and be helped by them? 
Economic Issues and Impacts 
 
 On general trends in Japan’s economic issues from 1850 to 1945, there are 
mostly positive and a few negative impacts and lessons for ODA. From 1850 to 1895, 
Japan was willing to borrow foreign economic ideologies and ideas to aid its economic 
growth. It also used indigenous ideologies to aid its growth and management. This is a 
very positive lesson that all LDCs should learn, and which should be encouraged in ODA 
policies. Also positive, on international trade, Japan has many wise lessons (1850-1895) 
for LDCs: seeking equal trade opportunities, to identify and focus on areas of economic 
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strength, developing a strong economic infrastructure, and placing priority on positive 
international relations and trade. Japan has always emphasized these lessons, based on its 
experience, to LDCs in its aid policies. Since they worked for Japan, and have worked for 
many other Asian nations, it seems wise that Japan continue to do so, though these 
policies must be modified for the varied conditions of other regions and economies.   
 Also positive, from 1895 to 1945, is the issue of balance in domestic economic 
growth: the need to balance large-scale industrialization with promotion of smaller-scale 
business and regional economic development. Related to aid and development, 
Yanagita’s two ideas that there are multiple paths to development and that each nation’s 
path should be customized according to its own conditions, plus the concept (not his) of 
the appropriateness of strong state intervention at early stages, are all important. Though 
Japan did not balance its economic development very well in this period,1749 on many of 
these issues, it presents a strong example and important, positive lessons for LDCs and 
ODA policies. There is also the irony that both Japanese and Western/global aid agendas 
have argued, in practice, for universalizing approaches to development for most of their 
history. Yet lately, in its rhetoric, the global agenda seems to support customized, local 
approaches more than the Japanese one does. The latter still strongly supports the 
economic infrastructural approach in practice, though in rhetoric, it also advocates local, 
grassroots involvement. 
                                                
1749 On the negative side, Japan did not pursue balanced economic growth from 1850 to 1895, but focused 
on large-scale infrastructure. Growth in an LDC needs to be more balanced, tailored to its local and 
regional conditions. It should also not open its economy to international competition too soon. Aid should 
learn from these lessons. 
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 Another positive lesson, based on Japan’s experience in international economics 
from 1895 to 1945, is that an LDC should place a high priority on trade as soon as it can. 
Economic openness to international trade should be geared to an LDC’s actual economic 
conditions. This idea is based on Japan’s actual experience, and fits the Japanese concept 
of customized development very well, as well as Japan’s actual ODA policy, which has 
sought to encourage bilateral trade and investment based on LDCs’ actual conditions.   
 On the negative side, ODA policies should limit the promotion of arms and 
military build-up, based on Japan’s negative experience in this area from 1895 to 1945, 
and its near destruction in World War II. Today Japan’s aid complies well with this 
lesson. In addition, based on Japan’s negative experiences before World War II, ODA 
policy should not use negative, propagandistic ideologies to promote development. 
 From Japan’s experience with imperialism, a key lesson on development and 
ODA policy is that aid that focuses at least partly on the promotion of economic 
infrastructure, that will promote actual economic growth, is positive, but it must be 
welcome in the LDC, and not violate the wishes of its people. On the negative side, Japan 
used various coercive ideologies, especially from 1895 to 1945, to impose its 
development and security goals on the Japanese people and many others in the empire. 
 Concerning likely sources for concepts in current Japanese aid policy for 
economic issues, I have organized key ideas four main areas: 1) concepts related to 
Japan’s domestic economic growth, development, and (war) recovery; 2) Japan’s external 











Table 9.3 Sources for Contemporary Japanese Aid Concepts: Economic Issues 
 
Note on sources: PRW: pre-World War II sources, influences present here. PTW: post-
World War II sources, influences present here.  
 
Idea/Concept          Thematic area(s)  Possible source(s) 
Aid from US, World Bank 
used by Japan to rebuild the 







US desire to quickly rebuild Japan as its key anti-
communist ally in Asia. Japan’s desire to recover 
and rebuild after the horrible war destruction; 
desire for national survival, to rise from despair 
of the war. Almost totally PTW.  
Goal to use Japan’s aid to 
build Japan’s economy, late 






Intense global economic competition and exports 
to the US: seen as Japan’s only path to survival. 
Early postwar era: most other goals subsumed to 
Japan’s need to rebuild and survive. Somewhat 
similar to the hard work and sacrifices of 
Japanese for national survival during Meiji era. 
Also, the tendency to relate everything (even aid) 
to Japan’s overarching goal of recovery and 
survival. PRW, PTW. 
In Japan’s aid, goal for  







Economic pragmatism: the private sector, in 
Japan’s and int’l experience, has much greater 
capacity to grow and generate wealth than the 
public sector. The latter can shepherd the 
process; the former empowers, makes the 
economy grow. Belief that int’l scene will 
parallel Japan’s experience. Somewhat PRW, 
mostly PTW. 
Goals from Japan’s private  
sector have been influential 






Pragmatism: public sector cannot effectively 
fund ODA without private participation. Great 
wealth, success of the private sector. Desire of 
business to benefit from gaining access to and 
exposure to foreign markets. Japan’s heritage: 
blurring of public-private boundaries in 
government, business. Somewhat PRW, mainly 
PTW. 
Aid used to promote Japan’s  
exports, and potential 
imports for Japan from 





Pragmatism, desire for economic survival: 
subsuming nearly everything to the national goal 
to survive, recover from war. Japan’s prewar 
economic heritage: importance of trade in prewar 
economic growth, success. PRW, PTW.  
Goal to connect ODA with  Japan’s Economic pragmatism, Japan’s desire to survive, 
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grow, excel; important role of trade in Japan’s 
economy (1868 to 1945), centrality of economics 
in most Japanese worldviews of the nature of the 
world and the global system. PRW, PTW. 





Desire to enhance Japan’s int’l prestige and to 
“fit in,” to be a productive, important, 
contributing member of the int’l system. New 
desire to “help” the global poor, especially by 
helping them transition into the global econ., 
trade, and to help Japan economically too. 
Somewhat PRW, mainly PTW. 
Major long-term goal of 
Japan’s ODA: help LDCs 





From Japan’s own dev. experience, and other 
Asian countries’: view that econ. infrastructure is 
the heart, basis for development. PRW, PTW. 
Global poverty reduction 
goals may conflict with 






Economic infrastructure goals reflect Japan’s 
own development experience (since Meiji era); 
tradition of charity (beyond one’s family) has no 
long historical or cultural background in Japan. 
Especially PRW. 
Goal to vastly increase  
Japan’s aid budget 
Japan’s ODA 
budget 
Increase Japan’s international prestige, influence, 
markets, resources, support for its foreign policy 
goals. Mostly PTW. 
 
 From the preceding table comparing economic issues in Japanese aid with their 
possible sources, there is only a small number of ideas/concepts. I cannot really judge 
what is happening in terms of the period of causation. Joint pre-World War II and post-
World War II causation and mainly/only postwar causation appear to occur only a few 
times here. In the mainly postwar occurrences, there seems to be a strong, but not 
dominant, presence of prewar causes in several occurrences. Among economic issues, 
there appears to be only a single occurrence with predominant prewar causation. In the 
largest subcategory here, “domestic economic growth and development,” most of the 
occurrences have mainly or only postwar causes. The main comment that I can make is 
that from the analysis here, for economic issues in Japanese aid, postwar causes seem to 
be slightly more dominant than prewar causes.  
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 On the connections between leaders’ views and ideas about economic issues 
(1850 to 1945) and later Japanese aid policies, on Japan’s domestic economy, in Chapter 
4, I studied three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato). They were all highly impressed about 
the successes of Western economics and believed Japan could learn valuable economic 
lessons from the West. They observed that the West’s economic development was 
currently superior to Japan’s, and that Japan must learn from this superior model, as it 
had learned from China for centuries. The thought of all three was affected by 
evolutionary principles, especially Kato’s. Both Fukuzawa and the government strongly 
supported the development ideologies of fukoku kyôhei and shokusan kôgyô. Fukuzawa 
emphasized the role of economics in the private sector, while Ito and Kato focused more 
on the public sector. The impact of Fukuzawa’s thought on the economy, especially the 
private sector, was large. 
 Evolutionistic thought, which presumes that some nations are more highly 
developed, more advanced, and therefore better than others, has also been influential in 
the worldviews underlying some of the economic aspects of Japan’s aid. In contemporary 
Japanese aid, a similar thought, on Japan’s domestic economic growth and development, 
is seen in the goal that aid should be used to help Japan’s economic growth. In the early 
postwar period, somewhat similar to the hard work and sacrifices of Japanese for national 
survival during Meiji era, intense global economic competition and exports to the U.S. 
were seen as Japan’s only path to survival. Like the Meiji era, in the early postwar period, 
most other goals subsumed to Japan’s need to rebuild and survive. While several of the 
five leaders studied for the period 1850 to 1895 embody this type of thought, that 
economics must be the nation’s top priority for its survival, Fukuzawa did so the most. 
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 Concerning Japan’s external economic relations (1850-1895), Fukuzawa and Ito 
observed the power of Western economics in Japan and abroad. Early education and 
overseas exposure to Western economics impressed these leaders, and motivated them to 
work hard, study Western economics, and begin to apply these lessons to Japan. ODA 
policies for economics must also consider what will motivate LDCs to learn economics. 
Early exposure through education and study abroad are optimal. Japan seeks to encourage 
this by bringing thousands of young trainees to Japan for technical training each year 
through JICA and other aid programs. Such an approach, of hard study and work in 
applying basic economics, reflects the actions of several of the leaders studied here, 
including Fukuzawa and Ito. Fukuzawa shared what he learned through his many 
writings, and applied many of the principles in the institutions and businesses he founded, 
including the Yokohama Specie Bank, Japan’s first international bank, which greatly 
influenced Japan’s international financial dealings. Ito tried to apply some lessons about 
Western economics and development to Korea. In this case, Japan took what it learned 
from the West and tried to apply it in another country. In doing so, it repeated some of the 
West’s mistakes. Japan should be careful not to repeat some of the mistakes of the West 
in its aid programs. Here we again see evolutionistic influence, in the economic thought 
of Fukuzawa and Kato, especially the latter. The evolutionistic influence in Japan’s 
current ODA and foreign economic relations is also seen in Japan’s pragmatic goal, for 
most of the postwar period, to connect ODA to international trade, to subsume nearly 
everything to the national goal to first survive, and then grow and excel.1750 It also 
reflects the core conviction in the worldviews of many Japanese, since the late Tokugawa 
                                                
1750 The goals to grow and excel are also connected to Japan’s overarching goal to survive economically. 
712 
 
and early Meiji eras, of the importance of economics in the nature of the world and the 
global system. 
 On leaders’ views of Japan’s domestic market (1895 to 1945), I mainly focus on 
Yanagita.1751 His views stress the effects of the international economy (Western 
technology and culture) on indigenous Japanese culture and its domestic economy. He 
desired balanced development across rural and urban regions, so that the heart of Japan’s 
culture, the countryside, would not be destroyed. Yanagita also asserted that there were 
multiple paths to development and the market, and insisted they be humane. As 
mentioned earlier, this has likely formed part of the basis for anthropologist Maegawa 
Keiji’s work on the concept of translative adaptation. Given the importance that this 
concept and similar ones such as “modernization” and internationalization receive, at 
times, in the thought of contemporary Japanese development economists,1752 it seems 
ironic that their principles have not been more systematically applied in Japanese ODA 
policy before now, though Japan has recently expressed the desire to support the 
participatory, customized aid goals inherent in the MDGs and the current global aid 
agenda.1753 Yanagita also highly supported workers’ and human rights, and opposed 
                                                
1751 I found the most data on Yanagita’s views of Japan’s external economic relations during this period.  
1752 For example, see Ohno and Ohno, Japanese Views, and several additional essays in that volume. 
1753 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. It is interesting to note that the basic goals of customized development and 
translative adaptation, while noble, do not really appear among the key economic goals and ideas behind 
Japanese ODA that have been noted by David Arase (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid) and many other 
scholars, and which I outline in Table 9.3 in this chapter. This brings up an interesting question: although 
Japanese aid scholars, activists or policymakers may express support for elements of the concepts of 
customized aid and translative adaptation, in practice, how much are they really applied in Japanese aid?   
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economic development that was too large-scale. His overall impact on Japan’s domestic 
economy was small.1754  
 On Japan’s external economic relations (1895 to 1945), Yanagita opposed 
Japanese government policies in place from about 1900 through the 1920s. They placed 
heavy emphasis on heavy, large-scale industries for export. Yanagita favored smaller-
scale industries, agriculture, and the domestic market. Yanagita felt that despite the 
arrival of an era of true international trade, nations still mostly pursued their own self-
interests, with the strongest countries devouring the weakest. So evolutionism also 
influenced his views on international economics, somewhat. Yanagita also supported 
strong state economic involvement through national economic planning. Only limited 
elements of Yanagita’s views have been embodied in Japanese economic policy and its 
external economic relations, namely the stress on strong state involvement in helping to 
shepherd Japan’s overall economy and trade. Yanagita chafed at the government’s 
emphasis on large-scale industrialization and heavy trade for Japan’s economic 
development. Yet some of the evolutionistic assumptions in his overall economic 
thought, and additional ones, are reflected in both Japan’s long-term economic policies, 
and in its ODA programs.1755 Beyond this, almost no element of Yanagita’s thought is 
present in the key ideas of current Japanese ODA policy as summarized in Table 9.3 
                                                
1754 Given its extreme ideological conservatism from the late 1920s to 1945, the chances that the Japanese 
government would pay attention to or apply the insights of a scholar like Yanagita in the prewar era were 
small. But, as noted earlier, in the postwar period, the government has applied aspects of his general 
thought about preserving rural elements of Japanese cultural traditions. 
1755 I am referring to the idea that only the strongest nations survive, and that stronger countries will devour 
weaker nations. Other evolutionary assumptions present in the thought of developed countries and their 
ODA programs, noted earlier, are that developed nations are “advanced” and “superior” to LDCs. 
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earlier.1756 However, the aid ideas in Table 9.3 reflect economic infrastructural goals, 
historically very strong in prewar Japanese economic policies and its postwar ODA 
programs, very well.  
 Yanagita had the heart of an engaged, activist scholar, one who cared deeply 
about applying his knowledge for the well-being of his nation and its people. In this vein, 
he well fits the traditions of several socially engaged disciplines, such as applied 
anthropology and social work. It is interesting that while his thoughts about balancing 
Japan’s economic development and its external economic relations with its cultural 
integrity were not applied much by the government in the prewar period, thus far, neither 
have the insights of anthropologists been very well applied to Japanese ODA policy as a 
whole.1757 
Working Hypothesis 
 What conclusions may be reached about this project’s working hypothesis, that 
Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations (1850 to 1945), 
as seen in the beliefs of several of its key leaders, has affected its current aid policies? I 
wish to argue, in a qualified sense, that it is true that the beliefs of several of the leaders 
studied here, and reflected in Japan’s experiences, have affected Japan’s current aid 
policies. In reflecting on these leaders’ ideas, it seems apparent that in many cases, rather 
than a particular leader’s thought contributing directly to later trends in Japan’s current 
ODA, leaders’ thoughts more often likely reflect particular intellectual currents that have 
                                                
1756 The only principle present in this table that reflects Yanagita’s thought is the idea that Japanese aid 
should help other countries (LDCs) too, not just itself. 
1757 For more on the challenges of applying anthropology to Japan’s contemporary ODA policy, see 
Matsuzono, “International Cooperation Activities,” (discussed earlier). Earlier I also noted the program in 
development anthropology at Tokyo’s Waseda University, presently led by Kikuchi Yasushi, which 
hopefully can help to encourage more anthropological input in Japanese ODA policy. 
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evolved over time, and that, in some contemporary form, have influenced current ODA. 
We have identified several possible streams of influence, though they are usually not 
direct. I also argued earlier in this chapter that it is challenging to identify absolutely 
direct lines of influence since the project’s current stream of historical research only 
extends through 1945, leaving an historical gap of over sixty years between the past and 
the present.  
 Despite this gap, what are some of the most important lines of influence we may 
be identify here? Of the seven leaders studied, which offer evidence of the strongest lines 
of influence of contemporary Japanese ODA policy, and on which areas of policy? The 
four leaders who appear to have had the strongest influence on ideas in Japan’s current 
ODA policy are Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, and Hirohito. I can identify two possible 
levels of influence, on both the general and more specific levels (ideas that seem more 
closely related to those in current Japanese aid policy).  
 On the general level, Fukuzawa’s most significant possible connections to ODA 
policy occur in two main areas, sociocultural issues and economics. His most important, 
significant connection occurs on the theme of learning and absorbing general knowledge 
from foreign cultures: encouraging Japanese to do so on a broad, popular level, and to 
effectively translate foreign concepts and ideas that were often highly alien, in ways that 
average Japanese could understand. Second, he contributed greatly to the common 
understanding and practice of modern business and economics in modern Japan. These 
emphases on the necessity of learning useful knowledge from foreign cultures, and of 
mastering pragmatic economic and technological skills, have deeply affected both 
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Japan’s own development process, and the approach to aid that it seeks to encourage in 
its aid recipients.   
 Ito’s general connections with later Japanese ODA policy flow from his work 
on the Meiji Constitution of 1889, which exercised great influence on the everyday lives 
of millions of Japanese in prewar Japan through the laws and policies it encouraged. This 
influence extended to many areas of politics and culture, including education. It allowed 
the creation of an authoritarian, conservative political system that eventually became 
heavily militaristic, nearly destroying the nation in World War II. On a second level, Ito’s 
connection emerges through his involvement in Japan’s international relations, as a 
diplomat, foreign minister, and major actor involved in crucial political and economic 
negotiations on multiple occasions. 
 Yamagata’s connections with Japanese ODA policy stem from his role as the 
architect of the Japanese military, his direction of the military’s modernization and build-
up in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, his role in directing Japan’s 
involvement in several wars, especially the Russo-Japanese War, and the long-term 
impact he had on Japan’s culture of politics through his service as a genro1758 in the early 
1900s. Through 1945, all of these encouraged to Japan to move toward a more 
authoritarian, aggressive political system. The aggressive military moves that Yamagata 
encouraged against Japan’s neighboring states, including Russia and Korea, also had 
long-term effects on Japan’s foreign relations with its neighbors, and on future conflicts. 
These excesses resulted in Japan’s defeat in World War II, the American invasion and 
                                                
1758 Genro refers the elder statesmen who served as long-term advisors to the emperor in the prewar 
Japanese political system, from the Meiji period through 1945. 
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occupation, and the creation of a new culture of politics in Japan that has historically 
strongly rejected the militarism and imperialism of the prewar era.1759 All of these 
developments have strongly affected the domestic culture of politics from which Japan’s 
aid emerged and in which it continues to operate.  
 As noted earlier, there is no other Japanese actor who had a greater influence on 
Japan’s domestic and international affairs in the twentieth century than Hirohito. Though 
Hirohito did not cause the authoritarian, militarized culture of politics in which he served 
before 1945, he did nothing to contest or change it. Deeply affected by the spiritual and 
scientific dynamics in his worldviews, he served as a shrewd, all-powerful and usually 
rational policy actor in the prewar political system, promoting policies and decisions that 
affected the lives of hundreds of millions of people across Asia, the Pacific, North 
America, Europe and beyond. Given his unique, unmatched power in prewar Japan as its 
autocratic, influential ruler, it seems likely that his policies did more to destroy Japan and 
East Asia in World War II than anyone other single individual’s. His postwar survival 
and reemergence as a strong symbol of peace and constitutional monarchy, still deeply 
loved and revered by many Japanese, is a supreme irony, but also a compliment to his 
(and the Japanese government’s) extreme political shrewdness and highly skillful image 
management abilities. His strong prewar support for such ideologies as Japanese 
nationalism, State Shinto, hakkô ichiu, and the emperor ideology, and his overwhelming 
desire to assure Japan’s (and the throne’s) survival in a hostile international environment, 
contributed to the seeming necessity for Japan’s continuing colonial involvements in Asia 
and the Pacific. As one example of Japan’s strong, unavoidable connections to Asia, 
                                                
1759 This is not to imply that postwar Japan has a totally new culture of politics. It certainly does not. 
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these reemerged in postwar Japan’s aid policies in both negative and positive fashion. For 
all of the postwar period, the necessity of Japan’s economic involvement with Asia, and a 
peaceful environment so that all in the region may flourish, has been countered with 
general Asian resistance to Japanese influence on multiple levels, partly due to past 
Japanese political and cultural aggression with which Hirohito had much connection.1760 
These challenges have unavoidably affected the progress of Japan’s aid to, and economic 
relations with, Asia in the postwar period.1761        
Lessons Learned 
 
 What are some of the main lessons learned for aid and development policy that 
can be drawn from this exploration of Japan’s experience with, and key leaders’ 
worldviews of, technology, development and international relations from 1850 to 1945? I 
organize my insights into three main areas: sociocultural lessons, political lessons, and 
economic lessons, especially focusing on lessons for Japan. It is more challenging to 
relate these lessons to today’s LDCs, since Japan was never an LDC.1762 Yet a few of 
these lessons may relate to them, on an institutional, though likely not a cultural, level.1763 
There are many historical strengths in Japan’s economic approaches to its development 
and current aid strategies. In terms of economic infrastructure, both Japan’s internal 
development efforts and its external aid schemes can be called highly successful. 
                                                
1760 Of course this situation was also greatly affected in the past by Cold War politics.   
1761 One example is riots in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and in China in the 2000s over potential or actual 
Japanese economic involvement in those regions.  
1762 I mentioned this point in Chapter 1.  
1763 Chalmers Johnson and Peter Evans argue that certain institutional elements of Japan’s development 
experience should be transferable to other countries, though not on a cultural level. See Johnson, MITI  and 
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Indutrial Transformation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
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However, consideration of the political and especially the social factors related to Japan’s 
aid remains weak, in comparison with the economic ones.   
 Regarding sociocultural issues/lessons, science and technology policy for 
Japan’s development was largely tackled on the national level, and the government had a 
key role. It sought the most advanced technologies that it believed were appropriate, 
since they were viewed as key for Japan to maintain its freedom and survival. On society, 
culture, and development, Japan’s leaders pondered how entering the global economy 
would affect its politics and society. Yet there was overwhelming emphasis on increasing 
Japan’s economic wealth and technological strength, so practical consideration of how to 
protect Japan’s culture was lacking. The Meiji state chose to manipulate a particular 
indigenous spiritual tradition, Shinto, into a national ideology to motivate Japanese in 
their development and modernization efforts. The state’s coercive methods trampled 
many freedoms, including freedom of religion. The perversion of Shinto into State Shinto 
helped plunge Japan into World War II, which nearly destroyed the nation. A lesson for 
LDCs is that though there may be positive values in religion that can help promote 
development, the state must not trample on religious freedom to encourage them, or some 
type of painful destruction may result.  
  On political issues, national survival was Japan’s supreme goal, for which it 
made aggressive efforts. Japan’s leaders considered Japan’s political and economic 
independence as even more important is its domestic development. Without that, all else 
would fail. High priority was also given to Japan’s political and military development. 
For that, learning from more advanced systems was essential. Among its first priorities, 
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Japan also emphasized building its own governmental and institutional capacities, on 
which security and all else depended.  
 For Japan’s economic development, practical ideas, material and spiritual, were 
important. Japan’s government sought to learn the most advanced technologies it could. 
The government placed a high priority on education as a primary sector to encourage 
development. To aid in this, foreign experts and scholars were brought to teach in Japan. 
Students studied both technical and cultural/linguistic knowledge. Japan was highly 
successful in this education effort. Building Japan’s wealth and economic development 
were seen as important for its security and national survival. Encouraging wealth, 
business and economics was also crucial for Japan’s growth and security. The Japanese 
state also did all it could to encourage the growth of the private sector. It sought to 
carefully intervene in the economy, to encourage cooperation among sectors, and to 
provide overall guidance and key economic knowledge it helped import. It made 
mistakes, but overall, its efforts were successful. Strong state involvement in 
development seems appropriate in the early stages of an LDC’s development, where a 
strong state exists. In Japan’s case, it did. 
 Japan placed first priority on its own internal development, before trade. It 
sought growth it believed to be focused and strategic. Yet Japan now knew it could no 
longer be mostly economically isolated. Yet Japan’s leaders knew they should not open 
the country to excessive free trade until it reached an adequate level of maturity from 
which to compete. Perhaps more, rather than less, state guidance in the economies of 
LDCs may be appropriate, especially at earlier stages. Japan’s government also sought to 
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protect the nation from excessive economic and cultural exploitation from abroad; its 
success varied, especially in the cultural arena. 
 
“Modernization,” Internationalization, and Translative Adaptation: 
An Accurate Picture of Japan’s Experience with Technology and Development? 
 
 
 Regarding the second key question of the dissertation, do the concepts of 
“modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation present an accurate 
portrayal of Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1945? If 
so, how much are they seen in Japan’s aid policies of today? On “modernization,” did 
what happened with the West cause Japan to be increasingly absorbed into the global 
economy during this period? On the issues of technology and development, did Japan’s 
culture become “Western,” on the surface and/or in its core, or did it remain essentially 
“Japanese?” It is challenging to draw absolute conclusions here, since even the concepts 
of “the West” and “Japanese” can be problematic. It is best, of course, to avoid cultural 
stereotyping.  
 Concerning technology, development, and “modernization,” Japan imported a 
great deal of Western technology into its society to rapidly industrialize, for the purpose 
of national survival. The purpose of the massive importation and intense study of these 
technologies was to quickly build up the nation, to help it become wealthy enough to 
afford the huge arms build up and military reform that Japan’s top leaders and oligarchy, 
typified by Yamagata Aritomo, believed was necessary for the nation’s defense. These 
events follow the ideology of fukoku kyôhei (“rich nation, strong army”) fairly well. In 
the first period, 1850 to 1895, Japan embarked on the massive project of learning and 
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importing foreign technology and knowledge. The first period represents Japan’s 
accelerating absorption of foreign technology and knowledge, their application to 
Japanese industries, economy and society, and then to the build-up of Japan’s new, 
modernizing military.  
 At the start of the second period, 1895 to 1945, this intensive, domestic 
absorption of foreign knowledge began to be externally applied. Japan defeated its two 
greatest neighboring powers, China and Russia, and the rest of the world took shocking 
notice. On many levels, the basic goals of fukoku kyôhei succeeded. The process of 
economic growth based on Japan’s expanding industrialization continued into the early 
twentieth century, and was accelerated by Japan’s industrial boom during World War I. 
Japan continued importing much foreign knowledge, though not as frenetically as during 
the first period. The economic expansion brought in part by the wars with China, Russia, 
and World War I continued into the 1920s. This boom accompanied the cultural 
flowering and relative openness of the vibrant Taisho democracy period.  
 After World War I, Japan’s leaders began to feel more tension with the world, 
especially the West, when they discovered that the West continued to view Japan through 
ethnocentric, racist eyes. Japan encountered a world dominated by the West, a region that 
was not very prepared or willing to open up and share the world stage with a virtually 
unknown, mysterious, isolated non-Western power. As Japan’s leaders applied their new 
worldviews influenced by modern science and evolutionism, they determined that for 
Japan to continue to survive and flourish, it must not stop applying the fruits of its new 
power against the hostile West. As Japan’s leaders observed the West’s actions in Asia 
and China, it seemed that aggression must be met by aggression. For its survival and 
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independence, Japan determined that it must increase its presence and intervention in 
Asia, to help weaker nations seemingly unable to defend themselves against the West. 
Unfortunately these worldviews, and Japan’s rising military power and actions, led to 
increasing repression in Japan, more aggression and atrocities by Japan across East Asia 
and the Pacific, and great destruction and death in World War II. “Modernization” asks, 
through all of these events, did Japan become more “Western”? 
 What if we consider events in Japan (1850 to 1945) through the lenses of 
development and “modernization?” In the anthropologically-based definition of 
“development” offered in the Glossary, development has three major components: 1) 
increasing a society’s capacity for industrial production, capitalism and its products, and 
the society’s movement toward “modern life;” 2) improving a society’s quality of life, 
standard of living, and reducing/eliminating the presence of poverty within it; and 3) 
building a society’s capacity for local participation in these decisions. The first part of the 
definition largely encompasses an increase in industrialization and industrial capacity, the 
second part the improvement of a society’s social and quality-of-life components during 
processes of economic change, and the third, improving a people’s capacity to decisively 
participate in these changes on the local level. What happened in Japan from 1850 to 
1945, and through these events, again, did Japan become more “Western,” or stay mostly 
Japanese? 
 If we reexamine events in Japan from 1850 to 1945 in the light of development 
and “modernization,” it is clear that Japan went through massive economic and social 
changes as it moved through and toward “development.” In this period, the Japanese state 
defined development in terms of the first part of the above definition: large-scale 
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industrial production supported by increasing international trade. By this standard, from 
1850 to 1895, economic development was a great success. The economy experienced 
great industrial expansion, the development of many new industries, expanded trade, 
employment, and the increase of capitalism and industrial products. Ironically, in the 
second period, 1895 to 1945, these industrial successes were virtually obliterated by 
Japan’s actions and the foreign responses in World War II.  
 Yanagita’s conceptions of holistic development, discussed earlier, while 
acknowledging the presence and importance of industrialization in development, stress 
the second and third components: enhancing quality of life (in Japan, social solidarity and 
communality in rural areas), and increasing/maintaining local capacity for participation in 
these important decisions. From the evidence presented here, in the prewar period, Japan 
failed greatly in these last two aspects of development. In this midst of its rapid 
industrialization from 1850 to 1895 and into the early 1900s, social change issues were 
largely ignored, except when violent protest, extremist or democratic movements erupted. 
Japan’s conservative culture of politics usually brought this response from the state. From 
1895 to 1945, the situation did not improve. Continuing rapid industrialization and 
growth into the 1920s and wars with China, Russia and World War I brought further 
social change and disruption. Yet these changes cannot compare with the socioeconomic, 
political and material destruction hitting Japan from the late 1920s to 1945, as it went 
through depression, increased militarization, war in China, Southeast Asia, the South 
Pacific, with the United States, Great Britain and finally, the Soviet Union. The damage 
and social disruption hitting Japan also affected other regions such as China, most of East 
Asia, and the United States. Japan’s industrial achievements from 1850 through the 1920s 
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were destroyed by late 1945, and its society, rural and especially urban regions, were 
greatly damaged.1764      
 Though Japanese society changed in multiple, painful ways through the huge, 
traumatic events from 1850 to 1945, adopted many Western technologies and cultural 
phenomena during this period, and experienced massive social changes over the century, 
it did not change in the core of its identity or worldviews, in the essence of what makes it 
truly “Japanese.” Though Japanese adopted numerous forms of Western technology, 
dress, economic structures, communication, transportation, fought in huge wars that 
nearly destroyed the country, and brought massive changes to their daily lives through 
rapid economic growth and industrialization, the basic, core social structures of their 
society did not change that much. Neither did many core elements of the Japanese 
worldview and one of its most important aspects, the most essential views and practices 
of religion and spirituality, change in their basic nature.1765 Though elements of Japanese 
identity and worldview were influenced and altered by Japan’s interactions with the 
West, I wish to argue that its cultural core and base society remained mostly intact, both 
through 1945 and in the many traumatic changes to follow, in the American occupation 
and years of rapid economic growth and today’s economic recession. In terms of 
                                                
1764 For a treatment of the social conditions in Japan at the time of its surrender in 1945 and through the 
period of the American occupation, see Dower, War Without Mercy.  
1765 I say this while acknowledging the vibrancy and incredible variety of religious and spiritual activity in 
Japan’s spiritual landscape, seen in the amazing diversity of its new religious movements. For studies on 
these, see H. Neill McFarland, The Rush Hour of the Gods; A Study of New Religious Movements in Japan 
(New York: Macmillan, 1967); Mark Mullins, Susumu Shimazono, and Paul L. Swanson, Religion and 
Society in Modern Japan: Selected Readings (Berkeley, Calif: Asian Humanities Press, 1993); and Susumu 
Shimazono, From Salvation to Spirituality: Popular Religious Movements in Modern Japan (Melbourne, 
Vic: Trans Pacific, 2004).  
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technology and development issues, the concept of “modernization” represents Japan’s 
experiences from 1850 to 1945 very well. 
 Does the concept of internationalization well portray Japan’s experiences with 
technology and development from 1850 to 1945? Remember that internationalization 
focuses on what happened economically and culturally on the international level, as the 
West absorbed peripheral countries like Japan and others into the global economy. To 
apply this concept here, I will focus on Japanese colonialism and on Japan’s international 
reaction to the West’s actions, as both Japan and Asia were brought into world trade from 
the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s.1766 Readers in the United States are more familiar with 
how the West “forced” Japan and other non-Western regions into the global system. It is 
more interesting to address what Japanese colonialism did, partly in response to the 
West, since that approach to internationalization is more relevant to what Japanese aid is 
doing today.  
 On the issue of technology, from 1850 to 1895, as Japan imported and mastered 
more Western technology and industrial products, it was increasingly enabled to turn its 
gaze to nearby Asian regions. More Japanese wealth and military strength empowered 
Japanese assertiveness as Japan began to increase its presence in both northern and 
southern regions, including Hokkaido, Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and the Ryukyu 
Islands. As these regions were incorporated, in varying degrees, into Japan proper, Japan 
                                                
1766 This does represent a slight variant of the definition of internationalization that is in the Glossary and in 
K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11-12, since according to that definition, internationalization involves what the 
active West does to passive non-Western nations as it forces them into the world economy. Here I apply the 
concept to what Japan, a non-Western country, has done in its colonial processes involving other non-
Western nations. Usually Japan is not considered to be part of the West, geographically or culturally, 
although it is often allied with western Europe and North America in various political and economic 
dealings.    
727 
 
extended its gaze beyond, to Korea, China, and Taiwan. Soon Japan’s rising industrial 
prowess enabled the growth of its military and technological capabilities, which it used to 
attack China, Russia and Korea. Technological and industrial capabilities and extreme 
discipline enabled Japan to achieve costly victories over these nations, and to acquire 
colonies in Taiwan, Southern Manchuria (China), and Korea from 1895 to 1910.  Japan 
also used its techno-industrial prowess to begin to assess and build industrial capabilities 
in each of these regions. Its economic investments in Hokkaido, Taiwan, Korea and 
Manchuria were great. Japan’s rule in different regions varied, but sometimes grew harsh 
when it encountered much resentment or resistance. Japan also imposed its language, 
education system, and State Shinto on Taiwan and Korea. Japan’s military and 
technological capabilities also enabled it to conquer additional regions through 1945, 
including eastern China, Southeast Asia, and regions in the South Pacific. But it did not 
have the capacity to consolidate these holdings for very long.   
 Based on the definition of development, Japan invested the most heavily in 
developing key segments of industrial production and transportation in Manchuria, 
Taiwan, and Korea, and some agricultural production. Japan did not show much concern 
about improving the living standards of indigenous populations in its colonies, and it did 
not do much to increase the local capacity of these populations to be involved in Japan’s 
development decisions for their regions. As the conditions of Japan in World War II grew 
worse, conditions for the colonies were often more repressive and difficult, especially for 
newly conquered territories.  
 In terms of technology, development and internationalization, as Japan resisted 
the West’s attempt to coercively and exploitatively absorb it into the global economy, it 
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ironically did a similar thing to many of its neighbors in attempting to conquer them. 
Japan’s economic and cultural impact on its colonies in the short term was not as huge as 
the impact of European empires on their colonies. This is likely because the period of 
Japan’s major colonization1767 was shorter than Western colonization. But in the postwar 
period, the legacy of Japan’s industrial investment in these regions has gradually become 
massive, as has the example of Japan’s economic growth and development for other East 
Asian nations. Many of them, including South Korea, Taiwan, and China, have had 
among the fastest rates of economic growth in history, and some are entering the ranks of 
the world’s wealthy nations. Compared to the legacy and long-term impacts of Western 
and European colonialism on their former colonies, this is a stark difference indeed. Even 
so, this is not to minimize the pain or suffering these regions suffered because of 
Japanese imperialism. It was often huge. I conclude that internationalization does 
represent well what Japanese colonialism did to its colonies as it absorbed them into its 
economic and cultural universe in the period 1850 to 1945. Japan most certainly 
“actively” engaged and conquered these territories, though their reactions were not so 
passive, and the process certainly did involve a great deal of subjugation and exploitation 
of these regions by Japan. In these senses, Japanese imperialism and colonialism seem 
similar to their Western counterparts. 
 Does translative adaptation present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience 
with technology and development from 1850 to 1945? Was Japan able to properly match 
and adjust its own culture to imported Western items? With the presence of the new 
                                                
1767 I am referring to colonies besides those that were absorbed into Japan proper, the latter being Hokkaido 
and the Ryukyus/Okinawa. Japan held Taiwan, the longest held colony, for fifty years.  
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Western technologies, did Japanese cultural items continue, or were many of them 
destroyed? Did Japan develop “well”? 
 On technology and translative adaptation, one of the major issues with which 
various Japanese leaders struggled (here, Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Kato and Yanagita) was 
how Japan could import needed Western cultural items and not destroy its social and 
cultural integrity. On technology issues, the work of Fukuzawa and Yanagita is the most 
significant. Though Yanagita articulated the basic concept of translative adaptation 
decades ago, the work of Fukuzawa on this issue had the most long-term, widespread 
impact on Japan. What happened in Japan from 1850 to 1895 and from 1895 to 1945 in 
terms of translative adaptation? Many surface cultural features of Japanese life changed, 
for example, clothing, technologies used in daily life, modes of communication and 
transportation, and large-scale public architecture. Many social institutions changed and 
evolved as well: the postal system, education, health, agriculture, transportation, 
communication and governmental institutions all encountered massive change.  
 But what happened to the most enduring parts of Japanese culture, its core or 
base cultural features, including social organization, family structure, interpersonal 
behavior, gender roles, worldviews,1768 and views of religion and spirituality? Many of 
these have changed to varying extents. But as even a brief review of many areas of 
Japanese social life will reveal, they have proven extremely enduring within the generally 
conservative base of Japanese society. Various ideologies and features of Japanese 
society follow this trend, such as the influence of the Confucian ie system and bushido 
                                                
1768 Here I mean worldview in the more conventional anthropological, holistic sense, not my own narrower 
definition of worldview as a cognitive framework. See Worldview (anthropology) in the Glossary section.  
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values on prewar (1850 to 1945) and postwar Japanese corporate life, the presence of 
Confucian-influenced, hierarchical social roles in Japanese life, the use of hierarchical 
and honorific terms in the Japanese language, the heavy influence of group-based 
behavior on individuals, and so forth.1769 This is not to deny the highly fluid, rapidly 
changing nature of Japanese society, as complex and dynamic as any society on earth,1770 
nor the contested, fragmented nature of culture as commonly conceived by contemporary 
social and cultural anthropologists. But in sum, from 1850 to 1945, I wish to argue that in 
general, most of the deepest core features of Japanese culture proved enduring. 
Technology greatly affected them, but it did not change or eliminate them at the most 
fundamental levels.     
 Is translative adaptation an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with 
development from 1850 to 1945? Despite traumatic social changes in that century 
brought by Japan’s economic development and subsequent destruction in World War II, 
did core “Japanese” cultural features, amid “Western” influences, continue intact? Did 
Japan develop “well?” Considering the three main aspects of development defined 
above,1771 the first level of development, industrial production, had large impacts on 
Japanese society at many levels, as outlined earlier. Quality of life in Japan suffered, 
especially during World War II. Local capacities for civic participation were not 
                                                
1769 For a well-known treatment of this hierarchical, Confucian aspect of Japanese culture, see Nakane, 
Tekiô no jôken. It is true that some of these patterns in Japanese corporate life are now changing, due to the 
influence of the economic recession that started in the early 1990s. 
1770 For an excellent overview and treatment of contemporary Japanese culture, see Sandra Buckley’s 
Encyclopedia of Contemporary Japan (Buckley, Encyclopedia of Contemporary). Examples of the rapidly 
changing nature of Japanese society include the current gradual elimination of the life-time employment 
system in large Japanese corporations, due to the economic recession of the 1990s and early 2000s, Japan’s 
shrinking population and demographic crisis that may lead to a significant presence of immigrants in Japan, 
and the nation’s continuing innovations in high technology that amaze the world.  




encouraged by the top-down development approaches that the government supported. In 
the 1930s through 1945, repression became more common. The base societal elements of 
Japanese life continued intact, despite the great changes brought by development and by 
technology. Though Japan’s economy developed and grew greatly through the 1920s, it 
did not develop very “well,” not in terms of how anthropologists and Yanagita Kunio 
would define well: improved quality of life for most people and chances for local 
participation in development decisions. In the 1930s to 1945, with the onset of militarism 
and World War II, everything related to quality of life and local participation declined 
even further.  
 Above I argued that the Japanese development concepts of “modernization,” 
internationalization,1772 and translative adaptation all, on a basic level, accurately 
describe Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1945. How 
do they relate to contemporary Japanese aid policies? Is “modernization” also valid for 
Japanese aid? That would mean that as LDCs are drawn into trade with Japan, they 
hopefully develop, but also retain their unique, indigenous features, and do not become 
Western or Japanese clones at the core level. To seriously answer this question, we would 
need to do ethnographic fieldwork on the cultures of various recipients of Japan’s ODA. 
Barring this, I can reflect briefly on a few cases. One of the most interesting is Malaysia. 
Former leader of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad (prime minister from 1981 to 2003) 
strongly advocated the nation’s adoption of a Japanese style development model, and 
Malaysia has also received much aid from Japan. Under Mahathir’s efforts and policies, 
                                                




Malaysia enjoyed mostly high levels of economic development and growth.1773 This 
growth did not cause Malaysia to become Western or Japanese in its core cultural 
identity. While it is impossible, without ethnography, to definitively judge whether most 
Japanese aid recipients effectively retain their core identities despite receiving Japanese 
aid or investment, my suspicion is that they do. Two other significant recipients of 
Japanese aid, China and Indonesia, have also retained their core cultural features. 
“Modernization” is likely a valid concept for what happens to the core cultures of many 
Japanese aid recipients, at least Asian ones. The principles of “modernization” are also 
embodied in Japan’s aid goals to customize aid for local conditions, not interfere in other 
countries’ internal affairs, to enhance Japan’s image,1774 to build positive relations with 
other countries,1775 and to benefit LDCs, not just Japan.1776         
 What is the relevance of internationalization for Japanese aid? Here the question 
becomes what has happened to recipients of Japanese ODA, economically and culturally, 
as they have been drawn into the global economy? This is an important, complex 
question that could be studied on a general level, or for individual countries. Considering 
one example in Chapter 2, most Japanese aid experts who know China well conclude that 
Japanese aid to China has greatly helped China to develop economically by helping lay a 
                                                
1773 For more on the economic development of Malaysia, see K. S. Jomo and Yun-chung Chen, Southeast 
Asia's Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Policy and Economic Development in Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997); Ishak Shari,“Economic Growth and Social Development 
in Malaysia, 1971-98: Does the State Still Matter in an Era of Globalisation?” in Development and 
Structural Change in Asia-Pacific: Globalising Miracles or End of an Era? eds. Martin Andersson and 
Christer Gunnarsson (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 108-24; Hua Sing Lim, Japan's Role 
in Asia: Mutual Development or Ruthless Competition (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003); and 
Haider A. Khan, “Japanese Aid: Comparative Analysis,” 224-234. Of course, Malaysia’s growth was 
threatened in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, but it eventually recovered.  
1774 These three points are from Table 9.1. 
1775 This point is from Table 9.2. 
1776 This point is taken from Table 9.3. 
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strong infrastructural foundation, and that Japan’s ODA has increased China’s diversity 
and possible openness to later political change.1777 The perspectives of Chinese experts 
concur on the significance of Japan’s ODA as helping lay a basis for China’s 
development, though they disagree on some other points.1778 In studying the issue of 
internationalization for Japanese ODA, both donor and recipient perspectives should be 
considered. In terms of ideas in current Japanese ODA policy, those which support the 
study of recipients’ economic and cultural conditions, during or after they received 
Japanese aid, are relevant to internationalization: goals to customize aid for local 
countries’ conditions,1779 goals to use aid for Japan’s strategic interests,1780 Japan’s goals 
to use aid to support its external political relations and the global aid agenda,1781 and 
Japan’s economic goals for its ODA related to international economic development.1782 
From this brief review, internationalization seems relevant for analyzing contemporary 
Japanese aid.  
 Is translative adaptation useful for Japan’s ODA policy? Leading Japanese 
development economists believe it is.1783 In general, it must be applied to single country 
case studies. To apply the concept to Japanese aid, one must ask, as a particular LDC 
receives Japan’s aid, how well is it adjusting culturally to the process? Is its core culture 
                                                
1777 See Chapter 2 above, also Takamine, Japan's Development Aid.  
1778 Feng, “Japanese Aid to China.” 
1779 Table 9.1. 
1780 See Table 9.2. These goals require Japan to study the conditions of recipients, their compliance with its 
ODA norms, and Japanese ODA’s effects on them. 
1781 See Table 9.2. These goals necessitate Japan’s awareness of how other countries (donors and 
recipients) perceive its aid.  
1782 See Table 9.3. For these economic development goals, of course Japan must study the economic 
conditions of aid recipients. 
1783 See Ohno and Ohno, Japanese Views; “Vietnam’s Industrialization Strategy in the Age of 
Globalization: Overview and Key Proposals (Main Page);” and “Vietnam’s Industrialization Strategy in the 
Age of Globalization: Translative Adaptation.” 
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being destroyed, or are its indigenous cultural features able to survive alongside imported 
items? If the recipient’s base society is still intact, is development working? In the case of 
larger countries, Japanese aid, in many cases, as only a small part of a nation’s entire 
economy, has likely not fundamentally altered or eliminated the core cultural features of 
the recipient society. As noted above, in Malaysia and China, Japanese aid has not altered 
most of the core cultural features of these two societies. For these two cases, Japanese aid 
has decisively contributed to each nation’s development. Clarifying the situation is likely 
more complex if one seeks to study cases in regions beyond Asia. Again, to confirm what 
has happened for other countries, ethnographic research is a must. If we compare the 
principles of translative adaptation to key ideas in current Japanese ODA, the ideas and 
themes that most naturally support translative adaptation include: customizing aid for 
local conditions, enhancing Japan’s image/face,1784 improving Japan’s relations with 
other countries,1785 and Japan’s recently articulated goals to genuinely help LDCs with 
their infrastructural and additional aspects of development.1786 Japan has often seemed to 
put its own interests first in its aid, but this may be changing. New pressures and goals 
from both domestic and international sources require Japan to be more sensitive to the 
genuine, ground level needs of its aid recipients. 
 
Possible Effects of Spirituality and Religion on Japan’s Foreign Aid Policies 
 
 
 How has Japanese spirituality affected Japan’s foreign aid policies? In Chapters 
1 and 2, I presented several arguments for how worldviews are one important factor, 
                                                
1784 The previous two goals are from Table 9.1. 
1785 This is from Table 9.2. 
1786 These goals appear in Table 9.3. 
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among several, in determining what a country’s aid policy outcomes will be.1787 Religion 
and spirituality are one of the most fundamental parts of worldview,1788 so it is logical 
that they must be influential, to some extent, in helping shape aid policy outcomes. There 
are also other cultural, religious and historical factors mentioned in earlier chapters that 
relate to Japan’s aid.1789   
 What evidence do we see in the historical data presented here?1790 From 1868 to 
1945, religion and spirituality played somewhat important roles in policies to “protect” 
Japanese culture from foreign, Western influences. In this period, as the Meiji state 
created State Shinto, there was an atypical (for Japan) fusing of politics and religion to 
promote national development and Japanese nationalism. The state made State Shinto a 
national ideology for that purpose. Most leaders supported it; a few preferred 
Christianity. State Shinto was also used to strengthen the Japanese national sense of 
identity. This also connected with the highly kin- and locality- based traditions of folk 
(“traditional”) Shinto. How can the negative experiences that Japan experienced in 
mixing religion and the state in this period, seen in how State Shinto as nationalistic 
                                                
1787 Perhaps the strongest argument is Carol Lancaster’s. She argues that a country’s worldviews (in her 
view, widely shared beliefs about what is right or wrong) shape its collective beliefs about what kind of 
behavior should happen in different situations, based on varied basic values that can lead to different policy 
outcomes in aid policy and expenditures (Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 18-19). 
1788 Ibid., 18. 
1789 As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, these include how a nation conceives of charity and giving, which often 
rises out of a society’s religious and spiritual mindset. There are also issues specific to Japan, including its 
historically “weak” values of charity toward other countries, perhaps based on traditional religious values 
(Rix, Japan's Economic Aid, 15-16), its lack of a strong Judeo-Christian heritage (Orr, Emergence of 
Japan’s Foreign Aid, 139), and an alleged fundamental rupture in worldviews between prewar religious 
and postwar secular values (Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, 7, 8). Cultural factors specific to Japan 
include its concepts of on (obligation), giri (duty) and ninjo (empathy) (Wright-Neville, Evolution 
Japanese Foreign Aid, 8-9, 33-39) and Japan’s uchi-soto (insider-outsider) tradition, an emphasis on 
helping those inside one’s own group, not outsiders (Hirata, Civil Society, 25). 
1790 Here I discuss general, relevant trends from Japanese experiences with these issues as revealed in the 
contexts we examined in many of the chapters.  
736 
 
propaganda and as a tool for state coercion, serve as positive lessons for development and 
ODA policies today? This is a key task for Japanese aid policymakers and scholars of 
development to consider. Part of the value of Japan’s experience is the lesson of how 
dangerous it is for religion to mix too closely with politics for development. 
 In the late Tokugawa period, Japan’s leaders and government valued certain 
areas of Western knowledge (Dutch learning) and science as helpful for Japan, such as 
medicine and military weaponry. They also rejected a leading non-material ideology, 
Christianity. Japan sent trade missions abroad to obtain desired technical knowledge, but 
at first rejected religious (Christian) missions and missionaries the West sent to Japan, 
until forced to accept them early in the Meiji period. A leading motivator for national 
isolation during this period was the desire of the Tokugawa regime to prevent Western 
imperialism and takeover of Japan. Christianity and European trade were seen as two of 
the chief Western means to achieve this end; therefore the first was totally banned and the 
second severely curtailed. Confucianism and its ideals played an important role in the 
ethics of late Tokugawa Japan, and continued to be influential in helping to motivate the 
nation for development through Confucian-influenced, bushido-type work values in the 
Meiji period and beyond. Neo-Confucian ideologies also contributed ideologies and 
thought helpful for Japanese business and industries. And in 1855, the state founded the 
Bansho Shirabasho, the first public facility in Japan for the study of Western languages 
and sciences. From this point in early modern Japan, the state’s involvement in the 
importation of foreign knowledge, both cultural and technical, became more important 
and decisive. In today’s aid, the Japanese state continues to play an important role, but 
unlike in the late Tokugawa period, the state’s role is increasingly dependent on the 
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private sector. Also different from the late Tokugawa era, the state’s legally mandated 
separation of religion and state policy now discourages Japan from considering the role 
of spirituality in ODA and development very deeply. 
 In the late Tokugawa period, religion played an important role in Japan’s 
education system, in the form of shrine and temple-based schools (terakoya). Somewhat 
similarly, in the Meiji era, State Shinto was placed into the national consciousness 
through the new national education system. Through 1945, Japan’s national system of 
education supported state-sanctioned nationalistic propaganda drawing on elements from 
Shinto and Confucianism. In education for women and private education, Christianity 
made important contributions from 1895 to 1945. Education is one of the most important 
components in an LDC’s development, as it was in Japan’s, but it can be used either 
positively or negatively. Japan’s ODA, especially JICA, continues to place a strong 
emphasis on technical training for Japan’s aid recipients. What lessons can be drawn 
from the manipulation of State Shinto in Japanese education, as a tool for promoting 
nationalistic development, for other LDCs? One of the most important lessons is that here 
the state abused its power, damaged religion, education, and the nation in the process. 
How can ODA policy discourage such abuses of power in other LDCs? Can it or should 
it? If we support Japanese and global aid goals for the promotion of democracy, human 
rights, and freedom, we can say that ODA policy should discourage manipulation of 
education and other cultural features for state ends.   
 In the Meiji era, in general, Japan rejected its “ethical,” Confucian heritage, 
seen as inferior, and Christianity, and coveted “scientific” Western knowledge. Japan 
accepted technology and knowledge it deemed useful, but sought to reject what it 
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considered harmful. Contrary to Tokugawa policy, to avert Western imperialism, Japan 
began aggressively importing Western knowledge and technology, as rapidly as possible. 
For the same purposes, some leaders (here, Fukuzawa and Mori) strongly supported 
Japan’s adaptation of Western values, and even Christianity (Mori). Most Japanese 
strongly resisted the temptation to adopt Christianity as the new national religion or 
development ideology. Like Japan, today other LDCs struggle with how to integrate 
development and aid with their own spiritual heritage. Japan’s painful lessons here may 
serve them well. This should also be an encouragement for Japan to consider more deeply 
the impact of religious forces on its aid. 
 The United States had profound influence on Japan from 1868 onward, more 
than any other foreign power. Interestingly, two of the greatest areas of American 
influence on Japan, were educational: the sharing of science and technology, and Western 
religion (Christianity), both often through the vehicle of English. When English was 
chosen as the most important Western language for study, it became the seminal 
linguistic vehicle for the transference of both Western scientific and cultural knowledge, 
including religion, into Japan. Like the U.S., Europe brought much influence, including 
science, technology, and Christian-influenced ideologies, religious and secular, cultural 
and political features, which were significant in the Meiji period. Foreign experts, 
scientists, teachers and businesspeople who came to Japan brought much-coveted foreign 
knowledge, but they also brought Western cultural values, and often, Christianity. The 
impact of foreign teachers on Japan in many areas of knowledge, including science, 
technology, and religion and philosophy, was great. Through Japan’s attempts to develop 
in this era, it had to interact with foreign nations and foreigners. In the process, it 
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received science, technology, and foreign religious influence, though most Japanese 
would have preferred only the first two. No matter how hard an LDC desires to limit 
certain cultural influences from abroad, doing so is extremely hard, as these lessons from 
Japan show. Rather than resorting to repression, the LDC should more fruitfully direct its 
efforts at deciding how it can positively benefit from religious input, even from foreign 
countries. This would be a positive question for Japanese aid officials to concretely 
ponder as they deepen their consideration of how religion affects Japan’s ODA projects, 
not to merely focus on negative questions such as religion and the promotion of 
terrorism. 
 From 1895 to 1945, the Meiji state continued to use the Kokugaku School of 
learning, and influences from Shinto and Confucianism, to heavily promote nationalism. 
The influence of various nationalistic ideologies, often fused with religious and spiritual 
overtones, was huge in this period, especially from the 1930s to 1945. Most of these drew 
on Shinto or Confucian values to some degree, not so much on Buddhism. 
The emperor exercised huge power and influence in the political system. The state 
encouraged the mixing of religion and politics through several ideologies involving the 
emperor, including State Shinto, kokutai and kôdô. State Shinto exercised a higher 
influence on Japanese politics, education, and society during this period. It was 
established to provide Japanese with a powerful, alternative form of identity to counter 
Western influences, and to promote Japanese nationalism. The effects of this continue to 
haunt Japan’s relations with other Asian nations. These negative experiences in Japan 
have made it harder for the religion factor to be easily considered in Japan’s ODA 
assessments today. But this issue deserves more concrete attention.  
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 Christianity had a broad, if diffuse, influence on several areas of Japanese 
culture in this period, such as ideologies of pacifism, socialism, and philosophy. It had 
larger impacts on other areas like education, women’s rights, democratic thought, human 
rights, and various liberal areas of cultural influence, through the Taisho democracy 
period. But as Japan moved closer to the 1930s and World War II, repression against all 
religion besides State Shinto increased, and these liberalizing influences in Japanese 
culture decreased. During the period of national cultural and scientific isolation in World 
War II, Japanese R&D also suffered. In national isolation, an LDC’s cultural and 
scientific development will suffer, as Japan’s did in such periods. This is strong support 
for the Japanese argument that openness to cultural exchange and training are paramount 
for successful aid and development.  
 Externally, from 1895 to 1945, Japanese spirituality was imposed on long-term 
colonies (such as Taiwan and Korea) as emperor ideology and forced participation in 
State Shinto. This created a great deal of resentment among these colonized populations, 
especially in Korea. State Shinto contributed to the nationalistic ideologies that were used 
to justify Japan’s aggressive actions in various conflicts and wars in Asia and the Pacific. 
This was a state-sponsored corruption of an indigenous form of spirituality that 
historically had no connection to such practices or ideologies. Extreme spiritual 
ideologies clouded the beliefs and policy actions of some of Japan’s top leaders, 
especially Hirohito’s. These had horrific consequences both for Japan and other nations, 
as he delayed surrender in World War II. The connections of State Shinto and Japan’s 
external economic relations are only indirect, and relate to the fact that politically, State 
Shinto helped provide ideological justification for Japan’s aggressive political actions 
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against other Asian nations. From these actions, some economic benefits, especially for 
Japan and somewhat for the colonies (economic infrastructure), resulted. The main lesson 
for ODA here is that extremist ideologies, including religious ones, can cause a nation’s 
politics to go asunder. One more factor for donors and recipients to consider, as they 
assess the religion factor in aid, is how ODA can be used to discourage political 
extremism in LDCs. 
 What possible evidence is there from my study of leaders’ views of religion, 
spirituality, economic development, science, technology, and international relations on 
how spirituality may be affecting Japan’s current ODA? In the leaders’ general views of 
religion and spirituality, especially from 1850 to 1895, science is generally assumed to 
underlie everything in the universe. These leaders believed that they must learn advanced 
technology from the West (not from “unscientific,” philosophical Asia), and that they 
need supportive “spirits” to help them do so. If possible, they preferred to get these 
“spirits” (or spiritual sources) of inspiration and hard work from indigenous sources. The 
general views of spirituality in the late Tokugawa era leaned more toward emphasizing 
ethical issues, while those of the Meiji period emphasized more material concerns. This 
was especially true of the views of economic issues. Though in the “traditional” Japanese 
worldview there was little separation of the material and spiritual realms, in Japan there 
has long been a separation of religion and the state, except for 1868-1945, which was an 
historical aberration.    
 One sees this emphasis on the material in the leaders’ worldviews and cultural 
logics (1850 to 1895 and beyond) of the domestic state and market, international political 
economy, and on the issue of technology transfers. Concepts and images emphasize 
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material power and values, and include the power of Western technology to conquer 
China, other Asian countries, and the strength of science, technology and economics to 
help save Japan. Money and material things drive the world. A basic lesson here is that it 
is much harder to transfer the soft, value-laden, “spiritual” aspects of technology. 
Transferring the “hard,” material aspects of technology is easier in many respects. LDCs 
can learn how Japan attempted to balance the material and ethical/contextual aspects of 
imported knowledge. Religion can make various valuable contributions to an LDC’s 
development, but these entail some cultural risk. Some of Japan’s Meiji leaders, such as 
Mori and Fukuzawa, were good students of development. They effectively identified 
positive things that Western religion gave the West for development, but this does not 
mean that everything was successfully or uniformly applied in Japan.  
 A third important area is the leaders’ view of the role of religion and spirituality 
in economic development. The leaders in the first period (1850 to 1895) did not mind 
using religion and spirituality to encourage social change in support of Japanese 
nationalism and development, though many did not want to use Christianity. Most of 
them, and the Meiji state, preferred to use Shinto. Religious and moral underpinnings 
were recognized as influencing the West’s strength over Japan and Asia, so these leaders 
admitted the possible contributions of spirituality to economic development. Though 
many Meiji leaders connected some values of Christianity with Western economic 
development, the domestic market worldviews and logics identified in this study seem to 
deemphasize non-material knowledge like religion. Most Japanese in this era disliked 
Christianity. Some of these leaders were impressed by what Christianity had done in the 
West (i.e. its moral strengthening of individuals, and historic role in promoting the 
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scientific and technological discoveries). But they were perplexed by the seeming 
conflicts of Christianity with Japanese culture. Even so Christianity was among the most 
important global cultural products to be brought (back) into Japan at this time. An 
implication is that today’s LDCs should reflect carefully on whether they wish to restrict 
foreign religion, since its contributions can be great, but risky. 
 From 1895 to 1945, on spirituality’s role in development, Yanagita stressed the 
impacts of spirituality on the nation’s politics and society on the local level, and Hirohito, 
on the national level. Both thought spirituality was important, but neither was capable of 
changing the damage state coercion through State Shinto ultimately inflicted on the 
Japanese polity and society. For ODA policy, LDC leaders need a clear idea of how 
religion affects the state and development. Without that, potentially great damage can 
result. Based on Japan’s negative example here, LDCs should be aware of religion and 
spirituality’s potential positive effects for economic development, as long as freedom of 
religion is maintained. Donor and recipient aid staff and LDCs’ leaders should include 
religion as a potentially positive tool in their development arsenal. 
 From 1895 to 1945, some leaders’ actions in international relations were 
affected both by religion and by science. Hirohito’s foreign and military policy actions 
were at times colored by his devotion to maintaining Japan’s sacred spiritual traditions 
and the throne (the delay of the decision to surrender in World War II), and by rational 
policy decisions about progress in battle (his guidance of battle plans in various South 
Pacific locations) (Bix 2000). Earlier, from 1850 to 1895, while the influence of 
evolutionistic, scientific thought on Japan’s international relations helped provide leaders 
such as Yamagata with justification for Japan to prepare to attack “backward” neighbors 
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seen as blocking Japan’s progress, other leaders (Kato in particular) worked hard to 
devise scientific, evolutionistic and spiritual arguments to justify the Meiji state’s plans 
for Japan’s development and international relations.  
 There were several potentially significant conflicts in the leaders’ views of 
spirituality and science. Despite the ethical emphasis of many late Tokugawa leaders’ 
views and the more material leanings of Meiji leaders (already noted), daily spiritual 
practice continued in Japan, both among leaders and the general population. There were 
several potential conflicts affecting the use of spirituality and science for Japan’s national 
policy goals in this era: conflicts between Western “scientific” knowledge and Asian 
“ethical” knowledge, Western religious values and Japanese ones, and Western and 
Japanese cultures. Though the separation of religion and state is a much longer tradition 
in Japan than in Europe, in the Meiji state’s pro-religion and pro-science ideologies of 
nationalism, the Flaw of the Excluded Middle and “conflicts” between the material and 
the spiritual are not really seen. From 1850 to 1895, another conflict emerged concerning 
which spiritual source might provide the best inspiration for Japan’s development. While 
most leaders preferred Shinto or Confucian sources, a few like Mori chose Christianity. 
Japan was totally open to accepting “useful” Western technologies, but generally not 
willing to accept foreign ideologies that seemed too conflicting with Japanese culture, 
such as Christianity. Another potentially important conflict (1850 to 1895) concerned the 
spiritual and material realms. Several leaders (Kato, Yamagata, and Ito) found Western 
culture and technology superior to East Asia’s, though not the West’s spirituality. In 
approaching the technical and ethical/cultural dilemmas of development, any LDC must 
seek a balance between the spiritual and material aspects of the process. In this era, the 
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power of the West’s technologies and Japan’s rejection of “weaker” East Asian models 
may have made it harder for Japan to do this. 
 From 1895 to 1945, conflicts between the spiritual and material realms in the 
leaders’ worldviews can be seen, first, in some of their policy implications. The leaders 
here, and the state, saw no essential conflict between spiritual and material concerns, or 
in drawing on either for policy needs. This, again, is an example of pragmatic Japanese 
spirituality. The conflict between Western and Eastern cultures was of much greater 
concern to these leaders. While essential dichotomies between the material and spiritual 
realms are likely assumed in the worldviews of most Western aid workers, what about 
Japanese aid staff? Perhaps at their conscious, operational level of policy such a 
dichotomy may be assumed, but likely not at the level of their personal spiritual practice 
(this would need to be confirmed ethnographically). Integration of the material and 
spiritual is seems to be a likely reality in the lives of many non-Western aid recipients. 
How do presumptions about the spiritual and material in aid workers’ worldviews affect 
the delivery of aid and its effectiveness? Aid staff should know their own operational 
presumptions, because they will surely affect their decisions, policies, and interactions 
with recipients. Knowing the worldviews of recipients, in general and regarding these 
issues, would also help in improving aid effectiveness. 
  From 1895 to 1945, conflicts also occurred in the leaders’ material and spiritual 
interventions in policy. Japan’s leaders used material means to transform Japan’s external 
environment, and to obtain access to territories and natural resources they perceived to be 
needed for Japan’s “defense.” Yanagita argued that Japan must use material means to 
defend its indigenous culture and spirituality, the foundation of its culture, identity, and 
746 
 
survival. But the aggressive material actions of the Japanese state, supported by forced 
spirituality, greatly alienated foreign populations against Japan, and nearly destroyed 
Japan and its empire. Coerced development is never the answer. Successful ODA policy 
must draw on both hard (material) and soft (spiritual) aspects of development to be 
effective. 
 What are the possible impacts of these leaders’ views of spirituality and/or 
science on their general policy actions and impacts? From 1850 to 1895, many of their 
views supported policies that would encourage science. Many Japanese and the state 
were willing to use religion and spirituality to support science and defense if the clash 
with Japanese culture was not too great; there was a definite tendency to mix religion and 
spirituality with politics in this era. In the leaders’ worldviews of the domestic political 
economy (1850 to 1895), there was more of an emphasis on the material realm, and less 
on the ethical/philosophical side. Religion was only seen as useful if it could be used to 
resist the West. The heavy material emphasis in Japan’s views of technology in this era 
caused Japan to emphasize large-scale industrial development, to chose State Shinto as 
the state spiritual ideology, and to partly reject its Confucian heritage. But the state did 
not apply State Shinto to international relations until the next era (1895 to 1945). Leaders 
here (from 1850 to 1895) stress how positive spiritual values might strengthen Japan’s 
cultural core, its development process, its scientific and technological growth, and its 
position in the international system. Yet despite the wise insights of Fukuzawa and others 
about the great things appropriate scientific “spirits” and values could give Japan, there 
were great pressures against importing Western religion into Japan. Japan’s leaders 
struggled to balance various extremes here, including transferring intangible cultural 
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values versus technical hardware, material and spiritual aspects of technology, values of 
hyper-Westernization and pro-Japanese nationalism. Perhaps the proper balance between 
all these extremes was never found before 1945. 
 Regarding the general policy impacts of leaders’ views of religion and 
spirituality from 1895 to 1945, the later in the period one examines, the greater was the 
role of spirituality in Japanese politics and nationalism. Since Hirohito was emperor, of 
course his views had a larger impact than Yanagita’s. The government’s choice of State 
Shinto as the state religion likely standardized local spirituality. For ODA policy, from 
this we learn that religion should be separate from the state, but the state cannot ignore 
consideration of the social effects of religion. As they affect policy, they inevitably affect 
aid, especially in highly religious societies. Spirituality and nationalism both mixed in the 
worldviews of Hirohito and Yanagita. Hirohito supported ideologies such as State Shinto 
and hakkô ichiu in reaction to foreign influences threatening Japan. The government used 
spiritual values in education, such as State Shinto, to increase citizen support for 
militarism. LDCs should learn from Japan’s negative example here. While there were 
seemingly not many conflicts in the worldviews of Hirohito and Yanagita between 
spirituality and the material, they seem slightly stronger in Hirohito’s case.1791 The 
worldviews of LDC aid recipients, their leaders and other relevant actors, including their 
views of spiritual and material phenomena, will affect how the LDC receives a 
technology or development intervention, and it succeeds. Knowledge of these issues by 
aid donors should help an ODA program or policy succeed. 
                                                
1791 Here I am referring to the conflict between Hirohito’s scientific rationality and his personal spiritual 
ritual/practice concerning his policy actions. 
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 From 1868 to 1945, Japan was happy to use spirituality to support nationalism 
and national goals, including control of all religious groups in the 1930s and 1940s. State 
policy (from 1895-1945) to use religion as needed resembles popular Japanese 
spirituality: a willingness to use religion for whatever practical needs one has. It may 
seem crass, but ODA policy should be willing to do the same—to call on religion 
whenever it can help development, and is willing. 
 What about the possible later policy impacts of these worldviews on religion 
and spirituality, related to science and development, on later ODA policies? In the period 
1850 to 1895, both the European ideal of integrated church and state and the Flaw of the 
Excluded Middle seem somewhat present in the worldviews of domestic state and 
market. Given the Meiji state’s choice of State Shinto as the national spiritual practice 
and development ideology, it does not seem that this was a secularizing force. Daily 
spiritual practice continued, though regional forms may have been squelched. Since 
ground-level spirituality continued underneath Meiji State Shinto, such a practice may 
underlie today’s ODA policy, too. What do Japan’s leaders do, not just say? Consider 
what most recent Japanese prime ministers and other top leaders have done at Yasukuni 
Shrine.1792 The presence of spirituality in daily practice is likely present in their lives, but 
must be confirmed ethnographically. What would this mean for ODA policy today? It 
would mean that there are spiritual influences, at some level, in their ODA policy actions, 
however subtle. 
                                                
1792 Most recent Japanese prime ministers have gone on a regular basis to worship at Yasukuni Shrine, to 
the great consternation of other East Asian nations such as China and South Korea.  
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 In this era, there were also many pressures in Japan against considering the 
contributions of religion and spirituality for development, and against using Christianity 
for this purpose. There was great pressure to overemphasize the material and de-
emphasize the spiritual in policies. Does the Constitution of 1947 bring similar pressure 
to today’s ODA in Japan? Are there “secularizing” forces today attempting to pressure 
policymakers from considering “spiritual” features in today’s aid? If so, how? 
 From 1850 to 1895, it seems Japan leaned more toward the material side, while 
choosing State Shinto as the national ideology for development, but from 1895 to 1945, it 
became more “spiritual” in its leanings, I would argue. Today, I suggest that Japan is 
more “material” in its approaches to ODA, but that it needs to become more 
knowledgeable of the “spiritual,” given the rise of Islam, global terrorism, and so forth. 
There are some signs it may do so. Attitudes similar to the practical attitudes of several 
leaders here toward spirituality, development, technology and knowledge1793 are also 
seen in Japan’s contemporary aid, i.e. the emphases on self-help and self-reliance in 
recipients. These attitudes evolved in ways that are connected over time, and which relate 
to what Japan aid is today and will ultimately become. Though the leaders of 1895 to 
1945 were not necessarily afraid to marshal spirituality in support of the state’s material 
goals, today Japan’s constitution prohibits such a practice. The Japanese state does not 
routinely intervene in religious affairs unless there is a pressing policy reason to do so 
(i.e. terrorism). It is time to bring consideration of religion and spirituality into Japan’s 
aid, for many of the reasons recognized by more international relations scholars today in 
                                                
1793 Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato. 
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the West. To not do so ignores a significant piece of the puzzle of international relations 
and development. 
 Hirata Keiko offers additional, valuable insights concerning the relevance of 
cultural, historical and spiritual values in Japan for today’s Japanese ODA policies.1794 
The first set of insights concerns NGOs in Japan and how they relate to the Japanese 
government and the ODA system.1795 Though Japan’s ODA community is younger and 
less well funded than NGOs in the West, its connections with the global NGO 
community are helping to bring an expansion of Japan’s civil society. The Internet has 
enabled a huge increase in transnational communication and networking between NGOs 
in different countries, and enabled NGO staff to increase their knowledge and skill levels 
about global and development issues. Both of these factors have combined to create 
attitudes among NGO activists that are less deferential to authority (a Confucian-based 
norm, strongly encouraged in Japan’s developmental state era), and more willing to 
question or protest against corruption or abuse.1796 Globalization has also brought more 
knowledge to Japanese society and to NGOs. It has empowered both citizens and NGOs 
so they do not have to be as easily deceived by state propaganda. They are more willing 
to organize themselves collectively and demand accountability from the government and 
its ODA.1797 
 Additional insights are seen in how NGOs cooperate with the Japanese 
government in current ODA policy. Despite the noble goals of NGOs to increase their 
                                                
1794 Ibid. 
1795 For a complete overview of the nature of NGOs in Japan and their relationship to Japan’s civil society, 
the government, and ODA, see Hirata, Civil Society. 
1796 Ibid., 62-63. 
1797 Ibid., 73. 
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cooperation with the Japanese government in ODA, these NGOs, including religious 
ones, often struggle with the increased bureaucratic and financial accounting 
requirements associated with seeking more cooperation with MOFA, to the point where 
even some of the NGOs’ own goals are hampered. According to Hirata, these 
partnerships can nevertheless be beneficial, but must be carefully managed by both sides. 
NGOs tend to support grassroots development efforts, and the global aid agenda goal of 
poverty reduction, more than MOFA does. MOFA supports the use of aid for Japan’s 
kokueki (its national and diplomatic interests, i.e. its security and economic needs and 
status in the international community).1798 
 Second, Hirata also offers insights on the issue of religion and spirituality in 
Japanese ODA in her examination of NGOs, both secular and religious, and how they 
relate to aid. According to Larry Diamond, religious, ethnic and communal groups that 
promote collective rights, values, faith, and beliefs are legitimate NGOs, while religious 
or racist hate groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, are not.1799 Virtually all NGOs are non- 
religious, with only a few exceptions.1800 There are a limited number of Buddhist or 
Christian groups. Of these, virtually none do proselytizing along with their charitable 
work in Japan, so these NGOs have a very high reputation.1801 According to Hirata, 
historically, Japan has no deep Christian tradition, and little regarding volunteerism or 
                                                
1798 Ibid., 158. In the post-Cold War era, the increasing priority of LLDCs in Japan’s ODA, especially to 
Africa and Indochina, is also of great political and economic importance, strategically, to Japan (Ibid., 174-
175). However, an increased Japanese spirit of generosity, likely resulting from Japan’s rising postmaterial 
values, is also significant. 
1799 Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 
5, no. 3 (1994), 4, quoted in Hirata, Civil Society, 10-11. 
1800 Of the twenty development-related NGOs in Japan with the largest budgets in 1996, only five were 
clearly religious in affiliation (according to their names). Of these, one was Buddhist, and the rest were 
Christian in orientation (Ibid., 41).  
1801 Ibid., 39. 
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charity. Before World War II, many NGOs in Japan were Christian-affiliated. Various 
Christian groups from abroad entered Japan after the war to assist with rebuilding the 
country, and many remained after the American occupation ended. The largest Christian-
related NGO that does development work, World Vision Japan, was established in 
1987.1802 
 Third, Hirata offers additional valuable insights about how historical cultural 
values relate to contemporary Japanese aid policy. Historically, Confucian ideological 
influence in Japanese society has encouraged three primary cultural values: “… 1) respect 
for hierarchy and authority, 2) emphasis on conformity to group interests rather than 
individual needs, and 3) emphasis on order and stability.” These values have encouraged 
citizen deference to state authority, and helped the state to subordinate Japan’s civil 
society when it has desired, as in the national goals for economic development that were 
pursued in late twentieth century Japan.1803 Today more Japanese are less willing to 
subscribe to Confucian values of sacrifice, hierarchical deference to authority, and 
conformity, but prefer independence and freedom.1804 Therefore they are more willing to 
participate in volunteer activities with NGOs. A significant non-Confucian value, the 
uchi-soto (inside-outside) tradition, relates to the group-oriented nature of Japanese 
society.1805 People usually see a great difference between those who are within their 
group, and those who are not. This has encouraged them to only give charity to those who 
are in their family or neighborhood, and not to support those who are outsiders. This was 
                                                
1802 Ibid., 25, 30-31, 33. 
1803 Ibid., 23-24. 
1804 Ibid., 28. 
1805 This was briefly mentioned earlier in the present chapter.  
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also encouraged by the values of filial piety and ie (Confucian family-like connections) 
influential from 1868 to 1945. Japan’s developmental state discouraged citizens from 
exercising civil activism, and their dependence on the state.1806 
 Fourth, Hirata briefly explores the influence of contemporary cultural and 
spiritual values on Japanese aid. With modern Japan’s affluence, “catching up with the 
West” is no longer one of the national goals. Young Japanese have begun looking for 
more meaning in life, even from spiritual and religious sources. Hirata argues that the 
postmaterial values that political scientist Ronald Inglehart identified in Western societies 
are also developing in Japan.1807 While older Japanese were willing to sacrifice, work 
hard and save, young Japanese value “social equality, self-expression, personal freedom 
and the quality of life.” Hirata calls this the “crumbling” of developmentalism and the 
developmental state. This makes Japanese more willing to volunteer or explore 
religion.1808 
 Hirata argues perceptively that many Japanese have undergone a spiritual crisis 
since the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Several 
of the development ideologies that drove Japan since the Meiji era, including the goals of 
catching up with the West, achieving a higher GNP, called “GNPism,” and rapid 
                                                
1806 Ibid., 25. 
1807 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1990) and Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and 
Political Change in 43 Countries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), quoted in Hirata, Civil 
Society, 28-29, 94, 95. 
1808 Ibid., 28-29. In Japan’s economic recession of the 1990s and 2000s, the strong alliance between 
Japanese business and government has weakened. People are looking for more meaning and fulfillment 
beyond sacrifice and single-minded commitment to Japan’s ideology of national development. People want 
to find meaning and personal happiness beyond corporate Japan, so they are more willing to participate in 
NGOs and volunteerism (Ibid., 74). 
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economic development, no longer hold sway.1809 The state ideology of “GNPism” 
generated a postwar corporate culture in Japan that encouraged the ultimate of samurai-
like devotion, creating such terms and phenomena as karôshi (death from overwork), 
môretsu shain (fierce company employees), kigyô senshi (the enterprise warrior), kaisha-
shijô-shugi (company-firstism), and chichioya-fuzai (children growing up “with father 
absent”). As Japan has become more affluent, younger Japanese have been less willing to 
make such sacrifices of their health and families. The economic recession has not allowed 
material concerns to disappear, but economic issues no longer consume most people’s 
lives as in the late twentieth century. Fewer people are willing to sacrifice their lives for 
authoritarian developmentalism.1810 
 The “spiritual crisis” generated by Japan’s economic recession in the 1990s and 
early 2000s has had two principle social effects. First, “traditional” norms in Japanese 
society have been weakened, including the weakening of patriarchal families and 
closeknit neighborhood and community connections, bringing unprecedented social 
problems. New problems include increasing youth violence, rebellion, juvenile 
delinquency, and with a minority of people, destructive spiritual cults such as Aum 
Shinrikyo.1811 Effects on youth are largely the result of their maturing in a materially 
affluent society that has generally lacked a solid moral or spiritual mooring. Second, as 
Japan has achieved its affluence, many more Japanese are looking to new postmaterial 
                                                
1809 “Catching up with the West” and “GNPism” are discussed in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan at the 
Crossroads: Asia Pacific Issues Analysis (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1999), 3; and Curtis, The Logic of 
Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999).  
1810 Hirata, Civil Society, 91-93. 




values beyond economic survival, including democracy, freedom, and life significance, 
and willing to give themselves to serving others in citizen volunteering. Many young and 
even older Japanese are embracing these values, and more willing to engage in citizen 
and grassroots activism, including helping people in other countries, or traveling and 
serving abroad. As the sacrificial values encouraged by Confucian ethics have weakened, 
fewer Japanese are willing to submit their personal well-being to the goals of the 
developmental state.1812 
 Hirata concludes that the onset of postmaterial values in Japan and increasing 
globalization, since Japan’s economic recession in the 1990s and 2000s, has contributed 
to the rise of several new values in Japan. More Japanese see themselves as chikyûjin 
(global persons), concerned for the welfare of people around the world, able to transcend 
the past limits of uchi-soto (inside-outside) mentality. Fewer people trust the 
effectiveness and ethics of Japan’s developmental state. Hirata argues that all of this has 
weakened the state, increased space in civil society for citizen activism, even on a global 
scale, and political pluralism in Japanese politics.1813 There has been a postmodern crisis 
of spiritual and material values. Once Japan achieved its goals of economic development 
and affluence on a par with the West, many Japanese realized that they had little life 
outside of corporations and work; “…they lacked meaning in their lives.” Japanese now 
demand more freedoms and are no longer willing for Japan to be dominated by the iron 
alliance of state and business. With continuing political and business scandals, and 
                                                
1812 Ibid., 93-95. 
1813 Ibid., 154-155. 
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For the first research question,1815 I argued that much of what Japan’s aid is today 
is based on Japan’s negative prewar experiences, a few positive, because of the great 
destruction Japan and East Asia experienced in World War II, the desire not to repeat past 
mistakes, and postwar policies imposed by the American occupation. Yet Japan has had 
much choice in how its postwar system has been implemented. In Japan’s own choices, 
of course, cultural and historical influences from the prewar period remain. 
 In the sociocultural area, I explored how Japan’s government placed 
overwhelming priority on Japan’s need to survive in the hostile international system. This 
need was driven by politics and economics, not by society and culture. As a result, the 
state continually placed top priority on political and economic issues, not social ones, 
despite wise observations by leaders like Fukuzawa and Yanagita who wrestled with the 
social meanings of Japan’s interactions with the West, and preserving the essence of what 
Japan was. The leaders studied struggled with significant social issues: how Japan could 
develop without culturally imploding, and the role of intangible values and spirituality in 
development and technology transfer. Sadly, in the prewar period, the state’s adaptation 
                                                
1814 Hirata also argues that although Asian countries like Malaysia and its former Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad have widely praised and emulated the Japanese development model and the developmental state, 
the current weaknesses in Japan’s economic and political system should raise doubts about aspects of the 
developmental state concept for other Asian nations. Rather, Hirata concludes that LDCs need “…another 
model, one that promotes short-term economic growth while also nurturing the conditions for sustainable 
economic, social and human development” (Hirata, Civil Society, 162-163). 
1815 This concerns the influence of Japan’s experiences and leaders’ views of technology, development and 
foreign relations on Japan’s contemporary ODA. 
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of State Shinto as a coercive development ideology contributed to the destruction of 
Japan and East Asia in World War II. These experiences offer rich lessons for LDCs on 
development, aid, and spirituality. 
 In comparing ideas in current Japanese aid policy with possible sources, there is 
much continuity between the prewar and postwar periods. Many ideas are based on 
Japan’s development experience. The experiences of Japan and other East Asian nations 
are distinct from the experiences of many Western nations. This may be a source of 
tensions between the Japanese and global aid agendas. A related theme is Japan’s 
continuing sense of international image. Despite how Japan has used aid to help its 
image, and massive aid budget increases through the late 1990s, aid has not met these 
expectations.  
 If Japan had had a stronger civil society and religious institutions in the prewar 
period, there may have been some checks on the destructive policies of the prewar 
political system. Since civil society was weak, much damage occurred. Tension between 
oligarchic rule and democratic desires was a main theme in prewar Japanese politics. In 
the prewar system, the oligarchs won. The wartime destruction of the prewar political 
system enabled the development of postwar democracy that now guides Japan’s aid. Now 
the aid bureaucracy must be accountable to public demands. On democratic 
accountability, Japan’s postwar political system is totally different from the prewar one. 
Japan’s weak prewar civil society enabled the state to manipulate State Shinto as a 
nationalistic ideology, to the nation’s peril. Although Japan’s contemporary culture of 
politics is more liberal than the prewar system’s, it is still heavily conservative. Yet the 
character of the recent institutional reforms of its ODA system can be called quite 
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progressive, in terms of various administrative moves, including the creation of the 
“new” JICA agency in October 2008, under the leadership of Ogata Sadako. These 
reforms have resulted from both internal and external pressures. Japan’s small NGO 
community and the public also exercise increasing influence over Japan’s aid.   
 Strategic and foreign policy interests are important in contemporary Japanese 
aid, and were also in Japan’s prewar politics. Some of the key features of that system 
were its authoritarian nature, political and ideological conservatism, the strong nature of 
the state, the powerful influence of the military in politics and government (especially 
from 1895 to 1945), and the overarching goal of the state to assure Japan’s survival. A 
major theme in Japan’s prewar politics was national survival. Though Japan is much 
stronger and more stable today, national survival remains an important undercurrent in 
the national psyche. It is no surprise that even postwar aid has always been strongly 
connected to Japan’s political and economic kokueki (national interests).  
 In the prewar system, ultimately its economic policies were more successful 
than its political ones. I found that Japan’s economic system and economic development 
experience has many wise lessons for LDCs, including how to borrow foreign economic 
knowledge and mix it with indigenous ideologies. Other lessons include the importance 
of hard work, education, a strong state, and how to learn and improve valuable economic 
knowledge from foreign powers. Early in its development, Japan had a strong state, 
which purposely took a strong role in national development and trade. Limiting an LDC’s 
openness to international trade near the beginning of its development, until different 
sectors and industries are mature enough to face international competition, is one of the 
most important lessons. Trade was imperative for Japan’s growth, and likely is for other 
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LDCs. Japan’s growth in the prewar system was heavily imbalanced toward large 
industries and urban areas. Postwar Japan continues to pay the price of congestion and 
other problems because of these mistakes. As Yanagita wisely argued, more balanced, 
cross-regional development is needed.  
Japan, as the first non-Western nation to develop economically, offers valuable 
insights for other non-Western nations, though most Western aid and development 
experts fail to recognize it. The challenge is to apply these lessons wisely in different 
regional environments and cultural conditions. Although many Western aid experts seem 
to have trouble believing that this can be done, Asian nations do not. This crucial issue 
deserves much more attention by the global aid and development communities. It should 
be possible to transfer, on some level, elements of what Japanese has done, to the 
development experiences of other developing nations today. As mentioned earlier, this 
must usually be done on an institutional level; it cannot be done on a cultural level.1816 It 
must also be done very carefully, following the ideas of translative adaptation. Lessons 
from any foreign development model or experience, including Japan’s, must be carefully 
applied and offered according to the unique conditions of each recipient nation. Each 
LDC’s own people are the best experts in helping an aid donor to offer effective aid that 
matches their nation’s actual needs and conditions.1817 Local peoples and experts, perhaps 
                                                
1816 Johnson, MITI and Evans, Embedded. A similar argument is made in Haider A. Khan, “Aid and 
Development: What Can Africa Learn from the Macroeconomics of Foreign Aid in Some Southeast Asian 
Economies?” in Asia and Africa in the Global Economy, eds. Ernest Aryeetey, Julius Court, Machiko 
Nissanke and Beatrice Weder, (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2003, 346-368). Khan 
argues that the effective application of institutional and policy inducements to support the best use of aid 
possible, such as has occurred in three Southeast Asian nations, will go a long way in promoting successful 
development and aid to Africa. 




aided by applied social scientists who know how to effectively listen and facilitate, seem 
the most capable of determining the local particularisms of applying Japanese or other 
foreign development and aid models to their local situations. 
 There were strong currents of evolutionistic thought in many of the prewar 
worldviews we have studied. Evolutionistic thought was influential at various levels in 
most of the leaders’ thought on social, political and economic issues, and is present in 
many assumptions of technological progress and notions of “development” that remain 
influential in the postmodern world, including in foreign aid. Such thought was partly 
used to justify imperialism and aggression by the West against non-Western nations, and 
by Japan against its temporarily weaker neighbors. These values often run counter to 
much less influential religious and ethical thought in Japan’s development and aid 
programs. The influence of evolutionism in current views of aid remains, though it is less 
overt and less racist than in the prewar period. Some degree of ethnocentrism, based 
partly on evolutionistic thought, continues in Japan’s aid. But overall, Japan now 
manifests a much healthier desire in seeking to help LDCs at multiple levels. Over the 
long-term, a science-based type of morality, such as desired by various Meiji leaders 
including Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato, emerged in Japan, albeit in modified form. The 
influence of evolutionism on various aspects of Japanese leaders’ thought is also seen 
here. One hopes that it is less racist than past Japanese thought was.    
 One of the most profound insights emerging from Japan’s development 
experience is the concept of translative adaptation, that each nation’s development plans 
must match its actual, unique conditions. It seems so simple and obvious. 
“Modernization” and internationalization are similar. It seems logical that such insights 
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would emerge from Japan’s rather unique development experience.1818 Translative 
adaptation offers many significant lessons for LDCs, so it is unfortunate that it has not 
been more carefully or systematically applied in Japan’s ODA policies to date. 
 I conclude that my working hypothesis is basically true. Japan’s experience with 
technology, development and foreign relations, seen in the beliefs of several important 
leaders, has affected its current aid policies, despite the fact that linkages between 
historical experiences and ideas usually seem indirect. Rather they are evidenced through 
the gradual evolution of several different streams of thought over time. Of the seven 
leaders I studied, I concluded that the ideas of Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, and Hirohito 
seem to be the most influential on the thought in current ODA policy. These leaders each 
exercised different, important influences over Japanese society and politics, domestically 
and internationally, that affected the postwar environments in which Japanese ODA 
emerged and in which it continues to function. Based on Japan’s positive and negative 
development experiences from 1850 to 1945, there are also many valuable applications in 
politics, economics, and culture for LDCs.1819 Japan’s experiences, even on this general 
level, offer many valuable insights for LDCs.   
 On the second key question of the research, whether the ideas of 
“modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation present an accurate 
picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1945, I 
concluded that in all three cases, they do. On “modernization,” although Japan adopted 
numerous forms of Western culture and technology, and encountered tumultuous social 
                                                
1818 Japan’s development experience is unique compared to the West’s, but not unique compared to the 
experiences of other East Asian nations. 
1819 See my discussion earlier in this chapter.  
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change on many levels, the true core of its identity and most basic social structures did 
not fundamentally change. Japan’s imperialism in East Asia well represents the concept 
of internationalization, since Japan actively conquered, absorbed, exploited and brought 
other Asian nations into its economic and cultural universe, as it was able. On translative 
adaptation, although imported technologies and ideologies greatly changed many surface 
(infrastructural and cultural) features in Japan, they did not fundamentally alter the 
deepest parts of Japan’s core culture, including its social organization, family structures, 
and core spiritual convictions. How do these concepts apply to Japan’s aid? Barring in-
depth ethnographic research, at present, “modernization,” internationalization, and 
translative adaptation all can be used to better understand the conditions of various 
recipients of Japanese aid.  
 On the third research question, the effects of spirituality on Japan’s 
contemporary aid policies, I argued that religion and spirituality, important components 
of worldview, have likely played an important though indirect role in shaping Japan’s 
ODA. But the question is how. Religion provides valuable lessons for today’s aid 
policies, but in Japan’s case, many of its applications flow from negative experiences in 
the prewar period. We find valuable lessons for LDCs in how Japanese leaders attempted 
to balance the “soft” (philosophical, spiritual) and “hard” (material) components of 
technology as they transferred many forms of foreign knowledge into Japan.  
 The Meiji state coercively mobilized a new spiritual ideology, State Shinto, to 
encourage support for nationalism and development in Japan. This indirectly encourages 
contemporary Japanese aid to steer clear of religion and spirituality, given Japan’s past 
interference in the affairs of other Asian states, partly by the Japanese government’s 
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imposition of State Shinto on them and on Japan. The danger here for Japan and today’s 
LDCs is mixing religion and state too closely for the purpose of development. Second, 
Japan’s government manipulated the education system with State Shinto and similar 
forms of nationalistic propaganda for state ends. This should be discouraged by ODA 
policies. Japan sought to import technologies believed to be useful for development, but 
discouraged the importation of ideologies believed to be harmful for Japanese culture, 
such as Christianity. But accepting certain desired technologies and filtering out 
accompanying cultural features is hard. LDCs should not resort to repression. In Japan’s 
case, an “indigenous” ideology, State Shinto, not a foreign religion, became the true tool 
of state repression and damage for the nation. LDCs should consider the dangers of 
foreign and indigenous extremist ideologies, whether secular or religious. This is an 
additional argument for promoting democracy, pluralism and freedom in aid and 
development policies, including freedom of religion. 
 An irony in Japan’s culture of spirituality is that while Japanese politics has 
discouraged mixing religion and state for centuries, most Japanese, including politicians, 
engage in spiritual practices on a regular or daily basis, even in public life.1820 Is this an 
interesting twist on the Flaw of the Excluded Middle? It is not. There is a difference in 
how the Japanese language defines religion and spirituality that I described in an earlier 
chapter. The Japanese state has long legally discouraged the manipulation of and 
involvement in politics by various religions (“shukyo,” sect-teachings such as different 
                                                
1820 Here I am referring to the periodic visits of national politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. Some 
prime ministers visit that shrine on an annual basis. While many Japanese pray at household Shinto shrines 
and/or Buddhist family altars on a daily basis, they visit public Shinto shrines or Buddhist temples on 
regular occasions too. Shinto shrines are typically visited on New Year’s Eve or New Year’s Day, 
December 31 and January 1. Thus the concept of “public” or “private” religion and spirituality seems rather 
murky in contemporary Japanese consciousness.   
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branches of Buddhism), but it did not formally proscribe the involvement of spirituality 
(seishin, spirit) or spiritual practices such as Shinto until after World War II. Politically, 
these were not viewed as “sect-teachings” until Japan’s postwar American occupiers 
forced that interpretation on the nation. Most Japanese still do not view Shinto as a 
“religion,” any more than most Americans view stopping at a Starbucks for coffee or 
putting up a Christmas tree as religion. Most Japanese see Shinto, the “way of the gods,” 
as it has been viewed in Japan for millennia, as a daily, regular ritual or custom of 
heartfelt gratitude to the kami, a natural part of everyday life. The prewar Japanese state 
refused to call State Shinto a religion.1821 It called it a patriotic (aikoku)1822 practice that 
Japanese should see as their natural duty of devotion and love for the nation. These 
examples reveal the diverse concepts of religion, spirituality and politics in different 
cultures, and how sensitively they must be handled in effective ODA and development 
policies.1823       
 Japan’s leaders struggled with deciding which spiritual ideology could best help 
motivate Japan for development. Because of perceived cultural conflicts, most chose 
Shinto over Christianity as the preferred aid.1824 States may use spirituality as a useful 
                                                
1821 The term for State Shinto is Kokka Shinto, which may be directly translated as “National Shinto” or 
“Shinto of the National House.” 
1822 The literal meaning of aikoku, a common word for patriotism, is “love the nation” (country). Today the 
term has a negative connotation of prewar propaganda and jingoism that it did not have before World War 
II.  
1823 Other examples of this spiritual complexity are seen in the research of Yanagita Kunio on Japanese 
spirituality that we explored earlier. Consider the “traditional” Japanese connections of spirituality with 
local identity, place, and kinship, very different from contemporary American views that often connect 
religion with beliefs or doctrine. Another example is the close non-Western connection of the spiritual 
realm with the material realm, as explained in the Flaw of the Excluded Middle concept (Hiebert, “Flaw of 
Excluded Middle,” and Anthropological Reflections).  
1824 The Meiji state also did not choose Buddhism as the preferred spiritual practice to motivate Japan’s 
development. In the Tokugawa period, Buddhism was often seen as a less indigenous source of tradition 
than Shinto (Buddhism originally entered Japan from overseas). This occurred as Tokugawa scholars 
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tool to promote cultural cohesion during development at either the national or local 
levels, but freedom of religion must be maintained. A few conflicts emerged in these 
leaders’ views of spirituality and science, especially over alleged conflicts between 
Japanese and Western cultures, but not really about spiritual and material aspects. To 
assess spiritual and religious issues in aid and development, aid workers need training in 
how to be sensitive to the spiritual (and secular) aspects of the worldviews of both aid 
donors and recipients. 
 From 1895 to 1945, the role of spirituality in Japan’s politics increased. The 
state drew more on State Shinto to promote nationalism, through education and other 
vehicles. The state’s willingness to use spirituality for its own purposes is similar to the 
pragmatic Japanese attitude of drawing on religion whenever it can help with practical 
needs. When the state chose State Shinto as the national spiritual practice, it likely had a 
somewhat homogenizing effect on local spirituality, as Yanagita feared, though daily 
spiritual practice remained alive throughout Japan. The same is likely true for Japan’s 
political actors, prewar and contemporary. Regardless of public statements about religion 
and spirituality, personal practices continue. The Flaw of the Excluded Middle does not 
seem to be in operation here. Likely the spiritual practices and convictions of even aid 
staff, at some level, play out in their views of aid and in their aid policymaking, though 
exactly how needs to be determined through ethnographic research. 
 On the relationship of religion and spirituality with Japan’s contemporary aid 
policies, we learned that in various respects, especially regarding “postmaterial” values, 
                                                                                                                                            
struggled to identify indigenous, genuine sources of tradition for the nation. Shinto was seen as such a 
tradition, while Buddhism was not.  
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Japanese are not so different from persons in other advanced nations. “Traditional” 
values, many from Confucianism, are being changed through the rise of new values that 
encourage people to seek freedom, purpose, and self-fulfillment. Many Japanese, 
especially the young, have lost their drive to achieve economic development at all costs. 
This has created a spiritual vacuum in increasing numbers of Japanese, making them 
more open to seeking personal meaning through human service or religion. Although 
Japan’s NGO community is small compared to those in most Western nations, it is a 
vibrant example of the expansion of Japan’s civil society, of how Japan is becoming 
more diverse, pluralistic, and how Japanese citizens are demanding greater public 
accountability on ODA and other issues. Increasing globalization and connections of 
these NGOs with their overseas counterparts have also strengthened their ability to 
pressure the government and its ODA programs, and provided further avenues for service 
and fulfillment for postmaterial Japanese.1825    
 Though there may be formal, legal or cultural pressures in Japan that discourage 
aid policymakers from considering spiritual factors in aid, they need to, given the rise in 
the importance of religion in international affairs since the 1990s, including terrorist 
attacks in Tokyo in 1995 and the 9-11 incident in New York in 2001. The question is how 
this can be practically done. Training development and aid workers and policymakers in 
practical research skills and approaches such as applied ethnography and holistic 
                                                
1825 A good example is a recent graduate of the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International 
Studies, Kimura Hiroshi. Before graduating, Kimura did a development-related internship in Bosnia with 
World Vision International. Returning to Japan, he served with both secular and religious NGOs in the 
Osaka area. Kimura now works as the international coordinator for a Tokyo area research institution.  
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anthropology is one way.1826 Like every major aid donor and advanced industrial nation, 
Japan needs to improve its consideration of the human, ground level factors and 
conditions that affect aid, diplomacy, security, and numerous other issues in international 
affairs. Let us hope that various efforts underway, both in Japan and globally, including 
new graduate programs in international development, organizational reforms and research 
improvements in aid agencies such as the “new” JICA, and cross-disciplinary efforts to 
bridge the social sciences in training for international affairs can help encourage this. 
                                                
1826 Yanagita Kunio’s ethnographic research of Japanese religious life and the resulting policy implications 
is one concrete example. Aid workers need training in practical, rapid ethnographic methods so that they 
can do this in overseas development research. Possible examples of such training include W. Penn 
Handwerker, Quick Ethnography (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2001); and James Beebe, Rapid 
Assessment Process: An Introduction (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2001). On a general level, 
giving aid policymakers and decision-makers basic training in applied cultural anthropology, which is 















 Chapter 10 explores this study’s possible policy implications for domestic and 
international issues.1827 I will often discuss worldview policy implications for both 
historical time periods studied1828 consecutively, though sometimes they will be 
considered together. Next, I will briefly examine possible future trends for Japan’s ODA 
policy. Finally, the chapter considers policy applications from this project for the social 
sciences (applied anthropology, political science and international studies) and 
development policy. What has Japan’s ODA accomplished in practice? Koppel and Orr 
argue that while the amount of actual ODA may seem “small” compared with value of 
private sector flows flowing from Japan, ODA is the main instrument through which 
postwar Japanese foreign policy has developed the capacity, via bilateral and multilateral 
channels, to broaden its goals and activities beyond mere trade and economic issues.1829 
In the conclusion, among several key insights, I stress the importance of applying 
improved social research methods to the Japanese aid system, and the urgency for the 
                                                
1827 Note that these policy implications and lessons are largely conjectural, offered from my own reflection 
on these issues.  
1828 The time periods studied are 1850 to 1895 and 1895 to 1945. 
1829 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 365. 
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Western-controlled, global aid system to acknowledge and better understand the 
significance of the East Asian development experience, in general and for other regions. 
 
Worldview Policy Implications for Domestic Issues 
 
 
Policy Implications of Technological Development Worldviews 
 
 For the time period 1850 to 1895, Fukuzawa Yukichi helped other Japanese to 
absorb knowledge about Western science, technology, and culture through his university, 
writings, and business ventures.  Fukuzawa, along with Mori Arinori, was one of the 
leaders of the bunmei kaika movement, which stressed the need for Japan’s pragmatic, 
liberal adaptation of Western science and knowledge. Mori Arinori later went to 
Washington as Japan’s first diplomat in the U.S. from 1871-1873 to prepare for the 
Iwakura mission, a high level delegation of Japanese officials and students sent to study 
U.S. and European “intellectual technologies” in science, business, education and 
government. It soon had a big influence on Japan’s industrialization.1830 In the early 
1870s, during his service in public works, Ito Hirobumi helped initiate various 
infrastructural improvements.1831 As a major political and military leader in Meiji and 
Taisho Japan, Yamagata Aritomo used certain “traditional” ideologies and values, 
coupled with Western ideas and institutions, to reform and strengthen Japan. He was 
particularly influential in contributing to reforms in the military, local government, 
                                                
1830 Van Sant, Mori Ariniori, xviii, xx-xxi, xxv. 
1831 Hamada, Prince Ito, 62-63. These improvements included Japan’s first railway and additional lines, 
telegraph lines, docks, lighthouses, mining, postal, and printing systems (Ibid.). 
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constitutional politics, and in Japan’s international relations,1832 including Japan’s 
adoption of the most advanced military technologies then available. 
 In the process of modernizing to repel Western invasion, Japan imported 
numerous forms of Western culture, science, politics, and technology. The government, 
suspicious of Western influence, attempted to limit it almost exclusively to the areas of 
science and technology, to maintain the distinctiveness of Japanese culture. Along with 
these goals, the government and some intellectuals sought a “scientific” theory that could 
allow rapid modernization and social change.  Social Darwinism met that need.  Kato 
Hiroyuki was one of the chief intellectuals who helped to develop and apply the theory 
for that aim.1833   
 The five leaders examined during 1850-1895 vary in their direct involvement in 
policymaking and in how their views of science and technological development affected 
policy.  Four of the five leaders served as policymakers during at least a part of their 
careers, in education, local government, the military, and foreign policy.  Only Fukuzawa 
never had direct policy involvement, though he worked briefly as a government 
translator. Concerning policy impacts for technological development, many of these 
leaders’ impacts were direct:  Mori on education, Ito on public works (in the 1870s), and 
Yamagata on Japan’s military and local governments.  Kato’s influence was broad, since 
he helped to apply Social Darwinism to Japan’s general context. Through that, the 
government hoped to limit Western impacts to mainly the science and technology sectors.  
The influence of Fukuzawa and Mori, members of the Meirokusha debate society, was 
                                                
1832 Dickinson, War and National, 40-42; Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 268-269. 
1833 Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 236-240. Yet as they received Darwin’s theory, many Japanese felt 
racially inferior to Caucasian Europeans (Ibid.).  
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also broad.  Fukuzawa had great impact on Japan’s perception of the West through his 
popular writings and work in education and business.  
 In the time period 1895 to 1945, early in his career, Yanagita Kunio had broad 
exposure to domestic and international policymaking, leading him to later study how 
interaction with Western technology and culture affected Japan’s core identity and 
culture, through the relatively new methodology of ethnography.1834 This was unlike 
many Meiji leaders, whose concern for Japan’s defense preceded their policy 
involvements.  Yanagita proposed many kinds of policy applications designed to preserve 
elements of Japanese “traditional” culture that he identified through his research across 
rural Japan.  But they seem to have had limited impact on actual government policies in 
Yanagita’s era.1835 The second major leader studied, Hirohito, was inspired by his love of 
science, by 1928, to establish two personal biological research facilities, and to pursue a 
scholarly scientific career as an avocation.1836 Both government propaganda (at times) 
and his personal worldview reconciled modern science with divine accounts of the 
national polity.1837 While Hirohito’s scientific bent was modulated by his obligations as 
emperor,1838 scientific rationality also influenced his significant policy actions 
                                                
1834 As noted above, early in his career, Yanagita served as a bureaucrat in several ministries, in the Diet 
(1914-1919), as a journalist for a major newspaper, and then as one of Japan’s delegates at the League of 
Nations in the early 1920s.  His use of ethnography began about 1930 (Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 1-3, 
81, 110-111). 
1835 While beyond the present study, it seems Yanagita’s policy impacts were greater in the postwar period, 
when the Japanese government began actual campaigns to preserve many unique aspects of Japan’s cultural 
heritage, and in the 1970s, when rural Japanese culture was widely promoted by the Japanese travel 
industry.  
1836 Hirohito became a naturalist and student of marine biology, collecting marine samples his whole life 
(Bix, Hirohito, 199-200). 
1837 Government propaganda connected with Hirohito’s enthronement celebrations in 1928 claimed that 
modern science and the kokutai (Japan’s national polity) were compatible (Ibid.).  
1838 Ibid., 60-62. 
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surrounding World War II. He was a shrewd, rational political actor, and yet his stubborn 
commitment to divine ideals nearly destroyed the nation.1839 
 While Yanagita was critically aware of the implications of Western technology 
and culture for Japan, and devoted much of his career to researching related phenomena, 
and offered policy applications, before 1945, their impact is questionable. Though 
Hirohito’s reflections on these issues were less overt, his policy implications were 
massive.  He experienced conflicts in his worldviews and policy actions based on his 
scientific rationality and his commitment to divine, imperialistic ideologies.  Both of 
these elements of his worldview influenced each other.  Given his position as the top 
political and military leader in the nation, his decisions and actions had huge effects on 
Japan.  His divine obligations nearly destroyed the nation, but his scientific-based 
rationality enabled both him and the throne to survive the turbulent politics of postwar 
Japan. On their views of technology and policy, Yanagita’s focus tended toward the 
domestic effects of technology on Japanese society (translative adaptation), while 
Hirohito’s approach leaned toward the threat of Western internationalization.  Yanagita’s 
policy applications were weaker than Hirohito’s. Given Yanagita’s concern with limiting 
the effects of Western technology on Japanese society, his views were more 
anthropological than Hirohito’s. Hirohito’s wartime militaristic technology policies were 
unsustainable.  The use of destructive Western technologies, including the atomic bomb, 
nearly destroyed Japan.1840 While pragmatic concerns and tones of scientific rationality 
                                                
1839 The influence of elements of Japanese religious tradition and the emperor ideology clearly also had a 
great influence on Hirohito’s actions, and are better known.     
1840 The effects of this destruction continued after World War II, in the number of people wounded by the 
atomic bombs who finally died, the utter devastation of the Japanese economy at the war’s end, and the 
widespread suffering, poverty, and starvation of many Japanese in the early postwar period.  For more 
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guided many of Hirohito’s policy responses to war with the United States, the conflict 
between his religious and scientific worldviews, and his spiritual duties as high priest of 
the nation, prolonged the war and contributed to Japan’s near destruction.1841    
Policy Implications of Domestic State Worldviews 
 
 Examining the period 1850 to 1895, Fukuzawa’s comments on politics were 
extensive.1842  He stayed largely independent of direct political involvement. His popular 
writings had a broad, indirect impact on Japanese politics and public opinion. But his 
belief in liberal political values, supported by the bunmei kaika movement, likely 
increased their appeal in society. Ito’s policy impacts were also broad and more direct 
than Fukuzawa’s. Ito had extensive involvement in domestic Japanese politics, and many 
impacts upon them.1843 He affected areas of politics that broadly influenced people’s 
daily lives, not specific policy issues so much.1844 He also researched Western political 
systems, their implications for Japan, and was the major author of Japan’s first 
constitution. Mori Arinori was a broad thinker, heavily involved in national policy. He 
thought and wrote about the nature of politics, Western politics, and their applications for 
Japan.1845 Yet his life was cut short.  Ultimately his major policy impact, only short-term, 
was on national education policy, examined below. Yamagata Aritomo stressed national 
                                                                                                                                            
details on this situation, see Dower, Embracing Defeat.  In the postwar period, Japanese technology 
policies enabled the restoration of the national economy.  Perhaps technology ultimately became Japan’s 
“salvation” for the rebuilding of the country, largely through the exports of improved technology to the 
market of the United States, the Western nation that used technology to both open Japan in 1853 
(Commodore Perry’s “black ships”), and then nearly destroy it at the end of World War II.    
1841 This point is explored further below in my discussion of the policy applications of Hirohito’s views of 
Japan’s external political relations. 
1842 His comments included foreign political systems, and how they applied to Japan. 
1843 Ito offered reforms for the legal system, the national government’s authority and structure, and 
democratic political participation, gradually somewhat warming to the idea. 
1844 The former included legal and constitutional areas (human rights and rights for political participation). 
1845 Mori supported limited public political involvement in Japan, evolutionary principles on political 
development, and a rather powerful central government, somewhat limited in authority. 
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unity as the nation’s first political goal, and accompanying military and political reforms.  
He judged Japan’s national survival, in the face of huge external threats, as the supreme 
task for Japan’s leaders.  He also introduced several important reforms for Japan’s 
domestic politics.1846 Ultimately, he did not hesitate to get involved in policy, fighting 
strongly for what seemed best for Japan. Yamagata had some of the most assertive policy 
involvements of the five leaders.  While his impacts on Japan’s domestic politics are not 
insignificant, they were eclipsed by his actions affecting Japan’s external relations. Kato 
Hiroyuki served in several national ministries and as the president of Tokyo Imperial 
University.1847  Relevant to this study, his most significant impact stemmed from his 
mature political thought in writings such as Jinken Shinsetsu, which, in the 1880s, gave 
the Japanese government an intellectual, “scientific” justification for its extensive reform 
programs for Japan’s domestic affairs.  Kato applied Social Darwinism to support official 
arguments against popular democratic movements.1848 He provided mainly intellectual 
arguments in support of the national state’s reform policies.          
 How did the interaction of each leader’s domestic political worldview with the 
surrounding environment affect each one’s policy judgments, actions, and outcomes?  
The environment of all five leaders was at first rather closed, because of national 
isolation.  To Fukuzawa, the forbidden West seemed the source of true power and 
                                                
1846 Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 243, 268-269; Dickinson, War and National, 40-42. Yamagata’s impacts on 
domestic politics included major reforms and innovations in local government, the military and 
constitutional politics (Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 243, 268-269; Dickinson, War and National,  40-42).  In 
domestic politics, he strongly supported strengthening the central government’s authority over local affairs 
to support national unity. 
1847 Davis argues that his greatest concrete policy impact, as a public servant, was in the national Ministry 
of Education (Davis, Moral and Political, 12). 
1848 For a time, Kato’s thought was fairly influential, until he was eclipsed by more appealing writers. 
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practical wisdom.1849  This, plus his observances in journeys to the West, led him to favor 
Western-oriented solutions in his policy reflections.  The Tokugawa period was a 
conservative age.  Fukuzawa, Ito, and Mori sensed the corruption of the Tokugawa 
regime.  Ito supported imperial restoration.  The outlook of the Meiji government was 
conservative, despite rapid reforms.  At first Ito was wary of Western influence, but soon 
recognized the West’s power, and that Japan must reform quickly.  The conservative 
environment, domestically and internationally, encouraged Ito’s conservative policy 
responses, as he modeled the Meiji constitution on the conservative Prussian model, and 
sought to limit popular political participation.  Mori’s journeys to the West and training 
in Western science and technology powerfully exposed him to the dynamism of Western 
knowledge, and led him to advocate strongly for Western-oriented reforms, at first, 
radical ones.  Gradual policy experience tempered this, later leading him to offer more 
conservative, pragmatic policy responses. Similar to Mori, at first Kato preferred more 
liberal, Western-oriented policies.  But in a few years, he underwent a conservative 
transformation, and developed conservative yet evolutionary based arguments for the 
Meiji government’s policies.  Like Ito, he adapted Western models of thought as 
conservative policy responses.  Yamagata responded to the hostile external policy 
environment pragmatically, by seeking to use the West’s knowledge and technology 
against it, to build and unify Japan so it could resist Western imperialism.  While perhaps 
radical in terms of the pace of change and the degree of state intervention, ideologically, 
                                                
1849 Remember that both Fukuzawa and Mori received early exposure to Western knowledge due to their 
upbringing in southwestern Japan, the region most open to Western influence during the Tokugawa period.  
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the outcome of these worldviews and policies on the domestic state was generally 
conservative.  
 In the time period 1895 to 1945, Emperor Hirohito emerged as Japan’s single 
most influential leader. Yanagita’s views of domestic politics (briefly explored in Chapter 
7) stressed the need for strong local, grassroots political involvement and democracy. But 
they had little impact on how domestic Japanese politics unfolded through 1945. On the 
other hand, Hirohito’s views about domestic politics, his own policy actions, inactions, 
and decisions, and how the government chose to represent him to the nation (his public 
images) all deeply affected Japan’s domestic politics. Long before he became emperor, 
the state engaged in careful image management on his behalf.1850 As emperor, he used 
divine myths to justify his actions and to strengthen his political position.  At times, he 
utilized religion as a tool of power.1851 One important example of the state’s image 
management of the emperor occurred in Hirohito’s enthronement. In 1928, the 
government spent huge sums for the event, reviving emperor ideology.1852 Enthronement 
                                                
1850 For example, in the Meiji era, Japanese citizens were taught that they must work hard, and give full 
allegiance to the emperor (Bix, Hirohito). From 1918 to the early 1920s, public indifference to the throne 
increased, and the status of monarchies declined abroad. Examples of this included the collapse of 
dynasties in Russia, Germany, Austria, and elsewhere, and pressures from the United States to spread 
democratic ideals abroad through the League of Nations and other institutions. As regent, Hirohito 
completed a tour of European countries (1921) to strengthen the public image of the throne. The public saw 
a vigorous crown prince, meeting with leaders in Europe. When Hirohito became regent in 1921, the press 
portrayed him as an energetic prince on military maneuvers and meeting with foreign dignitaries. To 
strengthen his image, aides urged him to study and work harder. Aides urged Hirohito to do this since they 
were concerned about his ability to perform. The government experimented with bringing the throne a bit 
closer to the people by allowing his photo in newspapers. Hirohito privately expressed his doubts about the 
divinity of emperors, but finally followed the official ideology in his future rule (Ibid., 84, 110, 112-114, 
119-122, 127-128, 135-136). 
1851 Bix, Hirohito discusses these issues at some length.  
1852 Ibid., 186-191. The rituals and intense media coverage of the Enthronement showed Japan as divine, 
and Hirohito as closely connected with his subjects.  In the climax, events across Japan and its colonies 
reinvigorated people’s support for the emperor and the state (Ibid.).  In the events, Hirohito was “deified,” 
united with the sun goddess, and watched massive military displays, uniting his images as the national 
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activities greatly influenced Japan’s political culture, strengthening the indoctrination of 
leaders and the people into the national morality, the fusion of religion with politics and 
the end of Taisho democracy.  The enthronement helped close Japan to Western 
influence, strengthened the expansionary slogan of hakkô ichiu, and encouraged the 
emergence of emperor worship through 1945.1853 But Hirohito’s image was not always 
uncontested.1854 By 1940, the emperor image and ideology were used to justify other 
ideologies of militarism, war, Japanese fascism, and colonialism.1855 Through the state’s 
prewar national image work regarding the emperor, Hirohito and the Japanese people 
evolved a symbiotic relationship of shared emotions, ideology, and experiences with war.  
Before the postwar period, he looked down on them as their exalted, benevolent father, 
with whom they were not to disagree, though some always did.1856 Yet in reality, 
Hirohito was terribly isolated from them.1857 
 How Hirohito’s prewar worldviews and images influenced policy is seen the 
most strongly after he became emperor.  In a setting like Japan, with a “divine” ruler, the 
                                                                                                                                            
religious leader and supreme military commander.  His weak personal image, national unity, and his 
symbolic connection with the people were strengthened (Ibid., 191-195). 
1853 Ibid., 198-202. Hakkô ichiu, eight corners of the world under one roof, based on a quotation in the 
seventh century chronicle of Nihon shoki, emerged as a philosophy during the Tokugawa era.  It reemerged 
from 1850 and in Meiji Japan, and became an important government slogan during World War II.  
According to this ideology, all corners of the world would eventually unite under the rule of Japan’s 
benevolent emperor (Ibid., 200-201; Japan, “Hakkô ichiu,” 491). 
1854 In 1933, Hirohito’s image was attacked from several domestic quarters. Those attacking his image 
included some in the military, the Privy Council, the Seiyûkai (a leading political party), and civilian right-
wing groups.  Some criticized him as limiting the military, as manipulated by his advisors, or overly 
interested in his recreational pursuits (Bix, Hirohito, 283). 
1855 Ibid., 283, 374, 384. For example, within official emperor theory there had long existed two competing 
images of the emperor:  the pragmatic image of the emperor as a “jewel” to be manipulated to provide 
political legitimacy, and an ideal image that supported the idea of actualized, “direct imperial rule.” By the 
2,600th anniversary of the Japanese state, November 10, 1940, the emperor also emerged as the colonial 
symbol of the “New Order for East Asia” (Ibid.).   
1856 Ibid., 10. 
1857 Bix, Hirohito. In another example of image management, to counter this isolation, the court had 
Hirohito initiate a rice planting ceremony, to improve his popular image (Ibid., 182-183). 
778 
 
nation viewing itself as a superior race, and supreme authority vested in the state, 
Hirohito and his court were free to directly influence politics in decisive ways.1858  In 
domestic politics in the mid- to late-1920s, conflicts emerged over the nature of Japan’s 
national polity, and oligarchic versus popular control of Japan’s politics.1859  Amid fierce 
Diet debate, Hirohito and the court found it hard to remain aloof.1860  The small, 
sophisticated, elite court group, operating beyond constitutional limits, assisted him.1861  
The court policymaking process was complex.1862  The elaborate politics forced the court 
group to develop methods for Hirohito to influence policies before their formal 
presentation to him by ministers. The court group also tried to prevent his involvement in 
partisan debates.1863 This encouraged secrecy and manipulation by high officials and the 
                                                
1858 Ibid., 11-12. For example, early in his reign, from a distance, Hirohito enthusiastically influenced the 
behavior of his first three prime ministers, hastened the downfall of political party cabinets, and resisted 
mechanisms for peace at the League of Nations (Ibid.). 
1859 Briefly, in the 1920s, Japanese at every level of society, including military, religious and academic 
leaders, debated the meaning of Japan’s kokutai (national polity or essence).  Leaders in the government, 
court, and Hirohito clung to slowly eroding, Meiji era images of the national polity, while political liberals 
and reformers in every sector hoped to make kokutai compatible with modern scientific thought and 
bureaucratic politics.  Conservatives resisted democracy and Japan’s subjugation to the West, arguing that 
“sacred” notions of the kokutai and the emperor were eternal.  Concerning pressures from liberals for 
increased democratic representation, in 1925 the Diet’s lower house passed the Peace Preservation Law, 
making anarchist, communist or republican movements almost inconceivable (Ibid., 159, 161-163).            
1860 Ibid., 157-163. 
1861 Ibid. Court group members were representatives of the most wealthy, powerful classes in Japan.  
According to Bix, they must be studied in conjunction with, not in contrast to, the military and the imperial 
family.  Their views, characteristics, strategies, and actual members shifted over time.  Hirohito directed 
their actions; they had little opportunity to operate outside his will (Ibid., 178-179).  From 1927, the court 
group sought to erect a new ideological framework where he could exercise true supervision over politics, 
prime minister appointments, and the cabinet (Ibid.).     
1862 The court policymaking process included naisô (informal reports from the prime minister, cabinet 
members and the military), gokamon (questions and responses from the emperor), and behind-the-scenes 
maneuvering for Hirohito’s approval. He influenced policymaking, high-level military appointments and 
promotions.  While Hirohito was interested in the military, the court group preferred he focus on domestic 
issues, hopefully his greatest legacy.  They assumed that he must both reign and rule, and hoped to revive 
his strength and image as authoritative, like the Emperor Meiji (Ibid.). 
1863 To limit party influence, Hirohito and the court group strongly affected prime ministers’ policies, 
including Tanaka Giichi.  Hirohito and the court group fired him, and promoted his successor, Hamaguchi 
Yuko, in 1929.  The court group privately praised Hirohito’s desire to resist parties and to assume stronger 
oversight over politics.  Yet he hesitated to exercise the strong control over the military required by law.  
Such interventions caused resentment by the right wing and the military from 1929 on (Ibid.). 
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court. Hirohito was interested in political action, often indirect, influencing cabinet 
decisions, political party and Diet disputes.1864 
Policy Implications of Domestic Market Worldviews 
 
 For 1850 to 1895, what were the major policy impacts and implications of the 
three leaders whose domestic market worldviews I studied?1865  Fukuzawa initiated 
influential ideas for both private and public sectors, but his stronger impacts were on the 
private sector and Japanese culture at large.1866  In the 1870s, Ito initiated several policies 
important for the foundation of Japan’s modern economy.1867  They were designed to 
modernize Japan’s national economic system, and help it better function in the global 
economy.  Both Ito’s political and economic views were conservative. In the Meiji 
Constitution, he believed that Japanese society must be broadly supportive of needed 
economic reforms.1868 I saw no evidence that Kato’s economic policy impacts were great. 
 In their overall impacts on policy affecting the domestic economy, Fukuzawa’s 
seem the broadest and deepest, on the place of economics and business in the general 
culture, and on the private sector.  The economic policy impacts of Ito and Kato both fell 
                                                
1864 Ibid., 178-181, 184-185, 206-208, 218-219. In the late 1920s, two additional important events affected 
domestic politics.  Conflict between Japan and China over the status of Manchuria began, and the Showa 
financial panic occurred.  Reports about the conflict over Manchuria emerged in Japan’s press in 1927 
(Ibid., 205).  The Showa financial panic occurred in 1927 in the context of economic growth that seemed to 
mainly benefit the zaibatsu and urban areas, to the detriment of rural areas and smaller businesses.  Both 
the financial panic and the Showa economic depression (the latter caused by the 1929 New York stock 
market crash) brought confusion and decreasing public confidence in Japan’s economy (Japan, “Showa 
Period,” 1417-1418).  
1865 The three leaders were Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ito Hirobumi, and Kato Hiroyuki.   
1866 Fukuzawa had broad cultural impact through his writings on economics and business, his establishment 
of several important businesses and Keio University, and his advocacy of modern principles on currency, 
banking, and other business issues. His strong impacts on the private sector were demonstrated in his 
advising of two important zaibatsu, and his founding of the Yokohama Specie Bank, which laid the 
foundation for the Bank of Japan, Japan’s central bank. 
1867 Hamada, Prince Ito, 62. These policies, modeled after Western economies, included revising the 
coinage system, adopting the gold standard, initiating the national mint and the Bureau of Taxation (Ibid.,). 
1868 The Constitution gave the Emperor and other political actors wide encouragement to intervene in public 
finance and (indirectly) in the marketplace. 
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mainly in the public sector. But evolutionary economic views provided a quiet 
undercurrent for the thought of all three leaders, in how they placed more economically 
developed countries in a higher position of respect, more worthy of emulation. Such 
views affected what economic policies were adopted and how the economy developed. 
They influenced decisions of what systems would be imitated, and which would not.1869   
 How did the interaction of each leader’s domestic market worldview with the 
surrounding environment perhaps affect each leader’s policy judgments, actions, and 
outcomes?  Fukuzawa and Ito were raised in southwestern Japan.  They grew up in the 
presence of Western cultural influence and trade, helping them to see the dynamism of 
the West and its economic influence.1870 This led them to later prefer Western models as 
the strongest and best for Japan.  Kato’s choice of German as his main foreign language 
greatly influenced his later worldviews and politics. For all three, their early exposure to 
Western culture and knowledge had profound impacts on their later thought and policy-
related recommendations. Through his writings and the founding of Keio University, 
Fukuzawa’s domestic economic legacy for Japan seems the greatest of these three 
leaders. 
  For 1895 to 1945, we also briefly studied the domestic economy worldviews of 
Yanagita Kunio and Hirohito. Yanagita’s views, which stressed the importance of 
regional development and agriculture as a foundation of Japan’s national life, were 
contrary to the general economic development policies pursued by the Japanese 
government through 1945, which mostly stressed large-scale industrialization and foreign 
                                                
1869 Western countries, with authoritarian systems most similar to Japan (i.e. Prussia), emerged as the 
preferred model for Ito and Kato. 
1870 Although the region also traded with Asia, the West seemed more powerful. 
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trade. Yanagita’s wisdom in this area was not well recognized until later in the twentieth 
century, when rapid urbanization began to threaten the economic viability of rural regions 
across Japan. In contrast, I found no evidence that Hirohito’s economic thought was 
either intrinsically significant or important in application to the domestic economy.  
Policy Implications of Domestic Society Worldviews 
 
 In the period 1850 to 1895, most of Fukuzawa’s writings of the 1870s and 
1880s were meant to help Japan in the task of worldview change that he identified as 
crucial for Japan’s reform.1871  He also contributed greatly to the worlds of Japanese 
business, journalism, politics and education.1872  Mori had extensive involvement in 
national education policy.1873 He rejected state attempts to infuse religious nationalism 
into the education system, and the state’s use of indigenous religious ideologies for the 
purpose of nation-building.1874 His educational reforms included institutional, educational 
and cultural standardization to create citizens who could be easily absorbed into the state. 
His overall approach was pragmatic and utilitarian.1875 In addition to his service in 
several national ministries, at their mature stage, Kato’s evolutionary based views of 
morality were in line with the general government policy of supporting evolutionary 
arguments for various imperial political institutions, the state, and for Japan’s origins. He 
supported the government policy that Shinto was not a religion, but a patriotic practice, as 
                                                
1871 Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 10-11. 
1872 Ibid., 168. 
1873 This happened when Mori served as the national minister of education. 
1874 This religious nationalism was based on “traditional” Japanese religious values drawn from Shinto and 
Neo-Confucianism. 
1875 His earlier calls for social reform included several “radical” proposals. Earlier in his public service, 
Mori proposed that Japan adopt English as the official language, Christianity as the state religion, and that 
non-government samurai give up their swords. 
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well as the state’s general religious policies and views at the time. Kato also affirmed the 
state’s use of nationalistic Shinto in his personal beliefs and practices.   
 As with domestic politics, Fukuzawa’s impacts on domestic Japanese society 
were broad, through his writings, educational institutions and businesses he started.  He 
offered numerous suggestions for other areas of Japanese society, including institutions 
of daily life, such as post offices, schools, business and banking.  One of his long-term 
impacts was to encourage Japan to adopt more attitudes supportive of science.  It does not 
seem that Mori’s views of society had significant policy impacts, but his beliefs about 
social change evolved into specific education policies.   His efforts at developing national 
educational standards had some effect. These policies encouraged the development of 
discipline and respect for the nation in students, and were not as nationalistic as those 
adopted after his death in 1889, which cut short his long-term impact on education. 
Kato’s policy impacts on domestic society were less direct than Fukuzawa’s or Mori’s, 
more those of strengthening ideological support for state policies on nationalism, political 
institutions, and religious nationalism.  His views of religion were supportive of the 
nation’s general religious policies. Did these leaders’ views and actions on society, social 
change and morality/religion help Japan become more “scientific?” Through his popular 
writings, Fukuzawa had the deepest impact on Japanese society, helping it to adopt 
various technological, institutional, educational and economic innovations that affected 
daily life for generations to come.  His writings encouraged a very practical view of 
science and technology.     
 We learn more if we compare the policy issues surrounding spirituality, social 
change, and the attitudes of the three leaders on these matters. I wish to argue that 
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generally the social institution of religion (specifically Shinto) was strengthened through 
1945.1876 State Shinto received much public funding, support, and organization as it was 
embraced as the state religion and became a chief ideological pillar of state nationalism. 
The high level of support continued until the war’s end. Although Fukuzawa and Mori 
argued for the adoption of some “Western” social values,1877 the Meiji state preferred to 
reinterpret elements of Western culture and apply them in a selective manner.1878 Kato 
supported this. The radical degree of social change that Mori supported in his earlier 
recommendations for policy reforms was rejected outright by the state.1879 Interaction 
with the West caused the Meiji state to attempt to formalize, institutionalize and/or 
nationalize areas of social life that were previously conducted less formally, such as 
education and Shinto.  While social change resulting from the state’s reforms was often 
rather sweeping, ideologically the state’s approach to social change seems conservative. 
 How did the interaction of each leader’s domestic society worldviews with the 
surrounding environment affect each one’s policy judgments, actions, and outcomes?  
Fukuzawa’s mindset and worldviews were deeply affected by his early journeys to the 
West, and by his continued writings about Western ideas.  As a leading public 
                                                
1876 This depends on how one defines strength.  Folklorist and ethnographer Yanagita Kunio would disagree 
with my argument that Shinto was strengthened.  He believed that the government’s formal 
institutionalization policy of Shinto into a highly organized, hierarchical, state-supported spiritual 
institution threatened to crush the genuine spirit of spontaneous, heartfelt worship that held Japan together 
as a nation and people.  See more detailed arguments earlier in Chapter 7. 
1877 Fukuzawa and Mori supported the adoption of such values as individualistic “spirits” of independence 
and religious freedom. 
1878 For example, the Meiji state translated the European tradition of state religions or churches into the 
adoption of Shinto as one of the state’s chief official ideological foundations to encourage nationalism and 
patriotism. 
1879 These recommendations included Mori’s suggestion that Japan adopt English as the official language, 
and Christianity as the national religion.  In the sixth century A.D., traditionally either 538 or 552, the 
Japanese state and imperial court officially embraced Buddhism from mainland Asia as a positive force for 
the country, and encouraged its spread. 
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intellectual, aristocrat, educator and entrepreneur, Fukuzawa was thoroughly enmeshed in 
domestic Meiji society.  His reflections about the West did not diminish his 
“Japaneseness.” His long-term impact on Japanese society was profound.  He helped 
familiarize Japanese with the thought and logic of many Western technological and social 
innovations. As Japan adapted more of these innovations, it seems its “Japaneseness” 
failed to diminish, and remained strong.  Like Fukuzawa, Mori was deeply affected by 
his many travels and lengthy stays abroad. Mori seemed, at first, more Westernized than 
Fukuzawa in his basic outlook, and in his earlier policy responses.  Later both of these 
moderated.  He became more pragmatic, conservative and nationalistic in his educational 
policies.  Their impacts were cut short when he was killed in 1889.  Kato’s study of 
German greatly affected his future worldviews, policy recommendations, and ideological 
thought. While earlier he was attracted to liberal ideas from Anglo-American sources, in 
the long run, concepts of Prussian conservatism, autocracy, and German evolutionism 
prevailed in his writings.  He adapted cutting edge principles of German Social 
Darwinism into patriotic, conservative arguments for nationalistic political and social 
innovations in Meiji Japan. His creative adaptation of foreign ideological currents for 
Japanese society remained ideologically conservative when translated into the Japanese 
environment.  Ultimately he became more ideologically conservative, keeping his 
“Japaneseness.”              
 In Chapter 3, when I assessed the implications of the three leader’s worldviews 
of domestic society (1850-1895), I used two key questions regarding the relationship of 
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technology and culture in Japan in that era.1880 Modified for policy, the first question 
becomes how the social conditions and contexts in Japan affecting its receipt of 
technological and related social phenomena influenced its policies for those issues. The 
willingness of the three leaders and the Japanese public to receive Western technological 
and cultural input varied.  They exhibited degrees of ambivalence. While desiring the 
“fruits” of Western technology and knowledge,1881 they did not always wish to receive 
influence from institutions, values, and effects associated with the technologies.1882  Both 
policymakers and leading thinkers struggled to develop effective policies that would 
allow Japan to import needed areas of knowledge, while enabling it to filter out 
ideologies and cultural influences believed to be socially negative.1883  The second 
question becomes how the degree of preparedness of Japanese society to receive certain 
technologies from abroad affected its policies for those issues.  Most policymakers and 
the Japanese people displayed a receptive attitude to science and technology, since they 
seemed necessary for Japan’s survival.  Near the end of the Tokugawa era, forward 
thinking intellectuals, feudal domains and the Tokugawa regime attempted to learn about 
Western technologies through Dutch learning, schools for the study of Western 
knowledge, and overseas missions.1884 The new Meiji state invested heavily in scientific 
and technological research, education, and infrastructure, so that Japan might quickly 
                                                
1880 The first question regarded how Japan’s social conditions (1850-1895) affected its receipt of 
technological input from abroad.  The second question concerned how socially prepared Japan was to 
receive new forms of technology from abroad. 
1881 These fruits included military power, increased comfort and safety in daily life, and wealth. 
1882 I mean cultural influences such as democratic values, labor and women’s rights, increased urbanization, 
pollution, and Christianity. 
1883 The government’s policies for temporarily importing foreign instructors, its prohibition against 
Christianity and foreign missionaries through 1873, and its attempt to use Kato’s theories to limit Western 
influence to science and technology sectors are examples of such policies. 
1884 See the section in Chapter 3 about the contexts of technological development (1850-1895). 
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gain the means and wealth to defend itself against the West. So general social support for 
scientific knowledge in Tokugawa and Meiji Japan eventually translated into strong 
policies for the development of Japan’s scientific and technological capabilities.      
 On the period 1895 to 1945, Yanagita’s holistic views of the interconnections of 
various facets of Japan’s domestic society are impressive, as are his observations of what 
should be done to protect Japan’s cultural, rural heartland. In his views, there is a heavy 
emphasis on the need to protect local, indigenous Shinto worship, what he saw as one of 
the central cores of Japanese identity, and on the connections between the spiritual and 
physical worlds, between which there is no essential conflict, and which can greatly 
affect Japan’s development. Sadly, in this period, Japan’s government was very not 
prepared to act on Yanagita’s recommendations, which seem so wise. Earlier in the 
period, the government placed overall emphasis on Japan’s rapid economic growth, 
military and industrial strength, and political independence, all of which seemed the most 
necessary for Japan’s survival. Later, the dramatic events of the war crowded out quieter 
concerns like these. 
 In contrast, Hirohito’s worldview of domestic society, which heavily supported 
the state ideology of Shinto, was also affected by his scientific training in the natural, 
policy, and military sciences. These created a subtle, under-the-surface conflict in 
Hirohito that, while not impairing his rational ability to function as a policymaker, had 
profound effects on Japan as his worldview “tension” played out in World War II. His 
overarching commitment to the Shinto gods, imperial ancestors and throne led him to 
take several destructive, less than rational actions that delayed Japan’s surrender. But he 
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did not lose his overall shrewdness and rationality, as seen in the postwar actions he took 
as Japan’s emperor who survived.1885    
 Hirohito also enacted several nationalistic cultural policies in the 1920s that 
affected domestic society. Several events in Japanese society in the early to mid-1920s 
also affected Hirohito.1886 His policies, while often not directly concerned with social 
issues, affected society greatly. In the early 1920s, to Japan’s elites, the continuing 
kokutai debate threatened national unity.1887 Responding to pressures for democratization, 
and to strengthen the imperial throne, in 1923 the government formulated a cultural 
policy, and in 1924, Hirohito established a “central association of culture” that religious 
groups were encouraged to join.  Nichiren Buddhism sought government recognition of 
its campaign for “national spirit,” which it partially received.1888 The campaign affected 
public opinion and the views of many military leaders during the Taisho era (1912-1926), 
contributing to the rise of ultranationalism in the 1930s.1889   
 From the late 1920s to the early 1940s, Hirohito’s nationalistic images from 
various sources, including the enthronement ceremonies, also had important effects on 
                                                
1885 Bix, Hirohito traces these events. 
1886 Two more important events affecting Hirohito occurred in 1923, the founding of the Japan Communist 
Party and the great Kanto earthquake (Bix, Hirohito, 139-145).  The Communist Party was the first modern 
group to press for the throne’s end.  The Kanto earthquake was one of the worst natural disasters of the 20th 
century (91,000 deaths and 104,000 wounded).  Afterwards, Hirohito increased his charitable contributions, 
partly to strengthen his image as a benevolent regent (Ibid., 140). 
1887 The Kokutai debate is mentioned in Chapter 7.  
1888 Nichiren Buddhism, the nationalistic ideology of hakkô ichiu (“benevolent” rule or “the eight corners of 
the world under one roof”), and racist ideologies in Japan in the 1930s all contained universalistic notions 
of the superiority of the Japanese nation and culture, and its ability to “purify” and “unify” the rest of Asia 
and the world (Ibid., 168-169, 196, 200-201, 372).   
1889 Ibid., 163-165, 167-169. Other extra-governmental organizations, such as right-wing groups, nationalist 
“study organizations,” and the military, also attempted to influence public opinion.  Some in the military 
attacked the myths of Japan’s founding.  Recent research by Japanese scholars suggests that there was 
declining support among the public and the military for the foundation myths of Japan at that time (Ibid., 
164-166).   
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Japanese society and politics.1890 First, they released huge popular patriotism and 
enthusiasm, drawing people closer to the state and throne, as did supportive civic 
groups.1891 Second, the state unleashed important campaigns and symbols that shored up 
nationalism and the image of the throne, national “spirit” and education campaigns, 
designed to encourage support for the kokutai, “Japanese spirit” (Yamato damashii), and 
national worship of the emperor, and to discourage mass political movements.1892 Also in 
this period, partly inspired by the enthronement, the Japanese government developed a 
new racist construction of Japanese identity, based on race—people—nation, not class.  
This simplifying, divine ideology of race helped fill Japanese nationalism with new 
universalistic tendencies.  The racist ideology of the 1920s hinted at later ideologies of 
the 1930s and 1940s, where Japan faced the world as a racially pure country waging holy 
wars to build “new orders” in Asia.1893    
 The nationalistic use of images and ideology (Shinto mythology and emperor 
ideology) by Hirohito and the government in 1930s also affected society. Before conflict 
broke out with China in 1931, Shinto mythology was taught as fact in Japan’s schools, 
                                                
1890 For a discussion of the exact nature of the Showa enthronement and its activities, see the section on 
domestic Japanese politics under Hirohito (1895-1945).   
1891 This enthusiasm was generated partly because the 1920s was an era of literary and artistic celebration 
of Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).  Supportive associations included youth and 
neighborhood associations (Ibid., 201).  
1892 Ibid., 201-202. These campaigns and symbols included the Rising Sun flag, and the placement of the 
“sacred” photo of the Emperor and Empress in schoolrooms across the nation.  Hirohito and his court group 
enthusiastically encouraged emperor worship, in which the emperor was seen as the source of all morality, 
including political, military and religious authority.   The ideology of the emperor-as-divine-being 
embodied various Shinto-derived dichotomies—clean versus unclean, and pure versus impure (Ibid., 197, 
201-202). 
1893 Ibid., 195-197. This new ideology developed amid conflicts over problems in the economy, rural areas, 
tenant farmer-landlord tensions, and labor and industrial relations.  Ethnological studies of rural areas in the 
1930s suggest that despite great government effort at promoting nationalism, except for persons in 
authority, such as schoolteachers and village officials, most people in rural areas placed family and village 
concerns ahead of the emperor (Ibid., 281-282).  
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and emperor ideology took a tone opposed to anti-Western imperialism.1894 In 1937, after 
the February 26 incident,1895 the emperor and his court group directed the Ministry of 
Education to develop the first of several educational tracts for schools.  These tracts 
emphasized the superior nature and immutable connection of the Japanese people and 
their emperor, and their mutual duty to liberate the rest of Asia from Western 
colonialism.1896 So, as Japan’s autocratic ruler, Hirohito’s own beliefs and actions on 
domestic social issues had profound influences on Japan, Asia, and beyond.  
 
Worldview Policy Implications for International Issues 
 
 
Policy Implications of External Political Relations Worldviews  
 
 Most of the five leaders whose views of external political relations we studied 
(1850 to 1895, Fukuzawa, Kato, Yamagata, Ito and Mori) were realists, and stressed 
borrowing Western political ideas. Their views were driven by Japan’s pressing need to 
survive in the international system. On the Japanese nation and its place in the 
international system, all five supported Japan’s task of nation-building for its survival, 
and the necessity of borrowing Western political and military knowledge for that 
                                                
1894 Ibid., 283. A conflict in this ideology was slowly emerging, between the uniqueness of Japan, and a 
pan-Asia identity uniting Japan with the rest of the continent (Ibid.).  The conflict erupted with Japan’s 
intentional provocation of China in the Manchurian incident.  See Japan, “The Manchurian Incident,” 916.   
1895 This was the famous coup d’état attempted by young army officers in central Tokyo that was 
successfully suppressed.  
1896 Bix, Hirohito, 313-315. The first tract, Kokutai no hongi (The Fundamentals of the National Polity, 
1937), stressed the superiority, purity, and selflessness of the Japanese people and nation over all others, 
the “centrality of the family-state, home and ancestors,” and the image of the emperor as military leader 
and living god.  It also embodied the philosophy kôdô (the “imperial way”) that allowed Japan to justify its 
aggressions, and harassment of internal opposition by the military and the right wing.  This tract also 
offered Hirohito the opportunity to encourage massive public support, which might strengthen his relations 
with the military.  A second tract, Shimmin no michi (The Way of the Subject, 1941), was written in the 
context of absolute fascism in Japan’s wartime society. It called for absolute sacrifice and devotion to the 
emperor, in order to throw off Western individualism, to build a new order in East Asia (Ibid., 314-315).        
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purpose. Kato’s views were the most creative, connecting evolutionary and Confucian 
thought, and the government used elements of his thought for policy purposes. All five 
leaders agreed that the West presently dominated the international system. Most saw Asia 
as inferior to the West, and Asia beyond Japan as weaker than Japan. Most drew on 
scientific and technological-influenced thought in their thinking about international 
relations. Three of the five (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) drew somewhat on religion and 
morality, Western or Asian, in their thought on international relations. Their key desire 
was to find values to strengthen Japan’s development and survival. In this era, Ito and 
Yamagata had the greatest policy impacts on Japan’s external political relations.  
 The four leaders studied for 1895 to 1945 (Ito, Yamagata, Yanagita and 
Hirohito) had varied views of foreign policy, ranging from realism to pacifism to 
international conflict between races. Most, except Yanagita, were politically 
conservative. The greater each leader’s role in actual policymaking and foreign policy, 
the greater his policy implications here became. Though all of these leaders believed that 
Japan should help the rest of Asia combat Western imperialism, not all supported 
Japanese aggression for that end. All of the leaders were cautious and fearful about the 
West: what it might do to Japan and Asia. Hirohito in particular had a more positive view 
of conflict compared with the other three leaders. Not surprisingly, Hirohito, through his 
position as Japan’s emperor, had a greater policy impact on Japan’s external political 
relations than any other leader studied here; Yamagata was second. 
 We can get a more in-depth handle on the policy implications of Hirohito’s 
worldviews of Japan’s external political relations by briefly examining some of the main 
contexts for his foreign policy actions from the late 1920s through 1945. In 1928, there 
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were four key events involving Hirohito with lasting effects on both Japan’s domestic 
politics and Sino-Japanese relations until the late 1930s, including the signing of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact (in August).1897 Hirohito was directly involved in various aspects of 
these events.1898 In the late 1920s, he received a large amount of foreign policy 
information, often secret, from various sources.1899 In the 1930s and 1940s, he played an 
active role in planning and guiding the China and Pacific wars. A 1941 alliance between 
Hirohito, his court group and hard-line militarist supporters of war against the United 
States and Britain enabled the Pacific War to occur.1900  Through the war, Hirohito 
exercised direct, often controlling influence on the Pacific battlefronts.   He gave the 
military continual feedback, an optimistic stress on offensive tactics, and careful 
                                                
1897 See Chapter 8 for more details on the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 
1898 Ibid., 214-217. The other three events were the Jinan Incident (May), the assassination of Chinese 
warlord Chang Tso-lin (June), and the first infusion of emperor ideology into Japanese society under 
Hirohito through his enthronement and deification (second half of the year).  The Jinan Incident involved a 
reign of terror launched by 17,000 Japanese troops who surrounded the city of Jinan, Shandong, China, sent 
there to protect Japanese residents in the city.  In June 1928, officers of Japan’s Kwantung army 
assassinated the warlord leader of Shandong, Chang Tso-lin (Ibid., 214-215).  After Chang Tso-lin’s 
assassination, some members of Japan’s military began uniting themselves with civilian right wing groups, 
laying the groundwork for the Manchurian Incident in 1931 (Ibid., 219-220).  
1899 Ibid., 178-179. For example, members of Hirohito’s court group gathered, analyzed and delivered 
solely to him information on foreign affairs from many places, including the embassies of the United States 
and Britain.  Hirohito also received huge amounts of data from government and military officers.  He was 
like a “silent spider” receiving and remembering information from every government and military branch.  
This was possible because the advisory organs of the state reported directly to him, yet were separate from 
each other. These organs included the cabinet, the Diet, the Privy Council, the general staffs of the military, 
and the bureaucracy (Ibid.). 
1900 Concerning his relations with the military, around 1930, when their morale problems increased, 
Hirohito avoided confronting the problem directly, passing it to his court entourage.  During World War II, 
he often had strained relations with military leaders, yet overlooked their acts of defiance when they 
achieved victory (Ibid., 224-226, 15-16).  Members of the military were angry with him for the signing of 
the London Naval Treaty, which Japan signed in April 1930, along with Britain and the United States.  It 
limited the number of primary and secondary warships that each signatory could build and possess.  Many 
top leaders in Japan opposed this treaty, but especially the entire Washington treaty system, which they 
viewed as erecting an Anglo-Saxon “iron ring” around Japan, so that it could not expand abroad.  The 
enthronement and exaltation of Hirohito had enhanced state power and its policies.  Those who disagreed 
had to somehow reverse those policies.  The London Naval Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (signed in 




oversight for theater operations.  He often visited war-related sites in Japan, though no 
war front, encouraging production and sacrifice for the state.  He developed a certain 
charisma and determination that helped him to survive the war.  But his leadership style 
had problems.  He was overly detailed, slow in decisions, not good with bureaucratic 
rivalries, and cautious. In early 1945, his hesitation to continue fighting, and yet not break 
with military supporters of fighting to the finish, delayed the war’s end.1901  
 Evidence of Hirohito’s policy impact on Japan’s external political relations is 
seen in his role in actions on foreign and war policy in China, Manchuria, Southeast Asia 
and the South Pacific from the 1930s to 1945. On September 18, 1931, the Manchurian 
Incident began.1902 This set off a succession of international and internal events that 
changed the course of the Japanese state. Hirohito could have intervened and stopped it, 
but offered his “tacit” support.1903  On March 1, 1932, Japan proclaimed Manchukuo’s 
independence.1904 In January 1932, the Shanghai incident occurred.1905 In this case, 
Hirohito directed events, while on Manchukuo, he watched passively.1906 In March 1933, 
                                                
1901 Ibid., 15-16, 423, 439, 441-442. 
1902 Officers of the Japanese army staged an explosion north of Shenyang near a line of the Japanese-
controlled South Manchurian Railway, and blamed it on Chinese soldiers.  Within a day, the Japanese army 
ventured beyond the Japanese leasehold of Kwantung and seized key towns along the railway, preparing to 
grab major cities of southern Manchuria (Ibid.). 
1903 Hirohito could have intervened and stopped the incident, since the military was not yet too strong, and 
public opinion was divided.  He publicly praised the army, and failed to punish its members for acts of 
insubordination.  Through 1931, Hirohito’s rule over Japan was somewhat problematic, and the 
Manchurian Incident is a good example.  His behavior was often inconsistent and contradictory, since he 
sometimes exercised his authority in “petty moments,” and caved in to army officers in more crucial ones 
(Ibid.).   
1904 Ibid., 235-236, 239-240, 245-247, 249. Manchukuo included territory from the regions of Manchuria 
and Inner Mongolia. 
1905 Japanese marines attacked near Shanghai, and faced much opposition from Chinese forces.  The 
Japanese army was called in (Ibid.).   
1906 Ibid., 250-251. 
793 
 
Japan withdrew from the League of Nations.1907 From late 1937 Hirohito influenced 
many aspects of the planning for the war in China, including promotion of the top 
military leaders.  By late 1940, when decision-making processes were more efficient, he 
was involved in every stage of policy review.1908  July 1937 marked the beginning of the 
long China conflict. Hirohito exercised influence on various aspects of these events.1909 
Nanjing fell on December 13, 1937.1910 The undeclared, difficult China war lasted eight 
years.1911 Japan got bogged down.1912 It declared the “New Order in East Asia” in late 
1938, and established a puppet Chinese regime in Nanjing in early 1940.1913   
                                                
1907 Ibid., 261-262. At this same time, Hirohito issued a “bland and blind” imperial rescript wallpapering 
over internal conflicts in Japan over the Manchuria and Jehol invasions (Ibid.).  In April 1933, Hirohito 
greatly opposed the invasion by Japanese troops of provinces south of the Great Wall.  Manchukuo was not 
an effective “buffer peace zone.”  Japan’s presence there allowed its Kwantung army to attack and pressure 
the five provinces in north China. But existence of the zone, plus the Soviet sale of China Eastern Railway 
to Japan, helped Hirohito to believe that it was an effective “peace zone” (Ibid., 271-272).  In addition to 
withdrawing from the League of Nations, in 1936, two key foreign policy documents set forth radical goals 
that would tax the empire if implemented concurrently.  These documents, “Criteria for National Policy,” 
and “Foreign Policy of the Empire,” projected an unrealistic combination of goals that would be impossible 
to achieve, including Japanese control or influence in Manchukuo, North China, the western Pacific and 
Southeast Asia, war with the Soviet Union, and naval competition with the United States.  The influence of 
the great Western powers was to be limited, and the influence of Japan’s benevolent emperor expanded 
(Ibid., 308-309). 
1908 Ibid.,12. Hirohito’s involvement extended up to the point of war with the U.S. and Britain, with him 
finally getting carried away with the excitement of imperial expansion and conflict (Ibid.).   
1909 Chinese and Japanese troops stationed near the Marco Polo Bridge southeast of Beijing exchanged rifle 
fire. After a three-day skirmish, a local armistice was signed.  A split occurred in the Japanese military’s 
China policy that Hirohito had to resolve.  At first, he was more concerned about the possible threat from 
the Soviet Union against Manchukuo (Ibid.). Finally, Prime Minister Konoe’s cabinet decided to expand 
the conflict. Hirohito quietly but actively approved. Chiang Kai-shek expanded the conflict south to 
Shanghai to force a showdown with the Japanese there. Konoe and Hirohito approved attacking Chinese 
forces strongly there, and across North China, to make the Chinese “reflect” on their mistakes.  Hirohito 
felt that the Chinese misunderstood Japan’s true intentions for “peace.”  Japan, for fear of angering the 
United States, a chief supplier of needed natural resources, could not declare war. Japan called these events 
“the China incident,” a sacred struggle (Ibid.). 
1910 Ibid., 333. Members of the Konoe government knew about the Nanjing massacre and the collapse of 
Japanese military discipline there.  Likely Hirohito knew too.  As Japan’s commander-in-chief and spiritual 
head, he failed to project concern about the collapse of moral or military discipline. Rather, he urged the 
military to greater victories in China. While figures are disputed, over the next six weeks, approximately 
200,000 to 300,000 people were executed in the Nanjing area.  At least 1,000, and likely many more, 
Chinese women were also raped until late March 1938 (Ibid., 334-338). 
1911 Ibid., 342. 
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 Hirohito’s involvement in war policymaking from the late 1930s and 1940s 
occurred as follows. In late 1937, an “Imperial Headquarters” was established, to 
improve the command structure for the China war.1914  More frequent were “imperial 
conferences” (gozen kaigi), where Hirohito had input on and approved major decisions 
affecting Japan, its colonies and other countries.1915 He had final command over the 
armed services, and exercised influence on the Headquarters through questions, repeated 
instructions, and lectures. Hirohito sometimes involved himself in daily decisions on 
campaigns and operations. At cabinet briefings, the Headquarters supported him as 
supreme commander. Consensus decisions were often predetermined, reflecting his 
thinking.1916 In reality, Japan had  “a powerless cabinet, an emasculated constitution, and 
a dynamic emperor participating in the planning of aggression and guiding the process, 
by a variety of interventions that were often indirect but in every instance 
determining.”1917 By summer 1941, Hirohito’s main court and military advisors began 
working at court to support him as commander-in-chief in more frequent liaison 
                                                                                                                                            
1912 Although Hirohito had several opportunities to press for a cease-fire or an early peace, he did not.  
Early in 1938 the Konoe cabinet offered difficult terms for peace to China.  When the Chinese delayed their 
response, Konoe stopped negotiations.  Hirohito’s silence at the imperial conference held on January 11, 
1938 betrayed his support of a harsher China policy than the army’s General Staff supported.  Although 
Japan managed to gain control of most major cities and railways in northern, central and southern China in 
1938, it could not control the vast countryside (Ibid., 342, 344-345, 347). 
1913 Ibid., 347-348. At the end of 1938 Japan also initiated a new offensive in China, but resistance 
strengthened, and the Nationalists withdrew their government to Chongqing (Ibid.). 
1914 Soon after, an “imperial palace-government liaison conference” was created to better integrate the army 
and navy branches (Ibid.). 
1915 Neither law nor Japan’s constitution mandated the conferences, designed for Hirohito to offer his input 
as a constitutional monarch, and to receive advice from his ministers of state.  Hirohito received advice, but 
only his chiefs of staff transmitted his orders (Ibid.). 
1916 Ibid., 327-332. 
1917 Ibid., 329. 
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conferences, which became more important than the cabinet. Basic military policy was 
still made by competing bureaucratic organs.1918 
 Hirohito supported the war and the “Southern expansion” of Japan’s forces into 
the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, but worried about American and British 
reaction.1919 He also worried that potential Japanese attacks on French Indochina and the 
Dutch East Indies would harm his “benevolent” image.1920 Yet the China war was the 
most important background factor influencing policy decisions in 1941, and enabled 
Japan to mobilize forces to attack the U.S. and Britain.1921 As the Pacific war 
commenced, both Hirohito and Japan’s top military leaders had many mistaken 
assumptions.1922 Herbert Bix argues that Hirohito’s reactions to Japan’s losses against the 
Americans in such battles as Guadalcanal, Saipan, Coral Sea, Midway and Okinawa are 
key for understanding his role in World War II. He seemed to not comprehend their 
                                                
1918 Ibid. 
1919 Ibid., 353, 357. Regarding Hirohito’s war responsibility over China, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, 
he was directly responsible for allowing the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons in the China 
war.  According to Bix, Hirohito also shares responsibility for the indiscriminate bombing of Chongqing 
and other large Chinese cities from 1938-1945.  Worst of all, he approved of massive “annihilation” 
campaigns throughout China, starting in 1938, which killed many more people (approximately 2.7 million) 
than the unplanned massacre in Nanjing (Ibid., 361-362, 364).  The Chinese Communist Party called these 
the “three alls policy” (burn all, kill all, steal all).  In Japanese, they are known as sankô sakusen.  Japanese 
historian Himeta Mitsuyoshi estimates that more than 2.7 million Chinese noncombatants died in the 
annihilation campaigns (Ibid., 365-367). 
1920 Ibid., 367-368, 371-372. Bix notes the irony that although Hirohito approved gassing Chinese and other 
atrocities, he worried about his image as benevolent emperor if Southeast Asia was invaded.  Such actions 
by leaders were not limited to the Japanese context, but have also occurred in the West (Ibid., 371-372). 
1921 Ibid., 387-390, 392, 396. When presented with conflicting options, Hirohito rejected the findings, being 
thoroughly familiar with the procedures that generated them.  From 1941, the high command became more 
complex, and the emperor received detailed reports daily.  He was very well aware about the war, and the 
deception of his subjects. He often viewed domestic and foreign press reports (Ibid.).   
1922 They focused on naval battles in the central Pacific Ocean, and the Soviet Union as the primary enemy, 
while the main naval battles unfolded in the south and southwestern Pacific, with the United States as the 
chief threat (Ibid., 444, 447). 
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gravity.1923 In monitoring many fronts, Hirohito directly intervened several times.1924 His 
rigidity and attention to detail lengthened the war.  
 Hirohito’s surrender rescript is a significant example of image maintenance, the 
first to reshape his national image as a peaceful, non-military, totally uninvolved ruler—
all false images.1925 He showed a lot of stubbornness in the face of criticism, including a 
refusal to surrender.1926 From February 1945, Hirohito and his top advisors chose to 
continue the war, despite terrible bombings of Tokyo soon after, and the atomic 
bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August.1927 After hints from the allies on August 
11 that his status might be maintained, Hirohito agreed to unconditional surrender on 
August 14, which he announced to the nation on August 15.1928 His reluctance to accept 
defeat, and his failure to act with certainty to end the conflict, “plus certain official acts 
                                                
1923 For more details on Hirohito’s reactions in these battles, see Ibid., 444, 446-452, 456-464, 466-467, 
470-471. For example, after hearing about Japan’s defeats at Coral Sea and Midway, Hirohito persisted in 
various customary public duties and leisure activities. Later in the battle for Okinawa (spring 1945), he 
stubbornly insisted that troops fight on, despite huge losses (Ibid., 451-452, 484-485). 
1924 Bix, Hirohito. 
1925 Ibid., 485-486, 525-529. Hirohito did not consider himself or the court group responsible for the final 
defeat.  In their worldview, acting in one’s own self-interest or according to one’s conscience was selfish.  
One must sacrifice for and obey one’s leaders, for the good of the nation.  This ideal was placed on citizens 
since beginning of the Showa era (1926).  Hirohito and the court expected this could continue in postwar 
period.  They could not connect the causes of defeat and the building of a new Japan (Ibid., 535-536).  In 
the surrender radio broadcast on August 15, 1945, he desired to confuse the issue of accountability, prevent 
internal conflict and rage in Japan, and empower its unification around himself.  On August 17, media and 
new Prime Minister Prince Higashikuni showed Hirohito as a benevolent, wise, non-political king.  
Hirohito blamed the bomb, the Soviet entry in the war, and preserving the national polity as the main 
reasons for surrender.  According to Bix, likely the last two reasons were true (Ibid.). 
1926 Ibid., 475-480, 483-484. Some of the criticism came from some members of the imperial family, and 
especially from leading members of Japan’s elites (Ibid.).   
1927 Ibid., 487-496, 499-505. 
1928 Ibid., 501-504. The Suzuki cabinet and Hirohito failed to come up with a strategy to save the Japanese 
from the destruction of the war.  They waited until the “face-saving” incidents of the atomic bombings, 
Soviet invasion, and partial clarification of the emperor’s future status to surrender.  They viewed the 
clarification of the status as the absolute minimum condition.  But the atomic bomb, the Soviet invasion, 
and fear of popular uprising if the war was prolonged also prompted Hirohito and his aids to finally accept 
the Potsdam Declaration (Ibid., 509-511). 
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and policies of his government,” continued the war for so long.1929 He continually pushed 
for victory and offense rather than peace and negotiation. When the surrender option 
came, he delayed while the atomic bombs were dropped and the Soviets invaded 
Manchuria and Korea. Ignoring the suffering they caused the Japanese and others, the 
emperor and Japan’s leaders hoped for a means to “lose without losing,” to minimize 
postwar criticisms and permit their political structure to be maintained. They missed 
several opportunities to end the war since they were most concerned with the fate of the 
throne and dynasty.1930 Hirohito failed to acknowledge his own war responsibility, since 
he believed he ruled by divine right, as the center of the state. He also lacked any sense of 
personal war guilt. After the war, this legacy continued. According to Bix, as long as no 
one considered Hirohito’s responsibility, the Japanese people did not have to consider 
their own. Serious inquiry in Japan of these issues did not begin until the early 1970s.1931 
Policy Implications of External Economic Relations Worldviews 
  
 Two of the three leaders (Fukuzawa and Ito) studied in the era 1850 to 1895 
were greatly impressed by what they observed Western economics doing long-term.1932 
Their internationally-inspired economic actions were important and influential in several 
ways. In his popular writings about economics and his founding of the Yokohama Specie 
Bank, Fukuzawa had broad influence on Japan’s economic system, on both the domestic 
and international levels. Second, Ito’s role in international economic negotiations, and his 
attempt to import Japanese economic concepts during his brief service as Japan’s first 
                                                
1929 But these actions do not account for the dropping of the bomb. That was due to the overwhelming 
influence of the throne, the “power, authority and stubborn personality” of Hirohito, plus “the power, 
determination, and truculence of Harry Truman” (Ibid.).   
1930 Ibid., 519-521, 523-524. 
1931 Ibid., 16-17. 
1932 Remember they made these observations in as youths in Southwest Japan and in their overseas travels. 
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governor-general in Korea, soon to become an important colony, are an example of 
Japan’s projection of its own economic goals on another country, similar to what the 
West had tried to do to Japan. But this is not to presume that Fukuzawa and Ito were 
among the most important leaders in Japan’s external economic relations in this era. The 
international economic thought of the third leader, Kato, was highly reflective of 
evolutionary currents present in the thought of many Meiji intellectuals, but had no 
notable policy impact. 
 Yanagita, the only leader whose views of Japan’s external economic relations 
we studied for 1895 to 1945, believed that the first truly global age of international 
economics had begun. Yet nation-states still acted in their own self-interest, seeking to 
devour others in cutthroat competition. Yanagita believed in heavy state economic 
involvement on the domestic and international levels, some protectionism, and a policy 
emphasis on primary production, agriculture, and the domestic market. The Japanese 
government, in its emphasis on heavy industrialization and trade, did not support his 
arguments, however, beyond heavy state involvement and protection of Japan’s market. 
Policy Implications of External Cultural Relations Worldviews 
 
 There are many wise observations about Western and Japanese cultures one 
learns by studying the four leaders’1933 attitudes of and interactions with foreign cultures 
for the period 1850 to 1895. Fukuzawa in particular seems extremely wise in many of his 
observations of Western culture and life, and their lessons for Japan. He was especially 
strong in highlighting positive aspects of Western culture that might be important for 
Japan’s reforms, including education, individual duty, and freedom. The four leaders here 
                                                
1933 The leaders studied here are Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori and Kato.  
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observed and noted many aspects of Western life, positive and negative. Ethnocentrism 
colors some of their observations, especially Kato’s remarks about Western and foreign 
religions (Christianity). These leaders struggled intellectually and practically, as all 
Japanese did, with their interactions with foreigners, Westerners, and Western ideas. 
Given Japan’s general geographic isolation, and its extreme cultural isolation in the 
Tokugawa period, how could this not have been the case in this period? These leaders 
and the Meiji government wisely encouraged Japan to embark on an aggressive 
international learning campaign during this era, in the most practical ways possible, 
largely through learning foreign knowledge through foreign languages, technologies, and 
ideas, especially through books. The single most influential leader here seems to be 
Fukuzawa, especially through his popular writings, in helping numerous Japanese to 
come to practical terms with their interactions with the world beyond Japan. Ito is second 
most important, due to his long-term influence in writing the Constitution of 1889. Its 
policies in many areas affected the lives of millions of Japanese through 1945. 
 For 1895 to 1945, the two leaders studied on Japan’s external cultural relations 
were Yanagita and Hirohito. Both saw Western culture as a major threat against Japan, 
and believed that the government must take systematic steps to protect Japan’s culture. 
Yanagita’s thought on this issue was highly developed, perceptive, and pragmatic, on 
what Japanese and their government should do to protect Japan’s cultural autonomy and 
integrity. While Yanagita and Hirohito shared some common concerns, Yanagita’s was 
more to protect Japan’s culture at the grassroots, from the bottom up, while Hirohito’s 
concern was to protect it from the elite level, the top down. This was inevitable, given 
Hirohito’s position and training. There is no evidence that the government heeded 
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Yanagita’s wise suggestions before World War II. Rather, along with the government’s 
intentions to spread State Shinto and other cultural influences throughout Japan and the 
empire, Hirohito’s policy impacts on external cultural relations were ultimately deep. The 
government’s standardization of rural spirituality through state Shinto likely meant that, 
as Yanagita feared, local, indigenous, spontaneous spirituality was squelched before the 
war. Second, the defeat of Japan in the war, to which Hirohito contributed greatly, 
opened up Japan to an unprecedented flow of foreign ideas and cultural products in the 
postwar period. Thus, Hirohito had a much greater impact on Japan’s external cultural 
relations in this era than Yanagita. 
Policy Implications of Worldviews on Japanese Imperialism 
 
  The leaders studied on imperialism (1895 to 1945) were Kato, Ito, Yanagita, 
Yamagata, and Hirohito.1934 Regarding the policy implications of their views of 
imperialism, most viewed it as positive (for the colonizers); only Yanagita saw it as 
negative. All saw certain negative effects of Western imperialism on colonies, though 
Kato saw some positive effects for both the West and colonies. These leaders universally 
felt Japan should stay free. The views of several, notably Kato and Hirohito, are colored 
with evolutionary images and additional influences from Japanese (Shinto and 
Confucianist) ideologies. Racial overtones in the views of Kato and Hirohito are that each 
nation and colony must take its proper place in the global hierarchy of nations. All the 
leaders focused on what imperialism and colonialism might do for Japan and its domestic 
affairs. Only two leaders, Ito and Yanagita, expressed much genuine desire for the well-
                                                
1934 Note that policy implications of leaders’ views of imperialism from 1850 to 1895 are not mentioned 




being of the colonies, beyond helping them resist the West. Most of the leaders (Kato, 
Yamagata, and Hirohito) regarded Japanese imperialism as positive, protecting Asia.1935 
All of them also viewed the colonies as inferior to Japan, needing Japan’s protection. 
Hirohito approved imperialistic adventures in several regions. Despite rhetoric suggesting 
a desire for colonial self-determination and equality, Hirohito’s real concern seemed to be 
for how imperialism could strengthen Japan internally, and the throne. Overall, Hirohito 
had the most policy influence of any leader studied here; most of his impact was 
negative. 
 
Japanese Aid: Policy Implications, Possible Future Trends 
 
 
 Some key issues for the future of Japanese aid include its capacity to address 
diverse needs and issues. How much can it encourage stability in the global system and in 
Asia? Can Japan’s ODA contribute substantively and creatively to vital new goals in 
North-South relations and international development? Or will it remain (in the eyes of 
critics) crassly “mercantilist” or become more “globally responsible?”1936 
 What is the possible influence of long-term trends from Japan’s cultural and 
historical legacies, as uncovered in the present study? How have these past views shaped 
present views on a policy level? Are future trends likely to be a continuation or disruption 
of those of the past and present?  Until now, Japanese aid has been strongly influenced by 
ideologies of its historic leaders.1937 I treat this issue (the evidence for the historical 
influence of Japan’s past experience and aspects of key leaders’ views on today’s ODA) 
                                                
1935 While Yanagita condemned Japanese imperialism, he supported Japanese strengthening and defense of 
Asia against the West.  
1936 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 366. 
1937 I thank Joseph Szyliowicz, University of Denver for his insights on these themes and general issues.  
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at length in Chapter 9.1938 I argue there that it is challenging to trace the direct influence 
of specific leaders from the period 1850 to 1945 on present aid policies, partly because I 
could not include the period 1945 to the early 2000s in the present research, so there is a 
gap of some sixty years. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify several significant streams 
of thought within which the views of the key leaders studied fall, and which seem highly 
influential on present aid approaches.  
 One of those streams is seen in Japanese aid’s continuous emphasis on 
economic infrastructure. Related to this, from 1868 to 1945 in particular, the Japanese 
government placed a heavy emphasis on developing the Japanese economy through 
heavy industry and international trade. A second influential stream is evolutionism, 
which was influential in the development- or security-oriented thought of almost all these 
leaders, especially those of Kato and Hirohito. The assumptions of Japan’s superiority are 
strong in prewar notions that Japan must lead Asia to counter the West, and in today’s 
ODA, that Japan must help Asian nations to develop. Additional examples include 
Japan’s prewar emphasis on economic relations with Asia, and its postwar regional aid 
focus on the same.1939 The concept of self-help and self-reliance in Japan’s aid is based 
on Japanese values of hard work and self-reliance that are centuries old, and which were 
also heavily stressed in the writings of Fukuzawa. The concept of translative adaptation is 
also based on Japan’s development experiences that are fairly unique compared to those 
of the West. This basic concept is seen in the thought of Yanagita Kunio, though 
                                                
1938 See Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 and the associated discussions in Chapter 9 for an in-depth treatment of how 
specific ideas in the prewar and postwar eras relate to key ideas in contemporary Japanese aid policy, in the 
areas of sociocultural, political, and economic issues.  
1939 Both the Cold War and Tokugawa Japan’s national isolation policy caused unnatural disruptions in 
Japan’s connections with Asia, but for most of history, its connections with continental Asia were stronger 
than with any other global region.  
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technically its reemergence in the work of anthropologist Maegawa Keiji is only since the 
1990s. The image Japan of serving as a development “bridge” or model between or for 
different world regions is also seen in the prewar hakkô ichiu ideology, where Japan 
would serve as a Confucian beacon of peace and civilization for other Asian nations, and 
in the early postwar “flying geese” paradigm of Japan leading Asia in development, 
influential in the thinking of Japan development experts over much of the postwar era. 
From my study in Chapter 10, I conclude that of the three major issues areas I explore, 
sociocultural, political and economic, the sociocultural area shows the most influence 
from prewar thoughts on important, contemporary Japanese aid ideas.        
 Some critics have continued to view Japanese aid in the light of Japan’s colonial 
and possibly neocolonial intentions of economic hegemony, but Koppel and Orr argue 
that it has meant much more. In their view, if one fails to consider broader themes, such 
as the emergence of Japan’s concept of comprehensive security,1940 one does not really 
understand Japan’s ODA. This concept sees economic development and political stability 
in developing nations as foundational to needed natural resources and international trade, 
key for Japan’s health and survival.1941 The concept is closer to the broadened concept of 
development and national security that has emerged in American foreign affairs since the 
9-11 terrorist attack, the idea that raising the level of development and well-being of 
various regions can enhance national and international security by defeating poverty, one 
of the possible root causes of terrorism.1942 
                                                
1940 I would add the important issues of domestic reform pressures and the influences of culture and history 
on Japanese aid, among many others.  
1941 Ibid., 364-365. 
1942 A former predominant American concept of foreign aid and security viewed ODA in narrower terms, as 
contributing mainly to military security. Comprehensive security is also broader than the concept of 
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 An additional, significant, global yet historical force affecting the future of 
Japan’s ODA is Japan’s interactions with the United States throughout the period studied 
(1850 to 1945) and then especially in the postwar period. Relations with the United States 
have had enormous effects on Japan at large, especially in the postwar period. This 
project has mostly focused on prewar influences.  
 Religion and spirituality also exercised a strong, direct influence on Japanese 
society and politics from 1868 to 1945 in the form of state-imposed Shinto. In the 
postwar period, direct political effects of spirituality and religion on government in Japan 
have been prohibited by the Constitution of 1947. The influence of spirituality on ODA is 
likely indirect, though present. Today there is a distinction between the formal, legal 
separation of religion from politics and policy and the spiritual practices of many 
Japanese, including aid staff and policymakers, in their daily lives. This is not, as I argue 
in Chapter 9, an example of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle.1943 
 The future of Japanese aid in the early twenty-first century is also related to 
various reform proposals that have emerged since the late 1990s.1944 In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the concept of “human security” was introduced into Japan’s diplomacy. 
Several official reports centered on the interconnectedness of security and 
development/poverty, plus the need for a broad approach to tackle the issues. Ogata 
Sadako, JICA’s current director, argued that Japan’s ODA should be more human-
                                                                                                                                            
Japanese aid as mainly contributing to Japan’s economic security: more contracts for its trading and 
construction firms (Ibid.). 
1943 The issue of how spirituality and religion affect Japan’s ODA is discussed at much greater length in 
Chapter 9. 
1944 Reform proposals for the early 1990s and earlier are studied in Chapter 2.   
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oriented, but that the goal was difficult under the request-based system for aid. In order to 
begin to accomplish this, more aid must be developed for targets below the state level.1945  
 In late 2003, the LDP released a report that recommended several key reforms 
in Japan’s ODA policy. These recommendations relate closely to several important, 
current policy options for the future of Japanese aid, and reveal the significant influence 
of the LDP on Japan’s aid. The first goal, beyond aid requests, was to increase the 
opportunity for partnerships and policy consultations with aid recipients. The second 
recommended reform was to consider goals beyond those expressed in Japan’s 1992 
ODA Charter, including poverty reduction, peace building and human security. The third 
objective was to improve policy coordination between aid implementation agencies (i.e. 
JBIC, JICA) and the Japanese government, and among aid agencies themselves. A fourth 
main goal was to upgrade the organization and roles of Japan’s ODA representatives in 
the field (agency field offices and governmental diplomatic missions).1946 
 In the early 2000s, several pressing issues emerged in Japan’s ODA system.1947  
These major challenges will help determine the future course of Japanese aid policy. In 
addition to continuing administrative and budget reforms, Akiyama and Kondo identify 
several of these issues as the need of Japan’s ODA for better coordination with the 
Western-dominated global ODA system, the need to “put a human face” on Japan’s 
ODA, securing Japan’s continuing national interests, and the need for better applied and 
                                                
1945 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 105-106. 
1946 Ibid., 106-107. 
1947 These issues included contributing to global peace building, reforming the request-based principle for 
obtaining aid, improving partnerships with other donors and international organizations, achieving better 
balance in aid for economic infrastructure and social infrastructure, improving aid for governance, the 
utilization of yen loans, preparing country assistance plans, and introducing new aid forms like budget 
support and Sector Wide Approaches (Akiyama and Kondo, Global ODA, 154). 
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coordinated development research.1948 In the likelihood of continuing aid budget 
reductions for the near-term foreseeable future, these challenges seem great. On aid 
coordination with other donors, earlier in Chapter 2 we noted several of the challenges at 
length. Japan desires, on some levels, to respond to the global, Western critiques of 
problems in its aid system, and also recognizes much of the value of the global aid 
agenda. There are no doubt various opportunities for increased partnership between 
Japan’s ODA and agencies from other countries.1949 Yet Japan desires to do more than 
just donate funds and “…give away all other presence enhancing ‘juicy’ parts to other 
donors.” Here Japan’s continuing concern for its international image again merges. 
Coordination of Japan’s system is extremely challenging, for reasons identified above, 
including Japan’s cumbersome aid bureaucracy, and the system’s basic goals that often 
conflict with other donors’. 1950 Another challenge for Japan is to better coordinate the 
loan and grant aspects of its ODA.1951 Since both of these functions are to be 
incorporated, to a large degree, in the “new “JICA from October 2008, it would helpful to 
examine how this merger affects this issue. 
 The “human face” issue relates to Japan’s concern for its international image 
and “face.” Akiyama and Kondo comment that in the history of postwar Japanese aid and 
economic relations, there are a small number of talented individuals whose faces have 
largely come to represent Japanese development and aid to the outside world, including 
                                                
1948 Ibid., 154-163. 
1949 In earlier chapters I mentioned examples of Japan’s partnerships with aid agencies from Canada and the 
United States. Akiyama and Kondo mention the United Kingdom as another excellent possibility (Ibid., 
155).  
1950 Perhaps administrative reforms in Japan’s aid system, such as the start of the “new” JICA, can help 
improve coordination with other donors somewhat.  
1951 Ibid., 156-157. 
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the late Foreign Minister Okita Saburo and Ogata Sadako.1952 In addition, there is the 
positive representation of Japan by numerous, vibrant young Japanese who have served 
with (or applied to) JBIC, JICA, JOCV, and the UN Junior Program Officer program. In 
recent years, Akiyama and Kondo charge that Japanese aid agencies have become 
somewhat more assertive in “flag raising,” making sure that Japanese contributions are 
visible and acknowledged in various aid projects. But ultimately, effective aid, not image, 
is what really counts.1953 
 Akiyama and Kondo further lament the relatively small recognition of Japanese 
aid and its contributions in the general world literatures on international development. 
While acknowledging the problems of Japan’s aid often cited by its global critics, they 
defend its valuable contributions to economic infrastructure and practical technical help 
given by Japanese experts, “…never poorly valued by developing countries.”1954 Overall, 
they emphasize the importance of serious, national effort by Japan to assure that Japan’s 
ODA is recognized for its actual contributions, not just its amounts:  
The challenge for us lies in how to improve Japanese aid while accepting these 
problems as real constraints, how to showcase the merits of our aid, and how to 
demonstrate to the world our intention to work on development assistance as a 
member of the international community.1955 
 
The concern for image and face, a perennial feature of Japanese culture, continues. 
    
 From the donor’s viewpoint, Akiyama and Kondo also stress that Japan must 
better secure its national interests (kokueki) through aid. They argue that it is 
                                                
1952 As noted earlier, Ogata is the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the current director of 
the “new” JICA aid agency in Japan.  
1953 Ibid., 157-159. Concerning human resources issues, signs that Japan’s aid may be somewhat improving 
its effectiveness include attempts to better train Japanese staff, hiring more local area staff overseas, and 
increasing South-South aid cooperation in developing areas (Ibid., 158-159). 




understandable that to gain public and business support for ODA, the Japanese 
government must highlight how ODA contributes to Japan’s kokueki. There may be value 
in the comparative study of different aid recipients, asking how each one perceives 
Japanese aid, how the country and aid for it may contribute to Japan’s kokueki, how 
aiding the country helps Japan, the productivity of investing in the country’s economic 
infrastructure and how much the public in that country appreciates the aid.1956 Again we 
see pragmatism and the concern for face and image.  
 There is also a great need for better study of the large-scale issues and policy 
concerns that Japanese aid seeks to address. Continual, comprehensive analysis of these 
issues at the national government level is needed, yet that analysis has been lacking. 
Though a fair number of Japanese universities and think tanks study such issues, there 
should be better coordination and communication of their efforts. National level study 
groups that include experts with expertise in different regions, sectors, and themes should 
be pursued. Another problem in Japan’s development research capacity is a common 
mismatch between the research conducted and actual field needs. Research grants, 
researcher interests and findings are not well coordinated with field conditions on the 
ground. These problems partly result from the organizational culture of Japan’s ODA 
system and agencies, which are commonly understaffed with overworked generalists who 
lack adequate training in the increasing technicalities of the international development 
field. Positively, while the World Bank has tended to heavily stress economics and 
econometric analyses, Japan realizes the value of interdisciplinary research for 
                                                
1956 Ibid., 159-161. 
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development.1957 Though different agencies and committees in the Japanese aid 
bureaucracy prepared study reports and plans to address these issues, Akiyama and 
Kondo argue that greatly improved research, characterized by “…clear, coherent and 
holistic ideas,” was needed to help improve the situation.1958 Among the key research 
tools that could help to improve this situation, the holistic, clear suggestions of applied 
anthropology seem particularly relevant.1959  
 Japan’s ODA system has continued to be characterized by competing goals 
from its domestic side (economically driven goals, calls for reform, and conventional 
foreign policy concerns), contrasted with the demands of the global aid community and 
agenda. In the recent past, many of the economic-related goals of Japan’s aid have been 
pursued through JBIC, while JICA has addressed many international norms. With the 
appointment of Ogata Sadako as head of JICA in late 2003, many dynamic reforms have 
occurred, including increasing the field presence of staff, poverty alleviation and conflict 
resolution goals, cooperation with NGOs, African aid, and local capacity building 
goals,1960 in addition to the merging of JICA and the OECO functions of JBIC into the 
“new” JICA in October 2008. It remains to be seen how the new merger will affect the 
actual operations and effectiveness of Japan’s aid. 
 By the early 2000s, both MOFA and JICA prepared recommendations for 
improving the reaction of Japanese ODA to global poverty reduction goals, but this was 
                                                
1957 Ibid., 161-163. 
1958 Ibid., 154-155. 
1959 Among the fine examples of such research are Peter Van Arsdale, “A Brief History of Development: 
An Applied Anthropologist’s Perspective,” High Plains Anthropologist 13, no. 2 (1993): 47-51 and Beebe, 
Rapid Assessment, among many others.   
1960 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 273-274. 
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only one of multiple goals for Japan’s overall ODA.1961 Part of the difficulty in 
reconciling conflicts between Japan’s ODA and the global aid agenda has been that many 
of the strengths of Japanese aid have not really matched the BHN focus of the global 
agenda and the MDGs. Ohno Kenichi has argued that Japan should seek to cooperate 
with the global aid agenda goals of poverty reduction, “…without losing its unique 
perspective.”1962 Some of these unique perspectives include the capacity to encourage 
actual economic growth, and to customize aid for the unique needs of each country. 
Ishikawa Shigeru argues that these are something World Bank development methods 
such as the PRSP have lacked.1963 Yet the economic and trade motivations for Japanese 
aid, while possibly overlapping with its foreign policy functions, may somewhat hinder 
goals that lean toward the international norms for poverty alleviation.1964 In reality, it is 
likely that the unique combination of factors in Japan’s domestic politics combine to 
prevent any full harmonization of Japan’s aid with the global aid agenda. Yet in addition 
to South Korea, several Asian nations, including Taiwan, Thailand, and even China seem 
to be imitating Japan in various aspects of their own emerging aid programs. Perhaps an 
                                                
1961 Foreign, especially Western, aid experts have also actively critiqued many elements of Japan’s aid 
system, and offered many suggestions for reform. Among these is Alan Rix. For more on the suggestions of 
foreign critics through the early 1990s, see Chapter 2. In his 2005 comparison of ODA from Australia and 
Japan, Rix argues that Japan should seriously consider merging grants, technical cooperation and project 
planning into one agency like JICA, expand its aid beyond a request-based only system, give less emphasis 
to economic infrastructure, and put more on social needs (Alan Rix, “Japanese and Australian ODA,” in 
Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions, ed., David M. Arase [London and New York: 
Routledge, 2005], 104-116). No doubt some of these foreign critiques are having an influence on Japanese 
ODA’s reform process. 
1962 K. Ohno, “Overview,” quoted in Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 112. 
1963 Ishikawa Shigeru, “Hinkon sakugen ka seichô sokushin ka,” quoted in Yamauchi, “Trends in 
Development,” 112. 
1964 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 13. 
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unusual, hybrid system of aid, borrowing from both Western and Japanese elements, will 
emerge in Asia.1965 
 David Arase has both lauded past Japanese efforts to take a lead in promoting 
global development, and lamented the fact that economic difficulties in the 1990s and 
early 2000s led Japan to scale back many elements of its massive aid program. Yet 
evidence suggests that a modest, more focused effort by wealthy nations could go far in 
aiding the developing world.1966 But major shifts in the world economy can affect both 
the aid of major donors and the socioeconomic conditions in the LDCs.1967  
 What are several likely scenarios for the future of Japanese aid? Arase argues 
that while it is likely that Japan will not return to the position of the world’s top donor, it 
can be among the top donors, if not number two, for the foreseeable future.  If Japan 
wants to improve the international image of its aid, it will have to do a better job of 
addressing the goals and concerns of the global aid agenda, such as the MDGs. Since the 
late 1990s, Japan has expressed a desire to do just that, to contribute more to poverty 
reduction, humanitarian aid, and conflict prevention resolution/prevention, amid 
conditions of increasing economic austerity.1968 When Kawaguchi Yoriko, a former 
METI official, took over as Foreign Minister in 2002, she pushed revision of the 1992 
ODA Charter to not only include Japan’s commitment to pressing global and 
humanitarian issues, but to expressly address its kokueki as well: “the objectives of 
                                                
1965 Ibid., 275. 
1966 Ibid., 1-2. 
1967 Ibid. This was seen in the major global economic downturn in late 2008, initially precipitated by the 
collapse of the mortgage loan industry in the United States, followed by severe downturns in major stock 
markets around the world. This crisis threatened not only the economies of major aid donors, but also their 
capacity to offer foreign aid, in turn affecting the ability of major global aid organizations to address a 
world food crisis.  
1968 Ibid., 271. 
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Japan’s ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international 
community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity.” The 2003 
ODA Charter also expresses goals for Japan to obtain access to needed resources, partner 
closely with Asia, and the traditional aid goals of self-help, economic and physical 
infrastructure and similar issues. While the 2003 Charter fails to even mention the 
MDGs, the 2005 Medium Term ODA Policy Outline does, while also emphasizing aid 
incorporating the East Asian development experience and Japan’s desire to cultivate 
economic relations.1969 
 Koppel and Orr argue that ODA is a thread in Japanese international relations 
that will likely remain important for some time into the future. However, it will also 
likely continue to be a “burden,” not only economically, but also perhaps politically and 
culturally. They conclude ODA is a tie that further binds Japan to the complexities of the 
international system, with ever shifting issues and interests.1970 
 One thing we can say with fair certainty is globalization and other foreign forces 
will increasingly influence the future of Japanese aid, more than ever before. These 
international forces include such actors and phenomena as the United States, other Asian 
countries and aid donors like China and Korea, and the effects of globalization on 
domestic Japanese society. As I discussed in Chapter 9, globalization is having important, 
gradual affects on Japan’s internal politics and civil society, including ODA policy. The 
entry of diverse, global values into Japan, through many venues such as the Internet, is 
strengthening Japanese civil society, increasing its pluralism and the capability of Japan’s 
                                                
1969 Ibid., 272-273. 
1970 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 366. 
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small NGO community and the public to influence the government’s ODA policies. More 
Japanese, especially young but also old, are turning to volunteering with such NGOs. 
Young Japanese are more open to spirituality, due to new postmaterial values affecting 
Japan, similarly to how they have affected other advanced, industrialized nations. These 
forces sometimes lead young Japanese to seek international work or volunteer 
opportunities with NGOs or public avenues such as JICA and JOCV in different areas, 
including development and aid work. Some of these NGOs are religious.    
   





 In this section, I offer study and policy suggestions for the overall field of 
applied anthropology. Recommendations for anthropologists in Japan are found in Table 
10.1, while recommendations for anthropologists outside of Japan, Westerners and 
others, are in Table 10.2. 
 
Table 10.1 Policy and Research Recommendations for Applied Anthropology: Japan-
based Researchers 
 





Yanagita Kunio is a wonderful example of an engaged scholar who 
conducted significant studies and made many insightful policy 
recommendations in the prewar period, though many were not 
applied then (why was this so?). Lives of such scholars should be 
studied, highlighted, and emulated. Mentoring programs and 
networks for applied scholars in Japan should be developed and 
strengthened. 
Improve policy through 
ethnographic research, 
study of aid recipient 
views, study of aid’s 
effects. 
Japanese and foreign anthropologists should ethnographically study 
the effects of Japanese ODA on foreign societies and populations, 
and how to better incorporate their viewpoints in Japan’s aid 
policymaking, to improve the overall quality of Japan’s aid. 
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Improved study of 
anthropology and dev. 
anthropology. 
More study of applied anthropology and its relationship to 
international development globally. 
Improved application of 
anthro to public policy 
issues. 
Increased consideration of how to make anthropology more useful 
for broad policy issues of the Japanese government, including 
development and ODA. 
Improved application of 
anthro to public policy 
issues. 
Specific consideration of how anthropology applies to the specific 
issues of Japan’s international relations, diplomacy, conflict 
resolutions, and international trade, and development of ideas for 
increasing the application of anthropological methods for such 
concerns. 
Improve policy through 
ethnographic research, 
study of aid recipient 
views, study of aid’s 
effects. 
Study of the actual social and grassroots effects of Japanese aid 
policies in Japanese aid projects and policies around the world, 
including Asia, and how to improve them. 




Ethnographic study of how to improve Japanese aid’s partnerships 
with other donors, Western and non-Western, bilateral and 
multilateral, and policy priorities of the global aid agenda, such as 
the MDGs. This would likely include ethnographic study of the 
organizational cultures of aid-related groups or agencies in Japan, to 
identify policymaking and decisional bottlenecks. 




Conduct organizational ethnographies of public aid-related groups 
in Japan to identify structural weaknesses and recommend 
opportunities for administrative and policymaking improvements. 
Such study can be intra-organizational, or inter-organizational, to 
better understand Japan’s complex ODA policy networks, how they 
function, and how they may be improved. 
Network analysis,  
organizational 
ethnography. 
Study the relations between Japan’s NGO and public 
ODA/development groups, in order to improve their relations, 
cooperation and mutual effectiveness. 
Study of aid recipient 
views. 
Study of the perceptions of Japanese ODA and development in 
recipient countries, and how they can be improved. 
Study of aid’s effects, 
improve policy through 
ethnographic research. 
Study of the social effects of Japanese aid for economic 
infrastructure in Japanese aid recipients, and development of 
concrete policy recommendations for the government, so these 
impacts can be improved. 
Historical study, study of 
historical impacts on aid, 
study of aid’s effects, 
improve policy through 
historical research. 
More holistic study of the history of Japan’s development and 
development ideologies, and their impacts on Japan’s former 
colonies and the rest of Asia today. Based on these lessons, what 
concrete policy lessons can be developed concerning the impacts of 
state development policies and ideologies on human populations, 
both domestic and foreign? How can other nations avoid Japan’s 
mistakes? What positive applications from the legacies of Japanese 
economic investment in former colonies and their successful 
development today can be drawn for other regions and cases of 
colonialism? 
Historical study, improve Based on Japan’s development experience, what can LDCs do to 
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policy through historical 
research, cultural preserv., 
protection. 
better protect their own cultures and identities during economic 
development? 
Ethnographic study of 
field conds., rapid social 
change, improve policy 
through ethnographic 
research. 
Study of the issue of how LDCs may better maintain their desired 
and/or existing social structures, values and cultural features in the 
midst of rapid economic change and rapid importation of new 
technological items. Develop concrete policy recommendations for 
LDCs and Japanese aid policymakers based on these findings. 
Improve policy through 
ethnographic research. 
Ethnographic study of Japan’s aid policymakers’ worldviews and 
their decision-making processes. Use these findings to develop 
recommendations for policymaking improvements. 
Improve policy through 
ethnographic research. 
Ethnographic study of how Japan does aid policymaking for the 
issue of social infrastructure and for economic infrastructure. How 
can these two areas be balanced and improved more? 
Improve policy through 
ethnographic research. 
Ethnographic study of the “spiritual” aspects and views of Japanese 
aid policymaking and staff, the spiritual and religious conditions of 
aid recipients, and consideration of how spiritual factors both affect 
and are affected by the receipt of Japan’s aid. What are the impacts 
of these issues for the effectiveness of Japan’s aid, and how can 
they be improved? What about for Japan’s general diplomacy? 
Professional skills 
promotion.  
Study the cross-cultural adjustment challenges of Japanese aid 
workers, based on lessons from Japan and similar aid systems such 
as South Korea. A similar situation is the cross-cultural adjustment 
challenges of Christian missionaries from both those countries. 
Develop recommendations to improve the cross-cultural training for 
Japan’s aid workers. 
Study of aid’s effects, 
improve policy through 
ethnographic research. 
Conduct research on whether Japan is projecting itself and its 
development experiences on aid recipients. If it is, is this bad? If so, 
how can it be changed? 
Improve policy through 
ethnographic research, 
study of aid’s effects. 
Study this issue ethnographically: does translative adaptation work? 
Does it help Japanese aid and LDCs? Are the goals of customized 
development achievable? Can they be balanced with universal goals 
often preached by the World Bank and similar groups? Develop 
concrete policy recommendations for Japanese aid from these 
insights. 
Historical study, study of 
historical impacts on aid. 
What are the legacies of Japan’s views of its colonies? How do 
these views affect Japan’s aid and its relations with developing 
countries? 
Historical study, study of 
historical impacts on aid. 
How have the evolutionistic views behind Japan’s imperial legacy 
affected Japan’s aid of today? If the results are negative, how can 




 In the above policy and research recommendations for researchers in Japan, key 
themes that emerge relate to improving ODA policy and development research through 
ethnographic research and increased understanding and use of anthropological 
approaches, including organizational ethnography, network analysis, and similar 
methods, in research on Japan’s ODA policies and programs. I suggest that these 
methods to be applied to such issues as better understanding the viewpoints of aid 
recipients, the social and political effects of Japan’s aid, cultural preservation issues, 
LDC field conditions, rapid social change, and improving the social research skills of aid 
agency staff and policymakers in Japan. A final area of application relates to historical 
issues: the improvement of Japanese aid policy through study of relevant historical 
issues, historical-oriented research for policy concerns, and study of the historical 
impacts of Japanese aid. Key insights that emerge for Japan’s ODA policies and 
programs include the possibility of further improving the delivery and effectiveness of 
ODA policy through the use of applied social science methods. These research methods 
should be applied to study of both Japan’s aid recipients, and to aid policy and 
implementation bodies in Japan. Their use will further strengthen the large reform efforts 





Table 10.2 Policy and Research Recommendations for Applied Anthropology: 
Researchers based outside Japan. 
 
Themes/                             Research or Policy Recommendation(s) 
Policy Areas 
Expand anthro study of dev of non-
Western cases, comparative study, 
cross-regional application of insights 
Increased study of and consideration of non-Western 
cases of development, including Japan, China, and 
Southeast Asia. Effective incorporation of these 
insights into mainstream anthropological theories of 
development, both in academic anthropology and 
applied/professional anthropology 
Expand anthro study of dev of non-
Western cases, organizational 
ethnography, improve ethnog research 
for policy, comparative study 
Ethnographic and applied study of non-Western aid 
donors and aid agencies, including their organizational 
cultures and policies 
Expand anthro study of dev of non-
Western cases, study of aid’s effects, 
improve ethnog research for policy, 
comparative study, cross-regional 
application of insights, study of aid’s 
effects. 
Ethnographic study of the effects of non-Western aid 
on developing countries and regions, such as Africa 
Expand anthro study of dev of non-
Western cases, improve ethnog research 
for policy, comparative study, study of 
aid effectiveness, cross-regional 
application of insights, study of aid’s 
effects, policy applications. 
Comparative ethnographic studies of Western and 
non-Western aid donor systems, incorporating such 
issues as the aid effectiveness of these systems, their 
impacts on recipient populations and countries, lessons 
for Western systems from non-Western systems (and 
the reverse) 
Study of aid effectiveness, study of non-
Western dev concepts, cross-regional 
application of insights 
Study and analysis of the Japanese development 
concepts of “modernization,” translative adaptation, 
internationalization, and consideration of how these 
concepts may apply to international development and 
aid issues worldwide, especially in new cases 
Study of aid effectiveness, study of non-
Western dev concepts, cross-regional 
application of insights, policy 
applications. 
Ethnographic investigation of the validity of 
“modernization,” translative adaptation and 
internationalization. Development of policy 
recommendations from these findings for global ODA 
organizations and development. 
Comparative study, policy applications, 
cross-regional study and application of 
insights.  
Cooperative study with Japanese anthropologists of 
the Japanese aid policymaking system. Development 
of concrete, practical recommendations for 
policymaking improvements and reforms, on Japan’s 
domestic level and for Japan’s improved cooperation 
with global aid groups and other donors. 
Study of aid policymaking and 
processes, policy applications. 
Analysis and study of how development research is 
done in Japan, by anthropologists and others, in order 




Policy applications, improved study of 
anthro, training/professional issues. 
Develop specific policy recommendations for how 
anthropological training and scholarship on spirituality 
and religion can be fruitfully applied to the training of 
American foreign policy makers and diplomats, so that 
our consideration of religion and international affairs 
can be improved. This may include incorporating 
insights from missiology and mission anthropology, 
despite present or past biases for or against such fields. 
Policy applications. Study how views of “spirituality” and “science” affect 
policies for foreign aid and development. 
 
 The key policy and research recommendations themes for non-Japan based 
researchers include expanding anthropological and other social science study of non-
Western cases of development and aid, studying non-Western development concepts, 
comparative study of Western and non-Western development models and aid systems, 
and careful cross-regional application of insights that are generated. While many non-
Japanese aid experts, many based in the West, have extensively studied and commented 
on many aspects of Japan’s ODA, there needs to be more study of other non-Western aid 
systems in countries like China, South Korea, and Taiwan. It is important that Western 
aid experts seriously consider the meaning of the Japanese and Asian development 
models and experiences, and what they mean for other regions. This must include 
reflection on the meaning and application of important non-Western development 
concepts, such as internationalization and translative adaptation that I explored in this 
project. Other key issues here are standard to the consideration by social scientists of 
development and aid issues everywhere: the study of aid’s effects, aid effectiveness, aid 
policymaking, the use ethnographic and other social methods in development research, 




Political Science and International Studies 
 
 In Table 10.3 I present policy and research recommendations for the fields of 
political science and international studies, mostly outside Japan. For research and policy 
outside Japan, these recommendations focus on improving international studies, 
diplomatic, development and aid policies and practices through further incorporation of 
anthropological research methods and approaches, including the use of ethnography to 
examine decision-making, local and global issues, and the effects of foreign and aid 
policies. On a third level, I again recommend comparative and cross-regional study and 
application of insights. For political science and international studies research in Japan, I 
recommend the improvement of international studies and foreign policy through the use 
of anthropological and ethnographic methods. 
 
Table 10.3 Policy and Research Recommendations for Political Science and International 
Studies. 
 
Themes/                                  Researcher     Research or Policy Recommendation(s) 
Policy Areas                                   Location(s) 
Improving international studies, 
improving diplomatic practice, 
improve policy through ethnographic 
research, policy application of anthro 
approaches, study of aid’s effects.  
Outside 
Japan 
Increased incorporation of anthropological 
methods and approaches in the study of 
foreign aid and foreign policy, to understand 
how foreign policies affect human populations 
on the ground level, and how those impacts 
may be improved. 
Improving dev policy, cross-regional 
study and application of insights. 
Outside 
Japan 
Increased study of East Asian and Japanese 
development models and experiences, 
especially consideration of how their 
significant lessons and experiences may be 
applied to other regions. 
Improving diplomatic and aid 
practices, organizational ethnography. 
Improve policy through ethnographic 
research, policy application of anthro 
approaches, improve decision-making 
through anthro approaches. 
Outside 
Japan 
Increased consideration of how 
anthropological studies of organizational 
culture and organizational ethnographies can 
help improve the transparency, ethics and 
decision-making processes of Western foreign 




Improving diplomatic practice. 
Improve policy through ethnographic 
research, policy application of anthro 
approaches, improve decision-making 
through anthro approaches. 
Outside 
Japan 
Increased incorporation of cognitive 
approaches from anthropology in research on 
foreign policy, especially contemporary 
policy, to enrich findings and understandings 
of how foreign policy and similar decision-
making processes happen and can be 
improved. 
Improving diplomatic practice, 
improve policy through ethnographic 
research, policy application of anthro 
approaches, improve decision-making 
through anthro approaches. 
Outside 
Japan 
Improvement of studies of decision-making 
and foreign policy decision-making through 
the incorporation of ethnographic methods for 
the study of the worldviews and decision-
making processes of individual political actors 
and decision-makers. 
Improve study of local and global 
issues in international studies, 
improve decision-making through 
anthro approaches, improving 
diplomatic practice, study of aid’s 
effects, comparative study, policy 
applications, cross-regional study and 
application of insights.  
Outside 
Japan 
Improved understanding of globalization and 
its effects by including the study of local level 
effects and their impacts on foreign aid 
policymaking bodies and their decisions, and 
the impacts of policies of foreign policy 
policymaking bodies on local sites and 
populations throughout the world. 
Comparative study of these findings. 
Improve decision-making through 




Improvement of the consideration of foreign 
policy decision-making through incorporating 
expanded, improved analytical concepts of 
perception and cognition, based on cognitive 
anthropological concepts such as worldview, 
cultural logics, and image. 
Cross-regional study and application 
of insights, comparative study, 
improving international studies. 
Outside 
Japan 
Better understanding of what colonialism, 
imperialism and globalization mean through 
improved consideration of these issues in the 
Japanese and other Asian cases. 
Improving international studies, 
improve policy through ethnographic 
research, policy application of anthro 
approaches. 
Japan More incorporation of cross-disciplinary 
approaches in policy studies and analysis, 
including anthropological approaches. 
 
Development Policy 
 In Table 10.4 I give policy recommendations for Japanese and Western 
development policymakers, mostly those in Japan. For development policymakers in 
Japan, I recommend the improvement of development policy practice and professional 
skills through the application of anthropological approaches in such areas as social 
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research skills, ethnography and organizational ethnography, and improved consideration 
of local issues in development. Increased public accountability is also a possible dividend 
from these efforts. My recommendations for development policymakers outside Japan 
stress improving development policies through cross-regional and comparative studies of 
Western and Asian development. I especially emphasize the consideration of Asian and 
non-Western development concepts, such as translative adaptation, namely their viability 
for development and beyond Japan.  
 
Table 10.4 Policy and Research Recommendations for Development Policy. 
 
Themes/        Policymaker/      Research, Policy Recommendation(s) 
Policy Areas         Researcher 
     Location(s) 
Professional skills issues, policy 
application of anthro approaches, 
improving dev policy. 
Japan Incorporate more training in applied       
anthropology, rapid ethnographic assessment 
methods for Japanese aid staff. 
Professional skills issues, policy 
application of anthro approaches, 
improving dev policy, improving 
study of local issues in dev policy.  
Japan Include training in basic cultural anthropology 
and applied anthropology for Japanese 
government policymakers, to increase their 
sensitivity toward and capacity to better 
incorporate consideration of human and 
grassroots factors of development in their 
policymaking. 
Professional skills issues, policy 
application of anthro approaches, 
improving dev policy and practice. 
Japan Offer such training in JICA’s and other 
Japanese government aid technical training 
programs for overseas personnel or Japanese 
volunteers preparing to serve overseas. 
Professional skills issues, policy 
application of anthro approaches, 
improving dev policy and practice. 
Japan Offer brief training seminars in applied 
anthropology and rapid research methods for 
NGO staff and volunteers across Japan. 
Professional skills issues, policy 
application of anthro approaches, 
improving dev policy and practice 
through anthro and ethnographic 
approaches, study of aid’s effects. 
Japan Improve the inclusion of the analysis of social 
and cultural factors in Japanese aid 
policymaking and aid analysis programs. 
Incorporate such training in such venues as the 
new JICA’s research and training institute. 
This will help Japan to improve its 
consideration of the grassroots aspects of its 
aid policy in very tangible, practical ways, 
improve the quality of its aid delivery and to 
improve the impacts of aid on target 
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populations and recipients. It will also make 
aid more effective in actually accomplishing 
what is intended. 
Policy application of anthro 
approaches, improving dev policy 
and practice through anthro and 
ethnographic approaches, 
organizational ethnography. 
Japan Hire expert organizational anthropologists such 
as Hamada Tomoko to study the organizational 
cultures of Japanese aid agencies and 
policymaking bodies, to offer policy 
recommendations for further organizational 
reforms to help improve the quality and 
delivery of Japanese aid. 
Policy application of anthro 
approaches, improving dev policy 
and practice through anthro and 
ethnographic approaches, improving 
public accountability and ethics of 
dev and aid policy. 
Japan Employ social scientists to further study 
Japanese public opinion of ODA through 
surveys, focus groups, and other avenues, in 
order to better understand public perceptions of 
ODA, how Japan’s aid can be improved by 
incorporating their suggestions. 
Policy application of anthro 
approaches, improving dev policy 
and practice through anthro and 
ethnographic approaches, improving 
public accountability and ethics of 
dev and aid policy. 
Japan Make Japan’s aid policy more democratic and 
ethical by using more public participation and 
insights for aid policy decision-making and 
goal setting. Use recommendations from social 
scientists for this purpose. 
Improving dev policy, cross-
regional study and application of 
insights, comparative study. 
Outside 
Japan 
Increased study of East Asian and Japanese 
development models and experiences, 
especially consideration of how their 
significant lessons and experiences may be 
applied to other regions. 
Improving dev policy, cross-
regional study and application of 
insights, comparative study. 
Outside 
Japan 
Study and in-depth consideration of the 
concept of translative adaptation. Is this 
concept valid? Should it be applied to aid 
policymaking at the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and at other 
leading international and bilateral donors? If 
so, how? 
Improving dev policy, cross-
regional study and application of 
insights, comparative study. 
Outside 
Japan 
What are lessons from Japan’s and East Asian 
development experiences for Western 
countries? 
Improving dev policy, cross-
regional study and application of 
insights, comparative study. 
Outside 
Japan 
What do the Western/global aid groups, 
agencies and their policy agendas need to learn 
from Japanese and other non-Western aid 













 Here I will briefly review some of my key findings about the policy 
implications for Japanese ODA policy generated from the study of historical leaders’ 
worldviews and Japan’s experiences related to technology, development, and foreign 
policy (1850 to 1945). What are some of the advantages of such a cognitive approach to 
policy analysis? What valuable insights does the consideration of “worldviews” bring to 
the issue of policy application? Here worldview generates especially significant insights 
into the behavior and motivations of Japan’s top political actor of the twentieth century, 
Hirohito, among others. Use of the anthropologically-enhanced concepts of image, 
worldview, and cultural logics, augmented beyond conventional political science 
approaches, enabled me to uncover newer, deeper insights on the possible motivations 
and understanding beneath these political actors’ actions. This approach seems richer and 
more nuanced than many conventional forms of decision-making analysis in political 
science. Applied to policy issues, it helps us to generate many additional insights about 
what these actors did, why, and within what contexts. The approach used in this study 
also draws extensively on historical and cultural insights that policy studies typically 
lack. This further enriches and deepens our findings about policy at many fundamental 
levels. 
 On policy issues in Japan’s domestic arena, I found that on technological 
development, the key leaders studied (1850 to 1895) were generally successful in 
applying their keen insights and study on various issues of transferring technology and 
culture to Japan. Both the government and these leaders sought “scientific” approaches 
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that would help support their efforts. That ideology was largely evolutionism. Most of the 
leaders in this period had direct policy applications in various significant sectors. From 
1895 to 1945, the seeming conflicts in Hirohito’s training and worldviews, both spiritual 
and scientific, flowed from his immersion in State Shinto, his love of and training in 
marine biology, and his duties as supreme autocrat, military commander, and high priest 
of the nation. Despite these seeming conflicts, he was a highly shrewd, rational political 
actor who helped to nearly destroy Japan in World War II, and yet personally survived 
the war intact. 
 In their domestic state worldviews, most of the leaders studied in the first era 
(1850 to 1895) were significant policy actors. Because of his authorship of the 
Constitution of 1889, Ito Hirobumi was most important here. The range of policy actions 
and influence of these leaders is impressive, within the conservative policy environments 
of late Tokugawa and early Meiji Japan. In the second period (1895 to 1945), as emperor, 
Hirohito emerged as Japan’s most significant political actor in the twentieth century, and 
his influence on domestic politics, starting with the Japanese state’s careful cultivation of 
his image, was huge. Once he became emperor, his actions and inactions, always behind 
the scenes, had enormous impacts on the nation. 
 Examining the three leaders’1971 domestic market worldviews in the first period 
(1850 to 1895), the policy impacts of Fukuzawa, through his writings, enterprises, and 
founding of several schools, are the greatest of the three. Both ideological and 
environmental factors were highly significant in formulating the domestic market 
                                                
1971 The three leaders studied here were Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato. 
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worldviews of these three men.1972 In the second period (1895 to 1945), the significant 
thought of Yanagita on domestic economic policy, on the development of regional 
industries across Japan, did not find application in the prewar period. 
 Concerning leaders’ worldviews of domestic society (1850 to 1895), I found 
that as with economics, Fukuzawa’s writings had the longest, broadest impact of the three 
leaders studied,1973 in encouraging wide popular support for science, technology and 
economics throughout society. The ideological conservatism of Japan in this era was 
consistent with the choice of State Shinto as the nation’s spiritual ideology for 
development. The Meiji state also wanted Japan to eagerly embrace Western science and 
technology, though not much of the cultural “baggage” that accompanied them. These 
leaders generally supported that attitude. In the second period (1895 to 1945), as Japan’s 
supreme leader, Hirohito’s actions and projected images yielded huge impacts on 
Japanese society and education, especially through the encouragement of patriotism, 
nationalism, and State Shinto. 
 Concerning international issues, on Japan’s external political relations (1850 to 
1895), most of the leaders studied were political realists, borrowed political ideas from 
the Western controllers of the international system, and urgently sought ideas for Japan’s 
survival. The four leaders studied from 1895 to 19451974 had varied views of international 
relations, and most were ideologically conservative. Hirohito had the largest impact on 
Japan’s external political relations by far. On his involvement in Japan’s international 
                                                
1972 Environmental factors here included the childhoods of Fukuzawa and Ito in southwestern Japan, where 
the presence and influence of trade with the West was highly influential. Among important ideological 
factors was Kato’s choice to study the German language and German studies, which led him to be heavily 
influenced by German Social Darwinism and evolutionistic thought.   
1973 The other two leaders studied on domestic society (1850 to 1895) were Mori and Kato.  
1974 These leaders studied for 1895 to 1945 were Ito, Yamagata, Yanagita and Hirohito. 
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relations before and during World War II, a key observation is his indecisiveness in many 
crises. Though he had key power and influence in major and minor decisions, Hirohito 
was conflicted, often failing to realize the gravity of significant defeats, and dangerously 
delaying Japan’s surrender, costing hundreds of thousands of lives. Here Hirohito’s 
scientifically-based policy rationality wavered amid many pressures and conflicting roles, 
not the least of which was his daily devotion to military duties, his personal schedule, and 
faithful attention to Shinto prayers and ministrations as the nation’s high priest. Through 
all of this, the state’s management of his image continued unabated. And on Japan’s 
external economic relations, though Ito Hirobumi emerges as the most influential policy 
actor (1850 to 1945), from my study, I gained no highly significant, additional insights on 
this policy area.1975   
 On external cultural relations (1850 to 1895), the leaders studied1976 reveal 
many of the same intercultural struggles with foreigners that all Japanese in that era did. 
Impacts of Fukuzawa and Ito emerge as the greatest, through Fukuzawa’s writings on 
Western cultures, and Ito’s work on the Constitution of 1889. On international and 
domestic issues, both had broad influence on the cultural attitudes, lives, and practices of 
millions of Japanese. The policy implications of Hirohito (1895 to 1945) on Japan’s 
external cultural relations were also enormous, through his impacts generated through 
World War II (the damage Japan received from abroad), and the massive influx of 
American influence through Japan’s defeat in 1945. The policy conflict in Hirohito’s top-
                                                
1975 On external economic relations (1850 to 1895, 1895 to 1945), the policy implications of Ito Hirobumi’s 
views are the most significant. This is seen in his participation in negotiations on international economic 
and trade relations, and his brief role as governor-general in Korea in the early 1900s. But I draw no 
notable conceptual observations on policy beyond these points.  
1976 Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori and Kato. 
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down and Yanagita’s bottom-up approaches to protecting Japan’s culture seems vaguely 
symptomatic of the struggles of Japan’s aid to address policy issues today: a strong 
emphasis on the national, state-to-state level, but not as much on ground level concerns. 
This emphasis is gradually shifting, a good development. 
 On leader’s views of imperialism, the leader with the greatest policy impact 
(1895 to 1945) was again Hirohito. All of the leaders1977 condemned Western 
imperialism and yet wanted Japan to “help” its weaker Asian neighbors. Unfortunately, 
this “help” repeated many of the West’s mistakes. Most of the leaders focused on what 
the colonies could for Japan, though not all.1978 Though Hirohito could have done much 
to improve conditions in colonies and conquered territories during the war, he did not. 
Evolutionary influences heavily colored these leaders’ views of the colonies, of Japan’s 
role as their “leader,” and of the position of all in the global hierarchy of nations. Though 
evolutionistic views color some assumptions behind both prewar Japanese imperialism 
and postwar ODA, in ODA policy, the negative, prewar aggressive tendencies seem to be 
mostly gone, though perceptions of that likely vary, depending on who one asks.1979 
 On the future policy implications of Japanese aid, I noted trends in several 
significant areas, such as the influences of Japan’s historical and cultural legacies in 
development, including spirituality, and important reform issues and pressures, both 
domestic and international. One of the greatest conflicts facing Japanese aid is between 
its largely internal, economic and strategic needs and the pressures and goals of the 
                                                
1977 Kato, Ito, Yanagita, Yamagata, and Hirohito. 
1978 Yanagita was the main exception. 
1979 Likely the view of Japanese aid as aggressive or as a hidden tool of imperialism remains at the popular 
level in nations such as China, though I am not sure.  
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global aid community. Due to the deep legacies of Japan’s experience as the first of many 
Asian nations to successfully develop, and its own cultural background, Japan’s long-
term emphasis on economic infrastructure likely will not change. The goal of the global 
aid agenda for poverty alleviation and sensitivity toward grassroots needs also has 
domestic support in the Japanese public, since it has many valid points. These facts, plus 
the high value placed on image and face in Japanese culture, and the increasing diversity 
of global influences hitting Japan, suggest that Japan will continue to evolve some type of 
“hybrid” aid system incorporating both economic infrastructure and social/grassroots 
goals, as David Arase argues.1980 I agree, though with continuous, sometimes rapid 
administrative changes, one cannot say what final structure this hybrid system may ever 
take. But it will likely be highly influential on the emerging donor systems of other 
countries throughout East Asia. 
 For the social sciences and development policy, both in Japan and abroad, it is 
imperative that more effective application of the practical research skills and findings of 
applied anthropology be applied to the study of Japan’s aid and its effects on recipient 
nations, their populations, how Japan’s aid is perceived, and how it can be improved. It is 
even more urgent that foreign scholars and anthropologists outside Japan increase their 
understanding of Japanese and East Asian development, Asian aid donor experiences and 
their relevance for international development and international relations at large, for the 
basic improvement of the human condition of millions in the developing world. Many of 
the assumptions of Westerners regarding development, including those of Western 
anthropologists, tend to be culturally bound, biased, and inaccurate at several 
                                                
1980 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid.  
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fundamental levels. The experiences of many nations in Northeast and Southeast Asia, 
some of the most important, on-going cases of development in history, prove this. One 













































Note: definitions marked with an asterisk (*) are simplified versions of the central 
analytical concepts used for the dissertation, or they are a concept of central importance 
for the research. Where several meanings of a concept from different fields are listed, the 
streamlined version used for this project will be listed first. 
 
Attitude(s):  “predispositions to respond in a particular way toward a class of specified 
objects [which] consist of both cognitive (beliefs) and affective (feelings) 
components.”1981 Attitudes “…are a result of cognition, and include ‘knowledge.’”1982  
 
Authoritarian developmentalism:  “…a politico-economic system designed to 
formulate and implement state-led development.  It emphasizes institutions, 
organizational structures, and policies that promote industrialization.  It uses capitalism to 
promote economic development, and state intervention in the economy. Once rapid 
growth has been achieved, an authoritarian developmentalist regime should be replaced 
with an open system.  Examples of this system include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and China.1983  The system has been paramount that region’s rapid economic 
growth, and it offers a useful regional model for catching up with the West. More 
concrete study of this issue is needed.1984  
 
Belief systems include a decision-maker’s beliefs about another actor’s strategies, tactics, 
motivations, and goals.1985 Some political scientists in the 1960s argued that belief 
systems are the same as worldview.  They defined belief systems as the views that states 
and citizens hold concerning the outside world and themselves, including conscious and 
unconscious beliefs that are held to be true (the belief system) or false (the disbelief 
system).1986  Martha Cottam draws a helpful distinction between belief systems and 
worldview, arguing that worldview consists of belief systems, but that they are not 
identical phenomena1987 (see Worldview—political science).  Research on individual 
belief systems has been driven by two presumptions, that “…reasoning consists of an 
awareness of particular phenomena and determination of the relations that exist among 
them…” and that all individuals process and perceive information similarly.  Research by 
Jean Piaget, 20th century developmental psychologist, argued that since cognitive 
                                                
1981 David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen. Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1967), 31-32. 
1982 Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 7. 
1983 K. Ohno, “Overview,” 32-33; Watanabe, “Designing Asia,” 202-203, 216-219. 
1984 K. Ohno, “Overview,” 34-35; Ohno and Ohno, Japanese Views, 310. 
1985 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 45. 
1986 Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Enemies, 19, 22, 29. 
1987 Cottam, Images and Intervention, 10. 
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development for each individual is unique, the assumption that all individuals reason in 
the same way is faulty.1988 
 
Bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment):  In Japan, the slogan attached to the 
process of adopting Western technology during the Meiji period (1868-1912).  After 
Japan was forced to open to the outside world, the Japanese were amazed at the superior 
technologies of the West.1989   
 
*Cognition (simplified version, used for this project): how we become aware, how our 
brains get knowledge, organize and use it, or how we perceive (sense and think about 
certain things in the world around us). It includes things like remembering, solving 
problems, talking, thinking, and making pictures in our minds. 
 
Cognition is the process through which we become aware, closely connected with 
language.1990  More technically, it is “…a collective term for the psychological processes 
involved in the acquisition, organization, and use of knowledge.”1991 In cognitive 
psychology, cognition refers to “…all the information processing activities of the brain, 
ranging from the analysis of immediate stimuli to the organization of subjective 
experience.  In contemporary terminology, cognition includes such processes and 
phenomena as perception, memory, attention, problem solving, language, thinking, and 
imagery.1992 
Political science work on cognition has produced an abundance of empirical 
studies and a shortage of general theory.  Rather than studying worldviews, some 
research focuses on how information is processed. Other areas of study include cognition 
in elite decision-making and mass public opinion, image and self-image in policy, roles 
in international relations, perceptions of power and control, and affective (feeling) 
responses to cognitive images.1993  
 
Cognitive anthropology is  “…the study of the relation between human society and 
human thought, …how people in social groups conceive of and think about the objects 
and events which make up their world.”  Cognitive anthropology is also the investigation 
of cultural knowledge, seen in stories, artifacts, and words, which humans share and 
learn.  One of the field’s main achievements is its detailed, accurate description of 
cultural representations.1994  Cognitive representations of various properties or objects 
                                                
1988 Shawn W. Rosenberg, Dana Ward, and Stephen Chilton. Political Reasoning and Cognition: A 
Piagetian View (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 37, 64-65. 
1989 Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 169. 
1990 Egon G. Guba, “The Alternative Paradigm Dialog,” in The Paradigm Dialog, ed. Egon G. Guba 
(Newbury Park, Calif: London: Sage, 1990), 91. 
1991 Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 6. 
1992 Ibid. 
1993 Cottam, “Recent Development,” 1-18. 
1994 Roy G. D'Andrade, The Development of Cognitive Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995),  xiv, 1, 251. 
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provide mental maps of the world. Both culture and psychology mutually affect each 
other.1995     
 
Cognitive categories are “a number of objects that are considered equivalent;” “…a class 
of events, objects, [or] ideas….  A given category invokes those attributes necessary for 
the identification of each member of the class to which the category refers.”1996  They 
form the foundation of our normal prejudgments and daily adjustments, and help us to 
“organize and simplify the environment.”1997  Categories provide the basis of how people 
organize their worldviews, information about “…what a part of the environment looks 
like, the identity of the [category’s] typical member, how it behaves, and how… [the 
perceiver] can respond.”1998   
The internal characteristics of cognitive categories include an object’s perceived 
attributes, images of events or movements, and “…patterns of behavior associated with 
the object, and response alternatives.”1999 The judgment process of cognitive categories 
includes two types of decisions, nominal judgments, where an individual makes a 
decision about which category in which to place an object, and ordinal judgments, where 
one positions objects relative to others in the category.2000  There are three levels of 
abstraction in categories.  At the highest level are less abstract categories, where the 
objects may have only a few attributes in common, for example, pieces of furniture.  The 
second level is the basic level, the most commonly used in forming categories.  The 
shape, movements, attributes and functions of objects in the category define basic level 
objects.  Third is the subordinate level, whose objects share many fairly concrete 
attributes with objects in other categories.  Another kind of cognitive category, 
psychological scripts, is recordings of events in the memory that assist the individual with 
predictions and judgments of future events and outcomes.  Political categories divide the 
political environment from other phenomena in the decision-maker’s world, and “identify 
basic level categories.”2001 
 
Cognitive maps in international relations are a visual attempt to show how belief 
systems of decision-makers relate to specific foreign policy issues, and to simulate their 
thought processes concerning actions in possible future scenarios.  They are one of two 
major cognitive models for the study of decision-making in international relations (See 
also Operational Code).2002  The purpose is to “…build models of policy-makers’ 
political worldviews and to use these models to explain decisions.”2003  The assumption 
here is that thought processes are important in politics, and that beliefs and “interpretive 
frameworks” of decision-makers influence and constrain their decisions.  Cognitive maps 
                                                
1995 Ibid., 179-180,182. 
1996 Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 36, 23. 
1997 Ibid., 24, 36. 
1998 Ibid., 23. 
1999 Ibid., 24. 
2000 Ibid., 25. 
2001 Ibid., 37-40. 
2002 Ibid., 5. 
2003 Ibid., 17, 8. 
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resemble diagrams used in systems analysis, and represent concepts (variables) and 
causal beliefs (definitions of variable relationships) connected by arrows.  Policymakers’ 
beliefs are analyzed through documents, interviews, and questionnaires.  Several 
problems with cognitive maps include their “…simplistic view of causality,” sole reliance 
on written and/or oral data, and their inability to predict future events due to their focus 
on past decisions.2004   
 
Cognitive psychology is the branch of psychology that focuses on the study of individual 
perception and decision-making.  This field has generally not examined social or 
aggregate level decisions.2005  Its main assumption is “…that any interaction between an 
organism and its environment changes not only its overt behavior or physiological 
condition but also its knowledge of or information about the environment, and that this 
latter change may affect not only present response but also future orientation to the 
environment.”2006  See also Political cognition.  
 
Cognitive style:  how individuals conceptually organize the environment;2007 how a 
person organizes his/her beliefs and handles information, especially when they are 
contrary to the person’s preexisting beliefs.  Cognitive styles are based on information 
processing and the organization of beliefs, so they influence a person’s images and 
behavior.2008 
 
Colonialism: in political science, has been called “the policy and practice of a stronger 
power extending its control territorially over a weaker people or nation.” The term was 
developed from the Latin word colonia, for country estate. One common meaning of 
colonialism in political science refers to colonialism that has happened in the recent 
historic past, where settlers feel as much a part of the territory where they now live as 
those their ancestors displaced felt (for example, South Africa). Second, colonialism 
refers to a sense of racial superiority and beliefs, practices and attitudes that result from a 
feeling of ethnocentrism. It can also connote xenophobia and racism in domestic society, 
not just overseas.2009  
 Anthropologists have studied colonialism extensively. Michael Watts calls it  
“ …the establishment and maintenance of rule, for an extended period of time, by a 
sovereign power over a subordinate and alien people that is separate from the ruling 
power.” Colonialism is distinct from colonization, which refers to “ …the physical 
settlement of people …from the imperial center in the colonial periphery.” Most colonial 
situations involve legal and political domination over an alien people, economic 
dependence, and regularized cultural and racial inequities. Colonialism is a variant of 
                                                
2004 Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 17-20. 
2005 Richard R. Lau and David O. Sears, Political Cognition: The 19th Annual Carnegie Symposium on 
Cognition (Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1986), 358. 
2006 Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 7. 
2007 Goldstein and Blackman quoted in Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 227. 
2008 Ibid. 
2009 Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, eds., “Colonialism,” in Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2nd 
Ed., (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 92. 
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imperialism (See Imperialism). Anthropologists studying colonialism have produced a 
huge literature. Common bodies of theory contributing to this work include dependency 
theory, neo-Marxism, and world systems theory. Western anthropology in particular has 
focused on the study of non-European “Others” in local places, and the institutions, 
practices, and peoples connected with those structures of Western domination. In some 
senses, anthropology is inseparable from colonialism, since colonial states used 
anthropology to help them understand and rule their colonies. Anthropology also 
pioneered the study of race. Today anthropologists also study postcolonialism, the 
broader contemporary situation of former colonies in the global system.2010 
 
Colonialism and ideology:  In global processes of colonialism, ideology is the 
subordinate worldview of a people being colonized.2011  While the new hegemonic 
worldview of the colonizer(s) provides overall form, ideology gives specific content.2012  
See also Hegemony. 
 
*Cultural logics (simplified version, used for this research): unspoken, shared 
assumptions and cultural patterns under a people’s worldview about something global 
(something that affects people across the world in many places). We can learn about 
cultural logics by studying a people’s actions, stories, and religious beliefs, among other 
things. 
 
Cultural logics:  the underlying rationalities of meaning (political, economic, and 
cultural) that shape human and political responses to the processes of globalization and 
transnationalism.2013 Different cultures contain varying logics of internal organization.  
These “…logics are not hard-and-fast rules, but dynamic, shared predispositions that 
inform behavior and thought.  Cultural logics cannot predict particular behaviors, but 
they …lend a sense of regularity and continuity to behavior….” They are based on a 
shared comprehension of acceptability, and are “…received [and redefined] by 
individuals through …socialization and …social interaction.”  Patterns of cultural logics 
are revealed in religious beliefs, observed behavior, metaphors, historical narratives, and 
other forms.  Cultural logics change very slowly since they are cognitively deep, but they 
are shaped and changed through interaction, catastrophic events, and on differing 
geographic levels—local and global—which connect with global economic processes.2014                  
 
Cultural theory:  Political scientists and anthropologists have attempted to strengthen 
the impact of the culture and political culture concepts in political science, policy studies 
and other social sciences by developing cultural theory.2015  In a historical framework, 
cultural theorists attempt to apply culture to a broad range of policy issues and political 
                                                
2010 Michael Watts, “Colonialism,” in Thomas Barfield, ed., The Dictionary of Anthropology, (Oxford; 
Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 1997), 69-72.  
2011 Comaroff  and Comaroff, Revelation and Revolution, 24-25. 
2012 Ibid., 28-29. 
2013 Ong, Flexible Citizenship, 4-6. 
2014 Fischer, Cultural Logics, 15-24. 
2015 Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, Cultural Theory. 
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theories, based on the recognition that political and policy decisions are made in a context 
of social values.2016  Cultural theory was also inspired by Wildavsky and Douglas’ 
pioneering work in the early 1980s on the influences of social context on risk perceptions 
of environmental and technological dangers.2017  According to cultural theorists, culture 
must be more clearly defined and measured.2018   
 
*Culture (my definition, used for this project): is all learned behavior, knowledge, values 
and attitudes, “… is a shared worldview held by a group or organization,” is distinctive, 
and has three main parts:  1) technology, 2) behavior, and 3) knowledge. 
 
Culture is all learned behavior and knowledge, as well as values and attitudes.2019 In 
applied anthropology, “culture is a shared worldview held by a group or organization.  
Cultures are distinctive, and have three main components:  artifacts [technology]…; 
behavior…; and knowledge….”2020  
 
Culture of politics, a holistic analytical approach for the study of political life and 
culture, was developed by political scientists and anthropologists in the 1990s.  In her 
work on regime change and democratization in Africa, Pearl T. Robinson argues that we 
need to examine political phenomena more holistically, by looking beyond government 
structures, to the contexts in which political life occurs.2021 Rather than focusing on 
political attitudes of citizens alone, as the political culture approach does (see Political 
culture), we need to use a wide variety of sources, materials and methods, including 
surveys and analyses of contemporary cultural phenomena such as street protests, 
political cartoons, rhetoric, dramas, and music.  Angelique Haugerud's The Culture of 
Politics in Modern Kenya (1995) fruitfully uses the “culture of politics” approach to 
analyze how Kenya constructs its national political culture. Haugerud seamlessly and 
creatively integrates multiple scales of analysis (local, national, regional and global) and 
methods (from anthropology, politics, and economics).2022 
 
Datsua-nyûô (leave Asia, join the West):  In the Meiji period (1868-1912), Japan’s 
leaders idolized the West.  According to the Datsua-nyûô doctrine, to promote 
development, some argued that Japan must follow the same path as the West, and that it 
must divorce itself from its Asian foundations.2023 
 
Decision-making and perception include rational and irrational factors, influenced by 
perception.  The basic steps include:  “1) definition of the situation, 2) calculation and 
evaluation of alternatives, 3) choice or selection of alternatives, and 4) implementation.”  
                                                
2016 Wildavsky, Ellis, and Thompson, Culture Matters, xiii-xvii. 
2017 Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture 1982. 
2018 Wildavsky, Ellis, and Thompson, Culture Matters. 
2019 This is my own definition, drawn from both political science and anthropology. 
2020 Nolan, Development Anthropology, 309. 
2021 Robinson, “Democratization.” 
2022 Haugerud, Culture of Politics.  
2023 Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 169-170. 
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Each stage is influenced by three considerations:  desires, possibility, and obligation.  
Decision-makers are influenced and constrained by their own perceptions, and sometimes 
label their opponents as enemies.2024 
 
*Development has several primary meanings—first, an increase in a society’s capacity 
for industrial production and the products of capitalism, and movement toward being a 
“modern” society.  Second, it means improving quality of life, the standard of living, and 
eliminating or relieving poverty.2025  In applied anthropology, it includes “attempts to 
[build] …local capacity, and [encourage] …local participation and decision-making.  
Development almost always involves multiple groups, and therefore, multiple cultural 
perspectives.”2026 
 
Development ideology:  In the task of development, ideology is a “…means of 
establishing symbolic relations between people and the state.”2027  It has also been called 
“…a set of doctrines about the proper methods to attain economic progress.”  While 
ideology is often associated with state power, and seems to take a directive role in state 
development planning, it is also contingent and malleable.2028  Contemporary 
anthropologists working in all three major theoretical approaches to anthropology and 
development (applied, postmodern, and actor-oriented) are making valuable contributions 
to the analysis of ideological factors in development.2029   
Historically, ideologies have played an important role in the development of East 
Asia.  Nationalistic ideologies used in promoting development in Meiji Japan included 
fukoku kyôhei and shokusan kôgyô.  In South Korea, “defeat communism and achieve 
unification” and in Taiwan, “retake the mainland” were important ideologies that initially 
motivated those nations’ postwar economic growth.2030  Since the rise of the West, 
modern history has been a process of the gradual domination of the West (the core) over 
the rest of the world (the periphery).2031  The ideologies of capitalism and communism, 
both of which originated in the West, are examples of powerful development ideologies 
that have had global significance.      
Some of the recent slogans used by third world governments to promote 
development include marketization, industrialization, and modernization.  “Market” and 
“democracy” are two of the most prized development ideologies today, and are 
aggressively promoted by the West and many international organizations.  These values 
have great appeal—“…the market mechanism is genuinely attractive because it [often] 
                                                
2024 Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Enemies, 13-16. 
2025 Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine, 15, 55. 
2026 Nolan, Development Anthropology, 309. 
2027 Robertson, People and the State, 41. 
2028 Ibid., 98-99. 
2029 See my overall discussion above of how the three major approaches to anthropology and development 
handle ideology and development in Chapter 1.  For applied approaches, also see Hoben, “Agricultural 
Decision Making;” and Gardner and Lewis, Anthropology, Development, and Post-Modern.  For a 
postmodern treatment, see Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine.  For actor-oriented studies, see Long and 
Long, Battlefields of Knowledge; and Arce and Long, Anthropology, Development, and Modernities. 
2030 Watanabe, “Designing Asia,” 202. 
2031 K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11. 
837 
 
promotes economic growth.”  International organizations encourage developing nations 
to “convert” through programs like structural adjustment, peacekeeping, and election 
monitoring.2032   See also Internationalization; “Modernization;” Translative adaptation.   
 
Developmental state:  a form of political economy that emphasizes state-led industrial 
policy through strategic approaches.  The government stresses “plan rational” 
development in collaboration with the private sector, and structures that guide domestic 
industry and enhance international competitiveness. Four key features of a developmental 
state are:  1) a small, elite bureaucracy, 2) a political system where the bureaucracy is 
given adequate space to intervene effectively in the economy, 3) perfection of methods of 
state intervention which still respect the market, and 4) overall guidance through a pilot 
agency like Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).2033  Limited 
elements of this concept should be institutionally transferable to other regions.2034 
 
Developmentalism is “…the ideology which places highest priority on economic 
development.”2035  It is “…a conscious attempt to exploit the tendency toward dynamic 
increasing returns regardless of who pursues it, whether a firm, a government, or any 
other organization.”  Developmentalism at the state level involves industrial policy.2036  It 
is “…an economic system based on private property and the market economy, …where 
the government is permitted to intervene in the market from the long-term perspective….  
Clearly, the state …is the founding unit of developmentalism as a political and economic 
system.”2037   
 
Ethnography:  a description of a single contemporary culture or a piece of culture, the 
collection of data that describe a culture,2038 or “…the study of a community or ethnic 
group at close quarters and the text (usually a monograph) which results.”2039  
 
*Flaw of the Excluded Middle: According to this concept developed by anthropologist 
Paul Hiebert, in their worldviews, Westerners often have a two-tiered view of the 
universe that excludes a middle realm commonly seen by non-Westerners. Many 
Westerners see two “worlds” or domains: the “seen world” of material, visible 
phenomena in this world, and the transempirical world (supernatural worlds beyond this 
present world, such as heavens and hells). Between the seen and transempirical worlds, 
Westerners miss the “unseen” domain of this present world: invisible things such as 
unseen powers (i.e. magical forces, the evil eye) and spirit forces in everyday life 
                                                
2032 Ibid., 11-12. 
2033 Watanabe, “Designing Asia,” 205-206. 
2034 Johnson, MITI. 
2035 Watanabe, “Designing Asia,” 204. 
2036 Murakami, “Theory of Developmentalism,” 180-184,188. 
2037 Ibid., 203. 
2038 H. Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 16-17. 
2039 Gardner and Lewis, Anthropology, Development, and Post-Modern, xiv. 
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(demons, spirits) that are commonly recognized by non-Westerners.2040 Anthropologist 
Charles Kraft makes a similar argument. Secular bias in common Western worldviews, 
based on the influence of the French Enlightenment, often blinds Westerners to the reality 
of the supernatural in everyday life. We fail to “see” or experience what we do not 
believe exists. Yet many non-Western cultures recognize and experience the operation of 
supernatural forces in this present world.2041 
 
Foreign aid/assistance:  “…a transfer of real resources or immediate claims on resources 
(such as foreign exchange) from one country to another, which would not have taken 
place as a result of market forces or in the absence of specific official action… by the 
donor country….” The OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) definition of 1973 includes grants, official loans, and credits with 
maturities over one year.  It excludes private export credits and private foreign 
investment.2042  One important form of foreign aid is ODA (Official Development 
Assistance) (see ODA, Japanese). 
 
Fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong army):  a powerful national slogan used in Japan 
during the Meiji period (1868 to 1912) to promote the adaptation of economic capitalism 
(fukoku) and a modernized military (kyôhei).2043  Richard J. Samuels traces the meaning 
of this and similar ideologies in Rich Nation, Strong Army (1994).2044 
 
*Globalization (simplified version used for this research) is speeded up and intensified 
global connections, including economic, social, cultural, and political linkages. It can be 
ethnographically and comparatively assessed on the micro-level (how it is perceived by 
individual, human actors) or the macro-level (public, shared perceptions).  It does not 
spread from one center or cultural tradition, but from several. 
 
Globalization is the process of speeded up and intensified global connections, especially 
in economics, but also social, cultural, and political linkages.  In anthropology, a well-
known portrayal of global cultural flows is Appadurai’s notion of “scapes:”  ideoscapes, 
ethnoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and technoscapes.  Analysis of the experience 
of specific actors, and the meanings they apply to globalization, is needed 
(microglobalization).  Or globalization can be experienced on a more public level 
(macroglobalization).2045  Grounded, empirical, ethnographic studies of globalization’s 
effects will allow a comparative theory of globalization to emerge.  Globalization does 
not spread from one center or cultural tradition. Rather, there are “multiple 
globalizations.”2046  Globalization emanating from Japan is just as powerful as those of 
the West.  
                                                
2040 Hiebert, “Flaw of Excluded Middle,” and  Anthropological Reflections. 
2041 Kraft, Christianity with Power.  
2042 Loutfi, Net Cost Japanese Foreign Aid, 97. 
2043 Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 169. 
2044 Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army." 
2045 Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference,” 48-49. 




Hegemony:  the dominant, finally naturalized worldview of a people in the process of 
being colonized.2047  Usually this corresponds in some degree with the predominant 
worldviews of the colonizer(s).  Hegemony provides overall form for the new 
worldviews in the colonized region.2048  See also Colonialism and ideology. 
 
Ideology: Political sociologist Karl Mannheim’s concept of ideology has been influential 
on later scholarship on ideology and worldview in both political science and 
anthropology.  He calls ideology “…the characteristics and composition of the total 
structure of the mind of [an] …epoch or [a] …group.”  Ideology combines concepts of 
both individual interests and the “…the whole outlook of a social group.”2049    
Ideology has many varied definitions in political science.2050 A common one 
derives from Weltanschauung, or world-view, meaning one’s overall perception of the 
social world and how it works.  An ideology is a consistent set of beliefs, morals, and 
attitudes.2051  Scholars of foreign policy argue that ideology can be viewed as a cognitive 
map, worldview, or guide to action.  It is often systematic, connects action and policy, 
and helps to frame situations, establish goals, and legitimize authority.2052  This project 
draws heavily on political scientist Richard Samuels’ notion of ideology, “…the ways in 
which history and political structure conspire to constrain the strategic choices of 
nations.”  Ideas/ideologies alone do not drive political outcomes. Rather, ideas and 
institutions interact extensively, and this interaction is finalized in the political economy.  
Ideologies are malleable and contested, and are embodied “…in a concrete and particular 
social history that has not only dates, but also names and faces.”2053   
Anthropologist Michael Kearney argues that in their nature, content and function, 
worldviews are influenced by ideological biases, and can also function as ideologies.  
Kearney identifies two primary ideological orientations that have influenced worldviews, 
cultural idealism and historical materialism.  In the former view, ideas drive social 
conditions, and in the latter view, social conditions cause ideas.2054  This debate is now 
outmoded in cultural anthropology.2055 According to Ernest Gellner, ideologies claim 
                                                
2047 Comaroff and Comaroff, Revelation and Revolution, 24-25. 
2048 Ibid., 28-29. 
2049 Mannheim, Wirth, and Shils, Ideology and Utopia, 55-59; Ibid. in Robertson, People and the State, 98. 
2050 John B. Thompson argues that the most common sense of ideology in contemporary political science is 
rather neutral, and refers to fairly coherent, discrete systems of thought, many of which are “isms,” such as 
communism, fascism or Catholicism (John B. Thompson, “Ideology,” in Oxford Companion to World 
Politics [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001], 381). Charles Jones calls ideology “any 
comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which a social group makes sense of the world” 
(Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 1996:233).  Marx did some of the most important work on the 
nature of ideology, and inspired a large amount of later work on the topic in political science and other 
social sciences.  I do not find Marx’s work relevant here, however.  For a brief summary of Marx’s 
contribution, see Ibid. 381 and Naugle, Worldview, 235-38. 
2051 Robertson, Dictionary Modern Politics, 232. 
2052 Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Enemies, 99-100, 19. 
2053 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” x-xi; Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late 
Meiji Period (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 10. 
2054 Naugle, Worldview, 240-242, 244. 
2055 Conversation with Sarah Hamilton, University of Denver, May 2003. 
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ultimacy, but are “…formed and perpetuated within a broader framework of language, 
values and discourse, from which they extract their meaning.”  Ideologies must accept the 
norms of the worlds within which they function, and seek to draw adherents.2056  For the 
state, ideologies create official aspirations and help to structure them.2057   
 
*Image (simplified version, used for this project): the basic ideas and pictures in our 
minds about reality; how we organize these ideas and pictures in our minds about reality 
and the world around us.  A set of images can form a worldview. 
 
Image (anthropology) has two general meanings, according to Kearney.  One is “…a 
visual representation in the mind.”  The second is fundamental, general perceptions and 
concepts of reality or schemata that together form a worldview.2058  Images of an object 
are constructed through a selective process of memory, of remembering and forgetting.  
The same is true of images of Japan constructed by Japanese expatriates and non-
Japanese local peoples in foreign countries.  Some tend to idealize Japan, others 
minimize negative memories, and some focus on their bad experiences with Japan.  
Historical experiences with Japan are sometimes not exploited, unless they are found to 
be useful.  Foreign governments may invoke either negative images of Japan (the case of 
China) or positive ones (Prime Minister Tony Blair’s campaign in the mid-1990s to 
promote state welfare in Britain) to suit their purposes.2059 
 
Image (political science) refers to “…perceptual filters that organize our environment 
and enable us to predict and respond to that environment.”  Like stereotypes, images 
include both facts and emotional responses.”2060  They are also called “…cognitive 
organizing devices, …information filters, …schema, …and …perceptual patterns.  They 
are frequently treated as synonymous with beliefs, … although … [they are not].  Images 
are cognitive organizing devices, while beliefs incorporate cognition and affect…. 
Psychology indicates that environments tend to be organized into seven, plus or minus 
two, images.”2061    
 There are several important types of images.  The enemy image is a range or 
collection of perceptions about an opponent.2062 In an international conflict, images of the 
enemy influence a nation’s internal and external images of itself. An enemy will polarize 
our images of good and evil.2063  Self-images “…serve the same function as images of 
others:  they facilitate information processing and environmental management, [and they] 
…tend to hold more positive attributes than negative ones.”2064 A national image is 
“…the totality of attributes that a person recognizes …when he contemplates [a] 
                                                
2056 Gellner quoted in Robertson, People and the State, 99. 
2057 Geertz in Robertson, People and the State, 98. 
2058 Michael Kearney, World View (Novato, Calif: Chandler & Sharp, 1984), 47.  
2059 Befu, “Global Context,” 15-18. 
2060 Cottam, Images and Intervention, 10. 
2061 Cottam, “Recent Development,” 3. 
2062 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 24. 
2063 Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Enemies, 19-21. 
2064 Cottam, “Recent Development,” 7. 
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…nation.”2065  Images are a valuable tool through which states can achieve their 
international goals without the use of costly resources. As rational actors, states attempt 
to project desired, even deceptive, images at low cost.  A state’s images are one major 
determinant among several of the policies of other states toward it.  We can study state 
images on the decision-making level.  They are often hard to change, since they include 
immutable factors like geography.2066 
Images have been studied generally as information screens and specifically as the 
image of the enemy.  By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the concept of image was also 
investigated in terms of stereotyping.  Eventually “the analytical utility of the concept 
expanded as efforts were made to explore the totality of images in the cognitive 
worldview of foreign policy makers.”2067  Theoretical issues in the study of image are 
complex.  Investigators have tended to focus on smaller concepts rather than larger 
theoretical frameworks.2068 
 
Imperialism: in political science, has been defined as “…domination or control by one 
country or group over others.” The exact nature, causes, clearest examples and other 
aspects of the term are debated by social scientists. In political science, there are varied 
arguments and positions on many of these issues. For example, some analysts contend 
that equating imperialism with global capitalism is too inexact, that a wider variety of 
politico-economic conditions are present.2069 Anthropologists have defined imperialism 
as “ …unequal territorial relationships among states based on subordination and 
domination, associated with particular expressions of industrial capitalism such as 
financial monopolies and transnational capital flows.”2070 The anthropological treatment 
shows more Marxist influence. 
 
*Industrial policy (simplified version, based on Murakami Yasusuke’s concept, used for 
this project): everything a government does in a country’s economy. It often includes 
technology. 
 
Industrial policy consists of all forms of government intervention into the economy, 
such as protection of failing industries, trade policies that protect infant industries, and 
promotion of high-tech industries.2071  The policy tools of industrial policy include:  basic 
policies (identification of industries), indicative, long-term or educative planning, 
promotion and diffusion of technical innovation, broad policies of protection (trade 
protection and subsidies), policies for the preservation of polipoly2072 (through the 
                                                
2065 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 12-13. 
2066 Jervis, Logic of Images, 3, 6, 8, 10-14. 
2067 Cottam, “Recent Development,” 3. 
2068 Ibid., 17-18. 
2069 Peter Burnell, “Imperialism,” in Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, eds., Concise Oxford Dictionary 
of Politics, 2nd Ed., (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 259-260. 
2070 Michael Watts, “Colonialism,” 69. 
2071 Murakami, “Theory of Developmentalism,” 188-190. 
2072 Polipoly refers to competition within a group of highly innovative firms.  In this case, the uncertainty of 
technical innovation “…causes a large number of firms to endlessly compete for a leading position, without 
any lasting monopoly.”  See Murakami, “Theory of Developmentalism,” 186-187. 
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regulation of prices, investments and production), indirect financial controls, and entry 
and exit policies for foreign firms.2073 
 
Institutions are “organizational mechanisms that ‘remain relatively invariant in the face 
of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and 
expectations of individuals.’”  Three important types of institutions are governmental 
institutions, economic institutions, and those that connect society, economy and politics, 
such as electoral systems and parties.2074  Institutions include rules, sanctions, legalistic 
aspects, and means of enforcement.2075  According to the World Bank, they signify the 
government’s ability to design and implement appropriate policies.2076 
 
*Internationalization (simplified version, used for this project): refers to the process 
where the “active” West absorbed the “passive” non-West, for the sake of its own 
development.  The non-West has included Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Americas, and 
much exploitation and subjugation.2077 Internationalization focuses on external, 
international processes: what happens as the powerful “core” West absorbs other peoples 
from the periphery into the global market. It looks at both economic and cultural factors: 
what occurs as the periphery countries are absorbed into the “cultural universe” of the 
West? Internationalization does not examine internal implications. It especially considers 
what happened on the international level through historic processes of colonialism. It can 
also study contemporary issues; i.e. what happens on the international level as Western 
development ideologies affect non-Western countries? 
 
Internationalization:  as defined by some Japanese scholars, is essentially the same as 
the process of “modernization” (see “modernization”).  Specifically, it is “…the process 
by which the militarily and economically superior West has subjugated other peoples in 
the periphery, absorbing them into its own cultural universe, positioning them as inferior, 
and exploiting them, if necessary, to the benefit of its own development.”  The “active” 
West dominates the “passive” non-West.  The zenith of this movement was the 
colonization of Asia, Africa and Oceania in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries,2078 though the earlier colonization of the Americas by Western powers is 
similar.  Internationalization continues today through the promotion of Western values 
like free markets and democracy in international development (see development 
ideology).2079  A second meaning of internationalization (kokusaika) is specific to Japan.  
See Kokusaika.   
 
                                                
2073 Ibid., 186, 189-190. 
2074 March and Olsen quoted in Pempel, Regime Shift, 1998. 
2075 Margaret Levi, “A Model, A Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis,” in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, eds. Mark Irving Lichbach and 
Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 25. 
2076 Ohno and Ohno, Japanese Views, 307. 
2077 K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11-12. 




JBIC (Japan Bank of International Cooperation):  a Japanese government agency 
established in the late 1990s.  Its purpose is to “…contribute to the sound development of 
Japan and the international economy and community through undertaking lending and 
other financial operations:  for the promotion of Japanese exports, imports or Japanese 
economic activities overseas; for the stability of international financial order, and for 
economic and social development or economic stability in developing areas; in 
accordance with the principle that it shall not compete with commercial financial 
institutions.”  Through September 2008, the two main components of the bank’s 
operations were International Financial Operations (IFO) and Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Operations (OECO), plus several supportive and administrative programs.  
IFO programs primarily consist of “…export loans, import loans, overseas investment 
loans, untied loans, [bridge loans, refinancing,] …and equity participation in overseas 
projects of Japanese corporations.”  OECO programs provided long-term, low interest 
ODA (official development assistance) loans for the “…self-help efforts of developing 
countries, including social infrastructure development and economic stabilization” (see 
also ODA, Japanese).  OECO used to exist as an important Japanese government agency, 
the OEFC (see OECF).  The primary areas OECO loans funded included socioeconomic 
infrastructure such as telecommunications, gas, power, agriculture and transportation.  
Additional areas include social development, human resource development, economic 
stabilization, and environmental conservation.  OECO also provided “Private Sector 
Investment Finance” (PSIF) which “…supports the activities of private companies in 
developing countries.”2080 On October 1, 2008, IFOs will be taken over by a new 
Japanese organization, the Japan Finance Corporation,2081 within its international finance 
area,2082 and JBIC’s OECOs will be absorbed into a new JICA organization.2083 JBIC had 
a total budget of 1,777 billion yen for FY 2007,2084 and outstanding loans worth 19,351.7 
                                                







2081 This is the tentative name for the new organization (JBIC, available from 
http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/profile/governor/index.php. Internet; accessed 12 August 2008). For 
more information on the merger process, see JBIC, available from 
http://www.jbic.go.jp/autocontents/english/news/2007/000085/index.htm; accessed 12 August 2008 and 
JBIC, http://www.jbic.go.jp/autocontents/ english/news/2007/000085/01.htm; accessed 12 August 2008. 
2082 The international finance sector of the new Japan Finance Corporation will continue to use the name 
JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation) (JBIC, available from 
http://www.jbic.go.jp/autocontents/english/news/2007/000085/01.htm. Internet; accessed 12 August 2008). 
2083 JBIC, http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/profile/governor/index.php; accessed 12 August 2008. 
2084 This budget was down from 1, 910 billion yen for fiscal year 2002. The 2007 budget figure includes 
1,007.0 billion yen for IFO, and 770 billion yen for OECO. Information (2007 data) about JBIC was taken 
from the following website: JBIC, http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/profile/organize/index.php; accessed 
12 August 2008. 
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billion yen on March 31, 2007.2085  JBIC’s staff numbers about 865.2086 JBIC has 29 
primary departments, sections and divisions in Tokyo.2087  There are also 29 branch 
offices outside Tokyo, both in Japan and overseas.2088  
 
JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency):  a Japanese government-related, 
independent agency established in 1974.2089 With JBIC, it has been one of the most 
important Japanese agencies responsible for Japanese ODA policy (see also JBIC and 
ODA, Japanese).2090 JICA handles the technical cooperation programs of Japan’s ODA. 
Its aim is the transfer of technologies and knowledge to aid the socioeconomic 
development and nation-building capacity of LDCs.  JICA’s chief programs include 
technical training of overseas trainees in Japan, a youth invitation program, dispatching 
technical cooperation experts from Japan overseas, project-type technical cooperation, 
development studies, provision of equipment, grant aid, the JOCV program (similar to 
the U.S. Peace Corps), disaster relief, limited support for Japanese emigrants and ethnic 
Japanese (mostly in Latin American locations), addressing aid effectiveness and global 
issues, and a community empowerment program.2091 JICA has more than 1,300 full-time 
                                                
2085 Outstanding loans were down from 21,737.1 billion yen on March 31, 2002. 2002 data in this and 
several of the footnotes, immediately following, was taken from these websites (all accessed September 17, 




english/base/profile/list/index.php; http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/network/ index.php. 
2086 The staff figure was current on March 31, 2007 JBIC, available from 
http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/bse/profile/organize/index.php. Internet; accessed 12 August 2008), and is a 
slight decrease from 886 staff in the early 2000s. 
2087 This figure includes the JBIC Institute, JBIC’s economic research center and think tank in Tokyo 
(JBIC, available from http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/about/ develop/index.php. Internet; accessed 12 
August 2008). There were about 27 primary departments in the early 2000s in JBIC in Tokyo. 
2088 This refers to the number of offices outside Tokyo, both domestic and international, on August 12, 
2008 (JBIC, http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/ network/index.php; accessed 12 August 2008). 
2089 In late 2003, as part of the Japanese government’s reform plans, JICA was transformed into an 
“independent administrative institution,” to promote more accountable and efficient ODA, strengthened 
public participation, peace building assistance, efficiency, transparency, and accountability. Now JICA 
manages and operates itself fairly autonomously, but presents plans, goals and performance evaluations to 
MOFA twice a year.  While third parties increasingly scrutinize its work, JICA has more freedom to select 
aid recipients. Sadako Ogata, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, became director in 
late 2003. Many hoped that she would bring a fresh touch to JICA, given her broad experience. Indeed she 
has encouraged more public participation and cooperation between governments and NGOs in Japan’s aid 
policy and JICA.  Critics charge that bureaucrats have long dominated JICA. In the past, its top chief has 
usually been a retired bureaucrat from MOFA. Information here about JICA is from these websites (all 
accessed 17 September 2003): JICA, available from http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/02.html; 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/ about/index.html; http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/newjica.html; 
http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getcd.p15?ed20030917al.htm.  
2090 This is in addition to several major ministries, one of which is MOFA. 
2091 Information about JICA is from these websites (all accessed 17 September 2003): 





staff members. They serve at varied locations, including the Tokyo headquarters, an 
additional 18 domestic offices including the Institute for International Cooperation, and 
99 overseas offices. JICA’s budget (end of FY 2006) was 155.6 billion yen.2092 In 
October 2008, the ODA activities of JBIC merged with JICA into a “new” JICA, creating 
a larger bilateral aid agency with an estimated budget of $8.5 billion, offering technical 
cooperation, grant and loan assistance within one agency.2093  
 
Kokusaika (internationalization):  an informal movement and way of thinking that was 
strongly advocated by the public and private sectors in Japan starting in the late 1970s.  
Kokusaika promoted international values in Japan through improved foreign language 
education, international conferences and scientific exchanges, the media, and 
international trade shows.  It was promoted outside Japan through exhibitions of Japanese 
culture in major world cities, the global spread of Japanese pop culture, Japanese foreign 
aid, and public and private trade organizations.  Examples of public vehicles that promote 
internationalization are the JET program inside Japan, and the Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) abroad.2094 Some critics condemn kokusaika as a sham.2095 
 
Kokutai: (national essence or polity), a scholarly line of inquiry in Japan in the 
Tokugawa era, stressed the uniqueness of the Japanese polity, through such ideas as the 
rule of Japan through the unbroken imperial rule, and Japan as a “family-state” (kazoku 
kokka).2096 The debate over the meaning of the kokutai goes back to the nineteenth 
century, and was, at its start, heavily influenced by different schools of Shinto.  Central to 
the concept of kokutai is the idea that the Japanese polity is unique, since the Japanese 
                                                
2092 Japan International Cooperation Agency, available from http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/orga.html. 
Internet; accessed 9 August 2008.  
2093 Japan International Cooperation Agency, available from http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/oda.html. 
Internet; accessed 9 August 2008. 
2094 JET is an official Japanese government program that has placed thousands of young foreign teachers of 
English and other major Western languages in locations throughout Japan. For more on JET, see 
McConnell, Importing Diversity and McConnell, “JET Lag.”  The Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) has offices in major cities worldwide, and for a long time, was a branch of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). In 2003, JETRO was reorganized as a government-affiliated, 
“incorporated administrative agency” (JETRO. “Changes in Japanese Trade & Investment: Evolution of 
JETRO.” Available from http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/jetro/profile/pdf/jetro.pdf; accessed 3 March 2008. 
Earlier it promoted Japanese products overseas, while more recently it has promoted foreign products and 
trade in Japan, and trade opportunities for small and medium sized Japanese firms (Ibid.).  It continues to 
gather global economic data. 
2095 While numerous Japanese organizations and institutions have promoted kokusaika, critics charge that 
Japan maintains the highest degree of discriminatory barriers against participation by foreigners in their 
society of any major industrialized nation.  Ivan P. Hall provides numerous examples of how Japanese 
institutions regularly discriminate against foreign participants in sectors such as law, academia, journalism, 
and scientific exchanges.  Hall charges that while Japan has eagerly embraced foreign things and ideologies 
since the Meiji era, it purposely limits in-depth participation by foreign people in Japan to a token 
minimum.  A good example is the refusal of most Japanese universities to grant tenure to foreign 
instructors.  Hall concludes that this sort of discriminatory parochialism threatens Japan’s future 
contributions to and ability to meaningfully function in the modern world.  See Ivan P. Hall, Cartels of the 
Mind: Japan's Intellectual Closed Shop (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1998), 172-185. 
2096 Japan, “Kokutai,” 819. 
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imperial line is descended in an unbroken line from the gods, and the concept of the 
family state, that all Japanese are related to the emperor as their “father.”  The debate 
reemerged in 1935, and the concept was important through the end of World War II as 
nationalist ideology promoted by Japan’s government.2097 
 
*“Modernization” (my definition, used for this project) is the process where a rich 
country in the core (center) of the world’s economy forces weaker, poorer countries in 
the periphery to trade with it, so it can become richer and more developed. As a poor, 
non-Western country is absorbed into the world economy, on the surface, its culture will 
start to look more Western (like the cultures of the rich “core”). But the core of its culture 
will not change much, but stay mostly non-Western. 
 
“Modernization,”2098 according to certain Japanese scholars, is the process through 
which the core West, which is economically and militarily superior, forces weaker 
peripheral peoples into the global economic system, in order to exploit them for its own 
development.2099  Anthropologically, “modernization” can be called “…the adaptive 
acceptance of Western civilization [culture] under the persistent form of the existing 
culture [of a non-Western society]….”2100  “Modernization” presupposes that non-
Western societies will evolve and eventually become like Western ones.  A non-Western 
society may adapt to Western civilization and the market principle, but core areas of non-
Western societies, such their social organization, will never become Western.  
“Modernization” is not unilinear.2101 Japan’s “modernization” began with the arrival of 
Commodore Perry’s “Black Ships” (armed steamships) in Japan in 1853, which helped to 
force open the nation to trade.  This process has continued through the Meiji Restoration 
                                                
2097 Japan, “Kokutai,” “Kokutai debate,” and “Kokutai no hongi,” 819-820. 
2098 I put quotation marks around the term “modernization” to distinguish this unique Japanese version of 
the concept from the more widely known definition of modernization used by Western social scientists 
such as W.W. Rostow in the 1960s and after. This concept was developed in the attempt to provide an 
acceptable, non-Marxist definition of how the newly independent countries in Asia, Africa and elsewhere 
could “develop.” In the more conventional definition, economic development is presumed to include a set 
of definitive stages any developing country must pass through to “develop.” This concept of modernization 
was also applied to other issues, including politics and society.      
2099 K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11. 
2100 Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 174. Maegawa’s conception of modernization is very similar to 
Comaroff and Comaroff’s concept of colonialism and ideology, except in the latter case, they argue that the 
ideologies of the receiving culture, despite providing content, will be subsumed under the overall form of 
the hegemonic worldview of the colonizer.  Maegawa seems to be suggesting that if the “modernization” is 
“successful,” the culture or worldviews of the receiving (non-Western) society will maintain their 
“persistent form,” and not be engulfed or subsumed under the adoption or entrance of the Western 
culture/worldview.  Comaroff and Comaroff assume that the Western (or colonizer’s) worldview will 
dominate that of the receptor society, at least in overall form.  We must also note that “colonizers” are not 
necessarily Western, as in the case of Japanese colonialism in East and Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific from 1895-1945, and the contemporary “colonialism” (perhaps an exaggerated accusation) of 
Chinese investment in Africa, a greatly increasing trend at present (2006). 
2101 Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 175. 
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(1868) up to the present.  It was a process of adaptation to the global economic system 
led by the modern Western nations.2102  See also Translative adaptation.  
 
ODA, Japanese (Official Development Assistance):  foreign aid that is coordinated by 
the Japanese government.  Japan’s ODA program began in 1954, while Japan itself 
received aid from the World Bank to aid in the postwar reconstruction of its economy.  
Japan’s aid has increased almost every year since that time.  Japan’s aid has gradually 
expanded to include recipients outside of Asia, and strategic, political goals, in addition 
to economic ones.  Japan’s ODA is divided into two forms, multilateral ODA and 
bilateral ODA.  Multilateral ODA consists of subscriptions and contributions to 
international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank.  Bilateral ODA 
includes grants (grant aid and technical cooperation) and loans.  Grants are provided by 
JICA, while loans are released by JBIC (see JICA and JBIC).  The purpose of Japan’s 
ODA is to contribute to global peace and prosperity through helping to stabilize the 
international economy, by supporting “…economic infrastructures and social 
development in developing countries.”  In its aid philosophy, Japan emphasizes self-help 
and self-reliance, often through the provision of ODA loans, as well as values of 
democratization and human rights.  Japan’s first ODA Charter was adopted in 1992.  Its 
goals included environmental conservation and development in tandem, the avoidance of 
using ODA for military purposes or sending it to countries with increasing militarization 
or arms trade, the strengthening of international peace and stability, democratization, 
market-based economies, human rights and freedom.  The second ODA Charter was 
approved in 2003.  According to the new charter, the effectiveness of Japanese aid must 
be improved.  The new charter defines the purpose of Japanese aid as “contributing to the 
peace and development of the international community and thereby ensuring the nation’s 
security and prosperity,” amid complex problems associated with globalization, including 
human rights, pollution, terrorism, religious and ethnic conflicts, and the gap between 
rich and poor.  Japan’s new aid policy will also require increased oversight (and 
monitoring) of the aid process on the part of Japan, the donor nation.  Formerly aid was 
provided on the basis of requests from potential recipients.  The majority of Japan’s ODA 
loans go to Asian countries.  ODA loans from the Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Operations of the JBIC account for 40 percent of Japan’s ODA, making them the 
“…cornerstone of Japanese ODA policy.”  Japan’s budget for total ODA for fiscal year 
1999 was $15.385 billion.2103 Since then it has decreased significantly. 
 
OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund):  the Japanese government agency that 
implemented Japan’s huge ODA (official development assistance) program from the 
1950s through the late 1990s (Ohno 1998: 1).  OECF provided “…so-called ‘two-step’ 
loans at concessional interest rates with long maturities to governments or public 
                                                
2102 Ibid., 167. 
2103 Information about Japanese ODA was taken from the following websites (all accessed 17 September 






financial institutions in developing countries.  Loan funds [were] …on-lent by borrower 
governments or public financial institutions in developing countries….  Two-step loans 
[were] …one of the main vehicles for Japan’s ODA loans….”2104 In the late 1990s, the 
OECF was absorbed into the newly created Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
(JBIC).  See also JBIC.  
 
Operational code is one of two major cognitive models for the study of decision-making 
in international relations (See also Cognitive maps).2105  It is “a guideline for describing 
some of the political beliefs of policymakers; …a descriptive set of analytical 
categories.”2106  When combined with theories of cognition, these beliefs suggest a 
connection between beliefs and behavior.2107  An operational code attempts to provide a 
“…general, non-situation-specific, framework of fundamental beliefs about politics and 
the political world.”  Beliefs are organized hierarchically, and scholars attempt to identify 
those that are central (unchangeable).  Two kinds of beliefs are seminal.  Philosophical 
beliefs are “fundamental assumptions” about politics, and instrumental beliefs are 
assumptions of “…how politics should be approached, [and] what kinds of behavior are 
appropriate.”  The code has several problems, such as connecting beliefs and behavior, 
and generating testable hypotheses.  Several scholars, including Holsti, have developed 
code typologies.2108    
 
Organizational culture(s):  “Organizations, like societies, have cultures of their own.  
Although an organization’s culture may incorporate major elements from the society in 
which it exists, it will differ in other ways.  Organizations that contain members from 
different cultures will reflect these differences to some extent.”2109  Also, organizational 
culture is a subject studied by several different disciplines, including anthropology, 
management sciences, policy sciences, sociology, linguistics, social philosophy, and 
psychology.  Anthropological studies of organizational culture fall within a wider 
framework of comparative (ethnological) and single culture studies of work and human 
relations in societies since human prehistory.  Today’s organizational anthropologists 
also apply the culture concept holistically to the study of formal organizations in complex 
societies.  The first anthropological studies were done in the 1930s.2110  
 
Organization(s) are “…groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to 
achieve objectives,”2111 “…collective actors who might be subject to institutional 
                                                
2104 Masaki Shiratori, “Afterword to the Japanese Translation of the World Bank Report the East Asian 
Miracle.” In Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market, ed. Kenichi Ohno 
and Izumi Ohno (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 77-83. 
2105Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 5.  
2106 Ibid., 12, 17, quoted in Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 3.  
2107 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 3. 
2108 See Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 13-14. 
2109 Nolan, Development Anthropology, 313. 
2110 Tomoko Hamada and Willis E. Sibley, Anthropological Perspectives on Organizational Culture 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 3, 6-7, 10-11. 
2111 Douglass Cecil North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5, in Levi, “A Model, A Method, and a Map,” 25. 
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constraint,”2112 or “…a body of procedures by which participating members pursue 
together a set of agreed goals through control of uncertainty.”2113  Anthropologically, an 
organization can be defined as “…a socio-cultural system embedded in larger socio-
cultural environments.”  Management is perhaps only one subculture among several of an 
organization’s cultures.  Organizational life is rather fluid, not linear, in the midst of 
changing decisions, plans, actors, meanings, and statuses.  Perception of organizational 
values often occurs subconsciously.  These values influence the reactions, behaviors, and 
decision-making of persons in the organization.  Many occurrences are ambiguous and 
unpredictable.  So we must examine not only events, but also their meanings.  Because of 
differences in perception, information processing, and interpretation, organizational 
members vary in how they interpret events.  Alliances formed by members do not 
necessarily correspond with their ideational worlds.2114  
 
Paradigm refers to “a pattern or model that guides thinking and action.”2115 
 
Perception:  Through the senses, we perceive certain elements of the world around us.  
How we perceive the total environment around us is affected by the nature of that 
environment.  Perceptions are gradually and systematically organized into a worldview.  
This worldview becomes the basis for how we interact physically and socially with the 
environment, helps us to alter the environment, and is affected by changes in the 
environment as well.2116  However, “perception alone does not explain behavior or set the 
range of options available to the actor.”  It is often a function of external stimuli and 
political drama.2117 Perception is not a concept commonly used in political science.   
 
Policy:  Political scientists have defined policy as a government’s or organization’s broad 
statement of intention, goals or objectives, implying theories,2118 or “…a hypothesis [by a 
public or private organization or group] containing initial conditions and predicted 
consequences.”2119  Anthropologists characterize policy as “an overall plan or course of 
action, usually based on clearly-stated values or beliefs, intended as a guide for decisions 
and plans”2120 or “…deliberate action in any sphere of human activity,” including public 
and private realms.  Some policies are “…institutionally sanctioned and have the 
                                                
2112 Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), in Levi, 
“A Model, A Method, and A Map,” 25. 
2113 Shih, “Seeking Common Causal Maps,” 40-42. 
2114 Hamada and Sibley, Anthropological Perspectives, 26-27. 
2115 Nolan, Development Anthropology, 314. 
2116 Kearney, World View, 42-45, 120-121. 
2117 Cottam, Images and Intervention, viii-ix. Political drama is defined as “…a collective sense-making 
mechanism that leads actors to fulfill certain roles” (Ibid.). 
2118 Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington 
Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of 
the Economic Development Administration As Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build 
Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), xxii-xxiii. 
2119 Ibid., xiii. 
2120 Nolan, Development Anthropology, 314. 
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potential for affecting large numbers of people.”2121  In general, the study of policy is 
more systematic in political science than in anthropology.      
 
Policy cycle/stages:  Lester and Stewart identify six stages in a policy cycle:  agenda 
setting, policy formation, policy implementation, policy evaluation, policy change, and 
policy termination.2122 According to anthropologist Erve Chambers, there are generally 
thought to be four basic stages in policy decision-making:  policy formulation, planning, 
program implementation, and review.2123 
 
Policy implementation means to complete, carry out, produce or accomplish a 
policy.2124  It is “…a process of interaction between the setting of [policy or program] 
goals and actions geared to achieving them; …the ability to forge subsequent links in the 
causal chain [of policies and programs] so as to obtain the desired results.”2125  Policy 
implementation is the second of the three traditional stages of policy identified by public 
policy studies, the first being policy formulation/design, and the third policy 
evaluation.2126  The process of implementation begins after new policy adoption, 
provision of funding, and program agreement.2127  The process is inter-organizational, 
entailing complex, joint actions.2128 
Public policy theorists largely ignored implementation until Pressman and 
Wildavsky’s Implementation (1973).2129  There is no certain model for successful policy 
implementation, although a large number of approaches have been attempted.2130  The 
“top-bottom” approach argues that policy is formulated at the top, and translated into 
instructions for staff that implement the policy at the bottom.  According to the “bottom-
top” approach, “street level bureaucrats” determine success in implementation through 
prioritizing and rationing policy as they serve their clienteles.2131  Or implementation is 
seen as an evolutionary, interactive, negotiative process, where it is difficult to determine 
the boundaries between policy and implementation,2132 which are viewed “…as a 
policy/action continuum….”2133 
 
                                                
2121 Erve Chambers, Applied Anthropology: A Practical Guide (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1985), 38. 
2122 Lester and Stewart, Public Policy, 6-9. 
2123 Chambers, Applied Anthropology, 41-45. 
2124 Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation, xiii. 
2125 Ibid., xxiii. 
2126 Davidson, “Study of Implementation,” 3. 
2127 Pressman and Wildavsky in Carl P. Carlucci, “Acquisition: The Missing Link in the Implementation of 
Technology,” in Implementation and the Policy Process: Opening Up the Black Box, eds. Dennis J. 
Palumbo and Donald J. Calista (New York, Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1990), 149. 
2128 Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation, xv. 
2129 Talib Younis and Ian Davidson, “The Study of Implementation,” in Implementation in Public Policy, 
ed. Talib Younis (Aldershot, UK:  Dartmouth Publishing and Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing, 1990), 4. 
2130 Ibid. 
2131 Ibid., 5, 8-9. 
2132 Ibid., 10. 
2133 Susan Barrett and Colin Fudge, Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy 
(London: Methuen, 1981), quoted in Younis and Davidson, “Study,” 12. 
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Political cognition:  a field of study that evolved in the 1970s and 1980s that applies the 
methods and theories of cognitive psychology to the study of political behavior.  Specific 
literatures examined from psychology include cognition, decision-making and social 
cognition.2134  Psychologists conduct some studies, but political scientists also do many.  
Scholarship is political cognition has suffered from several problems. According to 
Martha Cottam, problems in political science work include a failure to adequately draw 
on previous works or psychology itself, inadequate linkage of psychology and behavior, 
problems in connecting social psychology and individual cognition, and confusion of 
basic concepts such as belief, cognitive system, and worldview.2135 The first application 
of cognitive psychology to political science examined the beliefs of foreign policy 
makers about why certain events happened.2136  Other areas of investigation are 
information processing, selective memory and selective perception.  Scholars believe that 
information-processing theories can be usefully applied to important political questions, 
such as understanding political attitudes, ideologies, and reasoning processes of elites.2137        
 
Political culture in political science refers to political attitudes and values.  Almond and 
Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963) surveys political beliefs of individuals in five nations 
in order to predict political orientations and values conducive to democracy.2138  Almond 
and Verba conclude that there is one predominant political culture for each nation.  While 
many political scientists discount political culture, since in the late 1980s, it has been 
gradually strengthened.  In 1990, Wildavsky, Thompson and Ellis developed their 
political culture typology of social relations and shared values, called cultural theory (see 
Cultural theory).2139  They apply this typology to numerous past studies.  Wildavsky et al 
argue that it allows improved analysis, and that it can be universally applied.  They argue 
that there are multiple political cultures within each nation, a significant advance over 
The Civic Culture.2140 Putnam et al’s Making Democracy Work (1993) examines political 
cultures and democracy in Italy, through significant triangulation of methods 
(contemporary and historical statistics, and multi-sited ethnography).  They find that 
there are multiple political cultures in Italy, and that culture is a significant predictor of 
potential for democratization and successful economic development.  In Culture Matters 
                                                
2134 Lau and Sears, Political Cognition, ix-x. 
2135 For more details on Martha Cottam’s work on these issues, see Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision 
Making,  “Recent Development,” Images and Intervention; and Cottam and Shi, Contending Dramas.  
2136 Robert Axelrod, “Schema Theory:  An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition,” 
American Political Science Review 67 (1973), 1248-66, and Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of 
Political Elites (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
2137 Lau and Sears, Political Cognition, 6-7, 359, 363, 366. 
2138 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture; Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).  
2139 Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, Cultural Theory. 
2140 Daniel J. Elazar’s work on the different political cultures in the United States, as seen in the different 
state governments, and at different levels of government, local, state and federal, confirms the existence of 
multiple political cultures in the United States.  For examples, see American Federalism: A View from the 
States (1972), Building Cities in America:  Urbanization and Suburbanization in a Frontier Society (1987), 
Cities of the Prairie Revisited:  The Closing of the Metropolitan Frontier (1986), and Minnesota Politics 
and Government (1999). 
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(1997), Wildavsky, Ellis and Thompson apply cultural theory to a wide variety of policy 
areas, and argue powerfully for the need to better operationalize culture.2141 To improve 
political culture, we need to better integrate interpretive and predictive approaches, 
quantitative and qualitative methods, and multiple scales of analysis.2142 See also Culture 
of politics.  
Alternatively, some scholars of political cognition define political culture 
(“cultural system”) as “…all publicly common ways of relating in… [a] collectivity.”  A 
political culture/cultural system includes relationships among individuals, patterned 
systems of relating, and ways of relating that are commonly known to all participants in 
the culture.  These ways of relating are the public norm for a society.2143   
 
Positivism, a paradigm or group of philosophies with an extremely positive view of 
science and the scientific method, stresses “…objectivity, hypothetico-deductive theory, 
external law-like relations, exact and formal language, and separation of facts from 
meaning.”2144  Positivism stresses the use of hypotheses, postulates, explanation and 
prediction.2145  
 
Postpositivism is a paradigm that attempts to address weaknesses in the positivistic 
paradigm by following a critical realism that stresses that reality and truth exists, but can 
only be imperfectly comprehended.   It encompasses several theoretical approaches.  
There are perhaps four main paradigmatic approaches in the social sciences today:  
positivism, critical theory, postpositivism, and constructivism.2146  Objectivity is an 
important goal, but can only be partly achieved, through the use of external aids, such as 
critical theory and noting one’s biases.  Methodologically, imbalances are addressed 
through multiple methods, researching in more natural settings, and using more grounded 
theory and qualitative methods.2147  In postpositivism, knowledge is built cumulatively.  
The paradigm attempts to develop generalizable theoretical propositions built on 
empirical research, but holds that such generalizations are only tentative.  Human 
phenomena can be best explained by causal relationships.2148  Postpositivism values 
                                                
2141 Wildavsky, Ellis, and Thompson, Culture Matters. 
2142 Two studies that integrate multiple scales of analysis are Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and 
Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); and Haugerud, Culture of Politics, but they are only single-nation studies. We 
need multination studies like Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in 
Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder, Colo.: L. Reinner Publishers, 
1990), which include the integration of statistics, historical data, and long-term, multi-sited ethnography. 
2143 Rosenberg, Ward, and Chilton, Political Reasoning, 132-134. 
2144 Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 
1985), 19, 29. 
2145 Van Arsdale, “Ethnographic Field.” 
2146 Ibid. 
2147 Guba, “Alternative Paradigm Dialog,” 20-23. 
2148 Jennifer C. Greene, “Three Views on the Nature and Role of Knowledge in Social Science,” in The 
Paradigm Dialog, ed. Egon G. Guba (Newbury Park, CA and London: Sage, 1990), 230-232. 
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explanation, prediction, control, and rigorous inquiry through quantitative and qualitative 
methods.2149   
 
Program(s) in development “… [are] distinct from either a policy or a project.  [They] 
…operationalize broad (and sometimes vague) policy directives by collecting resources 
or various kinds, outlining sets of goals and objectives, and setting out timetables.”  
These plans are refined and then applied to the grass-roots level by projects.2150  More 
broadly, programs are “…governmental action initiated in order to secure objectives 
whose attainment is problematical….  Considered as a whole, a program can be 
conceived of as a system in which each element is dependent on the other[s]….  
Programs make… [policy theories] operational by forging the first link in the causal 
chain connecting actions to objectives.”2151 
 
Project(s) in development are “…a planned series of activities, bound in space and time, 
designed to achieve a stated set of objectives, using specific resources and employing 
stated strategies or rationales.  Projects are the predominant way in which development 
assistance is delivered.”2152 
 
Project stages:  There is no universal consensus on the stages involved in development 
and technology project decision-making.  The World Bank identifies six stages:  
identification, preparation, appraisal, negotiations, implementation and evaluation.  
According to the United Nations, there are eight (conception, formulation, analysis and 
evaluation, approval, implementation, reporting and feedback, transition to normal 
administration, evaluation).  Szyliowicz collapses them into five:  initiation, appraisal, 
approval, implementation and completion.2153  
 
Reasoning is “…a structured pragmatic activity [which] …explains the nature and 
development of structures of thought with reference to the general progress of intellectual 
development” (Jean Piaget, 20th century developmental psychologist).2154  Rosenberg et 
al argue that a general structure underlies each individual’s understanding of political and 
physical events, and that the nature of this cognitive structure varies among people.2155 
 
Religion is a complex social and spiritual phenomenon, challenging to define, that 
incorporates behavior, symbols, beliefs, and organizational structures. Any of these four 
primary features may be relatively simple or highly complex in different cultures. Across 
cultures the variance is so great, it is challenging to generalize.2156 Religion is also closely 
                                                
2149 Van Arsdale, “Ethnographic Field.” 
2150 Nolan, Development Anthropology, 314. 
2151 Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation, xxii-xxiii. 
2152 Nolan, Development Anthropology, 315. 
2153 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 30, 236. 
2154 Rosenberg, Ward, and Chilton, Political Reasoning, 11. 
2155 Ibid., 87. 
2156 William M. Clements, “Religion,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7, 2nd Ed., 
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connected with the cognitive: religion is “ …a symbolic and linguistic system that by its 
nature is powerfully evocative—it triggers experiences and emotions and at the cognitive 
level defines a meaningful universe including proper strategies for action.”2157  
 Social scientists argue that religion serves various social roles, including 
strengthening individuals in the face of limitations that nature or society imposes on 
them, and supporting and giving validity to other features of society, such as economic 
and political issues. Religion can provide an integrative function, highlighting values and 
norms in cultural identity that enable an individual to fit in well in society. Religion can 
give answers and solace for many challenges of human existence, including illness, 
death, stress, greed, and the afterlife. Other forms of human activity, such as business, 
also involve behavior, symbols, beliefs, and organizational structures. Though one can 
identify elements and terms common to religion that differentiate it from other such 
activities, such as ultimate, transcendent, spiritual, sacred, and supernatural, these terms 
are also challenging to define cross-culturally. Exactly what sets “religion” apart from 
other human endeavors that may be more “secular” or “profane?” Though religion 
appears to be a universal human endeavor in nearly all cultures, the West tends to draw a 
harder distinction between “religious” and “non-religious” social systems than other 
societies.2158 Many languages, such as Japanese, have no exact equivalent for the term 
“religion,” though many peoples, again including the Japanese, do activities that can be 
called “religious,” as defined in the West.2159 Monotheistic religions predominant in the 
West (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) tend to stress God as an all powerful, male king, 
judge and lawgiver, with the human problem defined as one of sinning against divine 
law. Eastern religions (i.e. Hinduism, Buddhism) often include numerous gods, or none, 
and stress meditation or devotion in pursuit of joy, freedom, inner peace,2160 material 
prosperity or health.  
 Religion is studied by different fields in multiple ways, which also makes it 
challenging to define. Anthropologists tend to take a holistic approach, studying any or 
all of the four key components of religion identified above. Sociology focuses on the 
social behavior patterns and organizational structures of religion. Theology, philosophy 
and comparative religion tend to stress belief. Literature and art history look at religious 
symbolism and art. Social scientists concentrate on how religion functions in different 
cultural contexts. One issue that all disciplines examine is origins. This addresses how 
religion became of concern in the human mind, individually and collectively. Scholars in 
different fields have offered different answers, including arguments that religion 
originated in dreams (anthropology), from feelings of guilt and fear (psychology), from 
the human tendency to personify difficult natural forces (philosophy), for the purpose of 
exercising elite control (philosophy), or from divine revelation (religion and religious 
                                                
2157 Roof, “Spirituality,” 59. For a detailed treatment of the cognitive aspects of religion, see Elizabeth 
Weiss Ozorak, “Cognitive Approaches to Religion,” in Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and 
Spirituality, eds. Raymond F. Paloutzian and Crystal L. Park (New York: the Guilford Press, 2005), 216-
233. 
2158 An example of this is the Flaw of the Excluded Middle discussed in Chapter 1 and earlier in the 
Glossary. 
2159 Clements, “Religion,” 159. 
2160 Roof, “Spirituality,” 59-60.  
855 
 
practitioners). Sociologist Emile Durkheim focused on how religion operates in society as 
a social institution. Anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown studied how religion supports 
other social institutions, while Bronislaw Malinowski focused on how religion assists 
people with daily issues that transcend scientific knowledge. Scholars such as Robert 
Bellah have identified forms of civil religion, such as patriotism, which incorporate 
beliefs, behaviors, organizational structures, and symbolism. Civil religion is present in 
the United States,2161 and Japan’s State Shinto was a form of civil religion. Also related 
to religion and politics, many scholars have been interested in how religion interacts with 
ideologies. One example is the work of Max Weber on the role of Protestantism in 
promoting capitalism, and on how other world religions relate to economic activity. 
Contemporary questions include how religious fundamentalism affects national and 
international politics, war, and global terrorism. Social scientists are also interested in 
issues of religious participation, religion and ethnicity, and religion and gender.2162 While 
formerly social scientists attempted to approach the study of religion in a scientifically 
detached manner, today there is more tendency for reflexivity, to admit one’s own 
religious biases and to consider how these may color one’s work.2163  
 New technological tools such as computers are expanding how religion is 
studied, and how religions extend their reach globally. There are many thousands of 
different religious systems today, and the impact of technology upon them is great. Some 
religions have almost always transcended geography (Christianity, Islam and Buddhism), 
while others have been more geographically tied (Hinduism, Shinto, and Jainism). 
Increased globalization through technology and world travel only increases the 
complexities of religion, including opportunities for expansion, interreligious dialogue, 
conflict, and syncretism.2164  
  
Schema/schemata:  preexisting knowledge structures used by individuals to process 
information.  A schema is “…a hierarchical organization of knowledge in a particular 
domain, which includes a category label, generic descriptions of the stimulus domain, 
particular instances of it, and interconnections among these.  For example, a politician 
schema could include general information about all politicians, …higher level organizing 
categories, …more specific …examples of politicians, and a specification of the 
relationships of the various attributes of the schema.”  Two classes of schemata important 
for politics are role schemata, which focus on broad social groups, and person schemata, 
which systematize knowledge about individuals.  Schemata direct the storage and 
processing of new information, and assist the recall and interpretation of information in 
the memory.  Researchers have used many different methods to measure political 
schemata.  An important issue is determining when particular schemata will be 
utilized.2165 
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2163 Ibid., 161. 
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Seiryoku tozen (the encroachment of Western powers in the East):  an ideological 
slogan that encouraged Japan to embark on the path of industrialization during the Meiji 
period, in order to avoid colonization by the West.  At that time, western capitalism was 
the only model of economic development available to Japan.  Yet also motivating Japan’s 
development were indigenous ideologies of spiritualism and nationalism, not Western 
individualism or utilitarianism.2166 
 
Shokusan kôgyô (increase industrial production):  One of two primary ideologies 
influential in Meiji Japan (1868-1912) that promoted nationalistic industrialization.  The 
other primary ideology was fukoku kyôhei.2167  
 
Social cognition and political behavior:  while all actions pass through a cognitive 
process, cognition is not a powerful independent variable.  The connections between 
cognition and political behavior must be assessed on different levels of analysis—social 
(international and domestic), and individual (political decision-makers).  There are 
several problems with the “social cognition” approach.  Sometimes people assess 
problems rationally, other times rashly.  This approach asks interesting questions, such as 
how beliefs are related to each other, how beliefs and images form, and how they change.  
A cognitive approach looks at an individual’s beliefs, values, and how s/he processes 
information.  Previous beliefs affect behavior and perceptions strongly.  A very important 
predictor of how a foreign policy decision-maker will view a situation is his/her beliefs 
and expectations.2168 
 
Spirituality is often considered hard to distinguish from religion, and hard to define.2169 
It has been called “ …the concern of human beings with their appropriate relationships to 
the cosmos.”2170 A simple dictionary definition renders it as an “attitude or principle that 
inspires, animates, or pervades thought, feeling, or action,”2171 or the connections 
between “ ...the human and the sublime, … the concrete and the abstract, and between 
man and God.”2172 Spirituality suggests feeling, thought, and practice connected with the 
inner, subjective world related to religion, and the meanings of the deepest parts of 
human life and existence. It is the main motivating force of religion, on corporate 
(organized or unorganized) or individual levels. Spirituality flourishes within living 
religious traditions, which often involve text, story, myth, doctrine, ritual and/or symbols. 
                                                
2166 Watanabe, “Designing Asia,” 205. 
2167 Ibid., 202. 
2168 Robert Jervis, “Cognition and Political Behavior,” in Political Cognition, eds. Richard R. Lau and 
David O. Sears (Hillsdale, NJ:  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), 319-320, 324-25, 327-28. 
2169 For mote on the distinctions between religion and spirituality, see Gross, “Contemporary,” 424. Part of 
the debate entails differences between religiosity and spirituality. Religiosity usually refers to religious 
behavior, “ …the way people and communities are influenced by religious ideas and shape social reality 
accordingly” (Tony Tain-Ren Lin, “Religiosity,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. 
William A. Durity Jr. Vol. 7. 2nd Ed. [Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008], 162).     
2170 MacDonald, “Spirituality,” 8718. 
2171 “Spirituality,” in Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd Ed., (1997), quoted in Roof, 
Spirituality, 59. 
2172 Gross, “Contemporary,” 424-425. 
857 
 
Forms of spirituality vary according to social and personal conditions and tradition.2173 
Although religious community or participation can generate spiritual power, social 
contexts shape what form it will ultimately take.2174 In advanced industrial societies, there 
increasingly seems to be a distinction between spirituality and religion. Many people in 
the United States claim to be spiritual, but not religious.2175 Similarly, a distinction 
between religion and spirituality exists in Japan also. For example, the Japanese word for 
religion (shukyo) connotes “sect teaching,’ while the general word for spirituality 
(seishin) suggests a more general form of “spirit.” Therefore many Japanese claim to not 
be “religious,” though they regularly participate in “spiritual” activities or rituals, on a 
daily or periodic basis.  
 In the social sciences, most academic research on spirituality is done in the 
fields of psychology and sociology of religion, based on empirical studies. According to 
Zehavit Gross, current research on spirituality in the West should be done in the context 
of postmodernity, since contemporary spirituality in the West [and in Japan] suggests 
increasing disenchantment with conventional religion. Increasingly, Western research 
seems connected with “ …the secularization process in the postmodern era, accompanied 
by the revival of privatization and individualization of religiosity…. [Spirituality] is 
connected to the affective, the rational, the cognitive, and the unconscious symbolic 
domains.”2176   
 
Systems theory/analysis:  a form of scientific analysis influential in technical/applied 
sciences, such as engineering and space science, and in the social sciences, including 
political science, policy analysis, and anthropology, starting in the 1950s and early 1960s.  
Pioneers in the field include Maruyama Maguroh and Kenneth Boulding.  Systems 
analysis attempts to picture the dynamics and interrelationships of the parts of any 
technical or social system through the use of systems diagrams, which graphically portray 
the relationships within systems through various forms of inputs, throughputs, outputs, 
and feedback loops.  In political science, David Easton pioneered the concept of political 
systems in the early 1960s, which attempted systemic analysis of politics in a dynamic, 
rather than static, way.  This form of analysis quickly became outmoded, due to its 
inability to handle the complexities of real politics.  The use of systems analysis for 
policy analysis has been more influential, including the analysis of foreign policy 
decisions.  In anthropology, systems analysis has been used to analyze policy issues, and 
uses of technology in contemporary societies, including agricultural and international 
development issues.  Somewhat related to systems analysis is world system theory, 
developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein in the early 1970s.  Based upon 
dependency theory, Marxist-influenced world system theory argues that the nations of the 
world are interconnected in a worldwide system of trade in which powerful core 
countries dominate and impoverish the developing countries of the periphery and semi-
                                                
2173 Roof, “Spirituality,” 59-60.  
2174 Max Weber, cited in Ibid., 60. 
2175 Ibid., 60. 
2176 Gross, “Contemporary,” 425.  
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periphery.  While influential in political science in the 1970s and 1980s, world system 
theory continues its importance in anthropology up to the present. 
 
Technological development:  Japanese scholars have identified five basic stages in 
technology development (not necessarily chronological):  1) acquisition of operational 
techniques (operations); 2) maintenance of new machines and equipment (maintenance); 
3) repairs and minor modifications of foreign technologies and equipment, both in the 
system and in operations (repairs and modifications); 4) designing and planning (original 
design and creation of a system); and 5) domestic manufacturing (self-reliance in 
technology).  Information and manufacturing capabilities are important throughout these 
stages.2177  
 
*Technology (my definition, used for this research): Tools, knowledge, learning and 
information that people use to live and survive. 
 
*Technology (Glick’s anthropological definition, simplified version, used for this 
project): an interconnected system of tools and knowledge used in a society or economy 
to accomplish purposes in daily life and work. 
 
Technology is “…ideas and practices which people use to maintain and enrich their 
material existence,”2178 or “the means and agencies by which human societies cope with 
and transform their material environment.”2179 More specifically, most western scholars 
of technology define it as “…any kind of practical know-how” and “…any set of 
standardized operations that yields predetermined results.”  It includes routines, 
procedures, methods, machines and tools, knowledge, skills, and forms of administration 
and organization.2180  Technology is also a system of inputs, throughputs, and outputs.  
Inputs include raw materials, parts, and knowledge, throughputs the organization and 
control of the manufacturing process, and outputs the completed product.2181  Political 
factors and cultural values are inherent in technological processes.2182 
Japanese scholars of technology argue that while science tries to discover 
universal principles and build on them, “…technology comprises all scientific knowledge 
deliberately and purposefully used for production, distribution, consumption, and 
utilization of goods, services, and information, especially that which concerns mechanical 
apparatus and systems.”  “Traditional” technologies also include (scientific) rationality.  
Contemporary technology consists of five main elements (the five “Ms”), in addition to 
money and information:  1) raw materials, resources, and energy; 2) machines and 
equipment; 3) manpower (engineers and skilled workers); 4) management (technology 
                                                
2177 Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 57-58. 
2178 Morris-Suzuki, Technological Transformation, 13. 
2179 Glick, “Technology,” 464. 
2180 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 231, n21. 
2181 Ibid., 8. 
2182 Ibid., 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
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management and management technology); and 5) markets for technology and its 
products.2183 
Technology was traditionally seen in sociocultural anthropology as tools, simply a 
subset of cultural artifacts.  It has been under-theorized.2184  One example of theory is 
cultural ecology, the study of how human societies adapt to surrounding environments, 
through technology and other means.2185 “Traditional” techniques were stressed, rather 
than “modern” industrial technology.2186  Using systems theory, many recent scholars 
view technology as a sociotechnical or technoeconomic system, examining how “people 
employ artifacts to accomplish social purposes in everyday life.”  Technology is seen as a 
socially-constructed phenomenon closely connected with the organization of work. To 
identify broader linkages, it may be better to include historical study of a technology’s 
cultural and cognitive aspects.2187  See also Technology and culture.      
 
Technology and cognitive factors:  Since decision-makers often possess inaccurate 
conceptions of technology, many errors are committed in technology transfer.  
Disregarding complexities, they see technology as machines that can be easily 
transferred.  Cognitive factors in technology projects are also important.  Sometimes the 
viewpoints of decision-makers limit optimality factors; one project is considered better 
than none.  Belief systems of actors influence choice through project stages, and project 
outcomes.  Decision-makers’ beliefs can affect their decisions for decades.  But we must 
not minimize constraints imposed by actual situations.  Mental maps become useless if 
policymakers do not readjust them to changing conditions.  Belief systems can be so 
strong as to blind decision-makers to reality; “…perceptions tend to diverge from the 
reality of the environment.”2188 
 
Technology and culture:  Technology shapes economics and history, but is itself a 
product of culture.2189  Technology includes cultural values.2190  In the early postwar 
period, some international organizations employed anthropologists to study how the 
“traditional” social structures and cultures of developing societies constrained their 
adoption of modern technologies, which were seen as a boon for development.2191  
Studies in the 1970s examined how the adoption of new technologies affects social 
change in developing and “traditional” societies.2192 
                                                
2183 Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 17, 52-53. 
2184 Glick, “Technology,” 464-465. 
2185 Clemmer, Myers, and Rudden, Julian Steward; Cohen, Man in Adaptation. In Clemmer et al., 
especially see Introduction and Chapters 10, 12, and 14. 
2186 Glick, “Technology,” 464-465. 
2187 Ibid., 466. 
2188 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 8, 212, 223. 
2189 Salomon, Sagasti, and Sachs-Jeantet, Uncertain Quest, 6-8. 
2190 Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52. 
2191 Spicer, Human Problems; World Federation for Mental Health and Margaret Mead, Cultural Patterns 
and Technical Change (Paris: UNESCO, 1953); Foster, Traditional Societies. 
2192 Pelto, Snowmobile Revolution; Bernard and Pelto, Technology and Social Change. 
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Science and technology are not neutral commodities, but inevitably influence the 
social structures of societies where they go.2193  Even though applied according to 
scientific principles, technology faces different natural and social conditions in each 
society.  The achievement of the same technological goal must be customized for each 
society.  The five Ms concept (see Technology) can help us to determine challenges in 
the technological development process.  The five Ms will differ in every society, firm and 
factory.  First, each society must select strategic areas and sectors for development, and 
then nurture its own indigenous engineers and technologists, without over-reliance on 
foreign experts for too long.  For “…in spite of the diachronic, trans-cultural nature of 
technology, it cannot function independently of the society and culture in which it is 
expected to function.”  Whenever a technology is transferred, the culture of the 
technology, surrounding it, is not transferred with it.  Indigenous technologists are best 
suited to adapt a foreign technology to their society’s conditions.2194  The cultures and 
structures of organizations are an important factor in technology transfer.  These factors 
influence technological choices and mastery by organizations.2195 
 
Technology and development:  The role of science and technology in development is 
complex, difficult to measure, and not automatically determined.  Development 
represents a complicated journey between “tradition” and “modernity.”   Only less 
developed countries (LDCs) can answer how each can “… modernize without sacrificing 
tradition, …or preserve tradition without compromising modernization.”2196  Truly 
development has become an uncertain quest, involving many questions about costs, 
benefits, and sacrifices that may be required.  Science and technology is no “magic pill” 
for solving development problems or value conflicts.2197  We are still a long way from 
achieving a complete account of how science and technology interact with development, 
especially given new social and environmental complexities.2198 
Science and technology resources are crucial for a nation’s social and economic 
development.  Improving economic growth is central to improving the quality of life. A 
wide variety of situations prevail in the LDCs concerning their science and technology 
resources, and no single strategy will be effective for all.  Social conditions and political 
institutions determine how a nation is able to develop and absorb science and 
technology.2199  Supportive conditions are important to encourage science and technology 
activities in the third world.  The effective flourishing of science and technology requires 
nations with stable, democratic, open environments supportive of innovation.2200 
Specific sectoral and development issues are also important.  Both LDCs and 
advanced nations face great challenges because of information technologies and rapid 
technological change. Technical change and growth are not predetermined or 
                                                
2193 Salomon, Sagasti, and Sachs-Jeantet, Uncertain Quest, 6-8. 
2194 Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52-54. 
2195 Salomon, Sagasti, and Sachs-Jeantet, Uncertain Quest, 1-6. 
2196 Ibid., 9-11. 
2197 Ibid., 22-24. 
2198 Ibid., 511-518. 
2199 Ibid., 1-6, 9-11. 
2200 Ibid., 511-518. 
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inevitable.2201  LDCs need help in determining how new technologies can help them to 
address crucial development issues, including social and environmental issues.  
Information technology solutions may help to provide low cost solutions.  While we have 
unprecedented power to overcome poverty, technological and other gaps between 
advanced nations and LDCs are increasing.  For these gaps to be overcome rapidly, 
science and technology issues must be thoroughly integrated into development strategies.  
Customized strategies and new frameworks are needed.2202  
 
Technology transfer:  Although the term implies an automatic, painless system, it is a 
costly, “…conflictual process involving many interactive dimensions—actors, mode 
(joint venture, licensing, etc.), content (the technology itself), channel (manpower 
training, plant construction, etc.), and impact.”  This process moves through several 
stages, and problems can occur at any point.  If decision-makers do not perceive the 
complexities, failure is more likely.  Success demands much time, effort and funding 
from both senders and receivers.2203       
To avoid problems in technology transfer, we should choose a technology with 
strong potential for enhancing and upgrading the links among a nation’s technological 
sectors.  We should also examine and adjust the quality and quantity of the transferred 
technology, to make sure that it meets the needs of the region it enters.  There are 
different levels of development (the end), and also different levels of technology (the 
means).2204  Some Japanese scholars argue that in order to determine how to best make 
technology transfer succeed, we need to determine the general patterns of successful 
cases, and minimize our consideration of political and value-laden factors.2205  On the 
other hand, technology transfer is full of political and ethical dilemmas, and these issues 
often lead to failure.2206  International actors in the external environment and domestic 
political actors and states themselves have a large impact on the outcomes of technology 
transfers and large technology projects.2207  Successful transfers require the necessary 
pre-conditions and supporting systems, including management and workers’ skills.  In 
Japan, these factors were present.2208  
 
*Technonationalism as ideology (my version, simplified, used in this project): 
Technology is an important, basic part of protecting a country by making it rich and 
strong. This idea has been an important part of Japanese thought for several centuries. 
 
Technonationalism as ideology (Japan):  According to Samuels, many Japanese feel 
discomfort with the terms “technonationalism” and “ideology.”  Technonationalism in 
                                                
2201 Ibid., 6-8. 
2202 Ibid., 511-518. 
2203 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 9. 
2204 Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 37. 
2205 Ibid., 37-38. 
2206 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Andrew R. Goetz, and Joseph 
S. Szyliowicz, Denver International Airport: Lessons Learned (New York: McGraw Hill, 1997). 
2207 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11, 22, 222-223. 
2208 Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 34. 
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Japanese suggests “technoprotectionism,” while ideology connotes nationalism, 
militarism, the emperor, and fascism.  Samuels uses the term technonationalism to signify 
the belief that “…technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must 
be indigenized, diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong.”  He also 
believes that it is an appropriate summation of useful Japanese beliefs that have 
influenced Japan through several centuries.2209  
 
*Translative adaptation (my definition, used for this project): the process where a non-
Western country adjusts to Western culture as it begins “modernization” and 
development.  As this happens, the non-Western country must carefully match and adjust 
its own culture and values to the imported cultural items. If it does this well, it will have 
Western and non-Western items in its new culture, and it will develop well. If not, it may 
not develop well, and its culture may be destroyed. 
 
Translative adaptation, a concept developed from economic anthropology and  
development economics, is the process where actors in a non-Western culture adjust to 
new elements of Western civilization by “…reinterpreting each element of Western 
culture” according to their own values, altering yet continuing their indigenous 
institutions.2210  Japan is a prime example of a society that has done this.  In order for a 
non-Western society to develop, there must be compatibility between its indigenous 
aspects (social institutions and values) and foreign aspects (imported organizational 
structures, technology).  If the two aspects are successfully merged, economic 
development can occur.  If they are not, the base society of the developing country may 
be destroyed.2211  If the non-Western society develops successfully, it will continue with 
a new dual identity.  Three important conclusions follow:  1) a market economy is closely 
connected with and embedded in the social structure of the surrounding society; 2) each 
society’s social structure is unique, and some societies may not be compatible with the 
imported market system; and 3) each society’s government must ensure that the path to 
economic development is customized according to each society’s unique conditions.2212  
This concept forms part of the ideological basis of the opposition of Japanese 
development economists to the universalistic, neoclassical, free market approaches to 
development advocated by the World Bank and other international development groups. 
 
Wakon yosai (“Japanese/Eastern ethics, Western techniques) is an important ideological 
slogan of the late Tokugawa period coined by Sakuma Shosan (1811-1864), a leading 
scholar of Western learning at the time. Sakuma used the phrase to signify that Japan 
urgently needed to learn Western science and technology, while maintaining its own 
Japanese spirit.2213 
 
                                                
2209 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” ix-x. 
2210 Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 174-175. 
2211 Hara Yonosuke quoted in K. Ohno, “Overview,” 14. 
2212 K. Ohno, “Overview,” 14-15. 
2213 “Sakuma Zosan” in New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 345.  
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Weltanschauung is  “…a particular philosophy or view of life; a concept of the world 
held by an individual or a group.”  It is often rendered “worldview” in English, from the 
German Welt (world) and Anschauung (perception).  Most scholars agree that Immanuel 
Kant coined the term in 1790, essentially meaning “the sense world of perception.”  
Many of Kant’s successors used the term, including Hegel and Goethe.  Weltanschauung 
stood beside philosophy as a companion concept, and was extremely influential in 
German intellectual life through the early twentieth century. German scholars of word 
history and the history of ideas have documented Weltanschauung’s history.  Soon 
Weltanschauung was adopted by scholars into the Romance, Slavic and Germanic 
language families, and was first used in English in 1858 as “world-view.”  Since then, 
Weltanschauung and worldview have become seminal concepts in the intellectual life of 
the Anglophone world, where they have received little attention in philosophy, unlike in 
the social sciences and theology.  As one of the central concepts in contemporary culture 
and thought, this is surprising.2214  The concepts of worldview in anthropology and 
ideology in political science are both related to Weltanschauung.2215 
 
*Worldview (cognitive framework) (my definition, used for this project): a set of 
pictures and ideas about the world, or a certain part of or thing in the world, that mostly 
makes sense, but which may not be totally correct. It includes complicated pictures about 
the world and how it works, based on deep, previously held beliefs. What people and 
political actors see and believe affects what they do. 
 
Worldview (anthropology) is defined as the set of psychological and cultural beliefs 
held by members of a cultural group.2216 According to Michael Kearney, worldview is 
“…a set of images and assumptions about the world, [a people’s] ...way of looking at 
reality,” the way in which the world is seen.  Worldview provides “…a mostly coherent, 
though not always accurate way of thinking about the world.”  It includes views of Self 
and Not-Self, and the relationships between them.2217   
Thomas Barfield argues that as anthropologists came to realize that since not all 
members of a society share the same views, and because cultural belief systems are 
constantly reshaped, the term worldview has been largely replaced with the term 
ideology.2218  Michael Kearney disagrees.  He argues that the concept of worldview is not 
totally outmoded, but a vibrant area of theoretical investigation.2219 Anthropologists often 
                                                
2214 Naugle, Worldview, 55, 58-62, 64-67. 
2215 Barfield, “Worldview,” in Dictionary of Anthropology, 499; Robertson, Dictionary of Modern Politics, 
232. 
2216 Barfield, “Worldview,” 499. This evolved from the work of linguists like Edward Sapir, and the 
concept of the Whorfian hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, habitual patterns of language structure 
thought patterns.  
2217 Kearney, World View, 242, and Winds of Ixtepeji, 43. 
2218 Barfield, “Worldview,” 499. 
2219 Kearney argues that the anthropological concept of worldview is similar to that of cosmology (the 
nature of the earth, its place in the universe, the nature of humans and our fate after death).  But worldview 
goes beyond cosmology, and includes ideas that underlie it, such as conceptions of time, space, self, other, 
relationship, causality, and classification.  Many of these concepts are tacit, and indirectly expressed 
(Kearney, “Worldview,” in Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology). 
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study the particular worldviews of different peoples.2220 Contemporary worldview theory 
is concerned with identifying universal structures that underlie all worldviews, so that 
they may be studied comparatively.2221 While earlier scholarship focused on identifying 
the worldviews of local communities and social groups, contemporary worldview theory 
looks at the worldviews of peoples in unbounded communities, of migrants, diasporas, 
and peoples influenced by the forces of transnationalism, global communication and 
cyberspace.  These profoundly challenge conventional anthropological notions of 
“tradition” and “modernity.”2222 
 
Worldview (political science):  Applied to politics and foreign policy, general 
worldviews/perceptions are “…not sets of beliefs so much as complicated bundles of 
cognition organized as images of types of states.”2223 Worldview is formed by our belief 
systems, “…a series of assumptions by which we explain the nature of man, our 
environment, and the universe.”  A formalized worldview consists of usually logically 
related beliefs and ideas that are institutionalized and communicated authoritatively.2224  
Michael Spicer defines worldview as “…pre-analytic cognitions or visions of how the 
world works; …they provide a frame of reference for interpreting human action on the 
basis of an almost instructive set of prior assumptions regarding why people act the way 
they do.”  Worldviews do not flow from reasoning or logic; but they shape the premises 
and objects of our reasoning.2225  Interaction between a perceiver’s worldview and his 
environment affects his final judgments.  Political worldviews form a basis for policy 
judgments, and consist of cognitive categories (see Cognitive categories).2226 Cottam 
identifies seven primary categories in the political worldviews of foreign policy decision-
makers, images of foreign states:  “…enemy, hegemonist, dependent ally of the enemy, 
neutral, ally, dependent of the perceiver’s state, and puppet of the perceiver’s state.”2227  
She argues that these state images form the natural basis of a foreign policymaker’s 
worldview, and that how the policymaker categorizes a state will affect his/her 
assumptions for that state’s characteristics and for predicting the state’s behavior.2228   
Political scientists studying foreign policy argue that in order to know how to 
behave, individuals must have a certain worldview that shows them the correct order of 
the world, how people behave, and the role of the self.  People act according to what they 
believe to be true about themselves.  Worldviews direct their perceptions, uses of 
information, and role expectations, and reinforce actors’ understandings of events, their 
causes and correct order.  As cognitive structures begin to share a “…meaningful, 
                                                
2220 Anthropologists also study factors that influence worldviews, including geographic environments, 
social organization, and technological systems.  Much of the work on the latter two areas is by Marxist-
influenced scholars (Kearney, “Worldview,” 1381-1382). 
2221 While certain universals may be identified, worldviews about phenomena such as self, time, and space 
differ significantly between and also within societies (Ibid.). 
2222 Ibid., 1380-1383. 
2223 Cottam, Images and Intervention, 10. 
2224 Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Enemies, 19. 
2225 Hayes, Limits of Policy Change, 8.  
2226 Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 26, 23. 




cognitive whole,” they become the central deciding factor of the intrastate and 
supranational system of [political] organization.  Worldview serves the psychological 
function of organization….”2229   
Recent American public policy scholars identify two predominant worldviews of 
political order, rationalist and anti-rationalist.  The former worldview sees humankind as 
perfectible, altruistic, and supports the capacity of science and government to solve 
human problems.  The anti-rationalists argue that humans are fallible and self-interested.  
Social problems cannot best be resolved through unlimited government, but rather 
through the spread of knowledge through economic systems, such as the free market.  
Both of these worldviews evolve very different visions of equality, freedom, and 
justice.2230  
                                                
2229 Shih, “Seeking Common Causal Maps” 40-42. 
2230 Hayes, Limits of Policy Change, 8-11. Hayes bases his work on worldview and policy change in 
American politics upon earlier works by Thomas Sowell, A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Foundations of 
Political Struggles (New York: William Morrow, Quill Books, 1987) and  The Quest for Cosmic Justice 
(New York: The Free Press, 1999); Michael W. Spicer, The Founders, the Constitution, and Public 
Administration: A Conflict in Worldviews (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995); and 
Friedrich A. Hayek, “Individualism: True and False,” in Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1948), 1-32. This is among the scarce work I found on the role of worldview 
in politics, besides the topic of foreign policy decision-making.  The scholarship here focuses on American 







Timeline of Japanese History 
 
(List of Historical Periods) 
 
Jômon……………………………………………………….c. 10,000 BC to c. 300 BC 
Yayoi………………………………………………………..c. 300 BC to c. AD 300 
Kofun………………………………………………………..c. AD 300 TO 710 
Nara, capital: Heijo (Nara) …………………………………710 to 794 
Heian, capital: Heian (Kyoto) ………………………………794 to 1185 
Kamakura, capital: Kamakura………………………………1185 to 1333 
Muromachi, capital: Muromachi (Kyoto)…………………..1336 to 1568 
Azuchi-Momoyama, capital: Azuchi, Momoyama (Kyoto). 1568 to 1600 
Tokugawa (Edo), capital: Edo………………………………1600 to 1868 
Meiji, capital: Tokyo………………………………………..1868 to 1912   
Taisho, capital: Tokyo………………………………………1912 to 1926 
Showa, capital: Tokyo………………………………………1926 to 1989 
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